Huckabay v. Tennessee Department of Correction et al

Filing 99

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUBSTITUTION AND TRANSPORTATION 82 83 85 . Signed by Judge James D. Todd on 3/4/15. (Todd, James)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION
JEFFREY HUCKABAY,
Plaintiff,
VS.
TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTION, et al.,
Defendants.

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No. 11-cv-1335-JDT-egb

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
FOR SUBSTITUTION AND TRANSPORTATION

Plaintiff Jeffrey Huckabay, an inmate, filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. The court dismissed various defendants and ordered service of process for Northwest
Correctional Complex (“NWCX”) Counselor Bonnie Foster, NWCX Job Coordinator Shelia
Jones, Physician’s Assistant Amanda Collins, Dr. Ojiugo Iko, Dr. Harold Butler,1 Nurse
Cathy Sampson, Nurse Megan Harris, and Nurse Bargery.2
Defendants Foster, Jones, Harris, and Collins have filed a motion for summary
judgment [DE# 82], and Defendant Dr. Iko has filed a motion for summary judgment [DE#
85]. Plaintiff has filed a response to the motions [DE# 89] and a supplemental response [DE#

1
2

On November 4, 2014, Defendants filed a suggestion of death as to Dr. Butler.
Defendants Nurse Sampson and Nurse Bargery have been dismissed from the action.

95]. Defendants have filed a reply to the supplemental response [DE# 97].
For the reasons set forth below, the motions for summary judgment [DE#s 82, 85] are
GRANTED. Plaintiff’s motion for substitution and transportation [DE# 83] is DENIED as
moot.
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). “[T]he burden on the moving party may be discharged by ‘showing’–that is,
pointing out to the district court–that there is an absence of evidence to support the
nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Revised Rule
56(c)(1) provides that “[a] party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed” is
required to support that assertion by:
(A)

citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including
depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or
declarations, stipulations . . . , admissions, interrogatory answers or
other materials;[3] or

(B)

showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or
presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce
admissible evidence to support the fact.

“If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another
party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c)” the district court may:

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“A party may object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a
form that would be admissible in evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). Additionally, Rule 56(c)(4) specifically
provides that “[a]n affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge,
set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on
the matters stated.”

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(1)

give an opportunity to properly support or address the fact;

(2)

consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion;

(3)

grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials–
including the facts considered undisputed–show that the movant is
entitled to it; or

(4)

issue any other appropriate order.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
In Celotex Corp., the Supreme Court explained that Rule 56:
mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery
and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there
can be “no genuine issue as to any material fact,” since a complete failure of
proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The moving party is “entitled
to judgment as a matter of law” because the nonmoving party has failed to
make a sufficient showing on an essential element of [his] case with respect to
which [he] has the burden of proof.
477 U.S. at 322-23. In considering whether to grant summary judgment, “the evidence as
well as the inferences drawn therefrom must be read in the light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion.” Kochins v. Linden-Alimak, Inc., 799 F.2d 1128, 1133 (6th Cir. 1986);
see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986)
(same).
A genuine issue of material fact exists “if the evidence [presented by the non-moving
party] is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

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The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s
position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could
reasonably find for the plaintiff. The judge’s inquiry, therefore, unavoidably
asks whether reasonable jurors could find by a preponderance of the evidence
that the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict[.]”
Id. at 252; see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (“When the moving party has carried its
burden under Rule 56[(a)], its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” (footnote omitted)). However, the court’s
function is not to weigh the evidence, judge credibility, or in any way determine the truth of
the matter. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249. Rather, the inquiry is “whether the evidence
presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so onesided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 251-52.
Plaintiff alleges that, on December 5, 2009, while confined at Hardeman County
Correctional Facility (“HCCF”), he fell and injured his neck. He was transferred to NWCX
on August 20, 2010. Plaintiff alleges that he informed NWCX officials that he required a
bottom bunk due to a medical health classification from the HCCF Doctor. He was told to
take the upper bunk or be written up and to see the NWCX doctor to remedy the problem.
While climbing off the upper bunk, Plaintiff allegedly fell.
On September 8, 2010, Plaintiff was transferred to NWCX, Site II. Plaintiff alleges
that he saw Dr. Iko who refused to move him from his top bunk assignment. Plaintiff alleges
that he again fell from the bunk while climbing down on October 27, 2010. Plaintiff alleges
that he sustained serious injuries, including a broken leg. Plaintiff was moved to a bottom
bunk temporarily.
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On November 12, 2010, Plaintiff was transferred to the Special Needs Facility where
he was examined and received orders for a walking cast, a walking cane, medication, and
surgery. Plaintiff alleges that he contracted a skin infection while at Special Needs. He was
examined by Defendant Dr. Butler who allegedly prescribed no medication for the infection.
Plaintiff allegedly developed sores from the walking cast that were treated twice daily at
NWCX.
Defendants Collins, Foster, Harris, and Jones
Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary judgment because they were not
deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. Under Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 104 (1976), “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes
the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’ ... proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.”
“In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently
harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. It is only such
indifference that can offend ‘evolving standards of decency’ in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.” Id. at 105.
An Eighth Amendment claim consists of objective and subjective components.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992);
Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298; Brooks v. Celeste, 39 F.3d 125, 127-28 (6th Cir. 1994); Hunt v.
Reynolds, 974 F.2d 734, 735 (6th Cir. 1992). The objective component requires that the
deprivation be “sufficiently serious.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8;
Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298. The subjective component requires that the official act with the
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requisite intent, that is, that he have a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Farmer, 511 U.S.
at 834; Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297, 302-03. The official's intent must rise at least to the level
of deliberate indifference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Wilson, 501 U.S. at 303.
In the present case, Plaintiff contends that these defendants knew of and disregarded
an excessive risk to his health and acted with a deliberateness tantamount to an intent to
punish, see Molton v. City of Cleveland, 839 F.2d 240,243 (6th Cir. 1988); Hicks v. Frey, 992
F.2d 1450, 1455 (6th Cir. 1993), by allegedly ignoring his health classification when they
made him use a top bunk bed and assigned him to the position of kitchen helper.
To refute Plaintiff’s claims, Defendants have presented the following evidence in their
statement of undisputed facts [DE# 82-2].
On May 10, 2007, Plaintiff had a physical examination by Dr. Stipanuek at HCCF and
was assigned a health classification of Class A – Full Duty. Affidavit of Amanda Collins at
§3. He received a health classification of Class A – Full Duty after a physical examination
by HCCF Nurse Practitioner Conner on April 9, 2010. Id. No activity restrictions were
assigned to Plaintiff as a result of these physical examinations. Id. Plaintiff’s medical chart
did not show any reason that his health classification should have been changed from the date
of the most recent physical examination through August 2010 when he was transferred to
NWCX. Id. Plaintiff received a Limited Activity Notice with activity restrictions after the
reported fall from his bunk at NWCX on October 27, 2010. Affidavit of Amanda Collins at
§12.
The affidavit of Defendant Collins, a physician’s assistant, states that she did not
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refuse Plaintiff any medically necessary treatment at any time, and her review of the medical
chart shows that no other health care providers at NWCX refused Plaintiff any medically
necessary treatment. Id. at §12. The affidavit also states that at no time did Defendant Collins
refuse to change Plaintiff’s health classification. Id.
The affidavit of Defendant Harris, a licensed practical nurse, states that she did not
refuse Plaintiff any medically necessary treatment or medication at any time. Affidavit of
Megan Harris at §7.
Defendant Jones was NWCX-Site 1 Jobs Coordinator, and her job responsibilities
included making inmate job assignments at NWCX-Site 1. Affidavit of Sheila Jones at §1.
On August 25, 2010, after Plaintiff was transferred to NWCX-Site-1, he was assigned to the
position of kitchen helper. Id. at §4. This assignment was consistent with his Class A – Full
Duty health classification. Id. Duties of a kitchen helper include mopping floors, washing
dishes and other cleaning duties. Id. Defendant Jones did not assign Plaintiff to a job
position that violated his health classification. Id. at §5. Plaintiff had no medically assigned
activity restrictions on August 25, 2010. Id.
In response, Plaintiff has submitted his own medical records “with highlighted notes.”
[DE# 95 at p. 2]. He claims that he was moved to a bottom bunk by the HCCF physician on
March 11, 2010, because of his neck and shoulder injury from his first fall. He also notes that
he was moved to a bottom bunk after his October 27, 2010, fall at NWCX. He acknowledges
that his neck and shoulder injuries were treated while he was at HCCF and at NWCX. [DE#
95 at p. 4].
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It is undisputed that Plaintiff was transferred to NWCX on August 20, 2010, and
between that date and August 30, 2011, Plaintiff had a Class A – Full Duty health
classification. His health classification was not changed until August 30, 2011, although he
received a Limited Activity Notice with activity restrictions after his October 27, 2010, fall.
[DE# 95 at p. 3]. The court finds, as a matter of law, that Defendants were entitled to rely
on that classification.
As explained in Espey v. Spectrum Health System, Inc., 2011 WL 2516638 (M.D.
Tenn.),
In Silas v. McGinnis, 2001 WL 1450717, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct.31, 2001), a pro
se prisoner sued multiple prison officials contending that they were
deliberately indifferent to his back condition when they assigned him to work
in the prison's food services area despite a 1994 MRI showing some
degenerative changes in his lower back. The Silas court determined, however,
that the prisoner's treating physician never placed any lifting restrictions on
him and, as such, prison officials “had no objective medical evidence that he
could not work in the food services area.” Id. Moreover, there could be no
deliberate indifference because the prisoner was sent for an examination by
medical personnel as soon as he began complaining about his inability to work
due to his back pain. Id. Similarly, in Harris v. Westbrooks, 2007 WL
1047594, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Apr.4, 2007), the pro se prisoner plaintiff, a
participant in the TVDP program, had a medical status listed as “Medical
Evaluation: Class B Medical, Medications/Restrictions: Three medications for
Hypertension/Lifting 100 lbs maximum-medium work only ...” Id. The
prisoner then sued multiple prison officials, including Defendant Daniel,
alleging that Defendant Daniel had assigned him to the community service
work detail despite her awareness of his medical status. Id. The court
dismissed the claim against Defendant Daniel because she “assigned the
plaintiff to the community services work detail based on his medical status as
it was known to her.” Id. at *3; see also Knight v. Wiseman, 590 F.3d 458, 465
(7th Cir.2009) (prison officials were entitled to rely on the absence of work
restrictions on prisoner's record and conclude that he could work without
endangering his health).

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2011 WL 2516638 at *14.
In the present case, as in Espey, Silas, Harris, and Knight, Defendant prison officials
were entitled to rely on the absence of restrictions in Plaintiff’s record and could conclude
that he did not have to be assigned a bottom bunk and could work as a kitchen helper without
endangering his health. Therefore, they were not deliberately indifferent to his serious
medical needs and are entitled to summary judgment.
Defendants Iko and Butler
In his own motion for summary judgment, Defendant Dr. Iko relies on the affidavits,
medical records, and arguments submitted by his co-defendants, as discussed above, which
show that Plaintiff did, in fact, receive treatment for his alleged neck and shoulder injuries.
A prisoner must plead facts showing that “prison authorities have denied reasonable
requests for medical treatment in the face of an obvious need for such attention where the
inmate is thereby exposed to undue suffering or the threat of tangible residual injury."
Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 (6th Cir. 1976). The Court clarified the meaning of
deliberate indifference in Farmer v. Brennan as the reckless disregard of a substantial risk
of serious harm; mere negligence will not suffice. Id. 511 U.S. at 835-36. Consequently,
allegations of medical malpractice or negligent diagnosis and treatment fail to state an Eighth
Amendment claim of cruel and unusual punishment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106.
Here, the record shows that Plaintiff received adequate medical care. The complaint
itself states that Plaintiff was “examined” by Defendants. Defendants are correct that
Plaintiff needs to establish more than a simple medical malpractice claim. See Comstock v.
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McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 703 (6th Cir.2001) (“The requirement that the official have
subjectively perceived a risk of harm and then disregarded it is meant to prevent the
constitutionalization of medical malpractice claims.”). In disputes “over the adequacy of the
treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments.”
Westlake, 537 F.2d 857 at 860 n. 5. But at the same time, “[a] government doctor has a duty
to do more than simply provide some treatment to a prisoner who has serious medical needs.”
See LeMarbe v. Wisneski, 266 F.3d 429, 439 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Similarly, the fact that Dr.
Wisneski eventually referred LeMarbe to a specialist does not automatically immunize Dr.
Wisneski from liability for LeMarbe's intervening injuries. For, as many federal courts have
recognized, a deliberately indifferent delay in giving or obtaining treatment may also amount
to a violation under the Eighth Amendment.”).
In the present case, Plaintiff has not shown that Defendants had a “sufficiently
culpable state of mind” so as to satisfy the subjective component of his Eighth Amendment
claim based on his allegations that Defendant Dr. Iko refused to move him to a bottom bunk,
despite his previous injuries and fear of falling, Defendant’s “examination” of him consisted
of looking at his knee from across the room, and Defendant failed to follow the orders of the
specialist, Dr. Sharon Albers. See Plaintiff’s response [DE# 61]. Therefore, Dr. Iko is
entitled to summary judgment.
As for Defendant Dr. Butler, defense counsel filed a “Suggestion of Death of
Defendant Harold Butler” on November 4, 2014. On November 28, 2014, Plaintiff moved
for Defendant’s estate and/or employer to be substituted as the defendant pursuant to Rule
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25 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [DE# 83].
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a) provides in relevant part:
(1) Substitution if the Claim Is Not Extinguished If a party dies and the claim
is not extinguished, the court may order substitution of the proper party. A
motion for substitution may be made by any party or by the decedent's
successor or representative. If the motion is not made within 90 days after
service of a statement noting the death, the action by or against the decedent
must be dismissed.
...
(3) Service. A motion to substitute, together with a notice of hearing, must be
served on the parties as provided in Rule 5 and on nonparties as provided in
Rule 4. A statement noting death must be served in the same manner. Service
may be made in any judicial district.
In the present case, Plaintiff has not named the “proper party” for substitution in his
motion. Instead, Plaintiff asks that Defendant Dr. Butler’s estate, employer, and insurance
company be substituted for Dr. Butler. There is nothing in the record showing that Plaintiff
served his motion on these nonparties as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(a)(3) or even the
identity of these nonparties.
However, the motion for substitution is moot, because the undisputed facts, as
evidenced by Plaintiff’s medical record, show that Defendant Dr. Butler did, in fact, treat
Plaintiff’s various conditions and/or refer Plaintiff to other providers for treatment. See, e.g.,
DE#96-1 at pp. 13, 47, 71, 147, 152-158, DE# 96-2 at pp. 19-22, 64-67, 93, DE# 96-3 at pp.
49, 53, 57, 65, 73, 83, 89, 99, 103, 105, 107, 115, 121, 123, 125.4

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Plaintiff has submitted 550 pages of medical records with “highlighted notes on the top 54 pages”
but has pointed to no specific records that dispute Defendants claims that he received adequate medical care. “The
Court has no duty when deciding a motion for summary judgment to scour the record for evidence that supports a
plaintiff's claim.” Abdulsalaam v. Franklin County Bd. of Com'rs, 637 F. Supp.2d 561, 576 (S.D. Ohio 2009) (citing
Williamson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 481 F.3d 369, 379 (6th Cir.2007)).

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The deliberate indifference standard is not met by complaints setting forth primarily
a difference of opinion about the course of treatment afforded an inmate. See Pohlman v.
Stokes, 687 F. Supp. 1179, 1182 (S.D. Ohio 1987); Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107. Plaintiff’s
medical records show that he has received more than adequate medical care and treatment
on numerous occasions from all of the defendants, including Defendant Dr. Butler.
Summary and Conclusion
Because Defendants have refuted Plaintiff’s claim that they were deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical needs and Plaintiff has pointed to no countervailing
evidence that creates a disputed issue of material fact, the court finds that Defendants are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and the motions for summary judgment [DE#s 82,
85] are GRANTED. Plaintiff’s motion for substitution and transportation [DE# 83] is
DENIED as moot.
The clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ James D. Todd
JAMES D. TODD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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