Maney v. Unknown Defendants

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: Pro se Plaintiff Deborah Maney, a resident of Nashville, Tennessee, filed this complaint against Unknown Defendants. (Doc. No. 1 ). Because her IFP Application reflects that she lacks sufficient financial resources to p ay the full filing fee without undue hardship, the IFP Application (Doc. No. 2 ) is GRANTED. As explained below, Plaintiff's in forma pauperis complaint is subject to dismissal as frivolous and delusional under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e). Additionally, the complaint fails to establish a basis for federal jurisdiction. Accordingly, this action is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.Because an appeal would not be taken in good faith, Plaintiff is not certified to pursue an appeal from this judgment in fo rma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). This is the final Order denying all relief in this case. The Clerk SHALL enter judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(b). Signed by District Judge Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr on 01/03/2025. (xc:Pro se party by placing at intake counter.) (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(ad)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
DEBORAH MANEY,

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Plaintiff,
v.
UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS,
Defendants.

No. 3:24-cv-01474

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pro se Plaintiff Deborah Maney, a resident of Nashville, Tennessee, filed this complaint
against Unknown Defendants. 1 (Doc. No. 1).
I. FILING FEE
Plaintiff submitted an Application for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP
Application”). (Doc. No. 2). According to Plaintiff’s IFP Application, her monthly income totals
$923 from Supplemental Social Security payments, she has no assets of any kind other than an
“inheritance of 100, 100, 100, 100 trillions of dollars stolen”, her monthly expenses total over
$1000, and she does not expect any major changes to her monthly income or expenses in the next
12 months (Id.) Plaintiff did not provide a residential address. It appears that Plaintiff may be
unhoused. Because her IFP Application reflects that she lacks sufficient financial resources to
pay the full filing fee without undue hardship, the IFP Application (Doc. No. 2) is GRANTED.
The Clerk therefore is DIRECTED to file the complaint in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

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Despite best efforts, neither the Clerk nor the Court can decipher Ms. Maney’s handwriting or intent in naming
defendants. For example, in the caption, it appears she has written, “Com Stalk,” “Male female”, “Blue tooth,” and
“Ovem Strollc.” (Doc. No. 1 at PageID# 1). On the second page of the complaint, under “The Defendant(s)”, it
appears Ms. Maney has written “State of Tennessee”, “Outloud – thoughts”, and “enjay vehicles Demonbrauns.”
(Id. at PageID# 2). Thus, the Clerk docketed the case as against “Unknown Defendants.”

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II. INITIAL SCREENING STANDARD
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to
“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In
doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are
assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from
filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e), which requires
sua sponte dismissal of an action upon certain determinations. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must review her complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Benson v. O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014, 1016 (6th Cir. 1999). Under
§ 1915(e), the Court is required to screen in forma pauperis complaints and dismiss any
complaint, or any portion thereof, if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F. 3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir.
2010).
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint contain: (1) a
short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, (2) a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for the
relief sought. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Although allegations in a pro se complaint are held to “less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520 (1972), “liberal construction . . . has limits.” Erwin v. Edwards, 22 F. App’x 579, 580 (6th
Cir. 2001) (citing Franklin v. Rose, 765 F.2d 82, 85 (6th Cir. 1985). And pro se litigants are not
exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Brown v. Matauszak, 415
F. App’x 608, 613 (6th Cir. 2011).
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III. ALLEGED FACTS
As best the Court can discern, 2 the complaint alleges that “a federal law itself” has
“cuss[ed]” and “hurt” Plaintiff. (Doc. No. 1 at PageID# 3). The complaint lists words and
phrases such as “federal constitutional laws”, “nigger nigger”, “vehicular homicide,” and
“poisons.” (Id. at PageID# 3). In the “Relief” section of her complaint, Plaintiff lists racist and
sexual terms and states that she is seeking “no open violation” and “wants [her] life back.” (Id. at
PageID# 5). Above the instructions on the form complaint that require plaintiffs to describe their
injuries, Plaintiff has written “Uggghhh.” (Id.)
IV. SCREENING OF THE IN FORMA PAUPERIS COMPLAINT
After conducting the initial screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court finds
that Plaintiff’s complaint does not satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 8 and cannot
survive screening under Section 1915(e)(2). The allegations set forth in the complaint are
frivolous and/or delusional. While a complaint need not contain “magic words,” it must contain
factual allegations and make plausible the claim for relief. Plaintiff’s complaint does not.
Moreover, “[t]his Court is not ‘required to create [Plaintiff]’s claims for [her],’ because ‘[t]o do
so would requir[e the] courts to explore exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff and
would transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an
advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party.’” Bell v.
Tennessee, No. 1:11-cv-14, 2012 WL 996560, at *9 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 22, 2012) (quoting
Thompson v. A.J. Rose Mfg. Co., 208 F.3d 215 (6th Cir. 2000) (bracket in original)).
Additionally, there is no basis for federal jurisdiction. “[F]ederal courts have a duty to
consider their subject matter jurisdiction in regard to every case and may raise the issue sua

The complaint is so skeletal and nonsensical that it is impossible to distill her statements into coherent narratives
and causes of action.
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sponte.” Answers in Genesis of Ky., Inc. v. Creation Ministries Int’l, Ltd., 556 F.3d 459, 465
(6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). There are two basic types of subject-matter jurisdiction:
federal-question jurisdiction and diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. A
plaintiff properly invokes federal-question jurisdiction under Section 1331 when he pleads a
colorable claim “arising under” the Constitution or laws of the United States. Arbaugh v. Y&H
Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513 (2006) (citation omitted). A plaintiff invokes diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction when he presents a claim between parties who are citizens of different states and the
value of that claim exceeds the required jurisdictional amount, currently $75,000. 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life
Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). When a plaintiff fails to establish jurisdiction, the
Court must dismiss the case without prejudice. Ernst v. Rising, 427 F.3d 351, 366 (6th Cir.
2005); Revere v. Wilmington Fin., 406 F. App’x 936, 937 (6th Cir. 2011).
Here, Plaintiff has not established subject-matter jurisdiction. She represents that
Defendant and Plaintiff are residents of Nashville, Tennessee (see Doc. No at PageID# 2); thus,
diversity of citizenship is not alleged. Neither has Plaintiff identified a federal question, nor can
the Court discern one.
V. CONCLUSION
As explained above, Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis complaint is subject to dismissal as
frivolous and delusional under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e). Additionally, the complaint fails to establish a
basis for federal jurisdiction. Accordingly, this action is hereby DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
Because an appeal would not be taken in good faith, Plaintiff is not certified to pursue an
appeal from this judgment in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).

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This is the final Order denying all relief in this case. The Clerk SHALL enter judgment.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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WAVERLY D. CRENSHAW, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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