Harris v. Vantell et al

Filing 17

MEMORANDUM ORDER: This Order addresses a motion to deem a summons improperly served (Doc. No. 14 ) and the status of service of process in pro se and in forma pauperis Plaintiff Ramsey William Harriss suit against Vincent Vantell, the deputy ward en of the Trousdale Turner Correctional Center (TTCC), and as-yet-unidentified Defendant "John Doe #1." For these reasons, Vantell's motion to deem the summons addressed to "John Doe Vincent Vantell" improperly served (Doc. No. 14 ) is GRANTED. The Clerk's Office is DIRECTED to provide Harris with a blank service packet with this Memorandum Order. Signed by Magistrate Judge Alistair Newbern on 3/6/2025. (xc: Pro se party by regular mail.) (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(ch)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
RAMSEY WILLIAM HARRIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
VINCENT VANTELL et al.,

Case No. 3:24-cv-00457
Judge Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr.
Magistrate Judge Alistair E. Newbern

Defendants.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
This Order addresses a motion to deem a summons improperly served (Doc. No. 14) and
the status of service of process in pro se and in forma pauperis Plaintiff Ramsey William Harris’s
suit against Vincent Vantell, the deputy warden of the Trousdale Turner Correctional Center
(TTCC), and as-yet-unidentified Defendant “John Doe #1.” (Doc. No. 1.) After screening Harris’s
complaint (Doc. Nos. 6, 10) as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A, the Court determined that Harris failed to plead any claim upon which
relief can be granted against Vantell but that Harris stated two colorable Section 1983 claims
against John Doe #1 in his individual capacity (Id.).
For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant Vantell’s motion (Doc. No. 14) and order
Harris to return a service packet addressed only to the individual he has identified to be John Doe
#1.
I.

Background
The Court screened Harris’s original complaint and dismissed Vantell from the action on
April 22, 2024. (Doc. No. 6.) In that order, the Court directed Harris to file an amended complaint
within thirty days. (Id.) Harris filed an amended complaint on May 8, 2024, naming only “John

Doe #1” as a defendant. (Doc. No. 7.) Harris describes John Doe #1 as a “transport driver . . . who
is an employee of CoreCivic” and who, while transporting Harris, rear-ended another transport
van because “he was distracted with his cell phone[.]” (Id.) Harris states that, in the collision, he
was “slung over and ½ onto an inmate directly in front of [him] resulting in [his] upper body
colliding with the mesh cage at an [awkward] angle knocking all the breath out of [him.]” (Id.)
Harris states that, despite requesting immediate medical attention, he “lay on the floor of the
transport vehicle for several agonizing minutes before [he] was able to retain a normal breath.”
(Id.)
The Court screened Harris’s amended complaint and allowed two claims to proceed: “an
Eighth Amendment claim against the John Doe Defendant in his individual capacity under Section
1983 for deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs and an Eighth Amendment
claim against the John Doe Defendant in his individual capacity under Section 1983 for deliberate
indifference to Plaintiff’s health or safety arising from Doe’s driving of the prisoner transport van
on March 14. 2024.” (Doc. No. 10.) The Court further “advised [Harris] that process cannot be
served upon any Defendant until the full name of the individual involved in the alleged incident
has been determined.” (Id.)
On June 25, 2024, the Court issued a summons addressed by Harris to “John Doe Vincent
Vantell” at TTCC (Doc. No. 12). The U.S. Marshals Service sent the summons to TTCC by
certified mail, where TTCC employee Renea Watts accepted service believing the summons to be
for Vantell. (Doc. Nos. 13, 14.)
On July 30, 2024, Vantell filed a motion to deem the summons improperly served on
grounds that he is no longer a party to this action and that Watts accepted the summons on his
behalf in error. (Doc. No. 14.) On July 31, 2024, the Court notified Harris that he could file any

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response “no later than 14 days after service of the motion” and stayed Vantell’s deadline to
respond to the summons pending the Court’s resolution of his motion. (Doc. No. 15.) Harris has
not responded to Vantell’s motion and has not filed anything in the case since June 3, 2024 (Doc.
No. 11).
II.

Legal Standard
“[T]he requirement of proper service of process ‘is not some mindless technicality[,]’”
Friedman v. Est. of Presser, 929 F.2d 1151, 1156 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting Del Raine v. Carlson,
826 F.2d 698, 704 (7th Cir. 1987)), nor is it “meant to be a game or obstacle course for plaintiffs[,]”
Ace Am. Ins. Co. v. Meadowlands Dev. Ltd. P’ship, 140 F. Supp. 3d 450, 455 (E.D. Pa. 2015).
Rather, it goes to the very heart of a court’s ability to hear a case. “[W]ithout proper service of
process, consent, waiver, or forfeiture, a court may not exercise personal jurisdiction over a named
defendant.” King v. Taylor, 694 F.3d 650, 655 (6th Cir. 2012); see also Mann v. Castiel, 681 F.3d
368, 372 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (explaining that “[s]ervice is . . . not only a means of ‘notifying a
defendant of the commencement of an action against him,’ but ‘a ritual that marks the court’s
assertion of jurisdiction over the lawsuit’” (citation omitted)). Where personal jurisdiction is not
properly established, a court cannot exercise its authority consistent with due process of law. See
Friedman, 929 F.2d at 1156–57.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) provides that “[i]f a defendant is not served within
90 days after the complaint is filed, the court—on motion or on its own after notice to the
plaintiff—must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be
made within a specified time.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). The Court must extend the time for service
upon a showing of good cause, and the Court may exercise its discretion to permit late service
even where a plaintiff has not shown good cause. United States v. Oakland Physicians Med. Ctr.,
LLC, 44 F.4th 565, 568 (6th Cir. 2022) (first citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); and then citing Henderson
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v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 662 (1996)). Otherwise, the language of Rule 4(m) mandates
dismissal, either on motion or sua sponte. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); see also Byrd v. Stone, 94 F.3d
217, 219 & n.3 (6th Cir. 1996). In light of this plain language, it is well established that Rule 4(m)
empowers a court to dismiss complaints without prejudice “upon the court’s own initiative with
notice to the plaintiff.” Hason v. Med. Bd. of Cal., 279 F.3d 1167, 1174 (9th Cir. 2002); see also
Friedman, 929 F.2d at 1155 n.4 (noting that “the issue of ineffective service of process may be
raised sua sponte”).
Moreover, when, as here, a plaintiff proceeds IFP, “[t]he officers of the court shall issue
and serve all process, and perform all duties in such cases.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). Rule 4(c)
“dovetails” with § 1915, Byrd v. Stone, 94 F.3d 217, 219 (6th Cir. 1996), by providing that “[t]he
court must” “order that service be made by a United States marshal or deputy marshal or by a
person specially appointed by the court” “if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed in forma pauperis
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3).
Together, Rule 4(c)[(3)] and 28 U.S.C. § 1915([d]) stand for the proposition that
when a plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis the court is obligated to issue
plaintiff’s process to a United States Marshal who must in turn effectuate service
upon the defendants, thereby relieving a plaintiff of the burden to serve process
once reasonable steps have been taken to identify for the court the defendants
named in the complaint.
Byrd, 94 F.3d at 219.
That does not mean, however, that an incarcerated pro se plaintiff proceeding IFP
automatically shows good cause for extending the Rule 4(m) deadline when the Marshals Service
has been unable to effect service of process on a defendant. Courts in this circuit consider the IFP
plaintiff's conduct and the totality of the circumstances in determining whether good cause exists
to extend the Rule 4(m) deadline. For example, in Abel v. Harp, the Sixth Circuit considered the
fact that the plaintiff diligently attempted to contact the Marshals Service “when he knew there

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was a problem with service on the defendants” and also considered the fact that “[t]he Marshals
Service [incorrectly] advised [the plaintiff] that it had served all of the defendants” before holding
that good cause existed to extend the Rule 4(m) deadline. 122 F. App’x 248, 252 (6th Cir. 2005).
By contrast, in VanDiver v. Martin, the court found that a pro se incarcerated IFP plaintiff failed
to show good cause to extend the Rule 4(m) deadline where the plaintiff “remained silent after
being put on notice that [ ] Defendants had not been served” at the address he provided because
the defendants “no longer worked for the Michigan Department of Corrections.” 304 F. Supp. 2d
934, 941, 942 (E.D. Mich. 2004); see also Freeman v. Collins, Civ. Action No. 2:08-cv-00071,
2011 WL 4914873, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 15, 2011) (finding that pro se incarcerated IFP plaintiff
failed to show good cause to extend Rule 4(m) deadline where he “took no action to cure the lack
of service for a significant period . . .”). Similarly, in Staub v. Nietzel, the Sixth Circuit found that
good cause did not exist to extend the Rule 4(m) deadline despite an “administrative snafu” in
which the Clerk of Court did not issue a summons for the unserved defendant because the plaintiff
“was on notice” that the defendant remained unserved, failed to inquire about the status of service
or provide additional information for service to the court, and “fail[ed] to provide any reasonable
explanation for sitting idly by for six years[.]” Case No. 22-5384, 2023 WL 3059081, at *8–9 (6th
Cir. Apr. 24, 2023).
III.

Analysis
A.

Motion to Deem the Summons Issued to “John Doe Vincent Vantell”
Improperly Served (Doc. No. 14)

Harris has not responded to Vantell’s motion to deem the summons addressed to “John
Doe Vincent Vantell” improperly served (Doc. No. 14), and the Court may grant the motion on
that basis. Regardless, there is no dispute that Vantell was dismissed from this action by the Court’s
initial screening order (Doc. No. 6) and that Harris’s amended complaint names only “John Doe

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#1” as a defendant (Doc. No. 7). Because Vantell is no longer a party, the summons was improperly
addressed to him. Vantell’s motion will be granted and he need take no further action in response
to the summons.
B.

Service of Process

It has been more than nine months since Harris filed his amended complaint against John
Doe #1, but Harris has not identified John Doe #1 and John Doe #1 has not been served. Harris
has far exceeded the time allotted for service under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m).
However, recognizing his pro se and IFP status, the Court will give Harris one last opportunity to
identify John Doe #1 and request a summons properly addressed to that person. The Court will
provide a blank service packet to Harris with this Memorandum Order. Harris will be ordered to
return the service packet addressed to the individual he has identified as John Doe #1 by April 3,
2024.
Harris is reminded that the ultimate responsibility for identifying John Doe and his correct
service address rests with him.
IV.

Conclusion
For these reasons, Vantell’s motion to deem the summons addressed to “John Doe Vincent
Vantell” improperly served (Doc. No. 14) is GRANTED.
The Clerk’s Office is DIRECTED to provide Harris with a blank service packet with this
Memorandum Order.
Harris is ORDERED to return the service packet addressed to the person he has identified
as John Doe #1 by April 3, 2025.

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Harris is reminded that failure to respond to this Order by April 3, 2025, or failure to
identify John Doe #1 so that he can be served with process may result in a recommendation that
his case be dismissed without prejudice.
It is so ORDERED.

____________________________________
ALISTAIR E. NEWBERN
United States Magistrate Judge

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