Felts v. NIRVC-TN, LLC
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT. Signed by Chief Judge William L. Campbell, Jr on 1/28/2025. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(mg)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
VICTORIA FELTS,
Plaintiff,
v.
NATIONAL INDOOR RV CENTER,
Defendant.
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NO. 3:22-cv-00531
JUDGE CAMPBELL
MAGISTRATE JUDGE NEWBERN
MEMORANDUM
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s Order on
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. No. 43). Defendant filed a response in
opposition. (Doc. No. 45). For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s motion (Doc. No. 43) is
GRANTED. The parties also filed a joint motion to continue the pretrial conference currently set
for February 10, 2025, at 10:30 a.m. (Doc. No. 47), which is GRANTED.
I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This is an employment discrimination case. Plaintiff worked as a service advisor at
Defendant’s Nashville dealership. (Doc. No. 24-1 at PageID # 92). After Plaintiff was hired, David
Hennessy, the general manager of Defendant’s Nashville dealership, informed her that
Defendant’s management operated in accordance with Mormon beliefs. (Doc. No. 24-2 at PageID
# 141-142).
In early May 2021, Plaintiff discovered she was pregnant and informed Hennessy. (Doc.
No. 28-6 at PageID # 387; Doc. No. 29 ¶ 33). During Plaintiff’s first ultrasound appointment, her
doctor informed her that her uterus had two severe hemorrhages and Plaintiff and her physician
determined that a medically prescribed surgery to end her pregnancy was the safest decision. (Doc.
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No. 31 ¶ 6). Plaintiff submitted a leave request to Hennessy and informed him that she planned to
have a pregnancy-related procedure. (Id. ¶ 7). Hennessy granted Plaintiff’s leave request, and she
underwent a procedure to terminate her pregnancy on May 27, 2021. (Id. ¶ 8; Doc. No. 29 ¶ 40).
On June 3, 2021, Plaintiff arrived at work feeling ill and continued to feel worse throughout the
day. (Doc. No. 28-6 at PageID # 398). Plaintiff asked Karla Thomas, NIRVC’s finance manager,
to call an ambulance. (Id. at PageID # 399). Angie Morell, NIRVC’s Director of Sales, was onsite
at the Nashville NIRVC location and assisted Thomas in calling 911. (Id.). Thomas informed
dispatchers on the phone call that Plaintiff had recently had an abortion. (Id. at PageID # 385).
Upon hearing this statement, Morell walked out of the office and did not return. (Doc. No. 24-2 at
PageID # 147).
After Plaintiff was hospitalized, her mother communicated her condition to Thomas and
Hennessy. (Doc. No. 28-6 at PageID # 404). Plaintiff’s physician informed her that she had a septic
infection resulting from her abortion. (Doc. No. 28-6 at PageID # 401). Plaintiff was discharged
on June 6, 2021, and scheduled to return to work on June 9, 2021. (Doc. No. 28-6 at PageID #
406). However, on June 8, 2021, Plaintiff went to the emergency room due to increased bleeding
and was instructed to return to work on June 11, 2021. (Id. at PageID # 406-407). Throughout
Plaintiff’s hospital stay and subsequent emergency room visit, she continued to update Thomas on
her condition. (Doc. No. 28-6 at PageID # 407). Plaintiff returned to work on June 11, 2021, and
provided Hennessy two doctors’ notes from her hospital visits. (Id. at PageID # 406, 410). On that
same day, Hennessy called Plaintiff into Thomas’s office and informed her that NIRVC had
decided to terminate her employment due to poor job performance. (Id. at PageID # 410). During
the meeting, Plaintiff told Hennessy that she believed the only reason she was being fired was
because of her pregnancy and abortion. (Id. at PageID # 411).
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Plaintiff brought suit against Defendant for sex discrimination, religious discrimination,
and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and violation of the
Pregnant Worker’s Fairness Act (“PWFA”). Defendant moved for summary judgment. (Doc. No.
24). On July 11, 2024, the Court entered an Order granting summary judgment only on Plaintiff’s
religious discrimination claim. (Doc. No. 40).
Plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the Court’s order granting summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s religious discrimination claim on the grounds that an intervening change in controlling
law occurred after the Court’s July 11, 2024 Order. Neither party challenges the Court’s Order
denying summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims for sex discrimination, retaliation, and violation
of the PWFA. Accordingly, the Court only addresses its previous ruling on Plaintiff’s religious
discrimination claim.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
While the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure fail to explicitly address motions to reconsider
interlocutory orders, “[d]istrict courts have authority both under common law and Rule 54(b) to
reconsider interlocutory orders and to reopen any part of a case before entry of final judgment.”
Rodriguez v. Tenn. Laborers Health & Welfare Fund, 89 F. App'x 949, 959 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing
Mallory v. Eyrich, 922 F.2d 1273, 1282 (6th Cir. 1991)). Thus, district courts may “afford such
relief from interlocutory orders as justice requires.” Rodriguez, 89 F. App'x at 959 (quoting
Citibank N.A. v. FDIC, 857 F.Supp. 976, 981 (D.D.C.1994)) (internal brackets omitted). Courts
traditionally will find justification for reconsidering interlocutory orders when there is: (1) an
intervening change of controlling law; (2) new evidence available; or (3) a need to correct clear
error or prevent manifest injustice. Louisville/Jefferson Cty. Metro Gov't v. Hotels.com, L.P., 590
F.3d 381, 389 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Rodriguez, 89 F. App'x at 959). This standard “vests
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significant discretion in district courts.” Rodriguez, 89 F. App'x at 959 n.7. District courts
reviewing motions to reconsider interlocutory rulings “at a minimum” require that there be some
clear error in the court's prior decision or that the movant put forth an intervening controlling
decision or newly discovered evidence not previously available. Al-Sadoon v. FISI*Madison Fin.
Corp., 188 F. Supp. 2d 899, 902 (M.D. Tenn. 2002).
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). The summary judgment movant has the initial burden of informing the Court of the basis
for its motion and identifying portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine
dispute over material facts. Rodgers v. Banks, 344 F.3d 587, 595 (6th Cir. 2003). The moving party
may satisfy this burden by presenting affirmative evidence that negates an element of the
nonmoving party’s claim or by demonstrating an absence of evidence of the non-moving party’s
claim. Id.
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the court views the facts in the light most
favorable for the nonmoving party and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving
party. Bible Believers v. Wayne Cty., Mich., 805 F.3d 228, 242 (6th Cir. 2015); Wexler v. White’s
Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 570 (6th Cir. 2003). The Court does not weigh the evidence,
judge the credibility of witnesses, or determine the truth of the matter. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). Rather, the Court determines whether sufficient evidence has been
presented to make the issue of material fact a proper jury question. Id. The mere scintilla of
evidence in support of the nonmoving party’s position is insufficient to survive summary
judgment; instead, there must be evidence of which the jury could reasonably find for the
nonmoving party. Rodgers v. Banks, 344 F.3d 587, 595 (6th Cir. 2003).
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III.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff argues that an intervening change in controlling law occurred after the Court’s
July 11, 2024 Order based on the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Amos v. Lampo
Group, LLC, No. 24-5011, 2024 WL 3675601 (6th Cir. Aug. 6, 2024). The plaintiff in Amos
alleged that he was terminated from his employment “based on his failure to submit to [the
employer’s] religious practices and his expression of his own religious beliefs with regard to
COVID measures” and brought various claims against the employer, including religious
discrimination and retaliation under Title VII. Id. at *1. The Sixth Circuit recognized that “Title
VII ‘preclude[s] employers from discriminating against an employee because ... the employee fails
to comply with the employer's religion,” which it referred to as a claim for “religious
nonconformity.” Id. at *2 (internal citation omitted).
Notably, the Sixth Circuit held that:
At its core, the claim is that an employee's “lack of adherence to the religious beliefs
promoted by the [employer] was the genesis of the discrimination.” Noyes v. Kelly
Servs., 488 F.3d 1163, 1168 (9th Cir. 2007). In other words, the adverse
employment actions “were taken because of a discriminatory motive based upon
the employee's failure to hold or follow her employer's religious beliefs.” Owens v.
City of New York Dep't of Educ., No. 21-2875, 2022 WL 17844279, at *2 (2d Cir.
Dec. 22, 2022); see also Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 292 (3d
Cir. 2009) (“Title VII seeks to protect employees not only from discrimination
against them on the basis of their religious beliefs, but also from forced religious
conformity.”). Accordingly, the focus of the claim is on “the religious beliefs of the
employer, and the fact that [the employee] does not share them”—not on the
specific religious beliefs of the employee himself. Shapolia v. Los Alamos Nat.
Lab'y, 992 F.2d 1033, 1038 (10th Cir. 1993).
Amos, 2024 WL 3675601, at *2. The Sixth Circuit rejected the district court’s finding that “[t]he
conflict causing the noncompliance must stem from the plaintiff's own religious beliefs; a
plaintiff's rejection of the employer's religious-based requirement could be based on something
other than religious beliefs of the plaintiff.” Id. at *3 (emphasis included in original). The Sixth
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Circuit ultimately held that the plaintiff pled facts sufficient to state a religious nonconformity
claim by pleading that he was terminated because he did not share the employer’s religion.
Here, Defendant argues that Amos does not represent an intervening change in controlling
law because “religious nonconformity claims have always been actionable under Title VII” and
Amos favorably cites to Sixth Circuit opinions published in 2009 and 2000 regarding the elements
of a religious nonconformity claim. (Doc. No. 45 at PageID # 45).
Plaintiff contends that Amos clarified that “religious discrimination under Title VII may
occur when an employer imposes policies based on its religious beliefs which causes an employee
to suffer discrimination” and that Plaintiff is not required to demonstrate that having an abortion
was a religious belief in order to state a Title VII religious discrimination claim. The Court agrees.
Amos makes clear that the Sixth Circuit “ha[s] yet to explore the contours of this type of
discrimination claim” and considered alternative terms for this claim before settling on the term
“religious nonconformity.” Amos, 2024 WL 3675601, at *2. Further, while Amos references two
earlier Sixth Circuit opinions supporting that Title VII “preclude[s] employers from discriminating
against an employee because ... the employee fails to comply with the employer's religion,” the
Sixth Circuit’s analysis in Amos does not end there. Id. (internal citations omitted). Instead, Amos
recognized that “the focus of the [religious nonconformity] claim is on ‘the religious beliefs of the
employer, and the fact that [the employee] does not share them’ – not on the specific religious
beliefs of the employee himself.” Id. The Court is unaware of – and Defendant fails to direct the
Court to – Sixth Circuit precedent pre-Amos that makes this distinction.
Moreover, the two cases cited in Amos and focused on by Defendant are distinguishable
from the present case. In Pedreira v. Kentucky Baptist Homes for Children, Inc., 579 F.3d 722 (6th
Cir. 2009), the Sixth Circuit considered whether the Kentucky Civil Rights Act’s prohibition
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against employment discrimination on account of religion prohibited employers from
“discriminating against an employee because of the employee’s religion as well as because the
employee fails to comply with the employer’s religion.” Id. at 727 (internal citations omitted)
(emphasis in original). While the Sixth Circuit recognized that Title VII precedent applied to its
analysis of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, Pedreira, as relevant to this case, was limited to holding
that courts had interpreted the Kentucky Civil Rights Act to prohibit discrimination of an employee
by an employer because the employee failed to comply with the employer’s religion.
In Hall v. Baptist Memorial Health Care Corp., 215 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2000), the Sixth
Circuit held that in the context of Title VII’s exemption for religious educational organizations
“[t]he decision to employ individuals ‘of a particular religion’ under § 2000e–1(a) and § 2000e–
2(e)(2) has been interpreted to include the decision to terminate an employee whose conduct or
religious beliefs are inconsistent with those of its employer.” Id. at 624. Unlike Pedreira and Hall,
Amos directly confronts the elements of a religious nonconformity claim under Title VII and makes
clear that a religious nonconformity claim exists where an employer terminates an employee for
failing to comply with the employer’s religion.
Defendant also argues that Plaintiff failed to raise a religious nonconformity claim at any
time before filing the motion to reconsider and that there is no evidence that Plaintiff failed to
conform with a religious belief held by Defendant. In Amos, the Sixth Circuit recognized that
religious nonconformity is a “type[] of religious discrimination claim[].” Amos, 2024 WL
3675601, at *2. Just as the plaintiff in Amos did not plead – and was not required to plead – a
stand-alone claim for religious nonconformity in addition to a claim for religious discrimination,
Defendant fails to justify imposing a heightened pleading requirement on Plaintiff here. Plaintiff’s
Complaint alleges that “[a]t the onset of her employment, [Plaintiff] was informed by coworkers
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and others that Defendant’s management closely held Mormon beliefs and that a significant
number of Defendant’s leadership followed the Mormon faith,” that she “discovered that many
employees at Defendant’s corporate office associated with the Mormon faith,” and that she
“frequently worked closely with employees that openly shared their Mormon beliefs.” (Doc. No.
1 ¶¶ 14-16). Plaintiff also alleges that she was “discriminated and retaliated against because of her
premarital pregnancy and for having a medically prescribed abortion.” (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 36).
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff alleged sufficient facts in the Complaint to sustain a
claim for religious discrimination.
Further, Amos was decided in the context of a motion to dismiss. Defendant’s evidentiary
burden on summary judgment requires it to establish the absence of evidence as to whether
Plaintiff was terminated for failing to comply with Defendant’s religious belief. Defendant has
not done so here. Plaintiff points to evidence that Defendant informed her that it operated in
accordance with Mormon beliefs. (Doc. No. 24-2 at PageID # 141-142). Plaintiff also points to
evidence that she was absent from work to undergo a procedure to terminate her pregnancy, and
that Hennessy was aware that Plaintiff planned to have a pregnancy-related procedure. (Doc. No.
28-6 at PageID # 392-394). Plaintiff points to evidence that Defendant learned about Plaintiff’s
abortion after Plaintiff returned to work, and that she was terminated shortly thereafter. (Doc. No.
24-2 at PageID # 146; Doc. No. 28-6 at PageID # 410). Moreover, Plaintiff points to evidence that
she informed Hennessy during her termination that she believed the only reason she was being
fired was because of her pregnancy and abortion. (Doc. No. 28-6 at PageID # 411).
Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant has failed to establish an absence of evidence
as to whether Plaintiff was terminated for failing to comply with Defendant’s religion and
summary judgment is inappropriate on Plaintiff’s religious discrimination claim.
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IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, Plaintiff’s motion to reconsider (Doc. No. 43) is GRANTED. The
Court’s Order entered July 11, 2024 (Doc. No. 40) is VACATED IN PART as to dismissal of
Plaintiff’s religious discrimination claim, and Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc.
No. 24) is DENIED. The parties’ joint motion to continue the pretrial conference (Doc. No. 47)
is also GRANTED.
An appropriate Order shall enter.
___________________________________
WILLIAM L. CAMPBELL, JR.
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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