Crutchfield v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 17

ORDER AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER. Signed by Chief Judge S. Thomas Anderson on 5/8/17. (Anderson, S.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION
TERRI CRUTCHFIELD,

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Plaintiff,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

Case No: 1:13-cv-01028-STA-dkv

ORDER AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER
__
Plaintiff Terri Crutchfield filed this action to obtain judicial review of Defendant
Commissioner’s final decision denying her application for disability insurance benefits under
Title II of the Social Security Act (“Act”). Plaintiff’s application was denied initially and upon
reconsideration by the Social Security Administration. Plaintiff then requested a hearing before
an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), which was held on April 19, 2012. On May 24, 2012, the
ALJ denied the claim. The Appeals Council subsequently denied the request for review. Thus,
the decision of the ALJ became the Commissioner’s final decision. For the reasons set forth
below, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a claimant may obtain judicial review of any final decision
made by the Commissioner after a hearing to which he was a party. “The court shall have the
power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying,
or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the

1

cause for a rehearing.”1 The court’s review is limited to determining whether there is substantial
evidence to support the Commissioner’s decision,2 and whether the correct legal standards were
applied.3
Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.”4 It is “more than a mere scintilla of evidence, but less than a
preponderance.”5 The Commissioner, not the Court, is charged with the duty to weigh the
evidence, to make credibility determinations and resolve material conflicts in the testimony, and
to decide the case accordingly.6

When substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s

determination, it is conclusive, even if substantial evidence also supports the opposite
conclusion.7
Plaintiff was born on August 21, 1957. She has a GED and past relevant work as a
kitchen manager. Plaintiff alleges that she has been unable to work since August 21, 2010, due
to irritable bowel syndrome, celiac disease, frequent rashes and sores on her body, hypertension,
diabetes with neuropathy, back pain, depression, abdominal pain, gallbladder removal, right
1

42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

2

Id.

3

Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997). See also Landsaw v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs, 803 F.2d 211, 213 (6th Cir. 1986).
4

Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 772 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.
389 (1971)).
5

Bell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 105 F.3d 244, 245 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Consolidated Edison Co.
v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
6

Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997); Crum v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d
642, 644 (6th Cir. 1990); Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984).
7

Warner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 375 F.3d 387, 390 (6th Cir. 2004).
2

ankle surgery with hardware, chronic recurrent anal fissures, and hemorrhoids. Plaintiff initially
alleged disability beginning on July 1, 2010, but, at the administrative hearing, she amended her
onset date to August 21, 2010.
The ALJ made the following findings: (1) Plaintiff met the insured status requirements
through December 31, 2015; (2) Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the
alleged onset date; (3) Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: diabetes mellitus,
peripheral neuropathy, and adjustment disorder; but she does not have impairments, either alone
or in combination, that meet or equal the requirements of any listed impairment contained in 20
C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1 of the listing of impairments; (4) Plaintiff retains the residual
functional capacity to perform medium work except that she can only sit, stand, and walk in
combination for a total of eight hours in a regular workday and must have a sit/stand option; she
cannot climb ladders and scaffolds; she can frequently perform the following activities: climbing
stairs and ramps, handling, fingering, feeling, reaching overhead, operating foot controls,
stooping, and crouching; she can occasionally perform the following activities: balancing,
kneeling, crawling, and being exposed to humidity, wetness, vibration, and temperature
extremes; she must avoid being exposed to hazards such as frequent exposure to moving
machinery and driving; she must completely avoid irritating inhalants; she can understand,
remember, and carry out short, simple instructions only and can make judgments on simple
work-related decisions; (5) Plaintiff is unable to perform her past relevant work; (6) Plaintiff was
an individual closing approaching advanced age with a high school education on the alleged
onset date; (7) transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability
because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that Plaintiff is
not disabled whether or not he has transferable job skills; (8) considering Plaintiff’s age,

3

education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in
significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform; (9) Plaintiff was not
under a disability as defined in the Act at any time through the date of this decision.8
The Social Security Act defines disability as the inability to engage in substantial gainful
activity.9 The claimant bears the ultimate burden of establishing an entitlement to benefits.10
The initial burden of going forward is on the claimant to show that she is disabled from engaging
in her former employment; the burden of going forward then shifts to the Commissioner to
demonstrate the existence of available employment compatible with the claimant’s disability and
background.11
The Commissioner conducts the following, five-step analysis to determine if an
individual is disabled within the meaning of the Act:
1. An individual who is engaging in substantial gainful activity will not be found to be
disabled regardless of medical findings.
2. An individual who does not have a severe impairment will not be found to be disabled.
3. A finding of disability will be made without consideration of vocational factors, if an
individual is not working and is suffering from a severe impairment which meets the duration
requirement and which meets or equals a listed impairment in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of the
regulations.
4. An individual who can perform work that he or she has done in the past will not be
found to be disabled.

8

R. 12-20.

9

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1).

10

Born v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs, 923 F.2d 1168, 1173 (6th Cir. 1990).

11

Id.
4

5. If an individual cannot perform his or her past work, other factors including age,
education, past work experience and residual functional capacity must be considered to
determine if other work can be performed.12
Further review is not necessary if it is determined that an individual is not disabled at
any point in this sequential analysis.13 Here, the sequential analysis proceeded to the fifth step
with a finding that, although Plaintiff cannot perform her past relevant work, there is a
substantial number of jobs that exist in the national economy that she can perform.
Plaintiff argues that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s findings.

She

specifically argues that the ALJ erred by not properly evaluating the medical evidence in the
record, especially the opinion on her treating physician; not properly assessing her credibility;
and failing to present an accurate hypothetical to the vocational expert based on a proper residual
capacity finding. Plaintiff’s arguments are not persuasive.
Weighing of Medical Evidence
Medical opinions are to be weighed by the process set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c).
Under the treating physician rule, an ALJ must give controlling weight to the opinion of a
claimant’s treating physician if it “is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in
[the claimant’s] case record.”14 The term “not inconsistent” is meant to convey that “a wellsupported treating source medical opinion need not be supported directly by all of the other

12

Willbanks v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs, 847 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1988).

13

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a).

14

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2).
5

evidence, (i.e., it does not have to be consistent with all the other evidence) as long as there is no
other substantial evidence in the case record that contradicts or conflicts with the opinion.”15
If an ALJ decides that the opinion of a treating source should not be given controlling
weight, the ALJ must take certain factors into consideration when determining how much weight
to give the opinion, including “the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of
examination, the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, supportability of the opinion,
consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole, and the specialization of the treating
source.”16 Any decision denying benefits “must contain specific reasons for the weight given to
the treating source’s medical opinion, supported by the evidence in the case record, and must be
sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to
the treating source's medical opinion and the reasons for that weight.”17 In the present case, the
ALJ properly weighed the opinion of Dr. Jerold White, who Plaintiff’s describes as her “treating
physician” and gave specific reasons for the weight given Dr. White’s opinion.
In connection with Plaintiff’s claim for unemployment insurance benefits, Dr. White
provided a medical certificate in which he stated that he treated Plaintiff from August 17, 2010,
to September 20, 2010, for non-insulin dependent diabetes.18 Dr. White opined that Plaintiff was
unable to work and that her condition was serious enough to necessitate her leaving work as of
August 17, 2010.19 The ALJ gave Dr. White’s opinion no weight because it was not based on

15

Soc. Sec. Rul. 96–2P.

16

Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004).

17

Soc. Sec. Rul. 96–2P.

18

R. 245.

19

Id.
6

longitudinal medical evidence in that Dr. White indicated that Plaintiff had only been under his
care for about a month.
Although Plaintiff insists that Dr. White had a twenty-year history of treating her prior to
rendering his opinion, Dr. White himself said on the medical certificate that he treated Plaintiff
from August 2010 to September 2010. Furthermore, Dr. White was listed as Plaintiff’s primary
care physician only from 2000 to 2004, according to Plaintiff’s medical history from TransSouth
Health Care and the Digestive Disease Clinic.20 All other treatment notes are from various other
doctors. Therefore, the ALJ could properly conclude that Dr. White only treated Plaintiff for a
month during the relevant time period. Because Dr. White did not have an ongoing treating
relationship with Plaintiff during the period at issue and at the time he rendered his opinion, the
ALJ could not consider Dr. White as a treating physician under the regulations.21
In addition to considering Dr. White’s limited treatment of Plaintiff, the ALJ gave the
opinion no weight because the opinion did not take into consideration the improvements that
resulted after Plaintiff’s diabetes was stabilized with medication. Dr. White diagnosed diabetes
and peripheral neuropathy in August 2010. Treatment notes dated August 2011 to March 2012
show that Plaintiff did not have a glucometer and was not checking her blood sugar. After
receiving a glucometer and prescription for Glimepiride, Plaintiff’s diabetes was deemed
controlled, and she reported no side effects from her medication.22

20

Plaintiff’s physical

R. 220-43.

21

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502 (defining a treating physician as one with an ongoing treatment
relationship with claimant and providing that an ongoing treatment relationship is when the
medical evidence establishes that a claimant “see[s], or ha[s] seen the source with a frequency
consistent with accepted medical practice for the type of treatment and/or evaluation required for
your medical condition(s)”).
22

R. 295- 314.
7

examinations revealed no musculoskeletal symptoms, normal sensation and motor, normal range
of motion of all her joints, no rashes, and no reported complaints of numbness.23
Dr. White’s opinion is also inconsistent with the findings of Dr. Leonard Hayden. R. 276279. Based on his examination of Plaintiff, Dr. Hayden opined that Plaintiff has no significant
work limitations but must comply with her prescribed medication in order to prevent
complications from diabetes.24 State agency consultants are highly qualified specialists who are
also experts in the Social Security disability programs, and their opinions may be entitled to great
weight if the evidence supports their opinions.25 Generally, an opinion from a medical source
who has examined a claimant is given more weight than that from a source who has not
performed an examination,26 and an opinion from a medical source who regularly treats the
claimant is afforded more weight than that from a source who has examined the claimant but
does not have an ongoing treatment relationship.27 In other words, “[t]he regulations provide
progressively more rigorous tests for weighing opinions as the ties between the source of the
opinion and the individual become weaker.”28

Opinions from nontreating sources are not

assessed for “controlling weight.” Instead, these opinions are weighed based on specialization,
consistency, supportability, and any other factors “which tend to support or contradict the

23

Id.

24

R. 17, 281-284.

25

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(2)(i); Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-6p.

26

20 C.F.R. § 404.1502, 404.1527(c)(1).

27

Id. § 404.1502, 404.1527(c)(2).

28

Soc. Sec. Rul. No. 96–6p.
8

opinion” may be considered in assessing any type of medical opinion.29 In the present case, the
ALJ adequately explained why Dr. Hayden’s opinion was credited over that of Dr. White.
The ALJ correctly reasoned that Dr. White’s opinion was not based on the longitudinal
medical evidence regarding Plaintiff’s diabetes for the full alleged period of disability and his
opinion did not take into consideration the improvement in Plaintiff’s condition with treatment.
The evidence showing improvement in Plaintiff’s condition with treatment, the opinion of Dr.
Hayden after an examination of Plaintiff, and the conclusory and unsupported nature of Dr.
White’s opinion support the ALJ’s decision not to accord any weight to Dr. White’s opinion.
Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the weight given to the medical evidence and
opinions in the record.
Plaintiff maintains that the ALJ should have further developed the record by recontacting Dr. White to resolve any inconsistencies. Although an ALJ has an obligation to
develop a full and fair record, the ALJ is not required to act as the claimant’s counsel or produce
evidence for the claimant.30 Whether to re-contact a medical source is within the ALJ’s
discretion.31 Here, the record contains treatment records from Dr. White, East Jackson Family
Medical Center, Medical Specialty Clinic, TransSouth Health Care, Digestive Disease Clinic,
consultative examinations and functional capacity opinions from Dr. Spring and Dr. Hayden, and
the opinions of Horace Edwards, Ph.D., and Thomas Neilson, Psy.D. Thus, the ALJ properly
29

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c).

30

See Trandafir v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 58 F. App’x 113, 115 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2003) (“Only
under special circumstances, i.e., when a claimant is without counsel, is not capable of
presenting an effective case, and is unfamiliar with hearing procedures, does an ALJ have a
special, heightened duty to develop the record.”).
31

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520b(c)(1) (stating that an ALJ “may recontact [a claimant’s] treating
physician, psychologist, or other medical source”).
9

used his discretion in determining that the record had sufficient evidence for him to make an
informed decision concerning the weight to give Dr. White’s opinion.
Credibility Assessment
A claimant’s credibility comes into question when her “complaints regarding symptoms,
or their intensity and persistence, are not supported by objective medical evidence.32 “To assess
credibility, the ALJ must consider “the entire case record,” including “any medical signs and lab
findings, the claimant’s own complaints of symptoms, any information provided by the treating
physicians and others, as well as any other relevant evidence contained in the record.”33 This
Court is required to “accord the ALJ’s determinations of credibility great weight and deference
particularly since the ALJ has the opportunity, which we do not, of observing a witness’s
demeanor while testifying.”34 However, the ALJ’s credibility finding “must find support in the
record.”35
Here, the Court finds no error in the ALJ’s credibility determination because Plaintiff did
not provide objective medical evidence to establish the intensity and persistence of her alleged
symptoms, and the record as a whole does not indicate that her condition was of disabling
severity. Although Plaintiff presented objective medical evidence of an underlying medical
condition (diabetes and peripheral neuropathy) and the ALJ found that these impairment could
reasonably cause the kind of limitations as alleged by Plaintiff, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s
statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effect of her alleged symptoms were not
32

Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 247 (6th Cir. 2007).

33

Id.

34

Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 476 (6th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).

35

Id.
10

entirely credible because they were inconsistent with the evidence of record. Medication therapy
and proper monitoring generally controlled Plaintiff’s diabetes, and, despite the diagnosis of
peripheral neuropathy, physical examinations revealed no sensory abnormalities or dysfunction
and no musculoskeletal or neurological deficits.36
Dr. Hayden’s clinical findings during his March 2011 physical consultative examination
support the credibility determination. As the ALJ discussed, Plaintiff had satisfactory range of
motion of her feet and toes, only demonstrated “a bit” of stiffness in her right ankle, could flex
and extend her fingers fully at all joints, could squat to forty per cent, balance on each foot
separately, and could straightaway walk without difficulty.37 Dr. Hayden opined that Plaintiff
could occasionally lift and carry up to fifty pounds, sit for one hour, stand for three hours, and
walk for four hours, all during an eight-hour day.38 Dr. Hayden also indicated that Plaintiff could
frequently reach overhead and use her feet with additional postural and environmental
limitations.39
With respect to Plaintiff’s allegation of disabling mental limitations, Plaintiff has never
required mental health treatment from a specialist or a mental health facility. Although
consultative psychologist Dr. Richard Spring diagnosed an adjustment disorder with mixed
anxiety and depressed mood, Plaintiff’s mental status was essentially unremarkable during the
February 2011 evaluation.40 Plaintiff had a therapeutic response to the use of psychotropic

36

R. 246, 297, 300-13.

37

R. 278-279.

38

R. 280-284.

39

Id.

40

R. 254-56.
11

medication. Dr. Spring opined that Plaintiff has the ability to understand, remember, and carry
out ordinary instructions, has no significant cognitive impairments, has the ability to work with
others appropriately, and has no significant limitations in terms of her daily activities.41 The ALJ
accorded great weight to Dr. Spring’s opinion as it was consistent with Plaintiff’s treatment
history, Dr. Spring’s clinical findings, and the lack of significant effects on Plaintiff’s functional
abilities. This evidence supports a finding that that her allegations of disabling mental limitations
were not entirely credible.
The state agency psychological consultants’ reports from Horace Edwards, Ph.D., and
Thomas Neilson, Psy.D, also support the ALJ’s credibility and residual functional capacity
finding. Based on their review of the evidence, they opined that Plaintiff has mild limitations in
activities of daily living and social functioning with moderate difficulties in concentration,
persistence, and pace.42
Finally, Plaintiff’s daily activities were not consistent with her allegedly disabling
symptoms.

Plaintiff attended to her personal needs, cooked, did household chores, went

shopping, drove, went outside, managed her finances, watched television, did crossword puzzles,
and socialized with others.43 An ALJ may consider a claimant’s activities of daily living in
assessing the credibility of the claimant’s subjective complaints.44
Residual Capacity Finding and Hypothetical

41

Id.

42

R. 258-275, 292.

43

R. 161-163.

44

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i).
12

At step five, the Commissioner must identify a significant number of jobs in the economy
that accommodate the claimant’s residual functional capacity and vocational profile.45 The
Commissioner may carry this burden by applying the medical-vocational grids46 which directs a
conclusion of “disabled” or “not disabled” based on the claimant’s age and education and on
whether the claimant has transferable work skills.47 However, if a claimant suffers from a
limitation not accounted for by the grids, as in the present case, the Commissioner may use the
grids as a framework for her decision but must rely on other evidence to carry her burden. In
such a case, the Commissioner may rely on the testimony of a vocational expert to find that the
claimant possesses the capacity to perform other substantial gainful activity that exists in the
national economy.48
Here, the ALJ relied on the testimony of a vocational expert in determining that there
were a significant number of jobs in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform.49 The
ALJ’s hypothetical question to the vocational expert included all of the limitations that the ALJ
found in his assessment of Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity.

The vocational expert

testified that an individual who was limited to the extent found by the ALJ could perform work
as: an information clerk, in which there are 16,170 jobs in the State of Tennessee, and 1,000,000
nationally; a routing clerk in which there are 19,760 jobs in the State of Tennessee, and 715,000

45

Jones, 336 F.3d at 474.

46

20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2.

47

Wright v. Massanari, 321 F.3d 611, 615 (6th Cir. 2003); Burton v. Sec’y of Health & Human
Servs., 893 F.2d 821, 822 (6th Cir. 1990).
48

Heston v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 245 F.3d 528, 537 – 38 (6th Cir. 2001).

49

R. 42-44.
13

nationally; and a dispatcher in which there are 18,460 in the State of Tennessee and 2,000,000
nationally.50
Plaintiff complains that the hypothetical question did not set out the exact number of
hours that each function could be performed. The ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform
medium work except that she can only sit, stand, and walk in combination for a total of eight
hours in a regular workday and must have a sit/stand option. “Medium work involves lifting no
more than fifty pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to
twenty-five pounds.”51 SSR 83-10 notes that “a full range of medium work requires standing or
walking, off and on, for a total of approximately six hours in an 8-hour workday in order to meet
the requirements of frequent lifting or carrying objects weighing up to 25 pounds.”52 Thus, the
regulations and SSR 83-10 explain the exertional demands associated with the ALJ’s finding that
Plaintiff could perform medium work.
The ALJ was not required to specifically outline the exact number of hours that Plaintiff
could perform each of the exertional demands associated with medium work.53 The ALJ
considered each function, determined that Plaintiff’s combined ability to sit, stand, and walk for
a total of eight hours, along with her other specified limitations, prevented her from performing
the full range of medium work, and then relied on the vocational expert’s testimony to find that

50

Id.

51

20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(c).

52

SSR 83-10.

53

See Delgado v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2002 WL 343402 at **5 (6th Cir. Mar. 4, 2002) (citation
omitted) (“Although a function-by-function analysis is desirable, SSR 96-8p does not require
ALJs to produce such a detailed statement in writing.”).
14

Plaintiff could, instead, perform light unskilled jobs.54 This testimony provides substantial
evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff could perform other work and is not
disabled.55
Because substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff was not
disabled, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ S. Thomas Anderson
S. THOMAS ANDERSON
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Date: May 8, 2017.

54

“If someone can do medium work, we determine that he or she can also do sedentary and light
work.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(c).
55

Foster v. Halter, 279 F.3d 348, 356-57 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding that substantial evidence may
be produced through reliance on the testimony of a vocational expert in response to a
hypothetical question).
15