Edwards v. Belew et al

Filing 7

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND. Signed by Judge James D. Todd on 12/14/15. (Todd, James)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION
MIKE DEWYANE EDWARDS,

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Plaintiff,
VS.
MONTE BELEW, ET AL.,
Defendants.

No. 14-1203-JDT-egb

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND

On August 20, 2014, Plaintiff Mike Dewyane Edwards (“Edwards”), an inmate at the
Northeast Correctional Complex in Mountain City, Tennessee, filed a pro se complaint pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 accompanied by a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1 & 2.)
In an order issued August 21, 2014, the Court granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis and
assessed the civil filing fee pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(a)-(b). (ECF No. 4.) Plaintiff’s complaint concerns his previous incarceration at the
Henry County Correctional Facility (“Jail”) in Paris, Tennessee. The Clerk shall record the
Defendants as Henry County Sheriff Monte Belew; Captain Steve Page; and Keri Jackson and
Brian Bennett, Correctional Officers at the Jail.
I. The Complaint
Edwards alleges that when he was transferred to HCCF he was tasered and placed in
restraints under an air conditioner for five hours. (ECF No. 1-1 at 3.) Edwards further alleges
that he was forced to work in hazardous and toxic conditions by Defendant Page. (Id. at 4.)

Edwards contends “they knew it was hazardous,” after a failed state inspection but that he was
still required to clean black mold out of the shower without proper protection. (Id.) On August
17, 2013, Defendant Jackson contacted Edwards over the intercom to ascertain what was wrong
with him. (Id.) When Edwards told her he was sick, she stated that she would send someone
down for him. (Id.) Edwards alleges that woke up in the hospital on life support requiring a
ventilator, and discovered that he had pneumonia. (Id.)
Edwards alleges that on September 1, 2013, Defendants Bennett, Page, and Belew
checked him out of the hospital “against medical advice” after he had words with a nurse, took
him back to the HCCF, and put him in segregation. (Id.) Edwards was in segregation until
September 3, 2013, during which time he was unable to walk without falling and was not given
any property, not even a towel or washcloth, and was forced to urinate and defecate on himself.
On September 4, 2013, Edwards was transferred into the custody of the Tennessee Department
of Correction. (Id.)

Edwards seeks five million dollars for damages due to the treatment he

received. (Id. at 5.)
II. Analysis
The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint, or any
portion thereof, if the complaint—
(1)
is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted; or
(2)

seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may be
granted, the court applies the standards under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as

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stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). “Accepting
all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, the Court ‘consider[s] the factual allegations
in [the] complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.’” Williams v.
Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681) (alteration in
original). “[P]leadings that . . . are no more than conclusions . . . are not entitled to the
assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they
must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555 n.3 (“Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to
relief. Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could
satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the claim, but also
‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.”).
“A complaint can be frivolous either factually or legally. Any complaint that is legally
frivolous would ipso facto fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Hill, 630 F.3d
at 470 (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 328-29 (1989)).
Whether a complaint is factually frivolous under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and
1915(e)(2)(B)(i) is a separate issue from whether it fails to state a claim for relief.
Statutes allowing a complaint to be dismissed as frivolous give “judges not only
the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory,
but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations
and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke,
490 U.S. at 327, 109 S. Ct. 1827 (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1915). Unlike a
dismissal for failure to state a claim, where a judge must accept all factual
allegations as true, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50, a judge does not have to accept
“fantastic or delusional” factual allegations as true in prisoner complaints that are
reviewed for frivolousness. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28, 109 S. Ct. 1827.
Id. at 471.

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“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383
(quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants and prisoners
are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown,
891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, No. 09-2259, 2011 WL
285251, at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for failure to
comply with “unique pleading requirements” and stating “a court cannot ‘create a claim which [a
plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’”) (quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co.,
518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975)) (alteration in original); Payne v. Sec’y of Treas., 73 F.
App’x 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of complaint pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and stating, “[n]either this court nor the district court is required to create Payne’s
claim for her”); cf. Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004) (“District judges have no obligation
to act as counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants.”); Young Bok Song v. Gipson, 423 F. App’x 506,
510 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e decline to affirmatively require courts to ferret out the strongest cause
of action on behalf of pro se litigants. Not only would that duty be overly burdensome, it would
transform the courts from neutral arbiters of disputes into advocates for a particular party. While
courts are properly charged with protecting the rights of all who come before it, that
responsibility does not encompass advising litigants as to what legal theories they should
pursue.”).
Edwards filed his complaint on the court-supplied form for actions under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
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secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in
any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such
officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation
of rights secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States (2) committed by a
defendant acting under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150
(1970).
Edwards’s complaint addresses his treatment at the HCCF, including getting tasered,
being forced to sit under an air conditioner, being required to work in unsafe conditions and
placement in segregation without any property. (ECF No. 1-1 at 3-4.) For a convicted prisoner,
such claims arise under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishments.
See generally Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991). In the case of a pretrial detainee, “the ‘cruel
and unusual punishment’ proscription of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution does not
apply,” because “as a pre-trial detainee [the plaintiff is] not being ‘punished,’” Cuoco v.
Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2000). Instead, a person detained prior to conviction
receives protection against mistreatment at the hands of prison officials under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if held in state custody. Liscio v. Warren, 901 F.2d 274,
275–76 (2d Cir.1990). Caiozzo v. Koreman, 581 F.3d 63, 69 (2d Cir. 2009). Even if Edwards
was a pretrial detainee during the events at issue, the court will analyze his claims under Eighth
Amendment principles because the rights of pretrial detainees are equivalent to those of

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convicted prisoners. Thompson v. Cnty. of Medina, 29 f.3d 238, 242 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing
Roberts v. City of Troy, 773 F.2d 720, 723 (6th Cir. 1985).1
An Eighth Amendment claim consists of both objective and subjective components.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992);
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991); Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d at 383; Mingus v.
Butler, 591 F.3d 474, 479-80 (6th Cir. 2010).u The objective component requires that the
deprivation be “sufficiently serious.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8; Wilson,
501 U.S. at 298.
To satisfy the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must show
that he “is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm,” Farmer, 511
U.S. at 834; see also Miller v. Calhoun Cnty., 408 F.3d 803, 812 (6th Cir. 2005), or that he has
been deprived of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hadix v. Johnson, 367 F.3d 513, 525 (6th Cir. 2004)
(“To succeed in an Eighth Amendment challenge, [a prisoner] must establish that . . . a single,
identifiable necessity of civilized human existence is being denied . . . .”). The Constitution
“does not mandate comfortable prisons.” Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). “[R]outine discomfort is part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for

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On June 22, 2015, the Supreme Court held, in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 133 S. Ct. 2466
(2015), that excessive force claims brought by pre-trial detainees must be analyzed under a
standard of objective reasonableness, rejecting a subjective standard that takes into account a
defendant’s state of mind. Id. at 2472-73. It is unclear whether or to what extent the holding in
Kingsley may affect the deliberate indifference standard for claims concerning an inmate’s health
or safety, which the Sixth Circuit applies to both pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners. See
Morabito v. Holmes, --- F. App’x ---, 2015 WL 5920204, at *4-*5 (6th Cir. 2015) (applying,
even after the decision in Kingsley, the objective reasonableness standard to pretrial detainee’s
excessive force claims and the deliberate indifference standard to denial of medical care claim).
Absent further guidance, the Court will continue to apply the deliberate indifference analysis to
claims concerning a pretrial detainee’s health and safety.
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their offenses against society.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Thus, “extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement
claim.” Id. at 9.
In considering the types of conditions that constitute a substantial risk of serious harm,
the Court evaluates not only the seriousness of the potential harm and the likelihood that the
harm will actually occur, but evidence that unwilling exposure to that risk violates contemporary
standards of decency, i.e., that society does not choose to tolerate the risk in its prisons. Helling
v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993). The Supreme Court has also emphasized that prisoners
can rarely establish an Eighth Amendment violation from a combination of conditions of
confinement that, in themselves, do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation:
Some conditions of confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment violation
“in combination” when each would not do so alone, but only when they have a
mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable
human need such as food, warmth, or exercise—for example, a low cell
temperature at night combined with a failure to issue blankets. To say that some
prison conditions may interact in this fashion is a far cry from saying that all
prison conditions are a seamless web for Eighth Amendment purposes. Nothing
as amorphous as “overall conditions” can rise to the level of cruel and unusual
punishment when no specific deprivation of a single human need exists.
Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304-05 (citation omitted); see also Thompson, 29 F.3d at 242 (“Eighth
Amendment claims may not be based on the totality of the circumstances, but rather must
identify a specific condition that violates” a particular right); Carver v. Knox Cnty., Tenn., 887
F.2d 1287, 1294 (6th Cir. 1989) (same).
To establish the subjective component of an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner
must demonstrate that the official acted with the requisite intent, that is, that he had a
“sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; see also Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297,
302-03. The plaintiff must show that the prison officials acted with “deliberate indifference” to a

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substantial risk that the prisoner would suffer serious harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Wilson,
501 U.S. at 303; Helling, 509 U.S. at 32; Woods v. Lecureux, 110 F.3d 1215, 1222 (6th Cir.
1997); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996); Taylor v. Mich. Dep’t of
Corr., 69 F.3d 76, 79 (6th Cir. 1995). “[D]eliberate indifference describes a state of mind more
blameworthy than negligence.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. Thus,
[a] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for
denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of
and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both
be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk
of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. This approach
comports best with the text of the Eighth Amendment as our cases have
interpreted it. The Eighth Amendment does not outlaw cruel and unusual
“conditions”; it outlaws cruel and unusual “punishments.” An act or omission
unaccompanied by knowledge of a significant risk of harm might well be
something society wishes to discourage, and if harm does result society might
well wish to assure compensation. The common law reflects such concerns when
it imposes tort liability on a purely objective basis. . . . But an official’s failure to
alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not, while no
cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction
of punishment.

Id. at 837-38, 114 S. Ct. at 1979 (emphasis added; citations omitted); see also Garretson v. City
of Madison Heights, 407 F.3d 789, 796 (6th Cir. 2005) (“If the officers failed to act in the face of
an obvious risk of which they should have known but did not, then they did not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment.”). The subjective component must be evaluated for each defendant
individually. Bishop v. Hackel, 636 F.3d 757, 767 (6th Cir. 2011); see also id. at 768 (“[W]e
must focus on whether each individual Deputy had the personal involvement necessary to permit
a finding of subjective knowledge.”).
The complaint does not allege that any specific Defendant tasered Edwards or confined
him to a seat under the air conditioning unit. Edwards does allege that Defendant Page asked
him to work in the moldy showers and that “they” knew it failed inspection, but there are no
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allegations that any named Defendants were aware of the inspection, knew the inspection
specifically related to mold in the showers, and understood the mold was a health risk to
someone cleaning the showers.2 Lastly, there are no allegations that any named Defendant put
Edwards in segregation without any property or was aware of the conditions under which he was
confined in segregation. Thus, the complaint fails to meet the subjective component in relation
to any Defendant.
Edwards also alleges that he was removed from the hospital early against medical advice.
(ECF No. 1-1 at 4.) Under Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976), “deliberate indifference
to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’.
. . proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” However, not “every claim by a prisoner that he has
not received adequate medical treatment states a violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle,
429 U.S. at 105. “In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions
sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. It is only such
indifference that can offend ‘evolving standards of decency’ in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.” Id., at 106.
Within the context of Estelle claims, the objective component requires that the medical
need be sufficiently serious. Hunt v. Reynolds, 974 F.2d 734, 735 (6th Cir. 1992). “A medical
need is serious if it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one
that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s
attention.” Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 575 (10th Cir. 1980) (quoting Laaman v. Helgemoe,
437 F. Supp. 269, 311 (D.N.H. 1977)).

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Although the Court apparently is meant to infer that Plaintiff’s pneumonia was caused
by the mold, he does not actually allege that was the case. The hospital discharge summary does
not indicate that his illness was mold-related. (ECF No. 1-2.)
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To make out a claim of an Eighth Amendment Estelle violation, a prisoner must plead
facts showing that “prison authorities have denied reasonable requests for medical treatment in
the face of an obvious need for such attention where the inmate is thereby exposed to undue
suffering or the threat of tangible residual injury.” Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 (6th
Cir. 1976). The Court clarified the meaning of deliberate indifference in Farmer v. Brennan, as
the reckless disregard of a substantial risk of serious harm; mere negligence will not suffice. Id.
511 U.S. at 835-36.
Edwards does not set forth any facts or circumstances that suggest that any Defendant
was deliberately indifferent to serious medical needs by removing him from the hospital. The
discharge summary attached as an exhibit to the complaint significantly contradicts many of his
allegations. (ECF No. 1-2.) The summary states that Edwards was “leaning towards the nurses
on the evening of December 1 that he wanted to be discharged” and that “he signed out AMA
and was released to the care of the local police authorities.” (Id.) This contradicts Edwards’s
contention that Defendants checked him out of the hospital without his consent. The discharge
summary further indicates that Plaintiff received treatment, did not need further antibiotics and
did not want any additional care. (Id.) Thus, Plaintiff’s allegations do not rise to the level of
deliberate indifference.
For all of the foregoing reasons, Edwards’s complaint is subject to dismissal in its
entirety for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.
III. Leave to Amend
The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may allow a prisoner to amend his
complaint to avoid a sua sponte dismissal under the PLRA. LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944,
951 (6th Cir. 2013); see also Brown v. R.I., No. 12-1403, 2013 WL 646489, at *1 (1st Cir. Feb.

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22, 2013) (per curiam) (“Ordinarily, before dismissal for failure to state a claim is ordered, some
form of notice and an opportunity to cure the deficiencies in the complaint must be afforded.”).
Leave to amend is not required where a deficiency cannot be cured. Brown, 2013 WL 646489, at
*1; Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. United States, 257 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 2001) (“This does not mean, of
course, that every sua sponte dismissal entered without prior notice to the plaintiff automatically
must be reversed. If it is crystal clear that the plaintiff cannot prevail and that amending the
complaint would be futile, then a sua sponte dismissal may stand.”); Grayson v. Mayview State
Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002) (“in forma pauperis plaintiffs who file complaints
subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) should receive leave to amend unless amendment would
be inequitable or futile”); Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We agree with
the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged by
amendment comports with due process and does not infringe the right of access to the courts.”).
In this case, the Court cannot conclude that any amendment to Edwards’s claims would be futile
as a matter of law.
IV. Conclusion
The Court DISMISSES Edwards’s complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief
can be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). However, leave to
amend is GRANTED. Any amended complaint must be filed within thirty (30) days after the
date of this order. Edwards is advised that an amended complaint will supersede the original
pleadings and and must be complete in itself without reference to those prior pleadings. The text
of the complaint must allege sufficient facts to support each claim without reference to any
extraneous document. Any exhibits must be identified by number in the text of the amended
complaint and must be attached to the complaint. All claims alleged in an amended complaint

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must arise from the facts alleged in the original complaint.

Edwards may add additional

defendants provided that the claims against the new parties arise from the acts and omissions set
forth in the original complaint. Each claim for relief must be stated in a separate count and must
identify each defendant sued in that count. If Edwards fails to file an amended complaint within
the time specified, the Court will assess a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and enter
judgment.
Edwards is reminded that he must promptly notify the Clerk of any change of address or
extended absence. Failure to comply with these requirements, or any other order of the Court,
may result in the dismissal of this case without further notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ James D. Todd
JAMES D. TODD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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