Transamerica Life Insurance Company et al v. Douglas et al

Filing 142

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION: Based on the forgoing, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that Jingbin Douglas's motion for summary judgment (Docket Entry No. 130 ) be GRANTED and judgment entered as follows. Signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes on 02/05/24. (xc:Pro se parties by regular mail.) (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(ad)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
TRANSAMERICA LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY et al.
v.
JINGBIN DOUGLAS et al.
JINGBIN DOUGLAS
v.
JEROME EDWARD DOUGLAS II and
DANIEL DOUGLAS
TO:

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Case No. 3:21-cv-00194

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Honorable Eli J. Richardson, United States District Judge

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
By Order entered November 9, 2023 (Docket No. 138), the District Judge referred the
motion for summary judgment filed by Jingbin Douglas (Docket No. 130) in this interpleader
action to the undersigned for a report and recommendation. Neither Jerome Edward (“Jed”)
Douglas II nor Daniel Douglas filed a timely response. 1 For the reasons set out below, the
undersigned respectfully recommends that the motion be granted, that judgment be entered and
interpled funds distributed as recommended below, and that all other claims asserted in this case
be dismissed.

1

As discussed below, Penny Grace Judd and Jingbin Douglas settled their claims against
each other. (Docket No. 113.)

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 2
The dispute between the individuals in this action brings to mind another contest, if not in
duration, at least in intensity; namely that of the litigants in Jarndyce and Jarndyce, as depicted in
Dicken’s Bleak House. 3 And unfortunately, it appears this dispute too has taken a toll not unlike
that which befell the Jarndyces. This is a fight among the widow of Jerome Edward Douglas, Sr.
(“Jerry”), his brother, and his two adult children over the proceeds of four ERISA benefit plans
held by Jerry upon his passing. (Docket No. 1.) 4
Transamerica Life Insurance Company and Transamerica Corporation (“Transamerica”)
filed this action on March 5, 2021 to determine the proper beneficiaries of the proceeds.
Transamerica originally named the following potential beneficiaries of Jerry’s benefits: Jingbin
Douglas, who identifies herself as Jerry’s wife (and, as discussed below, was found by the
Davidson County Seventh Circuit court, which is the probate court for Davidson County 5, to be
Jerry’s lawful spouse); Jerome Edward Douglas, II (“Jed”), Jerry’s adult son; Penny Grace Judd,

2

This case has a long and tortured history, some of which is recited in the Court’s
Memorandum Opinion of March 27, 2023. (Docket No. 122 at 1-6.) Only those underlying facts
and procedural background necessary to give context to or for explanation of this report and
recommendation are again recited.
3

Charles Dickens, Bleak House (1853).

4

This Court’s original jurisdiction in this case is a matter of federal question jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as Transamerica filed this case to resolve a dispute arising under federal
law, namely the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§
1001 et seq. There is no dispute that the benefit plans at issue are ERISA plans and the Court has
already determined that it has subject matter jurisdiction. See March 27, 2023 Memorandum
Opinion (Docket No. 122) at n.6.
5

The Davidson County Seventh Circuit Court, which has exclusive jurisdiction in
Davidson County, Tennessee for all matters related to the administration of a deceased person’s
estate, including the probating of wills, is referred to interchangeably herein as the “Seventh Circuit
Court,” the “Probate Court,” or the “Seventh Circuit Probate Court.”
2

Jerry’s adult daughter; and Daniel Douglas, Jerry’s brother. 6 Jed asserted four crossclaims against
Jingbin, and Jingbin asserted three crossclaims against Jed. (Docket No. 122 at 1.) 7

By

memorandum opinion and order entered on March 27, 2023 (Docket Nos. 122 and 123), the Court
dismissed Jed’s declaratory judgment crossclaims (see Docket No. 19, Crossclaim ¶ 54(a), (b), (e))
as to the portions that sought to invalidate a Chinese divorce decree between Jingbin and her first
husband, Hongwei Tang, and the Tennessee certificate of marriage of Jingbin and Jerry Douglas
based on a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and the domestic relations exception. (Docket No.
123 at 1.) The Court, also based on a lack of subject matter-jurisdiction and pursuant to the
domestic relations exception, sua sponte dismissed the portion of Jingbin’s declaratory judgment
claim that sought to enforce the Chinese divorce decree and the Tennessee marriage certificate
(see Doc. No. 65, Crossclaim at p.16, subsection (b)). (Id.) 8
6

Several parties in this case share the surname “Douglas,” so the Court may refer to the
potential beneficiaries by their first names for clarity. And the Court will refer to proceeds from
the four benefit plans at issue in this case, collectively, as “Jerry’s benefits.”
7

Penny and Jingbin also filed crossclaims against each other, but they later settled those
claims. (Docket No. 113.)
8

To be clear, in dismissing these claims, the Court expressly emphasized that:

because the domestic relations exception does not apply to the bulk of the pending
claims in this case, the effect of this ruling is limited. The Court simply holds that
it lacks subject matter jurisdiction to issue a declaratory judgment that would
invalidate or enforce the Chinese divorce decree and the Tennessee marriage
certificate. But for the purpose of deciding the remaining pending claims at other
stages of the case – including determining the proper beneficiaries of Jerry’s
benefits – the Court is not precluded from considering argument on the validity of
Jingbin and Jerry’s marriage, as well as any related evidentiary questions that may
arise in the course of considering such argument. These matters may still be
addressed by the Court in the context of resolving claims that do not seek
performance of functions reserved for state courts under the domestic relations
exception.
(Docket No. 122 at 15.)

3

Jingbin and Jed and Penny previously filed cross motions for summary judgment. (Docket
Nos. 96 and 100.) While those motions were pending, Penny retained new counsel and settled with
Jingbin. (Docket Nos. 111, 113, 114, and 115.) 9 Jed’s attorneys then moved to withdraw. (Docket
No. 117.) The Court granted the motion to withdraw by order entered on March 28, 2023. (Docket
No. 124.) In its March 28 Order, the Court allowed Jed until April 28, 2023 to retain new counsel
and directed that if new counsel had not entered an appearance by that date, Jed would be deemed
to be proceeding pro se. (Id. at 2.) 10
The March 28 Order further terminated the pending motions for summary judgment
without prejudice to refiling by either (i) 14 days from a notice of appearance by new counsel on
behalf of Jed or (ii) 14 days from the April 28 date on which Jed would be deemed to be
representing himself in the absence of an appearance by counsel. (Id.) The March 28 Order further
provided that, under the second option – that is, Jed proceeding pro se – any new or amended
summary judgment motions would completely replace the prior motions and briefing would
proceed according to Local Rule 56.01. (Id. at 3.) Additionally, the March 28 Order expressly
cautioned Jed that, as a pro se litigant, he would be required to “follow the same rules of procedure
that govern other litigants.” (Id.) (citing August v. Caruso, 2015 WL 1299888, at *6 (E.D. Mich.

9

Penny and Jed had previously been represented by the same law firm.

10

Daniel has proceeded in this case as an unrepresented litigant. On or about October 13,
2021, the Court received an answer to the amended interpleader complaint in which Daniel stated
that “any decisions that [Jerry] made should be respected and upheld.” (Docket No. 22 at 1.)

4

Mar. 23, 2015) and Greer v. Home Realty Co. of Memphis Inc., 2010 WL 6512339, at *2 (W.D.
Tenn. July 12, 2010)). 11 A copy of the March 28 Order was mailed to Jed and to Daniel. 12
No attorney entered an appearance on behalf of Jed by the April 28 deadline. On May 4,
2023, Jingbin filed a timely new motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 130), which is the
instant motion pending before the Court, with an accompanying statement of undisputed material
facts (Docket No. 131), a supporting memorandum of law (Docket No. 132), and evidentiary
exhibits (Docket No. 134.) According to certificates of service, Jingbin’s filings were all mailed
and emailed to Jed and to Daniel. (Docket Nos. 130 at 2; 131 at 7; 132 at 22; and 133 at 3.) 13
In support of the instant motion for summary judgment, Jingbin asserts the following
undisputed material facts (with supporting citation to the record as parentheses): 14

11

Although the cautionary admonition was not expressly extended to Daniel, it is equally
applicable to him as a pro se litigant as well. The Court has no reason to believe that Daniel could
not discern that he, too, would be obligated to follow the rules. However, throughout much of the
pendency of this case, Daniel has proceeded under his original answer that Jerry’s decisions should
be respected and upheld (see n.8), which the Court reasonably construes as a lack of contest to the
claims made by Jingbin.
12

The March 28 Order also directed that a copy also be sent by email to Jed, but it is not
clear from the docket whether a copy was emailed. Nevertheless, there is no indication that either
Jed or Daniel failed to receive the March 28 Order. Correspondence sent by Jed directly to the
District Judge included the same return address to which the March 28 Order was sent. See Docket
No. 135 at 12.
13

The certificate of service of notice of filing of the supporting exhibits does not clearly
state that all the filed exhibits were sent to Jed and Daniel with the notice. However, nothing on
the docket indicates any request by either party for copies of the exhibits.
14

Jingbin’s filing (Docket No. 131) includes additional statements, some of which are
arguments or legal conclusions. Only those facts that are material to the determination of the
motion for summary judgment are recited here. Further, the Court has reviewed the evidence
submitted by Jingbin in support of the stated material facts and recites only to the evidence the
Court finds as supporting. Regardless, however, the Court notes, as discussed in more detail below,
that because no response to Jingbin’s statement of undisputed material facts was timely filed, the
facts are treated by the Court as undisputed by operation of Local Rule 56.01(f), which provides
that “[i]f a timely response to a moving party’s statement of materials facts, or a non-moving
5

•

Jingbin is a designated beneficiary of each of Jerry’s Transamerica employment benefit
plans, as evidenced by Transamerica’s First Amended Complaint (Docket No. 16 at ¶¶
13, 22, and 23) and Jed does not dispute that Transamerica’s records reflect the
beneficiary designations claimed by Jingbin, as evidenced by his answer to
Transamerica’s First Amended Complaint (Docket No. 19 at ¶¶ 13, 22, and 23).

•

The Transamerica policy definition of “beneficiary” includes any “person(s) named at
the time the Eligible Employee enrolls in the plan or as later changed by the Eligible
Employee” (Docket No. 16-3 at 13, Page ID#550) without limitation on who may be
named as a beneficiary by an Eligible Employee (id.). 15

•

Jingbin Douglas and Jerry Douglas were legally married at the time of Jerry’s death on
September 6, 2020. 16 (Divorce decree issued by People’s Republic of China, Docket
No. 133-1; Jingbin Douglas Deposition, Docket No. 133-21; Jed Douglas Deposition
(at p. 95), Docket No. 133-25 at 6; Certificate of Marriage, Docket No. 133-4;
Application for and Notice of Approved Application for Permanent Residence in the
United States, Docket No. 133-5 and 133-6; Order of Davidson County Seventh Circuit

party’s statement of additional facts, is not filed within the time periods provided by these rules,
the asserted facts shall be deemed undisputed for purposes of summary judgment.”
15

Jingbin asserts as an undisputed material fact that her marital status at the time of Jerry’s
death is irrelevant regarding her entitlement to life insurance benefits based on this plan definition
of “beneficiary”. (Docket No. 131 at ¶ 2.) That is not, however, a statement of fact, but an asserted
legal conclusion.
16

This is also, arguably, an asserted legal conclusion or at least both a statement of fact
and legal conclusion. Nevertheless, for purposes of this proceeding, and based on the
determination by the Davidson County Seventh Circuit Probate Court, the Court accepts this as a
statement of fact.

6

[Probate] Court Granting Summary Judgment (at pp. 7-9 and 13), Docket No. 133-12
at 9-11 and 15).
•

Jerry Douglas designated his basic life insurance beneficiaries as: Jed 10%, Penny 10%,
Jingbin 80%; Jerry Douglas designated his supplemental life insurance beneficiaries
as: Jed 5%, Penny 5%, Daniel 5%, Jingbin 85%. (Transamerica's First Amended
Complaint in Interpleader, Doc. No. 16 at ¶¶ 22 and 23; admitted by Jed in his Answer,
Doc. No. 19 at ¶¶ 22 and 23; and, Designation of Benefits produced through discovery
from Transamerica to Jed via subpoena and authenticated by affidavit of a records
custodian, Docket No. 133-9 and Docket No. 133-26 17.)

•

Jingbin Douglas did not undertake changes to Jerry’s designated beneficiaries. (Jingbin
Douglas deposition, Docket No. 133-21 at p. 33, 35-36, 149, 300).

•

Jerry Douglas last changed his beneficiary designations regarding his Transamerica
benefits on November 15, 2019. (Transamerica Amended Complaint, Docket No. 16
at ¶ 21).

•

Jerry Douglas was competent when he made his final beneficiary changes. (Jingbin
Douglas deposition (at pp. 298-300), Docket No. 133-21 at 31-33; Docket No. 99-45,
manually filed recording of Jerry Douglas of November 15, 2019 made by
Transamerica; Daniel Douglas deposition (at p. 97), Docket No. 133-23 at 24; Jed
Douglas deposition (at p. 131), Docket No. 133-25 at 9; Order of Davidson County

17

The declaration of the records custodian was detached from the accompanying
documents referenced in the declaration. Nevertheless, because no timely response was made in
opposition to Jingbin’s statement of undisputed facts, the Court accepts the statement as
undisputed. See Local Rule 56.01(f).

7

Seventh Circuit [Probate] Court Granting Summary Judgment (at pp. 7, 11, 13), Docket
No. 133-12 at 9, 13, and 15).
•

Jingbin Douglas did not sign a Spousal Consent form to designate any beneficiary other
than Jerry Douglas’ spouse regarding the proceeds of the 401(k) plan. (Jingbin Douglas
deposition (at p. 292), Docket No. 133-21 at 28).

•

Under the provisions of Jerry’s Transamerica 401(k) plan, a designation of beneficiary
other than a spouse required Jerry’s spouse to complete a “Spousal Consent” form
consenting to the employee’s choice of a different primary beneficiary. (Docket No.
16-2 at 29)

Despite the plain instruction in the Court’s March 28 Order for briefing of the motion for
summary judgment in accordance with Local Rule 56.01, neither Jed nor Daniel filed a response
to Jingbin’s timely motion for summary judgment. Sometime in March of 2023, Jed sent a lengthy
letter directly to the District Judge, which, among other things, requested a criminal investigation
of various private actors and included other statements about the supposed facts of this case, but
did not specifically address Jingbin’s motion for summary judgment. (Docket Nos. 134 and 135.)
Concurrent with the filing of a motion for summary judgment, Jingbin also moved to strike
a portion of her crossclaims against Jed, Penny, and Daniel. (Docket No. 128.) Specifically,
Jingbin sought to strike the claim that none of those other beneficiaries are entitled to Jerry’s basic
and supplemental life insurance benefits and to allow for the distribution of those benefits in the
percentages designed by Jerry. (Id. at 1.) The Court granted Jingbin’s motion by order entered on
May 15, 2023, and struck subpart (h) of Jingbin’s crossclaim (Docket No. 65 at 17) in which it

8

was pled that Jed, Penny, and Daniel are not eligible beneficiaries of Jerry’s basic and
supplemental life insurance benefits. (Docket No. 136.) 18
The trial in this case, which was previously set for January 17, 2023 (Docket No. 30), was
canceled pending resolution of any timely filed motions for summary judgment and has not been
reset.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS AND ANALYSIS
A. Interpleader
Interpleader is an equitable proceeding that provides a party facing the prospect of defending
multiple claims to a limited fund under its control with a mechanism to settle the controversy and
satisfy its obligation in a single proceeding. U.S. v. High Tech. Prods., Inc., 497 F.3d 637, 641–42
(6th Cir. 2007). Interpleader may be invoked in the federal courts via Rule 22 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure 19 or via the Interpleader Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1335.
Here, Transamerica invoked Rule 22 to bring this interpleader action. 20 The Sixth Circuit
has commented on the progression of an action under Rule 22 as follows:

18

This effectively results in an award to Douglas, Jed, and Penny of the life insurance
benefits as recommended below.
19

Unless otherwise noted, all references to rules are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

20

Rule 22 provides in pertinent part that:

(a)(1) Persons with claims that may expose a plaintiff to double or multiple liability may
be joined as defendants and required to interplead. Joinder for interpleader is proper even
though:
(A) the claims of the several claimants, or the titles on which their claims depend,
lack a common origin or are adverse and independent rather than identical; or
(B) the plaintiff denies liability in whole or in part to any or all of the claimants.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 22.

9

An interpleader action typically proceeds in two stages. During the first stage, the
court determines whether the stakeholder has properly invoked interpleader,
including whether the court has jurisdiction over the suit, whether the stakeholder
is actually threatened with double or multiple liability, and whether any equitable
concerns prevent use of interpleader. During the second stage, the court determines
the respective rights of the claimants to the fund or property at stake via normal
litigation processes, including pleading, discovery, motions, and trial.
United States v. High Techn. Prods., Inc., 497 F.3d 637, 641 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal citations
omitted). In determining the propriety of an interpleader action, a court must ascertain whether the
stakeholder has a legitimate fear of multiple liability seeking a single stake. Id. at 642. Interpleader
is also appropriate where the claims against the stake are adverse to each other. See 4 James Wm.
Moore, Moore's Federal Practice § 22.03[1][d] (3d ed. 2016). The advantages of an interpleader
action are tantamount to a declaratory judgment action as both actions enable a “defendant to
precipitate a plaintiff’s suit in order to avoid multiple liability or other inconvenience.” Bell &
Beckwith v. United States, I.R.S., 766 F.2d 910, 914 (6th Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). The Court previously found that Transamerica properly utilized Rule 22 in
seeking interpleader and declaratory relief, based on the competing and adverse claims of multiple
parties to Jerry’s benefits. See Order of March 29, 2022 at Docket No. 63.
There is no requirement under Rule 22 that the party filing an interpleader action perform
any kind of investigation into the claims. Jackson Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Poole, Civil No. 3:14-CV1924, 2015 WL 276632, *4 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 22, 2015) (Trauger, J.). 21 It is “precisely the purpose
of an interpleader action to remove the holder of the proceeds from the equation and allow a neutral
third party to make determinations as to who is actually entitled to payment.” Id. There is no merit
to Jed’s argument, such as it is, that Transamerica was somehow in the wrong when it viewed all

21

The Poole case referred to a lack of any investigative requirement under 28 U.S.C. §
1335. However, the Court finds the reasoning equally applicable to Rule 22 interpleader actions.

10

the claims for the proceeds as legitimate competing claims and filed this lawsuit. See Docket No.
135 at 2 (“[Transamerica] is ultimately the one[] getting away with the responsibility of all of this
…”). In fact, the plain language of Rule 22 expressly permits an interpleader action in these
circumstances.
As previously held by the Court, Transamerica properly commenced this interpleader action
in the face of the multiple claims against the proceeds of Jerry’s benefit plans. Subject matter
jurisdiction is supplied by ERISA. Against this backdrop, the Court considers the relief requested
in the instant motion for summary judgment.
B. Motion for Summary Judgment
A motion for summary judgment is reviewed under the standard that summary judgment
is appropriate if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). A genuine issue of
material fact is a fact which, if proven at trial, could lead a reasonable jury to return a verdict for
the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The moving party has the burden of showing the absence of genuine factual disputes from
which a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at
249-50. Once the moving party has presented evidence sufficient to support a motion for summary
judgment, the non-moving party must present significant probative evidence to support its
position. Goins v. Clorox Co., 926 F.2d 559, 561 (6th Cir. 1991). In considering whether summary
judgment is appropriate, the Court must look beyond the pleadings and assess the proof to
determine whether there is a genuine need for trial. Sowards v. Loudon Cnty., 203 F.3d 426, 431
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 875 (2000). The Court must view the evidence and all inferences

11

drawn from underlying facts “in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” See
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., Ltd., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Gribcheck v.
Runyon, 245 F.3d 547, 550 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 896 (2001).
Here, Jingbin requests that judgment be entered: (i) awarding her Jerry’s pension plan
benefits in the amount of $17,900.33 and 401(k) retirement savings benefits in the amount of
$11,292.21; (ii) distributing Jerry’s basic life insurance benefits according to his last designations
in the amount of $5,900 each to Jed and Penny and $47,200 to Jingbin; and, (iii) distributing Jerry’s
supplemental life insurance benefits in the amount of $11,700 each to Jed, Penny, and Daniel and
$198,900 to Jingbin, in accordance with Jerry’s beneficiary designations. (Docket No. 132 at 2122.) 22 She further requests that Jed’s tort claims be dismissed. (Id.) 23
Neither Jed nor Daniel 24 filed a proper response to Jingbin’s timely motion for summary
judgment, despite the clear instruction in the Court’s March 28 order that the motion would
completely replace the previously filed motion and “would necessitate fresh briefing … with the
schedule for that briefing to follow this district’s local rules in the normal course.” (Docket No.
124 at 3.) 25 As noted above, sometime in March of 2023, Jed sent a lengthy letter directly to the

22

See discussion below regarding amounts of interpled funds.

23

Presumably, this refers to Jed’s claims abuse of process (Docket No. 19 at 11-12) and
intentional infliction of emotional distress (id. at 12). Jed also sought partition of three real estate
properties. (Id. at 11.) As discussed further herein, the issues regarding the real estate were decided
by the Davidson County Seventh Circuit Probate Court. Further, the undersigned respectfully
recommends that Jed’s partition claim be dismissed for failure to prosecute.
24

The statement in Daniel’s answer to the amended interpleader complaint that “any
decisions that [Jerry] made should be respected and upheld” (Docket No. 22 at 1) is reasonably
construed as no opposition to the arguments made by Jingbin that her position is supported by
Jerry’s actions prior to his death. The Court therefore focuses its attention to whether summary
judgment against Jed is warranted, based on the instant motion and supporting documents.
25

Local Rule 56.01(a) provides that responses to motions for summary judgment must be
filed within 21 days of service of the motion. Optional replies may be filed within 14 days of filing
12

District Judge, which, among other things, includes Jed’s unsworn statements about the supposed
facts of this case. (Docket Nos. 135.) 26 The letter does not, however, address the substance of the
motion for summary judgment or even mention the pendency of the motion.
When a motion for summary judgment is properly supported under Rule 56, such as
Jingbin’s motion, the non-moving party, in this instance Jed, may not merely rest on the allegations
in the litigation but must respond with affirmative evidence supporting his claims and establishing
the existence of a genuine issue of material fact that requires that the action proceed to trial. See
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323-24; Banks v. Wolfe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 330 F.3d 888, 892 (6th Cir.
2003); Chao v. Hall Holding Co., Inc., 285 F.3d 415, 424 (6th Cir. 2002).
Jed’s pro se status does not relieve him of this obligation, which is a threshold requirement
for all non-moving parties when summary judgment is sought by an opposing party. Sixty Ivy St.
Corp. v. Alexander, 822 F.2d 1432, 1435 (6th Cir. 1987). The Court cannot supply or assume facts
supporting Jed’s case and is not required to make legal arguments on his behalf. See Thompson v.
A.J. Rose Mfg. Co., 208 F.3d 215, 2000 WL 302998 (6th Cir. 2000); Bell v. Tennessee, 2012 WL
996560, *9 (E.D. Tenn. March 22, 2012). See also Guarino v. Brookfield Township Trustees, 980
F.2d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 1992) (“it seems to us utterly inappropriate for the court to abandon its
position of neutrality in favor of a role equivalent to champion for the non-moving party: seeking
out facts, developing legal theories, and finding ways to defeat the motion.”).

of the response.
26

Appended to the letter is a certified copy of Jed’s unsworn Petition Contesting Probate
of Will, Quit Claims/Fraud Conveyance, Executorship, Marriage/Bigamy, which was filed in the
Seventh Circuit [Probate] Court for Davidson County, Tennessee on or about November 25, 2022.
(Docket No. 135 at 4-12.)

13

Nor can the Court accept an unsworn letter as evidence of any facts asserted by Jed, even
if the Court were to afford Jed’s letter the most generous construction that it was submitted in
response to Jingbin’s motion for summary judgment. Jed is not entitled to a trial on his claims
against Jingbin and his opposition to her claims merely on the basis of allegations of his crosscomplaint. (Docket No. 19.) He must buttress the allegations of his cross-complaint with evidence
supporting his claims. Banks v. Wolfe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 330 F.3d 888, 892 (6th Cir. 2003). He
has not done so.
In sum, neither Jed nor Daniel have set forth any admissible evidence rebutting Jingbin’s
contentions that: (i) she is entitled to Jerry’s pension plan death benefits as his legal spouse; (ii)
she is entitled to Jerry’s 401(k) plan death benefits as his legal spouse; and, (iii) Jerry competently
made beneficiary changes on November 15, 2019 for distribution of his basic life insurance and
supplemental life insurance benefits in the beneficiary amounts described. Further, Jed has failed
to set forth any admissible evidence to rebut Jingbin’s request for summary judgment dismissing
his cross-claims. Because neither Jed nor Daniel filed a timely response to Jingbin’s statement of
undisputed material facts (Docket No. 131), as required by Local Rule 56.01(c), the facts are
deemed as undisputed for purposes of summary judgment, and the Court is therefore permitted to
rely upon the facts set forth by Jingbin as the undisputed facts. Accordingly, the Court concludes
that Jingbin Douglas is entitled to summary judgment, based on the following facts and legal
authority.

14

1. Pension Plan benefits
At the time of his death, Jerry had a death benefit under the Transamerica Pension Plan
valued in the amount of $17,551.63. 27 Section 6.2 of the Transamerica Pension Plan includes an
order of payment of the death benefit and provides that the death benefit of a plan participant shall
be paid to his Spouse, if the participant has a spouse at the time of death. Transamerica Pension
Plan (at pp. 20-22), Docket No. 16 at 26-28. The plan defines Spouse as “the person to whom the
participant is legally married.” Id. (p. 11) at 17. Jingbin Douglas was legally married to Jerry
Douglas at the time of his death.
The Court can deem Jingbin’s statement that she married Jerry Douglas as undisputed
simply because Jed failed to timely respond to the statement of undisputed material facts. See
Local Rule 56.01(f). However, the Court also finds the additional evidence submitted by Jingbin
supports the statement as undisputed. The undisputed evidence supporting the finding of a valid
marriage between Jingbin Douglas and Jerry Douglas includes: divorce decree issued by People’s
Republic of China, Docket No. 133-1; Jingbin Douglas Deposition, Docket No. 133-21; Jed
Douglas Deposition (at p. 95), Docket No. 133-25 at 6; Certificate of Marriage, Docket No. 1334; and, Application for and Notice of Approved Application for Permanent Residence in the United
States, Docket No. 133-5 and 133-6.
Further, the Davidson County Seventh Circuit Court, which has exclusive jurisdiction in
Davidson County, Tennessee for all matters related to the administration of a deceased person’s
27

The stated value amounts of all the subject benefits are the valuations as of the date of
Transamerica’s Amended Complaint, filed on August 11, 2021. (Docket No. 16.) Per the Clerk’s
receipt of interpled funds, docketed on December 2, 2021 (Docket No. 40) and January 11, 2022
(Docket No. 47), the amounts interpled pursuant to the Court’s order of October 22, 2021 (Docket
No. 23) are as follows: pension plan benefits of $17,900.33 (Docket No. 40); 401(k) benefits of
$11,292.21 (Docket No. 47); basic life insurance benefits of $59,000 and supplemental life
insurance benefits of $234,000 (Docket No. 40).

15

estate, including the probating of wills, in a contest over Jerry Douglas’ will, expressly found that
Jingbin Douglas was validly married to Jerry Douglas at the time of his death. See Order of
Davidson County Seventh Circuit [Probate] Court Granting Summary Judgment (at pp. 7-9 and
13), Docket No. 133-12 at 9-11 and 15. Application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel compels
this Court to give preclusive effect to this determination.
This Court has described collateral estoppel as follows:
[c]ollateral estoppel precludes relitigation of issues of fact or law actually litigated
and decided in a prior action and necessary to the judgment. Funk-Vaughn v.
Rutherford Cty., Tennessee, No. 3:18-cv-01311, 2019 WL 4727642, at *3 (M.D.
Tenn. Sept. 27, 2019). Under federal common law, four requirements must be met
before issue preclusion applies: (1) the precise issue must have been raised and
actually litigated in the prior proceedings; (2) the determination of the issue must
have been necessary to the outcome of the prior proceedings; (3) the prior
proceedings must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits; and (4) the party
against whom estoppel is sought must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
the issue in the prior proceeding. Id. (quoting Ga.-Pac. Consumer Prods. LP v.
Four-U- Packaging, Inc., 701 F.3d 1093, 1098 (6th Cir. 2012)).
Southall v. USF Holland, LLC, No. 3:19-CV-01033, 2021 WL 396688, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 3,
2021), aff'd, No. 21-5265, 2022 WL 221641 (6th Cir. Jan. 26, 2022). All the necessary elements
of collateral estoppel are met here.
The “precise issue” of the validity of the purported marriage between Jingbin Douglas and
Jerry Douglas was raised and actually litigated in the Seventh Circuit Probate Court proceedings
between Jingbin Douglas and Jed Douglas. (Docket No. 133-12 at 5.) The determination of that
issue was “necessary to the outcome” of the Seventh Circuit Probate Court proceedings, because
Jed Douglas specifically asserted that “[Jerry Douglas] was not validly married to Mrs. Douglas.”
(Id.) 28 The Seventh Circuit Probate Court proceedings resulted in a final judgment on the merits

28

To clarify any potential issue about whether the Seventh Circuit Probate Court
proceedings constitute “prior proceedings,” that litigation was commenced on September 11, 2020.
(Docket No. 133-12 at 4.) This action was commenced on March 5, 2021. (Docket No. 1.)
16

of the issue of the validity of the marriage between Jingbin and Jerry Douglas. Jed Douglas had a
“full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue” in the Seventh Circuit Probate Court proceeding. 29
As Jerry’s spouse, Jingbin is entitled to his pension plan death benefits as a matter of law
under the plain language of the plan. Summary judgment should be entered in favor of Jingbin for
Transamerica Pension Plan death benefits in the amount of $17,900.33 plus accrued interest.
2. 401(k) benefits
At the time of his death, Jerry Douglas had a death benefit under the Transamerica (401)(k)
Retirement Savings Plan valued at $11,019.55. (Docket No. 16 at 3.) 30 His beneficiaries under
the plan were designated as Jed 75% and Jingbin 25%. (Id.) The Transamerica 401(k) plan
provides that a legally married spouse must be the sole beneficiary of any death benefits unless
that spouse consents to the participant’s choice of a different beneficiary. (Docket No. 16-2 at 25
and 29.) Jingbin Douglas did not sign a Spousal Consent form to designate any beneficiary of the

Further, the Seventh Circuit Probate Court Order Granting Jingbin Douglas’ Motion for Summary
Judgment (Docket No. 133-12) was entered on March 29, 2023 (id. at 17), prior to this report and
recommendation.
29

The Seventh Circuit Probate Court’s Order makes clear that Jed was given a fair
opportunity to respond to Jingbin’s motion for summary judgment and was put on notice that a
failure to respond would result in the motion being granted. (Docket No. 133-12 at 5-7.) This
constitutes a full and fair opportunity to litigate. See, e.g., Leonard v. RDLG, LLC, 529 B.R. 239,
248 (E.D. Tenn. 2015), aff’d sub nom. In re Leonard, 644 F. App’x 612 (6th Cir. 2016)
(redetermination of issues is unwarranted absent some reason to doubt the quality, extensiveness,
or fairness of procedures followed in prior litigation). Further, it is clear, under Tennessee law and
federal law, that judgment rendered upon a party’s failure to respond does not obviate a full and
fair opportunity to litigate. See, e.g., Lawhorn v. Wellford, 168 S.W.2d 790, 792 (Tenn. 1943)
(default judgment is conclusive as to all issues that are well pled and material to the decision); In
re O'Rourke, 169 B.R. 383, 384 (M.D. Tenn. 1994) (same).
30

The interpled amount was $11,292.21. (Docket No. 47.)

17

proceeds of the 401(k) plan other than herself. (Jingbin Douglas deposition (at p. 292), Docket No.
133-21 at 28).
As Jerry’s spouse, and in the absence of her consent otherwise, Jingbin is entitled to the
401(k) plan death benefits as a matter of law under the plain language of the plan. Summary
judgment should be entered in favor of Jingbin for Transamerica 401(k) Retirement Savings Plan
death benefits valued in the amount of $11,292.21, plus accrued interest.
3. Life insurance benefits
At the time of his death, Jerry Douglas also maintained life insurance under the
Transamerica Life Insurance Plan. (Docket No. 16 at 4.) Jerry’s death benefit under the Basic Life
Insurance portion of the plan was $59,000 and the death benefit under the Supplement Life
Insurance portion of the plan was $234,000. (Id.)
The life insurance policy establishes the right of the participant to name his beneficiaries,
and states that the benefits will be paid to the designated beneficiaries. See Transamerica Life
Insurance Policy at p. 13 (Docket No. 16-3 at 13). The policy states the following regarding
designating a beneficiary:
A Beneficiary is the person(s) named at the time the Eligible Employee enrolls in
the Plan or as later changed by the Eligible Employee . . . The Eligible Employee
may change his or her Beneficiary designation without the Beneficiary’s consent
by giving notice either electronically or in writing to the Transamerica Employee
Service Center.
(Id.)
Jerry Douglas last changed his beneficiary designations under the life insurance policy on
November 15, 2019.

(Docket No. 16 at 21.) 31

31

Jerry designated his basic life insurance

Jed admitted in requests for admissions that the last beneficiary designations “showed
by Transamerica” were dated November 15, 2019. (Docket No. 133-8 at 8.)

18

beneficiaries as: Jed 10%; Penny 10%; and Jingbin 80%. (Docket No. 133-9 at 1.) Jerry Douglas
designated his supplemental life insurance beneficiaries as: Jed 5%; Penny 5%; Daniel 5%; and
Jingbin 85%. (Id. at 2.) 32
The undisputed evidence before the Court supports that Jerry Douglas was competent when
he made these final beneficiary changes. (Jingbin Douglas deposition (at pp. 298-300), Docket
No. 133-21 at 31-33; Docket No. 99-45, manually filed recording of Jerry Douglas of November
15, 2019 made by Transamerica; Daniel Douglas deposition (at p. 97), Docket No. 133-23 at 24;
Jed Douglas deposition (at p. 131), Docket No. 133-25 at 9; Order of Davidson County Seventh
Circuit Court Granting Summary Judgment (at pp. 7, 11, 13), Docket No. 133-12 at 9, 13, and 15).
Based on this evidence, the Court finds that Jerry Douglas was competent when he made these
designations.
Accordingly, Jingbin Douglas is entitled to summary judgment that Jerry Douglas’ life is
properly distributed as follows: (i) $59,000 in basic life to Jed 10%, to Penny 10%, and to Jingbin
80% and (ii) $234,000 in supplemental life to Jed 5%, to Penny 5%, to Daniel 5%, and to Jingbin
85%, with apportioned accrued interest to each. 33

32

Although the Court has already found that Jerry Douglas and Jingbin Douglas were
legally married for purposes of this motion, their marital status is of no consequence regarding
whether Jingbin is entitled to receive the basic life insurance and supplemental life insurance
benefits as designated by Jerry. The plain language of the policy authorized Jerry, as the Eligible
Employee, to name any beneficiary of his choosing. As discussed herein, the Court finds that Jerry
competently made the final designations on November 15, 2019, as described.
33

In her cross-claim, Jingbin initially asked the Court to find that Jed, Daniel, and Penny
are not eligible beneficiaries under the life insurance policy. (Docket No. 65 at 17 ¶ h.) However,
Jingbin later moved to strike that portion of her cross-claim (Docket No. 128), which the Court
granted (Docket No. 136). Accordingly, there is no dispute that Jed, Daniel, and Penny are eligible
beneficiaries under the life insurance policy.

19

4. Jed’s cross-claims for abuse of power and intentional infliction of emotional
distress
In his answer and cross-complaint, Jed also asserts claims for abuse of process and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Docket No. 19 at 11-12.) Because Jed failed to respond
to Jingbin’s motion for summary judgment, including to present any evidence in support of his tort
claims, he is not entitled to proceed to trial on the tort claims merely based on allegations of his
cross-complaint. To the extent the tort claims are properly before the Court, and in the absence of
any evidence to support the allegations of his cross-complaint, which Jed has failed to produce,
Jingbin is entitled to summary judgment and dismissal of Jed’s tort claims as a matter of law.
Banks v. Wolfe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., supra. 34
5. Jed’s cross-claim for partition 35
In his answer and cross-complaint, Jed asserts that he is the co-owner of three pieces of
real property and that, because the property cannot be equitably divided, he is entitled to partition.
34

It is therefore unnecessary for the Court to address the merits of Jingbin’s claims. The
Court also notes that there may be some question of the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction over
Jed’s tort claims. However, the Court declines to further analyze this issue, which was not raised
by Jingbin, and which is unnecessary to address given Jed’s lack of response to Jingbin’s motion
for summary judgment.
35

The status of the parties’ dispute over partition is not entirely clear from the instant
filings. Nevertheless, the Court finds it necessary and appropriate to address this issue to fully
resolve all issues in this case.
In its Memorandum Opinion (Docket No. 122), this Court concluded that Jed’s claim for
partition in this case was not precluded by the probate exception because of quitclaims deeds that
were purportedly executed by Jerry prior to his death relinquishing ownership to Jingbin, which
this Court found removed the properties from the custody of the probate court. (Id. at 13-14.)
However, in the interim between the parties’ filings that resulted in this Court’s Memorandum
Opinion (see Docket Nos. 34, 58 and 62), the last of which was filed on March 11, 2022, and the
issuance of the Memorandum Opinion on March 27, 2023, Jed filed a pro se Petition Contesting
Probate of Will, Quit Claims/Fraud Conveyance, Executorship, Marriage/Bigamy (Docket No.
135 at 5-12) in the Davidson County Probate Court in which he apparently raised the issue of
ownership of the three properties. See Docket No. 133-12.

20

(Docket No. 19 at 11.) 36 However, the Seventh Circuit Probate Court, in its Order of March 29,
2023, found and concluded that Jerry Douglas competently executed a will on May 13, 2015, in
which he devised and bequeathed all real property to Jingbin Douglas, who was his lawful spouse.
(Docket No. 133-12 at 7-15.) The Seventh Circuit Probate Circuit further ordered that ownership
of the three properties in which Jed claimed an interest passed pursuant to Jerry’s valid will with
right of survivorship and vested solely in the person of Jingbin Douglas. (Id. at 15.) 37
Under principles of collateral estoppel, as discussed above, Jed is precluded from any
further contest over the three subject properties. The “precise issue” of ownership of the three
properties was raised and actually litigated in the Seventh Circuit Probate Court proceedings
between Jingbin Douglas and Jed Douglas. (Docket No. 133-12 at 3.) (“In his prayer for relief, Jed
asked the Court to set aside the Will and to grant fifty percent ownership of Mrs. Douglas’ three
homes to him.”) The determination of that issue was “necessary to the outcome” of the Probate
Court proceedings, because Jed Douglas specifically asserted that he was a fifty percent owner of
the subject properties. (Id.) The Seventh Circuit Probate Court proceedings resulted in a final
judgment on the merits of the issue of ownership of the properties. (Id. at 15.) Jed Douglas had a
“full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue” in the Probate Court proceeding.

36

The three properties are: 532 Elaine Avenue, Nashville, Tennessee; 622 Eastboro Drive,
Nashville, Tennessee; and, 671 Westboro Drive, Nashville, Tennessee. (Docket No. 19-4.)
37

Numbered paragraph 5 of the Seventh Circuit [Probate] Court’s order, adjudication, and
decree includes the specific referenced language. The extent to which the Probate Court considered
the quitclaim deeds is unclear. Certainly, Jed raised that issue in his pro se petition for relief from
the Probate Court. (Docket No. 135 at 7 and 10.) There is no specific mention of the quitclaim
deeds in the Probate Court’s March 29, 2023 Order. (Docket No. 133-12.) Nor did either party
seek to modify this Court’s March 27, 2023 Memorandum Opinion and Order (Docket Nos. 122
and 123) based on the Probate Court’s subsequent determination of ownership of the three
properties.

21

However, even if collateral estoppel does not preclude further consideration by this Court
of Jed’s partition claim, including based on this Court’s prior ruling regarding the partition claims,
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows the Court to dismiss Jed’s partition claim
for “fail[ure] to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order[.]” Pursuant to Rule 41(b),
the Court may dismiss an action upon a showing of a clear record of delay, contumacious conduct,
or failure to prosecute by the plaintiff. See Knoll v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 176 F.3d 359, 364
(6th Cir. 1999); Bishop v. Cross, 790 F.2d 38, 39 (6th Cir. 1986); Patterson v. Township of Grand
Blanc, 760 F.2d 686, 688 (6th Cir. 1985) (per curiam). 38
Courts generally consider four factors in determining whether dismissal under similar
circumstances is appropriate: (1) whether the subject party’s failure is due to willfulness, bad faith,
or fault; (2) whether the opposing party was prejudiced by the dilatory conduct of the subject party;
(3) whether the subject party was warned of possible dismissal; and (4) whether less drastic
sanctions were imposed or considered before dismissal was ordered. Stough v. Mayville Cmty.
Sch., 138 F.3d 612, 615 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing Regional Refuse Sys., Inc. v. Inland Reclamation
Co., 842 F.2d 150, 153-55 (6th Cir. 1988)). No single factor is dispositive, although the Sixth
Circuit has held that a case is properly dismissed where there is a clear record of delay or
contumacious conduct. Knoll, 176 F.3d at 363 (citing Carter v. City of Memphis, 636 F.2d 159,
161 (6th Cir. 1980)). Courts are additionally required to consider their limited resources as part of
the analysis. See In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184 (1989) (“A part of the Court’s responsibility
is to see that these resources are allocated in a way that promotes the interests of justice.”)

38

Dismissals pursuant to Rule 41(b) may be directed by the Court in the absence of a
defense motion. Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 109 (6th Cir. 1991).

22

The Court finds that the first factor of willfulness, bad faith, or fault weighs in favor of
dismissal. That Jed has failed to fulfill his responsibilities as a litigant, the fault for which, in the
absence of any other evidence, is attributable to him is apparent. This Court’s order of March 28,
2023, expressly directed Jed to respond to any refiled motion for summary judgment (Docket No.
124 at 2), which he failed to do.
The resulting prejudice to Jingbin from Jed’s dilatory conduct is that she may now be
required to continue litigation over the potential issue of partition in this Court, even though there
is a final order of the Seventh Circuit Probate Court that resolves the question of ownership of the
subject properties. That issue is even further complicated by the essentially concurrent decision
from two different courts with conflicting outcomes. Further, Rule 41 and Local Rule 41.01(a)
also plainly permit dismissal under the circumstances of this case, namely, Jed’s dilatory conduct,
as does the Court’s inherent authority to manage its own dockets. This second factor therefore also
supports dismissal.
Jed was given an opportunity to avoid dismissal, albeit not as clearly as to the partition
claims, by simply responding to Jingbin’s motion for summary judgment and asserting his position
that the partition claim remains for disposition by this Court, if that is, in fact, his position. Instead,
Jed ignored that opportunity by failing to respond to Jingbin’s motion for summary judgment at
all, despite the Court’s plain directive for him do so. (Docket No. 124.) Additionally, Jed has taken
no other action to move this case forward except to improperly send a letter directly to the District
Judge sometime in March of 2023. (Docket Nos. 134 and 135.) The District Judge issued an order
on May 4, 2023, following receipt of Jed’s letter, which put Jed on notice that requests for relief
from or action by the Court can only be sought by appropriate motion. (Docket No. 134.) The
District Judge’s May 4 order also put Jed on notice that failure to comply with the order could

23

result in any of the sanctions authorized by Rule 16(f), which includes dismissal. Following the
May 4 order, Jed also failed to otherwise seek relief from the Court, including as to any partition
claim, despite the allowance of an opportunity in that order to do so. All these circumstances
weight the third and fourth factors in favor of dismissal. Because Jed was given an opportunity to
avoid dismissal and failed to do so, the Court cannot find that any less drastic remedy would
produce a different result. 39
Further, the Court has already expended significant judicial resources on this litigation.
Any further expenditure of already limited judicial resources is unwarranted. For all these reasons,
dismissal of Jed’s partition claim is appropriate.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the forgoing, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that Jingbin Douglas’s motion
for summary judgment (Docket Entry No. 130) be GRANTED and judgment entered as follows:
1.

Jingbin Douglas be awarded the death benefit under Jerry Douglas’ Transamerica

Pension Plan in the amount of $17,900.33 and the interpled funds plus accrued interest be
distributed to her.
2.

Jingbin Douglas be awarded the death benefit under Jerry Douglas’ and 401(k)

retirement savings benefits in the amount of $11,292.21 and the interpled funds plus accrued
interest be distributed to her.
3.

Benefits under Jerry Douglas’ basic life insurance policy be awarded according to

his last beneficiary designations and interpled funds distributed in the amount of $5,900 or ten
percent (10%) each to Jerome E. (“Jed”) Douglas, II and Penny Grace Judd and $47,200 or eighty

39

Notice of this report and recommendation also provides Jed Douglas with an opportunity
to respond to the recommended dismissal of his partition claim.

24

percent (80%) to Jingbin Douglas, with accrued interest apportioned as 10% to each of Jed Douglas
and Penny Grace Judd and 80% to Jingbin Douglas.
4.

Benefits under Jerry Douglas’ supplemental life insurance policy be awarded

according to his last beneficiary designations in the amount of $11,700 or five percent (5%) each
to Jed Douglas, Penny Grace Judd, and Daniel Douglas and $198,900 or eighty-five percent (85%)
to Jingbin Douglas, with accrued interest apportioned as 5% to each of Jed Douglas, Penny Grace
Judd, and Daniel Douglas and 85% to Jingbin Douglas.
5.

The cross-claims of Jed Douglas for abuse of process and intentional infliction of

emotional distress be dismissed.
6.

The cross-claim of Jed Douglas for partition be dismissed.

ANY OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed within fourteen
(14) days of service of this Report and Recommendation and must state with particularity the
specific portions of this Report and Recommendation to which objection is made. See Rule
72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rule 72.02(a). Failure to file written
objections within the specified time can be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal the District
Court's Order regarding the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140
(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). Any response to the objections
must be filed within fourteen (14) days after service of objections. See Federal Rule 72(b)(2) and
Local Rule 72.02(b).

25

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to send a copy of this Report and Recommendation to
Defendant Jerome E. (“Jed”) Douglas, II and to Defendant Daniel Douglas at their addresses of
record in this case.
Respectfully submitted,

_________________________________
BARBARA D. HOLMES
United States Magistrate Judge

26