Reid v. Chandler et al

Filing 8

ORDER TO MODIFY THE DOCKET, DISMISSING COMPLAINT, CERTIFYING AN APPEAL WOULD NOT BE TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH AND DENYING LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS. Signed by Judge James D. Todd on 8/12/15. (Todd, James)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION
E.L. REID a/k/a ELDRED L. REID
a/k/a ELDRED LONNIE REID,
Plaintiff,
VS.
PAT CHANDLER, ET AL.,
Defendants.

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No. 14-1191-JDT-egb

ORDER TO MODIFY THE DOCKET, DISMISSING COMPLAINT,
CERTIFYING AN APPEAL WOULD NOT BE TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH
AND DENYING LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS

On August 12, 2014, Plaintiff E.L. Reid a/k/a Eldred L. Reid a/k/a Eldred Lonnie Reid
(“Reid”)1 who was, at the time, incarcerated at the Benton County Jail in Camden, Tennessee,
filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis.
(ECF Nos. 1 & 2). In an order issued August 13, 2014, the Court granted leave to proceed in
forma pauperis and assessed the civil filing fee pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act of
1995 (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b).2 (ECF No. 4.) On February 4, 2015, Plaintiff

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The Clerk is directed to MODIFY the docket to list as aliases the other forms of
Plaintiff’s name, which were obtained from his resident account summary (ECF No. 2-1) and
previous cases he filed in this district, see, e.g., Reid v. Dep’t of Corr., No. 94-1167-JDT (W.D.
Tenn. Aug. 25, 1994).
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Plaintiff failed to disclose that he is a “three strikes” filer pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(g). See Reid v. Tirey, No. 3:97-cv-00216 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 28, 1997) (dismissing case
because Reid had three prior strikes under § 1915(g) and did not allege he was in imminent
danger of serious physical injury). Thus, the filing fee in this case was assessed prior to the
determination of whether the allegations fall within the exception to § 1915(g).

notified the Clerk that he was no longer in Benton County but was incarcerated in Galveston,
Texas. (ECF No. 7.) The Clerk shall record the Defendants as the Benton County Jail (“Jail”),
Jail Administrator Pat Chandler; Advanced Medical, which contracts to provide medical care to
inmates at the Jail; Shela Brake, a nurse employed by Advanced Medical; and Lisa Hatch, a
physician employed by Advanced Medical.
I. THE COMPLAINT
Reid’s filing alleges that he was denied his “[c]ore” basic constitutional rights while he
was incarcerated at the Jail. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 2.) Reid’s first set of allegations concern the
medical treatment available at the Jail. Reid alleges that he should have been sent to a Veterans
Affairs (“V.A.”) hospital in order to receive reading glasses, to receive treatment for prostate and
urinary issues and for dehydration due to his current blood pressure medication, and to receive
narcotics for back pain. (Id. at PageID 3.) Reid argues the Jail has a “complete lack of medical
treatment involving pain.” (Id. at PageID 8.) He alleges that he never saw a doctor, but was told
by Nurse Brake that Dr. Hatch had prescribed his blood pressure medicine. (Id. at PageID 4.)
Reid contends that he should never have been given that medicine, which he alleges made him
sick and dizzy, causing him to fall out of his bed and injure his neck, hip and back. (Id.) Reid
maintains that he has difficulty walking around and that the cane that he uses is insufficient to
assist him with his injuries. (Id. at PageID 5.) The Court will presume the allegations regarding
the lack of medical care sufficiently allege that Plaintiff was in imminent danger of serious
physical injury when the complaint was filed. See, e.g., Vandiver v. Vasbinder, 416 F. App’x
560, 561-62 (6th Cir. 2011) (assessment of whether a prisoner is in imminent danger is made at
the time of filing).

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Reid also includes allegations regarding his criminal proceedings in state court. (Id. at
PageID 7.) He alleges that his arrest warrant was the result of fruit of the poisonous tree because
the police continued to ask him questions even after he requested an attorney to be present. (Id.)
Reid further alleges that when an attorney was provided, the attorney provided was an attorney,
“in name only.” (Id.)
Reid further alleges that the law library at the Jail is insufficient to address his complaints
regarding that facility. (Id. at PageID 6.) He alleges that the law library only has a few books
and no “USCA” books. (Id.) Reid contends the grievance forms do not meet “incarceration
standards.” (Id.) He further alleges that he is not provided with addresses to get complaint
forms. (Id.)
The only relief sought by Reid is injunctive in nature. He first asks the Court to order
that he receive treatment at the V.A. hospital/medical center. Reid further requests that the Court
rule the arrest warrant and search and seizure as illegal products of fruit of the poisonous tree,
declare his appointed attorney from his criminal trial incompetent, and reprimand the Jail for
operating in an unconstitutional manner. (Id. at PageID 9.)
II. APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
In his complaint, Reid also seeks appointment of counsel in this case. (Id.) Pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), “[t]he court may request an attorney to represent any person unable to
afford counsel.”

However, “[t]he appointment of counsel in a civil proceeding is not a

constitutional right.” Lanier v. Bryant, 332 F.3d 999, 1006 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Shepherd v.
Wellman, 313 F.3d 963, 970 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he plaintiffs were not entitled to have counsel
appointed because this is a civil lawsuit.”); Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 605-06 (6th Cir.
1993) (no constitutional right to counsel in a civil case); Farmer v. Haas, 990 F.2d 319, 323 (7th

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Cir. 1993) (“There is no constitutional or . . . statutory right to counsel in federal civil cases . . .
.”). Appointment of counsel is “a privilege that is justified only by exceptional circumstances.”
Lavado, 992 F.2d at 606 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “In determining
whether ‘exceptional circumstances’ exist, courts have examined the type of case and the
abilities of the plaintiff to represent himself. This generally involves a determination of the
complexity of the factual and legal issues involved.” Id. at 606 (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). Appointment of counsel is not appropriate when a pro se litigant’s claims are
frivolous or when his chances of success are extremely slim. Id. (citing Mars v. Hanberry, 752
F.2d 254, 256 (6th Cir. 1985)); see also Cleary v. Mukasey, 307 F. App’x 963, 965 (6th Cir.
2009) (same).3
Reid has not satisfied the burden of demonstrating that the Court should exercise its
discretion to appoint counsel in this case.
III. ANALYSIS
A.

Screening and Standard
The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint, or any

portion thereof, if the complaint—
(1)
is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted; or
(2)

seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

relief.

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These factors are important, because § 1915(e)(1) “does not authorize the federal courts
to make coercive appointments of counsel” to represent indigent civil litigants. Mallard v.
United States Dist. Ct., 490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989).
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28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may be
granted, the court applies standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as stated in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555-57 (2007). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). “Accepting all wellpleaded allegations in the complaint as true, the Court ‘consider[s] the factual allegations in [the]
complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.’” Williams v. Curtin,
631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681) (alteration in original).
“[P]leadings that . . . are no more than conclusions . . . are not entitled to the assumption of truth.
While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by
factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (“Rule
8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief. Without
some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the
requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on
which the claim rests.”).
“A complaint can be frivolous either factually or legally. Any complaint that is legally
frivolous would ipso facto fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Hill, 630 F.3d
at 470 (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 328-29 (1989)).
Whether a complaint is factually frivolous under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and
1915(e)(2)(B)(i) is a separate issue from whether it fails to state a claim for relief.
Statutes allowing a complaint to be dismissed as frivolous give “judges not only
the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory,
but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations
and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke,
490 U.S. at 327, 109 S. Ct. 1827 (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1915). Unlike a
dismissal for failure to state a claim, where a judge must accept all factual
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allegations as true, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50, a judge does not have to accept
“fantastic or delusional” factual allegations as true in prisoner complaints that are
reviewed for frivolousness. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28, 109 S. Ct. 1827.
Id. at 471.
“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383
(quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants and prisoners
are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown,
891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, No. 09-2259, 2011 WL
285251, at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for failure to
comply with “unique pleading requirements” and stating “a court cannot ‘create a claim which [a
plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’”) (quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co.,
518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975)) (alteration in original); Payne v. Sec’y of Treas., 73 F.
App’x 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of complaint pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and stating, “[n]either this court nor the district court is required to create Payne’s
claim for her”); cf. Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004) (“District judges have no obligation
to act as counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants.”); Young Bok Song v. Gipson, 423 F. App’x 506,
510 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e decline to affirmatively require courts to ferret out the strongest cause
of action on behalf of pro se litigants. Not only would that duty be overly burdensome, it would
transform the courts from neutral arbiters of disputes into advocates for a particular party. While
courts are properly charged with protecting the rights of all who come before it, that
responsibility does not encompass advising litigants as to what legal theories they should
pursue.”).

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Reid filed his complaint on the court-supplied form for actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in
any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such
officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation
of rights secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States (2) committed by a
defendant acting under color of state law . Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150
(1970).
B.

Mootness
“Article III of the Constitution limits the judicial power to the adjudication of ‘Cases’ or

‘Controversies.’” MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 137 (2007) (citing U.S.
Const., art. III, § 2). This is “a cradle-to-grave requirement that must be met in order to file a
claim in federal court and that must be met in order to keep it there.” Fialka-Feldman v.
Oakland Univ. Bd. of Trs., 639 F.3d 711, 713 (6th Cir. 2011). “[A] federal court has no authority
to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of
law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.” Church of Scientology of Cal.
v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Coalition for
Gov’t Procurement v. Fed. Prison Indus., Inc., 365 F.3d 435, 458 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Under the
‘case or controversy’ requirement, we lack authority to issue a decision that does not affect the
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rights of the litigants.”); Sw. Williamson Cnty. Cmty. Ass’n, Inc. v. Slater, 243 F.3d 270, 276 (6th
Cir. 2001) (same). The mootness question turns on whether a federal court can afford a litigant
any “effectual relief.” Coalition for Gov’t Procurement, 365 F.3d at 458.
As indicated, after the filing of the complaint Plaintiff submitted a change of address
showing that he is no longer incarcerated at the Jail. Because the only relief Plaintiff seeks in the
complaint with regard to his allegations against the Jail, Advanced Medical, and the individual
Defendants is declaratory and injunctive, his claims are now moot. Moore v. Curtis, 68 F. App’x
561, 562 (6th Cir. 2003) (claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against prison staff moot
when inmate transferred to another facility); Kensu v. Haigh, 87 F.3d 172, 175 (6th Cir. 1996)
(same); Tramber v. Pleasant, No. 4:12CV-P31-M, 2012 WL 4594339, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 2,
2012) (inmate’s claim for a transfer and medical care moot when he was transferred to another
facility).
C.

Claims Concerning Plaintiff’s Criminal Proceedings
Reid’s allegations of illegal search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment and

his allegations that his trial counsel is ineffective appear to concern ongoing criminal
proceedings in state court and are not properly brought against Benton County. However, even
if Benton County was the proper Defendant, this Court cannot order that Plaintiff’s state criminal
charges be dismissed or otherwise interfere in those proceedings. Under the Anti-Injunction Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2283, “[a] court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings
in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of
its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.” The Sixth Circuit has explained that
“[t]he Act thereby creates ‘an absolute prohibition against enjoining state court proceedings,
unless the injunction falls within one of three specifically defined exceptions,’ which are set

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forth in the statutory language.” Andreano v. City of Westlake, 136 F. App’x 865, 879-80 (6th
Cir. 2005) (quoting Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286
(1970)).

Federal injunctions against state criminal proceedings can be issued only “under

extraordinary circumstances where the danger of irreparable loss is both great and immediate.”
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The
Supreme Court has emphasized that
[c]ertain types of injury, in particular, the cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of
having to defend against a single criminal prosecution, could not by themselves
be considered “irreparable” in the special legal sense of that term. Instead, the
threat to the plaintiff’s federally protected rights must be one that cannot be
eliminated by his defense against a single criminal prosecution.
Id. at 46. Irreparable injury may be found only where the statute under which the Plaintiff is
charged is “flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions, or where there
is a showing of bad faith, harassment, or other unusual circumstances that would call for
equitable relief.” Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 231 (1972) (internal quotation marks,
ellipses and citations omitted).

In this case, Plaintiff does not allege any unusual or

extraordinary circumstances that cannot be addressed through his defense in the criminal
proceeding.
Even if Plaintiff has now been convicted of the charges against him, the Court cannot
address Fourth Amendment search and seizure claims or Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance
claims in this § 1983 case. When a prisoner seeks to challenge his conviction and the validity
and/or duration of his confinement, his sole remedy is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973); see also Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750
(2004) (per curiam) (“Challenges to the validity of any confinement or to particulars affecting its
duration are the province of habeas corpus.”).

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IV. STANDARD FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may allow a prisoner to amend his
complaint to avoid a sua sponte dismissals under the PLRA. LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d
944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013); see also Brown v. R.I., No. 12-1403, 2013 WL 646489, at *1 (1st Cir.
Feb. 22, 2013) (per curiam) (“Ordinarily, before dismissal for failure to state a claim is ordered,
some form of notice and an opportunity to cure the deficiencies in the complaint must be
afforded.”). Leave to amend is not required where a deficiency cannot be cured. Brown, 2013
WL 646489, at *1; Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. United States, 257 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 2001) (“This
does not mean, of course, that every sua sponte dismissal entered without prior notice to the
plaintiff automatically must be reversed. If it is crystal clear that the plaintiff cannot prevail and
that amending the complaint would be futile, then a sua sponte dismissal may stand.”); Grayson
v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002) (“in forma pauperis plaintiffs who file
complaints subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) should receive leave to amend unless
amendment would be inequitable or futile”); Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir.
2001) (“We agree with the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a meritless complaint that
cannot be salvaged by amendment comports with due process and does not infringe the right of
access to the courts.”).
V. APPEAL ISSUES
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(3), the Court must also consider whether an appeal by
Plaintiff in this case would be taken in good faith. The good faith standard is an objective one.
Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). The test for whether an appeal is taken in
good faith is whether the litigant seeks appellate review of any issue that is not frivolous. Id. It
would be inconsistent for a district court to determine that a complaint should be dismissed prior

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to service on the Defendants, but has sufficient merit to support an appeal in forma pauperis.
See Williams v. Kullman, 722 F.2d 1048, 1050 n.1 (2d Cir. 1983). The same considerations that
lead the Court to dismiss this case for failure to state a claim also compel the conclusion that an
appeal would not be taken in good faith.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court DISMISSES Reid’s complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief can
be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). Leave to amend is
DENIED because the deficiencies in Reid’s complaint cannot be cured. It is also CERTIFIED,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal in this matter by Plaintiff would not be taken
in good faith. Leave to appeal in forma pauperis is DENIED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ James D. Todd
JAMES D. TODD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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