Shelby v. Dickson County Sheriff's Office

Filing 5

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: Because it appears from Plaintiff's IFP application that he lacks the funds to pay the entire filing fee, that application (Doc. No. 4 ) is GRANTED and a $350 filing fee is ASSESSED. The fee will be collected in installments. The warden of the facility in which Plaintiff is currently housed, as custodian of his trust account, is DIRECTED to submit to the Clerk of Court, an initial payment. The Clerk of Court MUST send a copy of this Order to the warden of the facility in which Plaintiff is currently housed to ensure compliance with that portion of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 pertaining to the payment of the filing fee. For the below reasons, this action is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)( B)(ii), for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this dismissal would not be taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). This is the final order in this action. The Clerk SHALL ente r judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P.58(b)(1). Signed by Chief Judge William L. Campbell, Jr on 08/29/24. (xc:Pro se party by regular mail. A copy of this Order mailed to the warden.) (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(ad)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
ROY B. SHELBY,
Plaintiff,
v.
DICKSON COUNTY SHERIFF’S
OFFICE,
Defendant.

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NO. 3:23-cv-01224
JUDGE CAMPBELL

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Roy Shelby, an inmate of the Dickson County Jail proceeding pro se, has filed a Complaint
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. No. 1) and an application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
(IFP). (Doc. No. 4.) Plaintiff has also filed a supplemental statement of the facts underlying his
Complaint. (Doc. No. 3.)
The case is before the Court for ruling on Plaintiff’s IFP application and for initial review
of the Complaint under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
I. APPLICATION TO PROCEED IFP
A prisoner bringing a civil action may be permitted to file suit without prepaying the filing
fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Because it appears from Plaintiff’s IFP application that he lacks the funds
to pay the entire filing fee, that application (Doc. No. 4) is GRANTED and a $350 filing fee is
ASSESSED. The fee will be collected in installments as described below.
The warden of the facility in which Plaintiff is currently housed, as custodian of his trust
account, is DIRECTED to submit to the Clerk of Court, as an initial payment, the greater of: (a)
20% of the average monthly deposits to Plaintiff’s credit at the jail; or (b) 20% of the average
monthly balance to Plaintiff’s credit for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of

the Complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Thereafter, the custodian shall submit 20% of Plaintiff’s
preceding monthly income (or income credited to Plaintiff for the preceding month), but only when
the balance in his account exceeds $10. Id. § 1915(b)(2). Payments shall continue until the $350
filing fee has been paid in full to the Clerk of Court. Id. § 1915(b)(3).
The Clerk of Court MUST send a copy of this Order to the warden of the facility in which
Plaintiff is currently housed to ensure compliance with that portion of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 pertaining
to the payment of the filing fee. If Plaintiff is transferred from his present place of confinement,
the custodian must ensure that a copy of this Order follows Plaintiff to his new place of
confinement, for continued compliance with the Order. All payments made pursuant to this Order
must be submitted to the Clerk of Court for the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Tennessee, 719 Church Street, Nashville, TN 37203.
II. INITIAL REVIEW
A. Legal Standard
In cases filed by prisoners, the Court must conduct an initial screening and dismiss the
Complaint (or any portion thereof) if it is facially frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). Review under the same criteria is also
authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) when the prisoner proceeds IFP.
To determine whether the Complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted, the
Court reviews for whether it alleges sufficient facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face,” such that it would survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009)). At this stage, “the Court assumes the truth of ‘well-pleaded factual allegations’

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and ‘reasonable inference[s]’ therefrom,” Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Vullo, 602 U.S. 175, 181
(2024) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79), but is “not required to accept legal conclusions or
unwarranted factual inferences as true.” Inner City Contracting, LLC v. Charter Twp. of Northville,
Michigan, 87 F.4th 743, 749 (6th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). The Court must also afford the pro
se Complaint a liberal construction, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), while viewing it
in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Inner City, supra.
Plaintiff filed the Complaint under Section 1983, which authorizes a federal action against
any person who, “under color of state law, deprives [another] person of rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution or conferred by federal statute.” Wurzelbacher v. JonesKelley, 675 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted); 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Complaint
must therefore plausibly allege (1) a deprivation of a constitutional or other federal right, and (2)
that the deprivation was caused by a “state actor.” Carl v. Muskegon Cnty., 763 F.3d 592, 595 (6th
Cir. 2014).
B. Facts
Plaintiff sues the Dickson County Sheriff’s Department, alleging that on November 13,
2023, he checked the kiosk at the jail and “Law Books 7-7A” were not available. (Doc. No. 1 at
3–5.) He claims that when he grieved the matter, the official response was that the books were
available “under book 8 on kiosk,” but that he and other inmates had been unable to find any law
books whatsoever on the jail kiosk. (Doc. No. 3 at 1.) Plaintiff claims that the unavailability of
Law Books 7-7A violated his constitutional rights. (Doc. No. 1 at 3–5.) He does not allege any
other injury or seek any relief. (Id. at 5.)

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C. Analysis
This case must be dismissed for two reasons. First, it is filed against an improper defendant,
the Dickson County Sheriff’s Office. “Although municipal corporations and other ‘bodies politic
and corporate’ may be sued under Section 1983, a sheriff’s department is not a body politic or an
entity that is considered a ‘person’ . . . under Section 1983.” Timms v. Tucker, No. 3:11-1109, 2012
WL 2008599, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. June 5, 2012), adopted, 2012 WL 2872053 (M.D. Tenn. July 12,
2012) (quoting Mumford v. Basinski, 105 F.3d 264, 267 (6th Cir. 1997)); accord Campbell v.
Cheatham Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 511 F. Supp. 3d 809, 824–25 & n.12 (M.D. Tenn. 2021)
(dismissing § 1983 claim and noting that sheriff’s departments “are not proper parties to a § 1983
suit”), aff’d, 47 F.4th 468 (6th Cir. 2022). Accordingly, the Dickson County Sheriff’s Office is not
a proper defendant to this action under Section 1983.
Second, the alleged denial of access to law books 7-7A did not violate any right under the
U.S. Constitution or federal law. Liberally construed, a claim of denial of law books could
conceivably implicate Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to access the courts. The right of access
to the courts “requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of
meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance
from persons trained in the law.” Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977). However, the concern
is with “a right of access to the courts, not necessarily to a prison law library.” Walker v. Mintzes,
771 F.2d 920, 932 (1985) (emphasis in original); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996)
(noting that Bounds did not establish a right to a law library). To establish that the absence of law
books on the jail kiosk interfered with his right of access to the courts, Plaintiff must show that it
resulted in actual injury to a nonfrivolous claim he was attempting to pursue. Lewis, 518 U.S. at

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353–55. He has failed to show such injury, as the denial of the law books at issue clearly did not
impact his ability to file grievances at the jail or the instant lawsuit.
Even if Plaintiff could plausibly claim interference with his access to courts, he could not
sustain such a claim against the Dickson County Sheriff’s Department, as discussed above, nor
would his allegations support the liability of Dickson County itself. Any such municipal liability
claim would fail for lack of an identified policy or custom of the County that could be said to be
the “moving force” behind the deprivation of the law books. See Okolo v. Metro. Gov’t of
Nashville, 892 F. Supp. 2d 931, 941 (M.D. Tenn. 2012) (“To plead a claim for municipal liability
under § 1983, Plaintiff must plausibly allege that his or her constitutional rights were violated and
that a policy or custom of [the municipality] was the ‘moving force’ behind the deprivation of
Plaintiff’s rights.”) (citing Miller v. Sanilac County, 606 F.3d 240, 254–55 (6th Cir. 2010)). In
sum, this lawsuit must be dismissed.
III. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, this action is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Court
CERTIFIES that any appeal from this dismissal would not be taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)(3).
This is the final order in this action. The Clerk SHALL enter judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P.
58(b)(1).
It is so ORDERED.
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WILLIAM L. CAMPBELL, JR.
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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