Smith v. Commissioner of Social Security
Filing
26
ORDER AFFIRMING DECISION OF COMMISSIONER. Signed by Judge James D. Todd on 1/26/15. (Todd, James)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
PEGGY N. SMITH,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
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No. 13-1278-T
ORDER AFFIRMING DECISION OF COMMISSIONER
Plaintiff has filed this action to obtain judicial review of Defendant Commissioner's
final decision denying her applications for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the
Social Security Act (“the Act”) and for supplemental security income (“SSI”) benefits based
on disability under the Act. Plaintiff's applications were denied initially and upon
reconsideration by the Social Security Administration. Plaintiff then requested a hearing
before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), which was held on April 19, 2012.
On June 11, 2012, the ALJ issued a decision, finding that Plaintiff was not entitled to
benefits. The Appeals Council affirmed the ALJ's decision. This decision became the
Commissioner's final decision. Plaintiff then filed this action, requesting reversal of the
decision of the Commissioner. For the reasons set forth below, the decision of the
Commissioner is AFFIRMED.
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a claimant may obtain judicial review of any final
decision made by the Commissioner after a hearing to which he was a party. “The court shall
have the power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment
affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with
or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” Id. The court's review is limited to
determining whether or not there is substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's
decision, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and whether the correct legal standards were applied. See
Lindsley v. Commissioner, 560 F.3d 601, 604–08 (6th Cir. 2009); Kyle v. Commissioner, 609
F.3d 847, 854 (6th Cir. 2010).
The Commissioner, not the court, is charged with the duty to weigh the evidence, to
make credibility determinations and resolve material conflicts in the testimony, and to decide
the case accordingly. See Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007). When
substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's determination, it is conclusive, even if
substantial evidence also supports the opposite conclusion. See Foster v. Halter, 279 F.3d
348, 353 (6th Cir. 2001); Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986).
Plaintiff was fifty-four years old at the time of the ALJ’s decision. R. 26. She has a
general education degree, R. 131, and past relevant work as a housekeeper. R. 129. Plaintiff
alleges that she became disabled in March 2002. R. 97
The ALJ enumerated the following findings: (1) Plaintiff has not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date; (2) Plaintiff has the following severe
impairments: severe hypertension, major depressive disorder, panic disorder with
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agoraphobia, and dependent personality disorder; but she does not have impairments, either
alone or in combination, that meet or equal the requirements of any listed impairment
contained in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1 of the listing of impairments; (3) Plaintiff
retains the residual functional capacity to perform medium work with no exposure to the
public and only occasional collaborative work efforts with coworkers and supervisors in an
environment with only occasional changes and no goal setting judgments; (4) Plaintiff is
unable to perform her past relevant work; (5) Plaintiff was an individual closing approaching
advanced age with a high school education on the alleged onset date; (6) transferability of
job skills is not material to the determination of disability because Plaintiff’s past work was
unskilled; (7) using the Medical-Vocational Rules (“the grids”) as a framework supports a
finding that Plaintiff is not disabled whether or not she has transferable job skills; (8)
considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity,
there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can
perform; (9) Plaintiff was not under a disability as defined in the Act at any time through the
date of this decision.
The Social Security Act defines disability as the inability to engage in substantial
gainful activity. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1). The claimant bears the ultimate burden of
establishing an entitlement to benefits. Born v. Secretary, 923 F.2d 1168, 1173 (6th Cir.
1990). The initial burden of going forward is on the claimant to show that he is disabled
from engaging in his former employment; the burden of going forward then shifts to the
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Commissioner to demonstrate the existence of available employment compatible with the
claimant's disability and background. Id.
The Commissioner conducts the following, five-step analysis to determine if an
individual is disabled within the meaning of the Act:
1. An individual who is engaging in substantial gainful activity will not be
found to be disabled regardless of medical findings.
2. An individual who does not have a severe impairment will not be found to
be disabled.
3. A finding of disability will be made without consideration of vocational
factors, if an individual is not working and is suffering from a severe
impairment which meets the duration requirement and which meets or equals
a listed impairment in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of the regulations.
4. An individual who can perform work that he has done in the past will not
be found to be disabled.
5. If an individual cannot perform his or her past work, other factors including
age, education, past work experience and residual functional capacity must be
considered to determine if other work can be performed.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); Howard v. Commissioner, 276 F.3d 235, 238 (6th Cir. 2002).
Further review is not necessary if it is determined that an individual is not disabled at any
point in this sequential analysis. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). Here, the sequential analysis
proceeded to the fifth step with a finding that, although Plaintiff cannot perform her past
relevant work, there is a substantial number of jobs that exist in the national economy that
she can perform.
Plaintiff argues that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s findings. She
specifically complains that the ALJ did not give the proper weight to her treating and
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consulting sources at Pathways, Inc., and did not correctly assess her residual functional
capacity. Plaintiff’s arguments are not persuasive.
In Gayheart v. Commissioner, 710 F.3d 365 (6th Cir. 2013), the Court of Appeals
clarified and reiterated the standards for weighing medical opinions:
These standards, set forth in administrative regulations, describe (1) the
various types of evidence that the Commissioner will consider, 20 C.F.R. §
404.1512; (2) who can provide evidence to establish an impairment, 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1513; and (3) how that evidence will be evaluated, 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520b. . . . Medical opinions are to be weighed by the process set forth in
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c).
As a general matter, an opinion from a medical source who has examined a
claimant is given more weight than that from a source who has not performed
an examination (a “nonexamining source”), id. § 404.1502, 404.1527(c)(1),
and an opinion from a medical source who regularly treats the claimant (a
“treating source”) is afforded more weight than that from a source who has
examined the claimant but does not have an ongoing treatment relationship (a
“nontreating source”), id. § 404.1502, 404.1527(c)(2). In other words, “[t]he
regulations provide progressively more rigorous tests for weighing opinions
as the ties between the source of the opinion and the individual become
weaker.” Soc. Sec. Rul. No. 96–6p, 1996 WL 374180, at *2 (Soc. Sec. Admin.
July 2, 1996).
The source of the opinion therefore dictates the process by which the
Commissioner accords it weight. Treating-source opinions must be given
“controlling weight” if two conditions are met: (1) the opinion “is
well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques”; and (2) the opinion “is not inconsistent with the other substantial
evidence in [the] case record.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). If the
Commissioner does not give a treating-source opinion controlling weight, then
the opinion is weighed based on the length, frequency, nature, and extent of
the treatment relationship, id., as well as the treating source's area of specialty
and the degree to which the opinion is consistent with the record as a whole
and is supported by relevant evidence, id. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(6).
The Commissioner is required to provide “good reasons” for discounting the
weight given to a treating-source opinion. Id. § 404.1527(c)(2). These reasons
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must be “supported by the evidence in the case record, and must be sufficiently
specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator
gave to the treating source's medical opinion and the reasons for that weight.”
Soc. Sec. Rul. No. 96–2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *5 (Soc. Sec. Admin. July 2,
1996). This procedural requirement “ensures that the ALJ applies the treating
physician rule and permits meaningful review of the ALJ's application of the
rule.” Wilson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir.2004).
710 F.3d at 375-76.
A prerequisite for characterizing a source as a “treating source” is identifying an
individual who is a physician, psychologist, or other acceptable medical source. An
acceptable medical source can be one of the following: a licensed physician, licensed or
certified psychologist; licensed optometrist, licensed podiatrist, or a qualified
speech-language pathologist. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513, 416.913.
Nowhere in the
regulations is a hospital, clinic, or other institution such as Pathways, Inc., described as a
treating source. See generally 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1502, 416.902. However, the ALJ did, in
fact, cite reports from Pathways, Inc., to support her findings.
Plaintiff was treated for mental disorders for numerous years and has been diagnosed
with various impairments. A diagnosis does not necessarily establish the severity of a
claimant's condition. See Young v. Secretary, 925 F.2d 146, 151 (6th Cir. 1990) (a claimant
must do more to establish a disabling mental impairment than merely show the diagnosis of
a dysthymic disorder). A finding of disability hinges on any attendant functional limitations
that prevent the claimant from engaging in any work available in the national or regional
economy. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; Griffith v. Commissioner, 217 Fed. App'x
425, 429 (6th Cir. 2007) (“A claimant's severe impairment may or may not affect his or her
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functional capacity to do work. One does not necessarily establish the other.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff has been diagnosed with COPD and bronchitis, and examination notes
document some limited supporting clinical findings of a respiratory pathology. The record
however, does not document any persistent objective clinical findings or supporting
diagnostic evidence of any chronic respiratory pathology. Likewise, the record does not
document supporting diagnostic evidence or objective clinical findings of any chronic
musculoskeletal pathology, nor does it document evidence of any significant corresponding
medical treatment. R. 226-28, 229-52, 390-447, 452-59, 487-506, 626-50, 651-76, 677-95.
Consequently, the record does not contain evidence of any impairment-related manifestations
imposing functional limitation beyond those found by the ALJ.
The ALJ gave little weight to the mental health reports from consulting examiners Dr.
Dennis Wilson and Dr. Stephen Rutledge. Both examiners reported marked limitations in
various mental activities that would negatively impact her ability to engage in work-related
activities. R. 258, 465. The ALJ, however, determined that these conclusions were not
supported by the mental health treatment records from Pathways, Inc. Specifically, the ALJ
noted that Plaintiff had a sporadic history of mental health treatment, as well as a failure to
comply with her mental health treatment regimen. R. 756, 757. See Awad v. Secretary, 734
F.2d 288, 289-90 (6th Cir. 1984) (A claimant may be denied benefits for failing to follow
prescribed treatment without good reason under the regulations 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1530,
416.930); Flaten v. Secretary, 44 F.3d 1453, 1464 (9th Cir. 1995) (ALJ entitled to draw
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adverse inference from general lack of medical care); Barrett v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 1019,
1023-24 (8th Cir. 1994) (claimant's minimal treatment inconsistent with claims of disabling
pain).
The ALJ acknowledged that the mental health records documented some clinical
findings, such as disorganized though content, as serious functional limitations. However,
the record did not document evidence of any psychological decompensation or ongoing
objective clinical findings of any marked functional limitations. R. 577-605, 696-733.
Furthermore, January 2012 examination notes showed that Plaintiff’s affect, mood,
appearance, eye contact, behavior, orientation, thought processes, judgment, intellect, speech,
motor activity, and reported sleep and appetite were within normal limits. R. 734-60.
Substantial evidence supports according little weight to the medical assessment
portion of consulting examiner Dr. Robert Sanner’s report. Dr. Sanner opined that Plaintiff
could only lift or carry a maximum of ten pounds because of knee and shoulder pain. R.
265-66. However, his report does not include objective medical findings to support those
limitations. R. 262-65. A claimant's subjective complaints are not a sufficient basis to support
such a medical opinion. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527; 416.927.
The ALJ also found Dr. Sanner’s restrictions internally inconsistent with the portion
of his report describing his physical examination findings. Dr. Sanner’s physical examination
included generally normal findings. R. 262-65. Plaintiff was well-developed and in no
apparent distress; she had normal muscle strength and range of motion as well as station, gait,
and mobility; and she demonstrated sixty pound grip strength in her right hand and fifty
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pound grip strength in her left hand. R. 262-65. Her ability to grasp and manipulate objects
was normal, as was her ability to lift ten pounds while seated. R. 263. Dr. Sanner
administered several neurological tests and reported normal results. R. 265. Given the
foregoing, substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision not to give portions of Dr.
Sanner’s report any weight.
In determining that Plaintiff could perform a reduced range of work, the ALJ found
that her subjective complaints were not entirely credible. The ALJ must consider a claimant’s
subjective testimony if she finds evidence of an underlying medical condition and (1)
objective medical evidence to confirm the severity of the alleged pain arising from that
condition or (2) the objectively determined medical condition must be of a severity which
can reasonably be expected to give rise to the alleged pain. See Duncan v. Secretary, 801
F.2d 847, 852 (6th Cir. 1986). When evaluating a claimant’s subjective complaints, an ALJ
must consider, in addition to objective medical evidence and Plaintiff’s work record, any
evidence relating to Plaintiff’s daily activities; duration, frequency, and intensity of pain;
dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of medication; precipitating and aggravating factors;
and functional restrictions. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929. Here, the ALJ considered
Plaintiff’s testimony, medical and opinion evidence, and inconsistencies between her
allegations and the evidence contained in the record and found that Plaintiff’s complaints
were not entirely credible.
Plaintiff’s activities of daily living also diminished the credibility of her subjective
complaints. Plaintiff reported that she visited with family members, prepared elaborate meals,
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washed dishes and did other household chores, shopped for necessities, and occasionally
attended church. R. 14. See Vance v. Commissioner, 260 F. App’x 801, 805 (6th Cir. 2008)
(affirming ALJ’s finding that claimant’s activities of daily living —including cooking, doing
dishes, driving, and shopping—were inconsistent with the level of pain and fatigue she
alleged). As pointed out by the ALJ,
It is worth noting that the claimant’s primary allegation is that she is mentally
disabled, yet Social Security Administration Field Office personnel reported
she did not have difficult hearing, reading, breathing, understanding,
coherency, concentrating, talking or answering during a telephone interview
conducted in September 2010.
R. 14-15 (citation omitted).
It is the ALJ’s responsibility to determine residual functional capacity based on all the
relevant evidence, including medical records, observations of treating physicians and others,
and the claimant’s own description of her limitations. See Anderson v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 777
(8th Cir. 1995); 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.945(a) & 416.946. Here, the ALJ considered all of the
evidence in the record and adequately explained the basis for her residual functional capacity
finding. As the ALJ’s residual functional capacity was within the “zone of choice” supported
by substantial evidence, her finding is upheld. See Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th
Cir. 1986) (en banc).
When a claimant’s vocational characteristics coincide with the factors of a rule in the
grids, the existence of jobs in the national economy is established, and the claimant is
considered not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1569, 404.1569a(b), 416.969, 416.969a(b);
20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2, § 200.00(b); Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 461-62,
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470 (1983); Kimbrough v. Secretary, 801 F.2d 794, 796 (6th Cir. 1986). If the grids cannot
be used to direct a finding of disabled or not disabled because of the claimant’s nonexertional
limitations, they may be used as a framework for the decision-making process. See 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1569, 404.1569a(d), 416.969, 416.969a(d); 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2, §
200.00(e)(2).
The Commissioner met her burden at step five by eliciting the testimony of a
vocational expert. The ALJ's hypothetical questions included all relevant vocational
information that pertained to Plaintiff, including the limitations that the ALJ found in his
assessment of Plaintiff's residual functional capacity. R. 16, 42. The vocational expert
identified examples of unskilled jobs that an individual with Plaintiff's vocational
characteristics could perform, which the ALJ included in his decision. R. 42. Because the
vocational expert’s testimony was in response to hypothetical questions that set forth all the
reasonable limitations Plaintiff had on her ability to work, the ALJ properly relied on that
testimony. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929; Smith v. Halter, 307 F.3d 377, 378 (6th Cir.
2001) (A vocational expert's testimony concerning the availability of suitable work may
constitute substantial evidence where the testimony is elicited in response to a hypothetical
question that accurately sets forth the plaintiff's physical and mental impairments.) Based on
vocational expert testimony, the ALJ found Plaintiff could perform various jobs within the
medium level of work activity such as conveyor off-bearer, dryer attendant, and box bender.
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Because there is substantial evidence in the record supporting the Commissioner's
decision denying Plaintiff's application for benefits, the decision of the Commissioner is
AFFIRMED. The clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ James D. Todd
JAMES D. TODD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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