Perkins v. Smith et al

Filing 33

ORDER GRANTING 11 DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS. Signed by Judge J. Daniel Breen on 3/6/13. (Breen, J.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION
ERNESTINE MARIE PERKINS,
Plaintiff,
v.

No. 1:12-cv-01023-JDB-egb

SOUTHWEST HUMAN RESOURCE AGENCY
and SOUTHWEST HUMAN RESOURCE AGENCY
BOARD OF DIRECTORS,
Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

Before this Court is Defendant, Southwest Human Resource Agency Board of Directors’
(“Board”), motion to dismiss Plaintiff, Ernestine Marie Perkin’s, claims against it pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (D.E. 11.) For the forgoing reasons,
Defendant’s motion is GRANTED.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 25, 2012, Perkins filed a pro se action against Defendants Mike Smith,
Southwest Human Resource Agency (“SWHRA”), and the Board alleging racial discrimination
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. (D.E. 1.) Plaintiff, an African-American
female, contends that she was fired when another white female co-worker complained to Smith
after a dispute arose between her and Plaintiff. (Id.) On April 16, 2012, the Court dismissed
Perkins’ claims against Smith and ordered the Clerk to issue and effect service of process for
SWHRA and the Board. (D.E. 6.) The Board filed the instant motion on May 10, 2012 to which
Plaintiff responded after being directed to do so by the Court. (D.E. 17, 20.)

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
Defendant contends that Perkins did not satisfy her pleading burden and failed to submit
factual matters sufficient to state a claim for relief. Specifically, the Board argues that while
Plaintiff made a number of allegations with respect to Smith, she did not assert any facts
suggesting that the Board took action against her or treated members outside her protected class
more favorably. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)). “Accepting
all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, the Court ‘consider[s] the factual allegations
in [the] complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.’” Williams v.
Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681, 129 S. Ct. at 1951).
“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual
allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of [her] ‘entitle[ment] to relief’
requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1964–65 (internal citations
omitted).
Here, Perkins fails to assert any facts linking the actions of the Board to her job loss. The
only mention of the Board in Plaintiff’s complaint is her inclusion of it as a defendant. She
provides no indication as to how the Board played a role in her termination or that it
discriminated against her in any way. While pro se complaints are not held to the same standards
as formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, and should be construed liberally, Williams, 631 F. 3d at
383, they are not excused from the requirements imposed by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). Here, even reading Perkin’s

complaint liberally she has made no factual claim entitling her to recovery from the Board.
Therefore, the Board’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against it is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 6th day of March, 2013.

s/ J. DANIEL BREEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE