Sipes et al v. Madison County Sheriff's Department et al
Filing
67
ORDER denying Motion to Set Aside Judgment 64 , 65 . Signed by Chief Judge J. Daniel Breen on 1/16/15. (mac)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION
GLADYS SIPES, individually,
as next of kin, and personal representative
of decedent CHRISTOPHER BARON
REID, and BRANDY COLLINS, natural
sibling of decedent CHRISTOPHER
BARON REID,
Plaintiffs,
v.
No. 12-1130
MADISON COUNTY, et al.
Defendants.
_____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF GLADYS SIPES’S
MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT
_____________________________________________________________________________
Before the Court is the motion of Plaintiff, Gladys Sipes, for relief from its June 24,
2014, judgment, pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Docket Entry
(“D.E.”) 64.) Defendants, Madison County, the Madison County Sherriff’s Department, and a
number of law enforcement officials, responded on October 20, 2014. (D.E. 66.) The motion is
now ripe for disposition.
I. Background
On June 4, 2012, this action was brought on behalf of the decedent, Christopher Baron
Reid, by Sipes, who is Reid’s mother and representative of the estate, and Brandy Collins, his
sister. (D.E. 1.) The complaint included several state law claims along with allegations that
Defendants deprived Reid of his constitutional rights while acting under color of law in violation
42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. at 7–17.)
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, (D.E. 49), and the Court granted it in
part on May 16, 2014. (D.E. 60.) The order dismissed the state law claims, which Sipes and
Collins abandoned, and the claims brought in their individual capacity because Sipes and Collins
were not the proper parties to bring suit on behalf of Reid under Tennessee state law. (Id. at 5–8.)
As the decedent’s sibling, Collins’s right to bring suit was inferior to Sipes’s as his mother. See
Tenn. Code Ann. § 31-2-104. 1 Sipes’s right to sue in her individual capacity was, in turn, inferior
to that of Reid’s son, whose existence Sipes acknowledged in her deposition. See Tenn. Code
Ann. § 20-5-106(a). Because the child, as the statutory beneficiary, was the real party in interest,
the Court also held that Sipes could not maintain the action on behalf of the estate unless he was
named in the complaint and ratified the lawsuit. (D.E. 60 at 9–10.) Sipes received thirty days to
file an amended complaint including Reid’s son and to obtain consent from his parent or
guardian, or she would face dismissal for lack of standing. (Id. at 10.)
By June 17, 2014, the thirty day period to amend the complaint had passed without Sipes
making any filing, and Defendants moved to dismiss the case for failure to prosecute. (D.E. 61.)
The Court granted their motion for summary judgment as to all remaining claims, (D.E. 62), and
entered final judgment in Defendants’ favor on June 24, 2014, (D.E. 63).
Over three months later, Sipes filed the present motion, requesting relief under Rule
60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (D.E. 64.) She claims that the judgment should be
set aside under Rule 60(b)(1) for “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect” because
“Defendants will not be prejudiced by Plaintiff obtaining relief”; Plaintiff “has a ‘meritorious’
claim” that is “good at law”; and “Plaintiff’s conduct was not willful in failing to comply with
the Court’s condition of obtaining consent to proceed.” (D.E. 65 at 3–6.) Further, she avers that
relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is proper because the statute of limitations would not bar Reid’s son
1
Collins also conceded that she lacked standing to sue in her individual capacity. (D.E. 57 at 1.)
2
from bringing another action, or, in the alternative, that “a truly harsh result would come to pass”
if a subsequent suit by the minor was time-barred. (Id. at 7–10.) Defendants respond that Plaintiff
failed to establish excusable neglect by not providing a reason for her delay, that her
misunderstanding as to whether she was initially entitled to file suit in her own name does not
support relief under 60(b)(1), and that she still had not offered any direct proof that she obtained
the proper consent to maintain the case. (D.E. 66 at 5–7.) As to Sipes’s 60(b)(6) arguments,
Defendants assert that because “relief is foreclosed under subsection (b)(1)[,] . . . . subsection
(b)(6) is not available.” (Id. at 8.)
II. Legal Standards
Rule 60(b) provides, in relevant part, that “[o]n motion and just terms, the court may
relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; . . . or (6) any other
reason that justifies relief.” A Rule 60(b) motion may only be granted for one of the reasons
specifically identified in the rule. Feathers v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 141 F.3d 264, 268 (6th Cir.
1998). A party relying on 60(b) “must show the applicability of the rule.” Jinks v. AlliedSignal,
Inc., 250 F.3d 381, 385 (6th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). Stated differently, “[a]s a prerequisite
to relief under Rule 60(b), a party must establish that the facts of its case are within one of the
enumerated reasons contained in Rule 60(b) that warrant relief from judgment.” Johnson v.
Unknown Dellatifa, 357 F.3d 539, 543 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Lewis v. Alexander, 987 F.2d
392, 396 (6th Cir. 1993)). 2 “[R]elief under Rule 60(b) is circumscribed by public policy favoring
2
Defendants cite Info-Hold, Inc. v. Sound Merch., Inc., 538 F.3d 448, 454 (6th Cir. 2008) (citations
omitted), for the proposition that “the party seeking relief under Rule 60(b) bears the burden of establishing the
grounds for such relief by clear and convincing evidence.” While this language appears to apply the clear and
convincing standard to all of 60(b)’s subsections, Info-Hold only concerned 60(b)(3) and (6) motions, see id. at 455–
59, and recent decisions can be interpreted to limit this holding to motions under 60(b)(2), (3), and (6). See, e.g.,
Thurmond v. Wayne Cnty. Sheriff Dep’t, 564 F. App’x 823, 827 (6th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he party seeking relief under
Rule 60(b)(3) bears the burden of showing entitlement to such relief by clear and convincing evidence.”); JPMorgan
3
finality of judgments and termination of litigation.” Tyler v. Anderson, 749 F.3d 499, 509 (6th
Cir. 2014) (citing Thompson v. Bell, 580 F.3d 423, 442 (6th Cir. 2009)), cert. denied sub nom.
Tyler v. Lazaroff, 135 S. Ct. 370 (2014).
Before addressing arguments under 60(b)(6), this “[C]ourt must first analyze whether
[60(b)](1) applies.” DirecTV, Inc. v. Turk, 282 F. App’x 382, 384 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Pioneer
Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 393 (1993)). Relief under Rule
60(b)(1) is proper “in only two situations: (1) when a party has made an excusable mistake or an
attorney has acted without authority, or (2) when the judge has made a substantive mistake of
law or fact in the final judgment or order.” United States v. Reyes, 307 F.3d 451, 455 (6th Cir.
2002) (citing Cacevic v. City of Hazel Park, 226 F.3d 483, 490 (6th Cir. 2000)). Because
Plaintiff does not claim that her counsel took unauthorized action or that the Court made a
mistake of fact or law, only whether an excusable mistake occurred is at issue. “In determining
whether relief is appropriate under Rule 60(b)(1),” three factors control the analysis: “(1)
culpability—that is, whether the neglect was excusable; (2) any prejudice to the opposing party;
and (3) whether the party holds a meritorious underlying claim or defense. A party seeking relief
must first demonstrate a lack of culpability before the court examines the remaining two factors.”
Yeschick v. Mineta, 675 F.3d 622, 628–29 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Flynn v. People’s Choice
Home Loans, Inc., 440 F. App’x 452, 457–58 (6th Cir. 2011)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Because the “acts and omissions” of attorneys are attributable to their clients, “the
proper focus is upon whether the neglect of [the parties] and their counsel was excusable.” Id. at
Chase Bank, N.A. v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 750 F.3d 573, 584 (6th Cir. 2014) (considering a 60(b)(2) motion), as
amended, (July 2, 2014); Green v. Bank of Am. Corp., 530 F. App’x 426, 429–31 (6th Cir. 2013) (considering (b)(2)
and (b)(3) claims); Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. J.O.A. Const. Co., 479 F. App’x 684, 693 (6th Cir. 2012)
(“[R]elief under either subsection (b)(3) or (b)(6) requires clear and convincing evidence.”). Regardless, the Court
need not determine whether the clear and convincing standard also applies to motions under 60(b)(1) because
Plaintiff has not shown that she is entitled to relief by even a preponderance of the evidence.
4
629 (alteration in original) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court has
identified four relevant factors for courts to use in “determining whether a party’s neglect of a
deadline is excusable”: (1) “the danger of prejudice to [the non-moving party],” (2) “the length
of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings,” (3) “the reason for the delay,
including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant,” and (4) “whether the
movant acted in good faith.” Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395; see also Yeschick, 675 F.3d at 629.
Under Rule 60(b)(6), this Court’s discretion has been said to be “especially broad.” Tyler,
749 F.3d at 509 (quoting Hopper, 867 F.2d at 294). In practice, however, exercise of this
discretion is “limited to ‘unusual and extreme situations where principles of equity mandate
relief.’” McGuire v. Warden, Chillicothe Corr. Inst., 738 F.3d 741, 750 (6th Cir. 2013)
(emphasis in original) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Mustangs Unlimited, Inc., 487 F.3d 465, 468
(6th Cir. 2007)), cert. denied sub nom. McGuire v. Robinson, 134 S. Ct. 998 (2014).
“[E]xceptional or extraordinary circumstances” are required for relief under Rule 60(b)(6). Id.;
see also 11 Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil § 2857 (3d ed.
2014).
III. Analysis
A.
Rule 60(b)(1)
Sipes has failed to show that she is entitled to relief under 60(b)(1) because she has not
“demonstrate[d] a lack of culpability” sufficient to excuse her own neglect or that of her counsel.
Yeschick, 675 F.3d at 629 (citation omitted). Plaintiff argues that she lacks culpability because,
after the entry of the Court’s order, she immediately sought the necessary consent; the child’s
mother gave the consent three days after the thirty day period had expired; and “Plaintiff could
not proceed in absence [sic] of such consent per th[e] Court’s [o]rder.” (D.E. 65 at 5.) She has
5
not offered, however, a reason for her failure to request additional time before the deadline
expired. Nor has she explained why she did not notify the Court that she had obtained the
required consent in the five days that passed before entry of the final order. Taken together, the
Pioneer factors do not weigh in favor of finding Plaintiff’s neglect excusable.
Sipes contends that setting aside the judgment would not prejudice Defendants because
the parties have already completed discovery, and all that remains is to proceed to a ruling either
on summary judgment or at trial. (D.E. 65 at 3–4.) In their response, Defendants did not refute
this. While recognizing that a party faced with a case reopening months after the final judgment
may be at a disadvantage, especially where the opposing party had the opportunity to continue its
preparations, the Court finds that any prejudice here would be minimal. 3
Plaintiff delayed notifying the Court of the consent for over three months after she
obtained it. Other courts have found similar delays to adversely affect proceedings. See, e.g., TriCorner Investments LLC v. First Def. Int’l Grp., Inc., 361 F. App’x 629, 632 (6th Cir. 2010);
Howard v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 306 F. App’x 265, 267–68 (6th Cir. 2009). In
Howard, the panel found that a “three-week delay interfered with the district court’s ability to
expediently resolve [a] summary judgment motion prior to trial and mediation” and supported a
finding of “prejudice to judicial administration” in the case. Howard, 306 F. App’x at 267. Here,
granting the motion would cause even more delay because the trial date has long since passed.
(See D.E. 43 at 1 (setting trial for July 21, 2014).) Sipes’s actions have already negatively
3
Plaintiff cites two cases in support of her argument concerning lack of prejudice. These decisions,
however, dealt with motions to set aside default judgments rather than a motion to set aside a ruling on summary
judgment. See United Coin Meter Co. v. Seaboard Coastline RR., 705 F.2d 839, 840 (6th Cir. 1983); Rooks v. Am.
Brass Co., 263 F.2d 166, 169 (6th Cir. 1959). Outside the default judgment context, the Sixth Circuit has upheld a
district court’s denial of a Rule 60(b) motion even where the defendant would suffer no prejudice. See Howard v.
Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 306 F. App’x 265, 266 (6th Cir. 2009).
6
impacted the proceedings, and granting her motion would only exacerbate the problem.
Consequently, this factor weighs against setting aside the judgment.
The nature of the reason given for the delay also weighs against setting aside the
judgment. Plaintiff argues that she promptly searched for the child’s mother and informed her of
the pending action and the need for her approval. (D.E. 65 at 5.) The mother “took time to
consider the action and whether she would consent . . . .” (Id.) She eventually provided
authorization three days after time had expired. (Id.) This, however, does not explain why Sipes
did not request an extension of time once the deadline approached or why it took well over three
months for her to inform the Court that she had obtained permission to add the child to the suit.
While Plaintiff contends that she “could not proceed in absence of [the] consent,” (id.), nothing
prevented her from requesting more time or promptly bringing the matter to the Court’s
attention. She has, therefore, “failed to present a compelling explanation” for her delay.
Tri-Corner, 361 F. App’x at 632.
The issue of whether Sipes acted in good faith is close. Her attorney claims to have
sought consent immediately after the Court entered the order granting thirty days to obtain it,
(D.E. 65 at 5), and Defendants do not specifically allege that she acted in bad faith, (see D.E.
66). As noted above, however, Plaintiff failed to request additional time, although she was fully
aware of the impending deadline, or notify the Court of the approval before final judgment, even
though she had sufficient opportunity. While it does not appear that Sipes acted with any
improper purpose, she did not act with “faithfulness to [her] duty or obligation.” Black’s Law
Dictionary 808 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “good faith”); see also Yeschick, 675 F.3d at 631
(“[G]ross carelessness or inadvertent conduct that results in judgment will not give rise to a
7
successful claim of excusable neglect if the facts demonstrate a lack of diligence.”). Therefore,
she did not act entirely in good faith.
On balance, these factors do not support a finding of excusable neglect. Not all of the
Pioneer factors have the same weight; “the reason for the delay is the factor that is most critical
to the excusable neglect inquiry.” Proctor v. N. Lakes Cmty. Mental Health, 560 F. App’x 453,
459 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Munoz, 605 F.3d 359, 372 (6th Cir. 2010)). As
discussed above, Plaintiff has not provided an adequate explanation for her delay. Granting relief
would also adversely impact the proceedings, and Sipes has “demonstrate[d] a lack of diligence.”
Yeschick, 675 F.3d at 631 (citation omitted). Though the danger of prejudice to Defendants is
relatively low, this does not outweigh the other Pioneer factors under these facts. See Howard v.
Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 306 F. App’x 265, 266 (6th Cir. 2009) (upholding a denial of
relief under 60(b)(1) where the defendant suffered no prejudice). Because Plaintiff’s neglect was
not excusable, this Court need not address the remaining two prongs of the 60(b)(1) analysis. See
Flynn, 440 F. App’x at 458.
B.
Rule 60(b)(6)
Sipes maintains that she is entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(6) because the statute of
limitations for the child’s claims should be tolled during his minority; thus, “the action should
continue.” (D.E. 65 at 9.) Alternatively, she points out that the child would be “foreclosed from
any recovery” if tolling does not occur, creating “a truly harsh result” that could be avoided by
granting her motion. (Id.) Relief under 60(b)(6), however, is limited to “exceptional or
extraordinary circumstances [that] are not addressed by the first five numbered clauses of the
Rule.” McGuire, 738 F.3d at 750 (quoting Mustangs Unlimited, 487 F.3d at 468). Under the facts
of this case, no extraordinary circumstances exist that would justify setting aside the judgment.
8
Sipes has not cited any authority indicating that uncertainty about whether a limitations period
has run can support a 60(b)(6) motion, (see D.E. 65), and the Sixth Circuit has suggested that
60(b)(6) generally does not provide a mechanism to address statute of limitations concerns where
an improper party was named in a wrongful death action, see McCurry ex rel. Turner v.
Adventist Health Sys./Sunbelt, Inc., 298 F.3d 586, 597–98 (6th Cir. 2002). Moreover, limitations
periods apply in almost all civil cases; therefore, the threat that an action may be time-barred is
not “exceptional or extraordinary.” See Powell v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 1:06CV00603, 2007
WL 6861068, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 14, 2007) (finding that a “claim regarding the statute of
limitations is not ‘exceptional or extraordinary’ and does not warrant relief under Rule
60(b)(6)”), aff’d, 303 F. App’x 284 (6th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, Sipes is not entitled to relief
under 60(b)(6). 4
IV. Conclusion
Plaintiff has not established that she is entitled to relief under Rule 60(b). She has not
shown excusable neglect that would make relief under 60(b)(1) proper, nor has she pointed to
any exceptional or extraordinary circumstances to support setting aside the judgment under
60(b)(6). For these reasons, and those previously discussed, the motion is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 16th day of January, 2015.
s/ J. DANIEL BREEN
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
4
Because the judgment still stands, the issue of whether the statute of limitations should be tolled is not
before the Court. This order, therefore, expresses no opinion on the matter.
9
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?