Harris v. Walmart Stores et al

Filing 31

ORDER ADOPTING DE 26 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS re DE 11 Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissing case with prejudice signed by Judge John T. Fowlkes, Jr. on 9/15/14. (Fowlkes, J.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION

TENASSA HARRIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
WAL-MART STORES, INC. d/b/a/
WALMART, CITY OF HUMBOLDT,
TENNESSEE, RAYMOND SIMMONS,
In his individual capacity and official
capacities as the Chief of Police for
the City of Humboldt, and DALE
BAKER, in his individual and official
Capacities as an officer of the
Humboldt Police Department,
Defendants.

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Civil No. 1:13-cv-2218-JTF-egb

ORDER ADOPTING THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
DISMISSING CASE WITH PREJUDICE

Before the Court is Defendants City of Humboldt, Raymond Simmons, and Dale Baker’s
Motion for Summary Judgment filed on August 27, 2013. (ECF No. 11.)

On October 15, 2013,

Plaintiff filed her Response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 17.)
On February 19, 2014, the Court referred the motion to the United States Magistrate Judge for
Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b).

(ECF No. 19.)

On July 1, 2014,

the Magistrate Judge issued his Report and Recommendation that Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment be granted.

(ECF No. 26.)

Plaintiff filed objections to the Magistrate’s

Report and Recommendation on July 15, 2014 (ECF No. 28.), to which Defendants responded on

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July 25, 2014 (ECF No. 30.).
After reviewing Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff’s Response, the
Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation, Plaintiff’s Objections, Defendants’ response, and the
entire record, the Court finds the Objections should be overruled and the Magistrate’s Report and
Recommendation should be adopted.

Thus, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is

GRANTED, and the case DISMISSED with prejudice.
I. FACTUAL HISTORY
The Plaintiff filed no objections to the Magistrate Judge’s proposed facts. Consequently,
the Court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings of fact as the factual history of this
case.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Magistrate Judge’s Reports and Recommendations
The district court has the authority to refer certain pre-trial matters to a magistrate judge
for resolution.

28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Callier v. Gray, 167 F.3d 977, 980 (6th Cir. 1999).

These

referrals may include non-dispositive pretrial matters, such as a motion to compel or a motion for
a protective order concerning discovery.

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). They may also include

dispositive matters such as a motion for summary judgment or a motion for injunctive relief.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).

When a dispositive matter is referred, the magistrate judge’s duty is

to issue proposed findings of fact and recommendations for disposition, which the district court
may or may not adopt. “The district judge may accept, reject, or modify the recommended
disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with
instructions.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).

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The district court has appellate jurisdiction over any decisions the magistrate judge issues
pursuant to such a referral.

28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

The standard of review

that is applied by the district court depends on the nature of the matter considered by the
magistrate judge.
If the magistrate judge issues a non-dispositive pretrial order, the district court should
defer to that order unless it is “found to be clearly erroneous or contrary to law.”
636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a).

28 U.S.C. §

However, if the magistrate judge order was issued in

response to a dispositive motion, the district court should engage in de novo review of all
portions of the order to which specific written objections have been made.

28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); Baker v. Peterson, 67 Fed. App’x. 308, 311, 2003 WL
21321184 *2 (6th Cir. 2003) (“A district court normally applies a ‘clearly erroneous or contrary
to law’ standard of review for non[-]dispositive preliminary measures.

A district court must

review dispositive motions under the de novo standard.”)
B. Summary Judgment
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, the court “shall grant summary judgment if
the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

The party moving for

summary judgment “bears the burden of clearly and convincingly establishing the nonexistence
of any genuine [disputed] issues of material fact, and the evidence as well as all inferences drawn
therefrom must be read in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.”

Kochins

v. Linden-Alimak, Inc., 799 F.2d 1128, 1133 (6th Cir. 1986); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The
moving party can meet this burden by showing respondent, after having sufficient opportunity

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for discovery, has no evidence to support an essential element of his case. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(2); Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir. 1989).
District courts “possess the power to enter summary judgment sua sponte, so long as the
losing party was on notice that she had to come forward with all of her evidence.” Bowling v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 233 Fed.Appx. 460, 464 (6th Cir. 2007). Because “the scope of discovery
is within the sound discretion of the trial court,” the non-movant has “no absolute right to
additional time for discovery.” Id. Summary Judgment may be entered before the end of the
discovery period, as long as there was a chance for sufficient discovery. Id.
When confronted with a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the
respondent must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine dispute for trial.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

See

A genuine dispute for trial exists if the evidence is such that a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986).

The nonmoving party must “do

more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356, 89
L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986).

Furthermore, one may not oppose a properly supported summary

judgment motion by mere reliance on the pleadings. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 324, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986).

Instead, the nonmoving must present

“concrete evidence supporting [her] claims.” Cloverdale Equip. Co. v. Simon Aerials, Inc., 869
F.2d 934, 937 (6th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). The district
court does not have the duty to search the record for such evidence. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(3); InterRoyal Corp. v. Sponseller, 889 F.2d 108, 111 (6th Cir. 1989).

The nonmoving

has the duty to point out specific evidence in the record that would be sufficient to justify a jury
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decision in her favor. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); InterRoyal Corp., 889 F.2d at 111.
IV. ANALYSIS
On July 1, 2014, the Magistrate Judge issued his Report and Recommendation regarding
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.

In addition to proposed findings of fact, the

Magistrate Judge recommended that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment should be
granted. Plaintiff filed objections to the Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation on July 15,
2014 which are discussed below.
A. Additional Time to File Response
Plaintiff claims, as part of his objections to the Magistrate Judges’ findings, that
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is not ripe for adjudication because the parties have
not completed discovery.

Plaintiff filed with the Court a Motion to Amend the Scheduling

Order, complete with a Rule 56(d) affidavit. The Affidavit states that “(a)t this early stage in
the discovery process, the Plaintiff is unable to ‘present facts essential to justify its opposition’ to
the Motion for Summary Judgment, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d), and needs to complete additional
discovery, including written discovery and depositions, in this matter in order to test the veracity
of the Defendants’ declarations and to properly respond to said motion.”

(ECF No. 13.)

As

the Magistrate Judge observed, this Court has already ruled on Plaintiff’s motion by granting an
additional thirteen days to respond. (ECF No. 15.)
Summary judgment may be entered before the end of the discovery period, as long as
there has been a sufficient time for discovery. Bowling v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 233 Fed.Appx.
460 (6th Cir. 2007). However, if a party needs additional time to respond or needs to conduct
additional discovery, a properly supported motion must be filed with the court. Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(d) provides: “[i]f a non-movant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it
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cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition, the court may: (1) defer considering the
motion or deny it; (2) allow time to obtain affidavits or declaration or take discover; or (3) issue
any other appropriate order.” In addition, it has been observed that “[b]are allegations or vague
assertions of the need for discovery are not enough. . . . . In order to fulfill the requirements of
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56([d]), [plaintiff] must state with some precision the material [she] hopes to
obtain with further discovery, and how exactly [she] expects those materials would help [her] in
opposing summary judgment.” Summers v. Leis, 368 F.3d 881, 887 (6th Cir. 2004).
Plaintiff was allowed additional time to respond to the Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment, and the Court notes that Plaintiff made no additional requests for time to respond.
Also, besides vague requests for additional discovery, Plaintiff does not specify with any
precision the materials she wishes to obtain and how said materials would assist her in opposing
the Motion.

Further, the parties indicated that they would not engage in any additional

discovery until after the Court’s ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment.
Thus, she failed to meet the requirements of Rule 56(d).

(ECF No. 24.)

Therefore, any objection relative to

her request for additional time to respond is DENIED.
B. Fourteenth Amendment: Equal Protection Claim
In his Report and Recommendations, the Magistrate Judge determined that Plaintiff’s
claims under the Equal Protection Clause should be dismissed because the Plaintiff is unable to
establish a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff objects that the Defendants are not
entitled to summary judgment with regard to her equal protection claim arguing: 1) that as an
African-American female, she is a member of at least one protected class;

and 2) she was

singled out in the past for discriminatory treatment by a Wal-Mart employee, who was
acquainted with Defendant Baker. In response, Defendants contend that Plaintiff must allege
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facts showing Defendant Baker treated similarly-situated persons outside of Plaintiff’s protected
class more favorably than he treated her.

See Harajli v. Huron Tp., 365 F.3d 501, 508 (6th Cir.

2004).
In Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, she argues that
under the liberal pleading requirement of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, her Complaint
adequately sets forth a claim against the Defendants under the Equal Protection Clause.
Ridgeway v. Ford Dealer Computer Servs., Inc., 114 F.3d 94, 96 (6th Cir. 1997).

Defendants

reply that the Supreme Court in Iqbal held that factual allegations are necessary in an equal
protection claim to show that the defendants’ actions were “for the purpose of discriminating on
the account of race . . . .” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009).

The Magistrate Judge

found nothing in Plaintiff’s Complaint that satisfies Iqbal and allows the Court to draw the
inference that Simmons or Baker acted because of Plaintiff’s race.
In responding to a Rule 56(c) motion, the non-movant must demonstrate that there is
“significant probative evidence” to support their claims, not just a mere doubt about the material
facts involved. Moore v. Philip Morris Cos., 8 F.3d 335, 340 (6th Cir. 1993). A "mere existence
of a scintilla of evidence” supporting the non-movant’s stance is not enough; the evidence must be
sufficient for a jury to be able to find in favor of the non-movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall
“deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend
XVI, § 1. It “prohibits discrimination by government which either burdens a fundamental right,
targets a suspect class, or intentionally treats one differently than others similarly situated without
any rational basis for the difference.” Rondigo, L.C.C. v. Twp. of Richmond, 641 F.3d 673,
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681-82 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Radvansky v. City of Olmsted Falls, 395 F.3d 291, 312 (6th Cir.
2005)). Thus, [i]n order to state an equal protection claim, Plaintiff must show that Defendants
treated Plaintiff ‘disparately as compared to similarly situated persons and that such disparate
treatment either burdens a fundamental right, targets a suspect class, or has no rational basis.’”
Ctr. For Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Napolitano, 648 F.3d 365, 379 (6th Cir. 2011). Here,
Plaintiff has failed to establish any evidence that the Defendants treated similarly situated persons
outside of Plaintiff’s protected class more favorably. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s Objection to the
Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation on the Equal Protection claim is DENIED.
C. Malicious Prosecution Claim
The Magistrate Judge concluded that Defendant Baker had sufficient information to
establish probable cause. Consequently, the malicious prosecution claim was without merit.
Plaintiff argues in her response to the summary judgment motion, and again in her
objection to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation that the record supports a
malicious prosecution claim on the basis that: (1) Officer Baker lacked probable cause to arrest
Plaintiff for criminal trespass; (2) Officer Baker filed the criminal charges with malice; and (3)
the legal proceeding was terminated in Plaintiff’s favor.

The Magistrate Judge indicated that

the (1) Defendants provided evidence that established probable cause; (2) Plaintiff has not
alleged facts that establish a reasonable inference that Defendant Baker acted with malice; (3)
Plaintiff admits that she had never met Defendant Baker prior to the arrest; and (4) the criminal
charge did not terminate in Plaintiff’s favor, but was a compromise.
A police officer can base his probable cause determination on statements of witnesses.
See Ahlers v. Schebil, 188 F.3d 365, 370 (6th Cir. 1999).

In this case, Defendant Baker spoke

with a Walmart loss prevention employee, Mr. Hurt, with whom he had a prior work
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relationship. (ECF No. 11-2 ¶ 7). Mr. Hurt told Defendant Baker that the Plaintiff was banned
from the store and showed Defendant Baker a Notification of Restriction from Property dated
December 28, 2011. (ECF No. 11-2 ¶ 6).

This communication provided Defendant Baker

sufficient probable cause to arrest Plaintiff and remove her from the premises.
Additionally, the legal proceedings underlying this case did not terminate in Plaintiff’s
favor. Prior to the General Sessions Court dismissing the criminal trespass charge, Plaintiff
signed a new notice form and agreed to not enter any Wal-Mart store. This compromise did not
terminate the proceedings in Plaintiff’s favor. A cause dismissed pursuant to a compromise
and/or settlement is an indecisive termination and cannot sustain an action for malicious
prosecution. Mitchem v. City of Johnson City, No. 2:08-CV-238, 2010 WL 4363399 at *at (E.D.
Tenn. Oct 27, 2010)(quoting Bowman v. Breeden, 1988 WL 136640, at *2 (Tenn.Ct.App. Dec.
20, 1988)).
The Court has reviewed the record and can find no factual support for Plaintiff’s position
on this issue.

Plaintiff is incorrect in her assertions that Defendant Baker lacked probable cause

to arrest her and that the underlying legal proceedings terminated in her favor. Therefore, the
Plaintiff’s Objection to the Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation on the Malicious
Prosecution claim is DENIED.
D. Abuse of Process
Under Tennessee law, an abuse of process claim requires a plaintiff to prove “(1) the
existence of an ulterior motive; and (2) an act in the use of process other than such as would be
proper in the regular prosecution of the charge.”

Givens v. Mullikin ex rel Estate of

McElwaney, 75 S.W.3d 383, 400-01 (Tenn. 2002) (citations omitted).

Defendants maintain that

Plaintiff has presented no proof whatsoever to show that Defendant Baker used legal process in a
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manner other than what would be proper in the regular prosecution of this charge. In response,
Plaintiff only states once again that her arrest in this case was without probable cause because
there was no evidence that she was trespassing while in the Wal-Mart store.

She further argues

that the proceedings were terminated in her favor. The Court has found, supra, that Defendant
Baker did not lack probable cause and that the legal proceedings did not terminate in the
Plaintiff’s favor. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s Objection to the Magistrate’s Report and
Recommendation on the Abuse of Process claim is DENIED.
E. Qualified Immunity: Baker and Simmons
“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231
(2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “Government officials”
includes police officers. Jefferson v. Lewis, 594 F.3d 454, 459 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Hills v.
Kentucky, 457 F.3d 583, 587 (6th Cir. 2006)).
The determination of qualified immunity rests on a standard of objective legal
reasonableness. Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S.Ct. 1235, 1245 (2012) (quoting Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987)). “A defendant enjoys qualified immunity on summary
judgment unless the facts alleged and the evidence produced, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, would permit a reasonable juror to find that: (1) the defendant violated a
constitutional right; and (2) the right was clearly established.” Morrison v. Board of Trustees of
Green Township, 583 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 2009), citing Jones v. City of Cincinnati, 521 F.3d
555, 559 (6th Cir. 2008).
Plaintiff asserts violations of her Fourth Amendment rights to be free from illegal
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searches and seizures which extend to state governments through the Fourteenth Amendment.
See e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984);
and Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).

Accordingly, the right to be free from illegal

searches and seizures is “clearly established” and thus, satisfies the second prong of the Morrison
test for qualified immunity.
The Fourth Amendment guarantees people the right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures and to be secure in their homes and personal effects.
IV.

U.S. Const. amend

The Fourth Amendment also requires probable cause in order to issue a warrant. Id.

Probable cause for an arrest exists where the facts and knowledge that an officer possesses would
cause a reasonably prudent person to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a
crime. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964) (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
175–176 (1949); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959)). Furthermore, probable
cause to conduct a search exists when a reasonable person has probable cause to believe that
evidence of a crime will be found in the place to be searched. United States v. Giacalone, 541
F.2d 508, 513 (6th Cir. 1976).

The courts analyze this theory under a standard of

reasonableness based on “an examination of all facts and circumstances within an officer's
knowledge at the time of an arrest." Crockett v. Cumberland College, 316 F.3d 571, 580 (6th
Cir. 2003) (quoting Estate of Dietrich v. Burrows, 167 F.3d 1007, 1012 (6th Cir. 1999)).
The Magistrate Judge found, and this Court agrees, that Officer Baker had probable cause
to arrest Plaintiff and that he did not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional right. Defendant Simmons
was not involved and also did not violate the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Therefore, the
Plaintiff’s Objection to the Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation on the Qualified Immunity
of Defendants Baker and Simmons is DENIED.
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F. Chief Simmons’ Immunity in Individual Capacity
In his Report and Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge recommends that Plaintiff’s
claims against Defendant Simmons be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to show that
Defendant Simmons violated her rights. Plaintiff objects that a supervisory official may be held
liable for the actions of his subordinates pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 when he “implicitly
authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending
subordinate.” Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984).

Defendants argue that

Plaintiff must plead facts that allow the Court to draw the reasonable inference that Simmons
“either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated
in it.”

Howell v. Sanders, 668 F.3d 344, 351 n.3 (6th Cir. 2012).
Upon review of the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, the Court finds that

Plaintiff has failed to establish any facts that show Defendant Simmons either encouraged or
directly participated in the alleged violations. Defendant Simmons was not involved in the
arrest of Plaintiff. (ECF No. 11-2 ¶3.)

As discussed supra, none of the Plaintiff’s constitutional

rights were violated so Defendant Simmons cannot be held responsible for the acts of Defendant
Baker. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s Objection to the Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation on
Defendant Simmons’ immunity in his individual capacity is DENIED.
G. The City of Humboldt’s Liability Under 42 U.S.C. §1983
In order to prevail on a claim under Title VII, or 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must show
that she “was deprived of a right secured by the Federal Constitution or law of the United States
by a person acting under the color of state law.” Paige v. Coyner, 614 F.3d 273, 278 (6th Cir.
2010). In order to impose liability on a municipality pursuant to §1983, the plaintiff must show
that the municipality, through its deliberate conduct, was the moving force behind the injury.
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Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997). The Plaintiff must show that there was a
direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights. Id. In
limited cases a municipality can be held liable under § 1983 for its failure to train its employees
when the failure to train is “evidence

of a ‘deliberate indifference’ to the rights of the

inhabitant.” Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 426-427 (1989).
The Magistrate Judge concluded, and this Court agrees, that Plaintiff has failed to provide
any factual content that would support her § 1983 claim against the city of Humboldt. She has
also failed to provide any factual basis to allow the Court to draw a reasonable inference that the
City had a policy, custom, or procedure that caused violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
Therefore, the Plaintiff’s Objection to the Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation on the city of
Humboldt’s liability under U.S.C. §1983 is DENIED.
H. Eighth Amendment Claim
Plaintiff does not oppose the entry of Summary Judgment on behalf of Defendants’ City
of Humboldt, Raymond Simmons, and Dale Baker regarding her Eighth Amendment claims.
Therefore, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment in this regard is GRANTED.
I. Fourteenth Amendment: Due Process
Defendants seek summary judgment on the Fourteenth Amendment claims. Plaintiff does
not respond to this argument.

Therefore, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is

GRANTED.
J. Tennessee Constitution
Plaintiff does not oppose Defendants’ motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s
claims that they committed violations of the Tennessee State Constitution. Therefore,
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment in this regard is also GRANTED.
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K. City of Humboldt Liability
Defendants seek summary judgment pursuant to the Tennessee Governmental Tort
Liability Act (GTLA) that the city is immune from suit for malicious prosecution, false arrest,
intentional infliction of mental distress, abuse of process, and for claims arising out of violation
of Plaintiff’s civil rights. Plaintiff does not oppose entry of Summary Judgment with regard to
malicious prosecution, false arrest, intentional infliction of mental distress, and abuse of process
claims. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
Plaintiff contends that the Defendant City is not entitled to summary judgment on
Plaintiff negligence claims under the GTLA. The Plaintiff argues that Defendants Baker and
Simmons were acting in the scope of their employment at the time of Plaintiff’s arrest and they
were negligent in failing to conduct a reasonable inquiry and investigation prior to Plaintiff’s
arrest and prosecution. The Court has determined that there was probable cause to arrest
Plaintiff. Therefore, the Defendants’ Objection to the proposed findings of the Magistrate Judge
with respect to this issue is DENIED.

Motion for Summary Judgment for negligence under the

Governmental Tort Liability Act is GRANTED.
For the reasons stated above, the Court finds Plaintiff’s objections are overruled and the
Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation is ADOPTED.
The Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 11, GRANTED and the case
DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 15th of September, 2014.

s/John T. Fowlkes, Jr.
JOHN T. FOWLKES, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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