Gill v. Walmart

Filing 8

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF THE COURT: The IFP application #2 is GRANTED. This matter is REFERRED to the Magistrate Judge to enter a scheduling order for the management of the case, to dispose or recommend disposition of any pretrial motions under 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(A) and (B), and to conduct further proceedings, if necessary, under Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of Court. Signed by District Judge Aleta A. Trauger on 2/5/2024. (xc:Pro se party by regular mail. ) (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(kc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
VICTOR G. GILL,

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Plaintiff,
v.
WALMART,
Defendant.

Case No. 3:23-cv-01370
Judge Trauger

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Victor Gill has filed a pro se Complaint for Employment Discrimination (Doc.
No. 1) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967, and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, claiming discrimination and wrongful
termination by Defendant Walmart. He has attached to the Complaint a notice of his right to sue
(Doc. No. 1-1 at 1) issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission less than 90 days
before his Complaint was filed, as well as the charge of discrimination he filed before that agency,
the notice of separation filed with the state, and the state’s notice of denial of his claim to workers’
compensation. (Id. at 2–4.) The plaintiff has also filed an application for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis (IFP). (Doc. No. 2.)
I. The Filing Fee
The plaintiff’s IFP application sufficiently demonstrates that he cannot pay the full civil
filing fee in advance “without undue hardship.” Foster v. Cuyahoga Dep’t of Health and Human
Servs., 21 F. App’x 239, 240 (6th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, the IFP application (Doc. No. 2) is
GRANTED. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

II. Initial Review
The court must conduct an initial review and dismiss the Complaint if it is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against
a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Ongori v.
Hawkins, No. 16-2781, 2017 WL 6759020, at *1 (6th Cir. Nov. 15, 2017) (“[N]on-prisoners
proceeding in forma pauperis are still subject to the screening requirements of § 1915(e).”). Review
for whether the Complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted asks whether it contains
“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,”
such that it would survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Hill
v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009)). Although pro se pleadings must be liberally construed, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007), the plaintiff must still “plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678, upon “view[ing] the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[.]” Tackett v. M &
G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009).
Review of the plaintiff’s filings reveals that his claims of discrimination are sufficiently
pled to proceed for further development. In the charge of discrimination attached to (and
referenced in) the Complaint, the plaintiff asserts that he was injured on the job, was wrongly
disciplined because of the accident, took medical leave in order to have a procedure to address his
medical condition, was denied a requested accommodation upon his return to work, and was
ultimately discharged “because of [his] disabilities” and otherwise discriminated against based on
his “race (AA), age (62), and disability.” (Doc. No. 1-1 at 2.) The charge provides dates for all of
these events, beginning with the plaintiff’s April 2021 injury and ending with his October 2022

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discharge. (Id.) Liberally construing the plaintiff’s Complaint to include “claims that are
reasonably related to or grow out of the factual allegations in the EEOC charge,” Younis v.
Pinnacle Airlines, Inc., 610 F.3d 359, 362 (6th Cir. 2010), the court finds that it is sufficient to
survive initial review and proceed for further development.
III. Further Proceedings
Defendant Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, filed an Answer to the Complaint on January 31,
2024. (Doc. No. 6.) Accordingly, this matter is REFERRED to the Magistrate Judge to enter a
scheduling order for the management of the case, to dispose or recommend disposition of any
pretrial motions under 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(A) and (B), and to conduct further proceedings, if
necessary, under Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of Court.
The above determination that the Complaint states colorable claims for purposes of this
initial screening does not preclude the court from dismissing any claim at any time for the reasons
set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), nor does it preclude the defendant from filing a motion to
dismiss any claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12.
The plaintiff is cautioned that he must keep the court informed of his current address at all
times. Noncompliance may result in dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 41(b); Local Rule 41.01(b). Additional resources for pro se litigants, including forms,
handbooks,

and

information

sheets,

are

available

on

the

court’s

website.

https://www.tnmd.uscourts.gov/representing-yourself-federal-court.
It is so ORDERED.
____________________________________
Aleta A. Trauger
United States District Judge

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