Clark v. Madison County Sheriff's Department et al

Filing 5

ORDER OF DISMISSAL AND ORDER GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND. Any amendment must be filed within thirty (30) days of the date of entry of this order. Signed by Judge James D. Todd on 3/30/15. (Todd, James)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION

ALONZO LAMONT CLARK,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MADISON COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants.

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No. 14-1081-JDT-egb

ORDER OF DISMISSAL
AND
ORDER GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND
On April 7, 2014, Plaintiff Alonzo Lamont Clark, who is confined as an inmate at the
Madison County Criminal Justice Center (“MCCJC”) in Jackson, Tennessee, filed a pro se
complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § l983, accompanied by a motion seeking leave to proceed in forma
pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1 & 2.) The Court issued an order on April 8, 2014, that granted leave to
proceed in forma pauperis and assessed the civil filing fee. (ECF No. 4.) The Clerk shall record
the defendants as Madison County,1 Captain Rudder, Lieutenant Petty, Sergeant Brown, and
Deputies Gray, Maze, Muse, and Wilson.
Plaintiff Clark alleges that on March 28, 2014, an inmate trustee at the MCCJC slammed his
finger in a pieflap, cutting the finger off . (ECF No. 1 at PageID 2.) Plaintiff alleges that “when the
officers were called everyone failed to respond in the proper manner and in a professional manner
to assist in medical treatment necessary in which I had lost a considerable amount of blood before
they decided to take the situation seriously.” (Id.) Plaintiff admits that he saw a doctor and received
surgery at a local hospital and has had followup care but believes the treatment is not proper because

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Plaintiff named the MCCJC as a Defendant. Governmental departments, divisions, and buildings
are not suable entities. The Court construes those claims against Madison County. See generally
Hafer v. Melo, 502 U. S. 21 (1991).

his finger has become infected. (Id. at PageID 3.) Plaintiff contends that he is not receiving his
medication as prescribed, cannot clean and dress the wound properly, and is afraid he will lose his
entire finger. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks demotion, suspension, or termination of the defendants, an
investigation into the MCCJC, and two million dollars in compensation. (Id. at PageID 4.)
The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint, or any
portion thereof, if the complaint—
(1)
is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted; or
(2)

seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may be granted,
the standards under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79
(2009), and in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007), are applied. Hill v. Lappin,
630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). “Accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as
true, the Court ‘consider[s] the factual allegations in [the] complaint to determine if they plausibly
suggest an entitlement to relief.’” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681) (alteration in original). “[P]leadings that . . . are no more than conclusions
. . . are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework
of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (“Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket
assertion, of entitlement to relief. Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see
how a claimant could satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the
claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.”).
“A complaint can be frivolous either factually or legally. See Neitzke [v. Williams], 490 U.S.
[319,] 325[(1989)]. Any complaint that is legally frivolous would ipso facto fail to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. See id. at 328-29.” Hill, 630 F.3d at 470.

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Whether a complaint is factually frivolous under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and
1915(e)(2)(B)(i) is a separate issue from whether it fails to state a claim for relief.
Statutes allowing a complaint to be dismissed as frivolous give “judges not only the
authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also
the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and
dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke, 490
U.S. at 327 (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1915). Unlike a dismissal for failure to state
a claim, where a judge must accept all factual allegations as true, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.
at 1949-50, a judge does not have to accept “fantastic or delusional” factual
allegations as true in prisoner complaints that are reviewed for frivolousness.
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28, 109 S. Ct. 1827.
Id. at 471.
“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting
Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants and prisoners are not exempt
from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As the Sixth Circuit has explained:
Before the recent onslaught of pro se prisoner suits, the Supreme Court
suggested that pro se complaints are to be held to a less stringent standard than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (per
curiam). Neither that Court nor other courts, however, have been willing to abrogate
basic pleading essentials in pro se suits. See, e.g., id. at 521 (holding petitioner to
standards of Conley v. Gibson); Merritt v. Faulkner, 697 F.2d 761 (7th Cir.) (duty
to be less stringent with pro se complaint does not require court to conjure up
unplead allegations), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 986 (1983); McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d
16 (1st Cir.1979) (same); Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237 (D.D.C. 1987) (pro se
plaintiffs should plead with requisite specificity so as to give defendants notice);
Holsey v. Collins, 90 F.R.D. 122 (D. Md. 1981) (even pro se litigants must meet
some minimum standards).
Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, No. 09-2259, 2011
WL 285251, at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for failure to
comply with “unique pleading requirements” and stating “a court cannot ‘create a claim which [a
plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’”) (quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518
F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975)) (alteration in original); Payne v. Secretary of Treas., 73 F. App’x
836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2) and stating, “[n]either this court nor the district court is required to create Payne’s claim for

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her”); cf. Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004) (“District judges have no obligation to act as
counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants.”).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,2 a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a
deprivation of rights secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States (2) committed by
a defendant acting under color of state law . Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits cruel and unusual
punishment. See generally Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991). An Eighth Amendment claim
consists of both objective and subjective components. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834
(1994); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992); Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298; Williams v. Curtin, 633
F.3d at 383; Mingus v. Butler, 591 F.3d 474, 479-80 (6th Cir. 2010). The objective component
requires that the deprivation be “sufficiently serious.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Hudson, 503 U.S.
at 8; Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298.
Under Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976), “deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’. . . proscribed
by the Eighth Amendment.” However, not “every claim by a prisoner that he has not received
adequate medical treatment states a violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105.
“In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful
to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. It is only such indifference that can
offend ‘evolving standards of decency’ in violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Id., 429 U.S. at 106.

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Section 1983 provides: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of
Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
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Within the context of Estelle claims, the objective component requires that the medical need
be sufficiently serious. Hunt v. Reynolds, 974 F.2d 734, 735 (6th Cir. 1992). “A medical need is
serious if it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so
obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Ramos
v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 575 (10th Cir. 1980)(quoting Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 311
(D.N.H. 1977)).
To make out a claim of an Eighth Amendment Estelle violation, a prisoner must plead facts
showing that “prison authorities have denied reasonable requests for medical treatment in the face
of an obvious need for such attention where the inmate is thereby exposed to undue suffering or the
threat of tangible residual injury.” Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 (6th Cir. 1976). The Court
clarified the meaning of deliberate indifference in Farmer v. Brennan, as the reckless disregard of
a substantial risk of serious harm; mere negligence will not suffice. Id. 511 U.S. at 835-36.
Consequently, allegations of medical malpractice or negligent diagnosis and treatment fail to state
an Eighth Amendment claim of cruel and unusual punishment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106.
Plaintiff has sued Madison County. When a § 1983 claim is made against a municipality, the
court must analyze two distinct issues: (1) whether plaintiff’s harm was caused by a constitutional
violation; and (2) if so, whether the municipality is responsible for that violation. Collins v. City of
Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992). The second issue is dispositive of Plaintiff’s claim
against Madison County.
A local government “cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—or, in
other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.”
Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (emphasis in original); see also Searcy v.
City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1994); Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1345 (6th
Cir. 1994). A municipality cannot be held responsible for a constitutional deprivation unless there
is a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional
deprivation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-92; Deaton v. Montgomery Co., Ohio, 989 F.2d 885, 889 (6th
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Cir. 1993). To demonstrate municipal liability, a plaintiff “must (1) identify the municipal policy
or custom, (2) connect the policy to the municipality, and (3) show that his particular injury was
incurred due to execution of that policy.” Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing
Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)). “Where a government ‘custom
has not received formal approval through the body’s official decisionmaking channels,’ such a
custom may still be the subject of a § 1983 suit.” Alkire, 330 F.3d at 815 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S.
at 690-91). The policy or custom “must be ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation’ in order
to establish the liability of a government body under § 1983.” Searcy, 38 F.3d at 286 (quoting Polk
Co. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. at 326 (citation omitted)). “[T]he touchstone of ‘official policy’ is designed
‘to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, and thereby make
clear that municipal liability is limited to action for which the municipality is actually responsible.’”
City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 138 (1988) (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S.
469, 479-80 (1986)) (emphasis in original).
Although civil rights plaintiffs are not required to plead the facts demonstrating municipal
liability with particularity, Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination
Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1993), the complaint must be sufficient to put the municipality on notice
of the plaintiff’s theory of liability, see, e.g., Fowler v. Campbell, Civil Action No. 3:06CV-P610-H,
2007 WL 1035007, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 30, 2007); Yeackering v. Ankrom, No. 4:05-CV-00018-M,
2005 WL 1877964, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 5, 2005); Oliver v. City of Memphis, No. 04-2074-B, 2004
WL 3316242, at *4 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 2, 2004); cf. Raub v. Correctional Med. Servs., Inc., No. 0613942, 2008 WL 160611, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 15, 2008) (denying motion to dismiss where
complaint contained conclusory allegations of a custom or practice); Cleary v. County of Macomb,
No. 06-15505, 2007 WL 2669102, at *20 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 6, 2007) (same); Morningstar v. City
of Detroit, No. 06-11073, 2007 WL 2669156, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 6, 2007) (same); Chidester
v. City of Memphis, No. 02-2556 MA/A, 2006 WL 1421099, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. June 15, 2005). The
allegations of the complaint fail to identify an official policy or custom which caused injury to
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Plaintiff. Instead, it appears that Plaintiff is suing Madison County because he was confined in a
county institution and the County employed persons who allegedly violated his rights.
The complaint contains no factual allegations against Defendants Rudder, Petty, Brown,
Mayberry, Bray, Maze, Muse, and Wilson. When a complaint fails to allege any action by a
defendant, it necessarily fails to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550
U.S. at 570. No named defendant is alleged to have been responsible for denying Plaintiff medical
care. Plaintiff does not allege how he made his requests for medical treatment or to whom he made
requests for medical treatment. He has admitted that, once the officers realized that his injury was
serious, he was taken to the doctor and then the hospital. He does not allege that any named
defendant was aware that he was not receiving his prescribed medicine or that his finger has become
infected. He does not allege that he has made further requests for treatment and medication to the
named defendants.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim on which
relief may be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).
The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may allow a prisoner to amend his complaint
to avoid a sua sponte dismissals under the PLRA. LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th Cir.
2013); see also Brown v. R.I., No. 12-1403, 2013 WL 646489, at *1 (1st Cir. Feb. 22, 2013) (per
curiam) (“Ordinarily, before dismissal for failure to state a claim is ordered, some form of notice and
an opportunity to cure the deficiencies in the complaint must be afforded.”). Leave to amend is not
required where a deficiency cannot be cured. Brown, 2013 WL 646489, at *1; Gonzalez-Gonzalez
v. United States, 257 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 2001) (“This does not mean, of course, that every sua
sponte dismissal entered without prior notice to the plaintiff automatically must be reversed. If it
is crystal clear that the plaintiff cannot prevail and that amending the complaint would be futile, then
a sua sponte dismissal may stand.”); Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir.
2002) (“in forma pauperis plaintiffs who file complaints subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)
should receive leave to amend unless amendment would be inequitable or futile”); Curley v. Perry,
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246 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We agree with the majority view that sua sponte dismissal
of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged by amendment comports with due process and does
not infringe the right of access to the courts.”).
With the exception of Plaintiff’s claims against Madison County, the Court cannot conclude
that any amendment to Plaintiff’s claims would be futile as a matter of law. Therefore, leave to
amend is GRANTED. Any amendment must be filed within thirty (30) days of the date of entry of
this order. Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint and
must be complete in itself without reference to the prior pleading. The text of the complaint must
allege sufficient facts to support each claim without reference to any extraneous document. Any
exhibits must be identified by number in the text of the amended complaint and must be attached
to the complaint. The amendment may not include any claim that was not in the original complaint.
The amended complaint may sue additional defendants provided that they were named in the
original complaint and the claims against each new party were contained in the original complaint.
Each claim for relief must be stated in a separate count and must identify each defendant sued in that
count. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint within the time specified, the Court will assess
a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and will enter judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED

s/James D. Todd
JAMES D. TODD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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