Trotter v. Ramsey, et al

Filing 56

ORDER GRANTING 44 DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AND/OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. Signed by Judge James D. Todd on 7/9/15. (Todd, James)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION
EMMANUEL S. TROTTER,
Plaintiff,
VS.
DIANE RAMSEY, et al.,
Defendants.

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No. 13-1087-JDT/egb

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION
TO DISMISS AND/OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff Emmanuel S. Trotter, an inmate at the Northwest Correctional Complex
(“NWCX”), filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) against Correctional Officer Diane Ramsey,
Sergeant Ray Lamb, Lieutenant Artie Lynch, Associate Warden Melvin Tirey, Kurt Gross,
Warden Wayne Carpenter, and Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”)
Commissioner Derrick Schofield. The court dismissed the claims against Defendants Gross,
Tirey, Carpenter, and Schofield for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted
and ordered service of process for Defendants Officer Ramsey, Sergeant Lamb, and
Lieutenant Lynch. Defendants have now filed a motion to dismiss and/or for summary
judgment [DE# 44]. Plaintiff has filed a response to the motion, and Defendants have filed

a reply to the response. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED.1
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). “[T]he burden on the moving party may be discharged by ‘showing’–that is,
pointing out to the district court–that there is an absence of evidence to support the
nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Revised Rule
56(c)(1) provides that “[a] party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed” is
required to support that assertion by:
(A)

citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including
depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or
declarations, stipulations . . . , admissions, interrogatory answers or
other materials;[2] or

(B)

showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or
presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce
admissible evidence to support the fact.

“If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another
party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c)” the district court may:
(1)

give an opportunity to properly support or address the fact;

(2)

consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion;

1

Because the court has considered matters outside the pleadings, the motion has been considered under the
summary judgment standard.
2

“A party may object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form that
would be admissible in evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). Additionally, Rule 56(c)(4) specifically provides that
“[a]n affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts
that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters
stated.”

2

(3)

grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials–
including the facts considered undisputed–show that the movant is
entitled to it; or

(4)

issue any other appropriate order.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
In Celotex Corp., the Supreme Court explained that Rule 56:
mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery
and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there
can be “no genuine issue as to any material fact,” since a complete failure of
proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The moving party is “entitled
to judgment as a matter of law” because the nonmoving party has failed to
make a sufficient showing on an essential element of [his] case with respect to
which [he] has the burden of proof.
477 U.S. at 322-23. In considering whether to grant summary judgment, “the evidence as
well as the inferences drawn therefrom must be read in the light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion.” Kochins v. Linden-Alimak, Inc., 799 F.2d 1128, 1133 (6th Cir. 1986);
see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986)
(same).
A genuine issue of material fact exists “if the evidence [presented by the non-moving
party] is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s
position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could
reasonably find for the plaintiff. The judge’s inquiry, therefore, unavoidably
asks whether reasonable jurors could find by a preponderance of the evidence
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that the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict[.]”
Id. at 252; see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (“When the moving party has carried its
burden under Rule 56[(a)], its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” (footnote omitted)). However, the court’s
function is not to weigh the evidence, judge credibility, or in any way determine the truth of
the matter. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249. Rather, the inquiry is “whether the evidence
presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so onesided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 251-52.
Plaintiff alleges that, on two occasions in 2012, Defendants Ramsey, Lamb, and
Lynch did not permit him to hold Sabbath/Advent Bible study. Plaintiff contends that the
actions of Defendants on these two occasions violated his right to practice his religion under
§ 1983 and RLUIPA.
According to Plaintiff, he has been an approved group leader since December 2010,
with authorization to conduct Bible study without a chaplain or religious volunteer. On
Saturday, October 27, 2012, Defendant Ramsey allegedly told Plaintiff that he would no
longer be allowed to hold his service without a religious volunteer present even though
Defendants had been given a directive to allow all inmate-led services to continue. Because
no religious volunteer was present on that date,3 Plaintiff was allegedly denied the
opportunity to observe the Sabbath. A similar incident allegedly occurred on November 3,

3

Apparently more traditional religious groups who hold their services on the weekend are not faced with
this problem, as it is easier to obtain a local volunteer to supervise those services.

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2012. Plaintiff alleges that he was told by Defendant Lynch that there would be no religious
service because a religious volunteer was not available.
Incarceration in a penal facility does not eliminate an inmate’s First Amendment
protections, including the right to exercise his religion. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482
U.S. 342, 348 (1987); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 545 (1979). However, that right is subject to restrictions that are reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests such as institutional safety and security. O’Lone, 482 U.S.
at 348-49; Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
The Turner Court adopted a deferential standard for reviewing prisoners'
constitutional claims: “[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights,
the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” 482 U.S.
at 89. Four factors are relevant under this standard. First, “there must be a ‘valid, rational
connection’ between the prison regulation and the legitimate [and neutral] governmental
interest put forward to justify it.” Id. (quotation omitted). In addition, courts should consider:
the existence of “alternative means of exercising the right” available to inmates; “the impact
accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates,
and on the allocation of prison resources generally”; and “the absence of ready alternatives”
available to the prison for achieving the governmental objectives. Id. at 90.
RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a),4 provides similar protections:

4

Monetary damages are not available against individual officers under RLUIPA. See Cardinal v. Metrish,
564 F.3d 794, 801 (6th Cir. 2009)

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No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of
a person residing in or confined to an institution, as defined in section 1997 of
this title, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless
the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person—
(1)

is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and

(2)
is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest.
RLUIPA applies a strict-scrutiny standard to actions by prison officials that impose a
substantial burden on the religious exercises of prisoners. See Marsh v. Granholm, 2006 WL
2439760, at *9 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 22, 2006) (report and recommendation).
The plaintiff has the burden of proving that the practice at issue imposes a substantial
burden on his religious exercise. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b); Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559,
567 (5th Cir. 2004); Treece v. Burnett, 2007 WL 2815020 at *4 (W.D. Mich.). The statute’s
legislative history indicates that the term “substantial burden” as used in RLUIPA is not
intended to be interpreted more broadly than the Supreme Court has interpreted it in religious
exercise cases. Living Water Church of God v. Charter Tp. of Meridian, 2007 WL 4322157
at *5 (6th Cir.). The Sixth Circuit explained the contours of the Supreme Court’s substantial
burden test in religious free exercise cases as follows:
[W]hile the Supreme Court generally has found that a government’s action
constituted a substantial burden on an individual’s free exercise of religion
when that action forced an individual to choose between “following the
precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits” or when the action in question
placed “substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to
violate his beliefs,” Sherbert [v. Warner], 374 U.S. [398, 404 (1963)]..., it has
found no substantial burden when, although the action encumbered the practice
of religion, it did not pressure the individual to violate his or her religious
beliefs. See Lyng [v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n], 485 U.S.
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[439, 449 (1988)] ...; see also Episcopal Student Found. V. City of Ann Arbor,
341 F. Supp. 2d 691, 702 (E.D. Mich. 2004)(“[C]ourts have been far more
reluctant to find a violation where compliance with the challenged regulation
makes the practice of one’s religion more difficult or expensive, but the
regulation is not inherently inconsistent with the litigant’s beliefs.”).
Living Water Church, 2007 WL 4322157 at *5 (some citations omitted). See also Cutter v.
Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005) (RLUIPA’s institutionalized persons provision was
intended to alleviate only exceptional burdens on religious exercise).
Defendants do not contest the fact that Plaintiff was an approved inmate service
leader;5 therefore, the issues before the court are (1) whether the prison had a policy that
allowed Plaintiff to conduct religious services without in-person supervision, (2) if not,
whether this policy violated Plaintiff’s religious rights, and (3) whether Defendants violated
religious rights on the two relevant dates.
It is undisputed that the version of TDOC Policy 118.01(VI)(d)(2)(b) in place at the
time of the events giving rise to this lawsuit stated as follows: “An inmate may be authorized
by the Warden to lead the service. Inmates may ONLY lead religious services in the presence
of staff” (emphasis in policy). Whether or not Plaintiff was an approved service leader did
not dispense with the requirement that the service be conducted with a staff member present
pursuant to Tennessee Department of Correction policy 118.01.
In addition to this policy, on September 18, 2012, Associate Warden Tirey sent a
memorandum to the security staff which stated, “Effective immediately, all religious services
5

Plaintiff’s congregation was never able to secure a religious volunteer from the free world. Trotter Depo.
pp. 18, 29, 32. Because the congregation could not find a volunteer in the community and the prison chaplains do not
work on the weekends, they had to rely on prison security staff to monitor their service.

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held in the Chapel must have security staff present unless the Chaplain or other approved
religious personnel are present.” Tirey Memo. 9/18/2012 attached to Tirey Affidavit, D.E.
55-1. On November 1, 2012, Tirey sent an email regarding chapel security. In this email, he
gave the following directive, “I have the [sic] instructed the chapel to remain secure when
not in use and for the inmate worker not to be there unless properly supervised. One main
issue must be made clear. When religious services are scheduled they WILL BE
CONDUCTED AS SCHEUDULE [sic]. If the chaplain is not here provide supervision but
make sure the services are conducted.” Tirey Email 11/1/2012 attached to Tirey Affidavit,
D.E. 55-1.
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants were given a directive by the warden to allow all
inmate-led services to be held as scheduled with security staff present or by video
monitoring. He asserts that staff could have monitored the service on closed circuit
television. However, neither of the above referenced communications from Associate
Warden Tirey allow for video monitoring by staff. Instead, read together, the
communications and the TDOC policy direct staff not to allow Plaintiff to conduct a religious
service without a chaplain, religious volunteer, or staff member present. Tirey Affidavit, ¶
8, D.E. 55-1.
In support of his argument, Plaintiff points to the portion of TDOC Policy
118.01(VI)(d)(2) that states “Group religious activities shall be videotaped and/or monitored
by staff.” However, this portion of the policy is modified by the proviso that “[i]nmates may
ONLY lead religious services in the presence of staff.” TDOC Policy 118.01(VI)(d)(2)(b)
8

(emphasis in original). Therefore, the court finds that prison policy mandated that inmate-led
services must have either an outside leader or security staff present and that video monitoring
only was not allowed.
Defendants have presented unrefuted evidence that allowing inmates to congregate
unsupervised raises the risk of their engaging in activity which threatens the safety of the
institution. Examples of such activity include drug use, gang activity, exercising undue
influence over one another, or engaging in prohibited sexual misconduct. Tirey Affidavit, ¶
4, 9, 10, D.E. 55-1. This is especially true in light of the fact that, during the time period at
issue, members of the prison staff were having problems with Plaintiff being unsupervised
in the chapel area. Lamb Affidavit, ¶ 4, 5. D.E. 44-3.
There are no alternative means by which the prison can prevent unsupervised religious
gatherings than by requiring that inmate religious services be attended by a chaplain,
religious volunteer, or prison staff member. Tirey Affidavit, D.E. 55-1. Assigning a
permanent staff member to the chapel at all times would place an undue burden on already
strained prison staff and prison resources. Id.
The court finds that the requirement that all religious services be supervised by an
outside religious leader or staff is reasonably related to the legitimate penological interest of
prohibiting inmates from freely interacting with one another behind closed doors where
security breaches could be carried out, including prohibited financial transactions, drug
transactions, gang-related interaction, or sexual acts. Prison chapels are often used to carry
out these activities because officers try to limit their interference with worship services to the
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extent they can and the lack of interference may be abused. As such, the court gives
substantial deference to the prison policy at issue which is aimed at prohibiting the behaviors
discussed above. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003). Because the policy at issue
was aimed at alleviating valid security concerns, it did not violate Plaintiff’s rights.
Finally, the court must consider whether Defendants violated Plaintiff’s rights on
October 27, 2012, and November 3, 2012, by refusing to allow him to hold a service in the
chapel.
Defendants contend that Plaintiff testified in his deposition that the two incidents may
have been the result of a misunderstanding as to whether he could conduct services without
a volunteer, chaplain, or security staff member present. However, as Plaintiff points out in
his response, he actually testified that, after the October 27 incident, he was told by Chaplain
Glenn that there had been a misunderstanding and he should have been allowed to hold a
service. Trotter Depo. at p. 39. Plaintiff also testified that Chaplain Glenn told him that the
problem would be fixed by November 3. Id. Plaintiff further makes it clear in his deposition
that he believed that Defendants’ actions were intentional, contrary to Defendants’
contention. Id. at pp. 43, 48 (“I believe what they did was intentional.”). Plaintiff responded
“yes” to the question “So in your opinion they intentionally prohibited you from having a
service?” Id. at p. 49. Clearly, Plaintiff did not testify that he thought that Defendants’
actions were merely “mistakes” or a misunderstanding.
Defendants have also mischaracterized Plaintiff’s testimony regarding whether
conducting a service in his cell was sufficient to fulfill his religious obligations. Defendants
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claim that Plaintiff testified during his deposition that, in the case of a lockdown or other
security reason, he could conduct a service in his cell by praying, meditating, fasting, and
Bible reading, id. at p. 17; and on the afternoon of October 27, 2012, he briefly met with his
brothers in a prayer circle and prayed before they went back to their cells to worship. Id. at
p. 37. Based on this testimony, Defendants reason that Plaintiff has not shown that the events
of October 27 imposed a substantial burden on the practice of his religion.
In actuality, Plaintiff made clear in his deposition that the “holy gathering of brothers”
cannot be conducted in a cell. Id. at p. 18 (“The commandment calls for a holy convocation
of the entire church or churches that observes the seventh day Sabbath. We can’t do that in
the cell in a lockdown because we can’t get to each other.”) Plaintiff also testified that there
is no gathering place in his unit where his “brothers of like mind can come together, id. at p.
36, and that he and his fellow Sabbath observers merely prayed for a minute or a minute and
a half before dispersing on October 27. Id. at p. 37. They were not able to have an actual
service outside the chapel.
Despite Defendants’ mischaracterization of Plaintiff’s testimony, the court finds that
Plaintiff’s rights were not violated on the two dates in question. The undisputed evidence
shows that, on October 27, 2012, staff was not available to monitor the service, and
Defendants did not have the authority to disregard prison policy and leave Plaintiff alone in
the chapel with his fellow worshipers. Lamb Affidavit, p. 3, D.E. 44-3; Lynch Affidavit, p.
2, D.E. 44-4; Ramsey Affidavit, p. 2, D.E. 44-5. Defendants’ actions in enforcing policy
118.01(VI)(d)(2)(b), which is in place to further a legitimate and compelling penological
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interest, and in not allowing Plaintiff to proceed with his service unsupervised did not
substantially interfere with his ability to freely exercise his religious beliefs.
As for the incident on November 3, 2012, Plaintiff contends that Defendant Lynch
told him at approximately 8:30 a.m. that he could not hold a service in the chapel because no
outside volunteer was available. Trotter Depo. at pp. 38-39. Based on this information,
Plaintiff did not attempt to hold a service at the scheduled time; instead, he went to the unit
yard and told his fellow worshippers that there would be no service that day. Id. at p. 40.
Defendant Lynch denies having any contact with Plaintiff on November 3 and
maintains that he directed central control to call for service in the chapel. Lynch Affidavit
at p. 2. He does admit that there was “some confusion about scheduling in the Chapel.” Id.
The prison log book from that date supports Defendant’s testimony. At 1:09 p.m., an entry
“Church Services in Chapel” was made. Log Books, D.E. 44-7.
Accepting as true for the purpose of deciding this motion only Plaintiff’s testimony
that Defendant Lynch told him early on November 3 that there would be no service that date,
the court finds that Defendant’s later action in instructing central control to call out the
service and have the chapel open negates any burden on Plaintiff’s exercise of his religious
beliefs. Although it was unfortunate that Plaintiff was outside and did not hear the call,
Defendant did not infringe on Plaintiff’s constitutional or RLUIPA rights by giving him
incorrect information earlier in the day.
Moreover, isolated incidents do not place a substantial burden on an inmate's exercise
of religion. See e.g., Greenberg v. Hill, 2009 WL 890521 (S.D. Ohio) (Even accepting the
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plaintiff's contention that he was denied a full Seder meal on two occasions, he failed to
establish a substantial burden under RLUIPA because these deprivations were isolated
occurrences.) See also Brown v. Graham, 470 F. App'x. 11 (2nd Cir. 2012) (failure to provide
a kosher meal on one occasion did not rise to the level of a substantial burden); Rapier v.
Harris, 172 F.3d 999 (7th Cir.1999) (“the unavailability of a non-pork tray for [plaintiff] at
3 meals out of 810 does not constitute more than a de minimis burden on [plaintiff's] free
exercise of religion”); Pfeil v. Lampert, 11 F. Supp.3d 1099 (D. Wyo.2014) (a single missed
visit with a minister is not a substantial burden); Mubashshir v. Moore, 2011 WL 1496670
(E.D. Mich. 2011) (Isolated acts or omissions are not a substantial burden on religious
freedom.); Shaheed v. Winston, 885 F. Supp. 861 (E.D. Va.1995) (a negligent failure to
accommodate prisoners’ Ramadan celebration resulted from a misunderstanding, which is
not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Salih v. Smith, 1994 WL 750529 (D. Md.)
(negligent act of serving a religious meal two hours late, which was caused by a
misunderstanding with the dietary department, was not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
Because the undisputed facts show that Defendants’ actions did not impose a
substantial burden on Plaintiff’s exercise of his religious rights, the motion to dismiss and/or
for summary judgment [DE# 44] is GRANTED. The clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment
accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ James D. Todd
JAMES D. TODD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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