Cage v. Nixon et al

Filing 12

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER: Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.3 The Court further certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal of this decision could not be taken in good faith. Signed by Visiting Judge Patricia Gaughan on 3/11/25. re 1 , 2 (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(ls)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

Quinton A. Cage,
Plaintiff,
v.
John T. Nixon, et al.,

Defendants.

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CASE NO. 3: 24 CV 1082
JUDGE PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN1

Memorandum of Opinion and Order

Introduction and Background
Plaintiff Quinton A. Cage, a Tennessee prisoner incarcerated in the Lois M. DeBerry
Special Needs Facility in Nashville, Tennessee, has filed this pro se civil action against retired
former United States District Court Judges William J. Haynes and John T. Nixon (now
deceased). (Doc. No. 1.)
Plaintiff was convicted in 1994 of “aggravated rape, especially aggravated kidnapping,
aggravated robbery, attempted aggravated robbery, and reckless endangerment with a deadly
weapon. He was sentenced to 55 years in prison.” Cage v. Tennessee, No. 3:99-cv-00362, 2022
WL 5261010, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 5, 2022). The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals
affirmed Plaintiff’s conviction and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied him leave to appeal.
After seeking and being denied post conviction relief in state court, Plaintiff unsuccessfully
pursued habeas corpus relief in federal court, filing at least eight federal habeas petitions
challenging his underlying state court conviction. See id.
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Judge Gaughan was designated to hear this case by the Chief Judge of the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals. (Doc. No. 10.)

In addition, while he was incarcerated, Plaintiff filed numerous other civil cases in federal court
that have been dismissed. Consequently, he was declared a frivolous filer and precluded from
proceeding in forma pauperis under the three strikes rule set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See,
e.g., Cage v. Nell, No. 3: 19-cv-604, 2020 WL 433991, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 28, 2020).
Plaintiff’s present complaint (Doc. No. 1) is rambling, convoluted, and difficult to parse,
but it is clear that he complains of rulings made by Judges Nixon and Haynes in various habeas
corpus petitions and/or prior civil cases he has filed in federal court. He contends Judges Nixon
and Haynes violated his rights by issuing “bogus rulings” in, and/or dismissing, his prior cases.
(Id. at 5.) He seeks monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief, including an apology from
Judge Nixon. (Id. at 5; Doc. No. 1-1 at 6 and 12.)
On September 20, 2024, Plaintiff filed a pleading labeled as a “Rule 46 Objection
Demand” (Doc. No. 5), stating he would like to add the United States Government as a
Defendant. He did not pay the filing fee in the case, but instead filed an application to proceed
in forma pauperis. (Doc. No. 2.)
The Court will liberally construe Plaintiff’s complaint as brought against the United
States in addition to Judges Haynes and Nixon. For the following reasons, his action is
dismissed.
Standard of Review and Discussion
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed and held to less stringent standards
than pleadings drafted by lawyers, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam);
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the lenient treatment accorded pro se plaintiffs has
limits, see e.g., Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). Pro se litigants must still
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meet basic pleading requirements, and courts are not required to conjure allegations on their
behalf or create claims for them. See Erwin v. Edwards, 22 F. App'x 579, 580 (6th Cir. 2001).
When a prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a governmental entity, or an
officer or employee of a governmental entity, the district court is expressly required, under 28
U.S.C. § 1915A, to conduct an initial review of the prisoner’s complaint and to dismiss the
complaint before service if the court determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief.
Upon review, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint warrants dismissal under §
1915A for multiple reasons. First, although Plaintiff indicates he brings this action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (see Doc. No. 1-1 at 4), he cannot assert a claim under § 1983 because that statute
applies only to federal rights violations committed by defendants who act under color of state
law.2 Plaintiff sues former federal judges, who are not state actors subject to suit under § 1983.
See, e.g., Smith v. Burton, No. 4: 21-cv-10762, 2021 WL 3269060, at *2 (E.D. Mich. July 30,
2021) (finding that defendant federal judge was not a state actor and so could not be sued under
§ 1983).
Second, although the Supreme Court recognized a limited cause of action against
individual federal government officials alleged to have violated a plaintiff’s federal rights in
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), Plaintiff’s complaint
alleges no cognizable claim against any Defendant under Bivens. The United States, as

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To establish a prima facie case under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that a defendant acting
under color of state law deprived him of a federal right. Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 677 (6th Cir.
1998).
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sovereign, is immune from suit unless it explicitly waives its sovereign immunity. The United
States has not consented to suit for violations of federal rights under Bivens. See Nuclear
Transport & Storage, Inc. v. U.S., 890 F.2d 1348, 1352 (6th Cir 1989) (“Since the United States
has not waived its sovereign-immunity and consented expressly to be sued in a Bivens-type
action, such suits cannot be brought against the United States.”) (citation omitted). Therefore,
Plaintiff has no plausible claim under Bivens against the United States or Judges Haynes and
Nixon in their official capacities. See id. (holding that claims for damages and injunctive relief
against the United States and individual federal defendants in their official capacities were
barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity).
Plaintiff’s complaint also alleges no plausible Bivens claim against Judges Haynes and
Nixon in their individual capacities. The Supreme Court has now made it clear that individual
capacity claims under Bivens should not be extended outside of the three specific contexts in
which the Supreme Court has already recognized claims, i.e., in the context of unreasonable
search and seizure claims under the Fourth Amendment, unlawful discrimination claims under
the Fifth Amendment, and claims for deliberate indifference to medical needs under the Eighth
Amendment. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120 (U.S., 2017); Elhady v. Unidentified CBP Agents,
18 F.4th 880, 882-83 (6th Cir. 2021).
Plaintiff's purported claims against Judges Haynes and Nixon clearly do not fit within the
specific three contexts that have been recognized for Bivens suits, and there is no basis to imply
a Bivens cause of action here. See Elhady, 18 F.4th at 883 (under the “exacting test” for
determining whether a court should recognize a new Bivens action, “the answer will almost
always be never”).

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Third, even if a Bivens claim could be implied, “[i]t is well established that judges and
other court officers enjoy absolute immunity from suit on claims arising out of the performance
of judicial or quasi-judicial functions.” Foster v. Walsh, 864 F.2d 416, 417 (6th Cir. 1988),
citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553 (1967). Absolute judicial immunity shields judicial
officers from suits alleging damages arising out of the performance of their judicial functions
even when they act erroneously or in bad faith. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11–12 (1991);
Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1115 (6th Cir. 1997). There are only two sets of
circumstances in which a judicial officer is not entitled to immunity. A judge is not immune
from liability for “nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity,” or
for actions “taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12.
Plaintiff’s claims pertain to conduct of Judges Haynes and Nixon occurring during the
performance of their official judicial functions in connection with prior lawsuits. Plaintiff does
not allege facts plausibly suggesting that either judge took action falling outside of the scope of
his absolute judicial immunity. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s suit also warrants dismissal on judicial
immunity grounds. See Kipen v. Lawson, 57 F. App'x. 691 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming sua sponte
dismissal of claims against federal judge on the basis of absolute judicial immunity).
Conclusion
Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.3 The Court further certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an
appeal of this decision could not be taken in good faith.

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In light of this dismissal under § 1915A, it is not necessary for the Court to address Plaintiff’s
application to proceed in forma pauperis or determine whether he is precluded from proceeding in
forma pauperis under § 1915(g).
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