Paige v. Funk et al

Filing 11

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DISMISSING CASE: James Paige, a state inmate confined at the Lois DeBerry Special Needs Facility (DSNF) in Nashville, Tennessee, filed a pro se Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. No. 1 ), supporting memorandum with e videntiary exhibits (Doc. No. 5 ), an application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) (Doc. No. 2 ), and a Motion to Appoint Counsel (Doc. No. 3 ) in November 2023. Because it appears from the plaintiff's IFP application that he l acks the funds to pay the entire filing fee in advance, that application (Doc. No. 2 ) is GRANTED and a $350 filing fee is ASSESSED. The Clerk of Court MUST send a copy of this order to the warden of the facility in which the plaintiff is cu rrently housed to ensure compliance with that portion of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 pertaining to the payment of the filing fee. [T]his action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and is therefore DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  7; 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The dismissal is WITHOUT PREJUDICE to the plaintiff's ability to re-file a claim for malicious prosecution if and when he achieves favorable termination of the criminal proceedings against him. In light of this dispositi on, all pending motions are DENIED as moot. The court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this dismissal would not be taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). This is the final order in this action. The Clerk SHALL enter judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(b)(1). Signed by District Judge Aleta A. Trauger on 2/6/2024. (xc: Pro se party by regular mail along with a copy of this Order to the warden of the facility in which the plaintiff is currently housed.) (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(mg)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
JAMES ANDREW PAIGE, #277716,
Plaintiff,
v.
GLENN R. FUNK, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 3:23-cv-01198
Judge Trauger

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
James Paige, a state inmate confined at the Lois DeBerry Special Needs Facility (DSNF)
in Nashville, Tennessee, filed a pro se Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. No. 1), a
supporting memorandum with evidentiary exhibits (Doc. No. 5), an application for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) (Doc. No. 2), and a Motion to Appoint Counsel (Doc. No. 3) in
November 2023. On January 25, 2024, the plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend Complaint (Doc. No.
6) and an Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 7). He also renewed his Motion to Appoint Counsel
(Doc. No. 8) and his IFP application (Doc. No. 9) and filed an updated supporting memorandum
(Doc. No. 10).
The case is before the Court for ruling on the plaintiff’s IFP application and for initial
review of his Amended Complaint under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A. 1
I. APPLICATION TO PROCEED IFP
Under the PLRA, a prisoner bringing a civil action may apply for permission to file suit

Rule 15(a)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to amend its pleading once as a
matter of course within twenty-one days after serving it. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(A). Because the complaint
in this case has not yet been served, the plaintiff did not need leave of court to amend it. The Amended
Complaint (Doc. No. 7) is thus the plaintiff’s operative pleading in this case. The court considers it, along
with the supporting materials submitted by the plaintiff, for purposes of conducting this initial review.

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without prepaying the required filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Because it appears from the
plaintiff’s IFP application that he lacks the funds to pay the entire filing fee in advance, that
application (Doc. No. 2) is GRANTED and a $350 filing fee is ASSESSED. The fee will be
collected in installments as described below.
The warden of the facility in which the plaintiff is currently housed, as custodian of his
trust account, is DIRECTED to submit to the Clerk of Court, as an initial payment, the greater of:
(a) 20% of the average monthly deposits to the plaintiff’s credit at the jail; or (b) 20% of the
average monthly balance to the plaintiff’s credit for the six-month period immediately preceding
the filing of the Complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Thereafter, the custodian shall submit 20% of
the plaintiff’s preceding monthly income (or income credited to the plaintiff for the preceding
month), but only when the balance in his account exceeds $10. Id. § 1915(b)(2). Payments shall
continue until the $350 filing fee has been paid in full to the Clerk of Court. Id. § 1915(b)(3).
The Clerk of Court MUST send a copy of this order to the warden of the facility in which
the plaintiff is currently housed to ensure compliance with that portion of 28 U.S.C. § 1915
pertaining to the payment of the filing fee. If the plaintiff is transferred from his present place of
confinement, the custodian must ensure that a copy of this order follows the plaintiff to his new
place of confinement, for continued compliance with the order. All payments made pursuant to
this order must be submitted to the Clerk of Court for the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Tennessee, 719 Church Street, Nashville, TN 37203.

II. INITIAL REVIEW
A. Legal Standard
In cases filed by prisoners, the court must conduct an initial screening and dismiss the
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complaint (or any portion thereof) if it is facially frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). Review under the same criteria is also
authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) when the prisoner proceeds IFP.
To determine whether the Amended Complaint states a claim upon which relief may be
granted, the court reviews for whether it contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” such that it would survive a motion to dismiss
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir.
2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Although pro se pleadings must be
liberally construed, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), the plaintiff must still “plead[]
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, upon “view[ing] the complaint in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff[.]” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th
Cir. 2009).
The plaintiff filed this action under § 1983, which authorizes a federal action against any
person who, “under color of state law, deprives [another] person of rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution or conferred by federal statute.” Wurzelbacher v. JonesKelley, 675 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted); 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, the
Amended Complaint must plausibly allege (1) a deprivation of a constitutional or other federal
right, and (2) that the deprivation was caused by a “state actor.” Carl v. Muskegon Cnty., 763 F.3d
592, 595 (6th Cir. 2014).
B. Allegations and Claims
The plaintiff sues District Attorney Glenn Funk, Davidson County Criminal Court Clerk
Howard Gentry, Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC) Commissioner Frank Strada,
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Davidson County Sheriff Daron Hall, criminal defense attorney Paul Walwyn, Investigator David
Zoccola, Gallatin Police Chief Don Brandy, and Nashville Police Chief John Drake. (Doc. No. 7
at 2–4.) He alleges that, in 2018, Zoccola advised Brandy to pick the plaintiff up and transport him
to Davidson County, in order to hand him over to Drake. (Id. at 5–6.) Chief Brandy did so, without
presenting the plaintiff with an arrest warrant, advising him of his Miranda rights, or informing
him of the charge of arrest. (Id.) Chief Drake then placed the plaintiff under arrest on rape charges.
(Id. at 6.) After stopping at the hospital for a blood draw for purposes of DNA testing (to which
the plaintiff did not consent), Drake delivered the plaintiff to the Davidson County Sheriff’s
Detention Center, where Sheriff Hall took him into custody. (Id.) The plaintiff was not advised of
his Miranda rights by either Drake or Hall. (Id.)
In April of 2021, the plaintiff was tried and convicted on three counts of rape, but the trial
judge “refuse[d] to pronounce judgment accepting the verdict.” (Id. at 7.) The plaintiff was
nonetheless remanded to Sheriff Hall’s custody. (Id.) District Attorney Funk prepared the
judgment form sentencing the plaintiff “without entry of judgment,” and Gentry unlawfully
entered the judgment on the plaintiff’s criminal record. (Id.) Despite the failure of the trial court
to properly accept the verdict of guilt and hold a sentencing hearing, the plaintiff was then
committed to TDOC custody. (Id.) At some point thereafter, Gentry “insert[ed] the judgment
document(s) into [the plaintiff’s] file commit[ing] [him] to the Tennessee Department of
Correction without the court ordering [it].” (Id. at 8.)
Attorney Walwyn is alleged to have been constitutionally ineffective in defending the
plaintiff (id. at 9–12), including by conspiring with D.A. Funk, whom Walwyn knew had withheld
evidence from the jury and allowed the alleged victim to commit perjury. (Id. at 12–13.)
Claiming violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights and malicious prosecution, the
plaintiff seeks an award of damages due to his unlawful incarceration, as well as expungement of
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the rape convictions from his record and removal of his name from the Tennessee Sex Offender
Registry. (Id. at 13–15.) He summarizes his claims in his supporting memorandum as “false
imprisonment, illegal restraints placed on his liberty based on malicious prosecution, through held
kangaroo court(s)/trial(s), unlawful and illegal document(s) placed in his file before, during and
after trial[,] [s]entencing hearing was never held, and the judgment document(s) were never
[e]ndorsed by the clerk.” (Doc. No. 10 at 1.)
C. Analysis
The court must dismiss this action because its claims are either improperly brought under
§ 1983, have not yet accrued, or accrued too long ago to be timely pursued at this point.
To begin with, explicit challenges to the validity of an inmate’s continued confinement, as
distinguished from the “circumstances” or conditions of confinement, are not properly lodged
under § 1983 but are within the sole province of habeas corpus. Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S.
749, 750 (2004). The plaintiff’s request for expungement of a conviction that allegedly rests on
unlawfully admitted or withheld evidence and the ineffective assistance of counsel, as well as a
falsified or unlawfully recorded sentencing judgment, is an explicit challenge to his conviction and
sentence that may only be pursued in federal court via a habeas petition, not a § 1983 action. 2 Id.
Moreover, where (as here) a prisoner implicitly challenges the validity of his confinement
by claiming unconstitutional, malicious prosecution and seeking relief that is proper under § 1983
but “unavailable in habeas, notably damages,” Muhammad, 540 U.S. at 751, that claim cannot be
pursued unless and until the prisoner succeeds in achieving the favorable termination of the
criminal prosecution. Gardner v. Morriss, No. 3:17-cv-00747, 2017 WL 4805205, at *2 (M.D.

The court takes judicial notice of its own docket, where the plaintiff’s pending petition for the writ of
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 presents some of these issues and is still in the pleading stage. See
Paige v. Holloway, No. 3:23-cv-01102, Doc. No. 12 (M.D. Tenn.).

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Tenn. Oct. 24, 2017) (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994)); see Sykes v.
Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 309 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Heck’s favorable termination rule in § 1983
action for malicious prosecution). Favorable termination is an element of a malicious prosecution
claim and a precondition for its accrual, such that the claim “is not available” before criminal
proceedings end in victory for the plaintiff. King v. Harwood, 852 F.3d 568, 578–79 (6th Cir.
2017); see McDonough v. Smith, 139 S. Ct. 2149 (2019). Because the plaintiff has not yet achieved
such favorable termination, his malicious prosecution claim cannot yet be pursued.
Finally, even if they are otherwise proper, any claims for false arrest and/or false
imprisonment (as distinct from malicious prosecution) are time-barred. A one-year statute of
limitations applies to § 1983 claims arising in Tennessee, per Section 28-3-104(a) of the Tennessee
Code. Dibrell v. City of Knoxville, Tennessee, 984 F.3d 1156, 1161 (6th Cir. 2021); Roberson v.
Tennessee, 399 F.3d 792, 794 (6th Cir. 2005). The plaintiff’s cause of action for false
arrest/imprisonment accrued, and the statute of limitations began to run, at the latest, when his
detention without a warrant or other legal process ended and prosecution began––presumably
shortly after his detention in Davidson County in April 2018. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384,
388–90 (2007) (finding that false arrest “is a species of” false imprisonment, and that the
petitioner’s longer period of false imprisonment ended “when legal process was initiated against
him, and the statute would have begun to run from that date”); Dibrell, 984 F.3d at 1162 (after
legal process is initiated––“when, for example, the plaintiff is brought before a magistrate”––“a
plaintiff relying on the law of torts to challenge any continuing detention must assert a maliciousprosecution claim”). This case was not filed until November of 2023, almost five years after the
one-year limitations period for any false imprisonment claim expired. Although the statute of
limitations is an affirmative defense that typically does not result in a pre-answer dismissal, where
(as here) “the allegations in the complaint affirmatively show that the claim is time-barred,” it is
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appropriate to dismiss on that basis, Cataldo v. U.S. Steel Corp., 676 F.3d 542, 547 (6th Cir. 2012)
(citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007)), even in the context of a PLRA initial review.
Campbell v. Chambers-Smith, No. 2:21-cv-4055, 2021 WL 4033162, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 3,
2021) (quoting Castillo v. Grogan, 52 F. App’x 750, 751 (6th Cir. 2002)); see also, e.g., Dellis v.
Corr. Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508, 511 (6th Cir. 2001).
III. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, this action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
and is therefore DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The dismissal is
WITHOUT PREJUDICE to the plaintiff’s ability to re-file a claim for malicious prosecution if
and when he achieves favorable termination of the criminal proceedings against him. In light of
this disposition, all pending motions are DENIED as moot.
The court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this dismissal would not be taken in good
faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).
This is the final order in this action. The Clerk SHALL enter judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P.
58(b)(1).
It is so ORDERED.
____________________________________
Aleta A. Trauger
United States District Judge

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