Johnson v. Haywood County Jail

Filing 8

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS, DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND 7 . Signed by Judge James D. Todd on 12/7/15. (Todd, James)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION
ROBERT WILLIAM JOHNSON,

Plaintiff,
VS.
HAYWOOD COUNTY, ET AL.,

Defendants.

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No. 14-1271-JDT-egb

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS,
DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND

On October 9, 2014, Plaintiff Robert William Johnson (“Johnson”), who was, at
the time, incarcerated at the Haywood County Jail (“Jail”) in Brownsville, Tennessee,
filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 accompanied by a motion to
proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1 & 2.) In an order issued October 14, 2014, the
Court granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis and assessed the civil filing fee
pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b). (ECF
No. 4.) Johnson subsequently filed a change of address notifying the Court that he was
no longer incarcerated. (ECF No. 5.) On October 5, 2015, the Court ordered Johnson to
file a non-prisoner in forma pauperis affidavit or pay the entire civil filing fee. (ECF No.
6.) Johnson complied with the order on October 19, 2015, by filing the appropriate non-

prisoner in forma pauperis affidavit. (ECF No. 7.) Based on the information contained
in that affidavit, Johnson’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED. The
Clerk shall record the Defendant as Haywood County.1
II. The Complaint
Johnson alleges that after he was arrested for a misdemeanor, he was placed in a
maximum security pod due to overcrowding at the Jail. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) While he was
out of his cell for his one hour of recreation, he was jumped and assaulted by “2 accused
murderers.” (Id.) As a result of the assault, Johnson alleges that his eyes were blacked,
he lost hearing in his right ear, and he has constant lower back pain. (Id.) Johnson seeks
compensation for his pain and suffering. (Id. at 3.)
III. Analysis
The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint,
or any portion thereof, if the complaint—
(1)
is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted; or
(2)
such relief.

seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may
be granted, the court applies the standards under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

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The Court construes the claims against the Jail as an attempt to assert claims against
Haywood County. The Clerk is DIRECTED to remove Haywood County Jail as a defendant and
add Haywood County.
2

12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71
(6th Cir. 2010). “Accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, the
Court ‘consider[s] the factual allegations in [the] complaint to determine if they plausibly
suggest an entitlement to relief.’” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011)
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681) (alteration in original). “[P]leadings that . . . are no more
than conclusions . . . are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions
can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual
allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (“Rule
8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.
Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could
satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the claim, but
also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.”).
“A complaint can be frivolous either factually or legally. Any complaint that is
legally frivolous would ipso facto fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
Hill, 630 F.3d at 470 (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 328-29 (1989)).
Whether a complaint is factually frivolous under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and
1915(e)(2)(B)(i) is a separate issue from whether it fails to state a claim for
relief. Statutes allowing a complaint to be dismissed as frivolous give
“judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the
complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual
contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S. Ct. 1827
(interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1915). Unlike a dismissal for failure to state a
claim, where a judge must accept all factual allegations as true, Iqbal, 129
S. Ct. at 1949-50, a judge does not have to accept “fantastic or delusional”
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factual allegations as true in prisoner complaints that are reviewed for
frivolousness. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28, 109 S. Ct. 1827.
Id. at 471.
“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at
383 (quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants and
prisoners are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, No. 092259, 2011 WL 285251, at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se
complaint for failure to comply with “unique pleading requirements” and stating “a court
cannot ‘create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’”) (quoting
Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975)) (alteration in
original); Payne v. Sec’y of Treas., 73 F. App’x 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming sua
sponte dismissal of complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and stating, “[n]either
this court nor the district court is required to create Payne’s claim for her”); cf. Pliler v.
Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004) (“District judges have no obligation to act as counsel or
paralegal to pro se litigants.”); Young Bok Song v. Gipson, 423 F. App’x 506, 510 (6th
Cir. 2011) (“[W]e decline to affirmatively require courts to ferret out the strongest cause
of action on behalf of pro se litigants. Not only would that duty be overly burdensome, it
would transform the courts from neutral arbiters of disputes into advocates for a
particular party. While courts are properly charged with protecting the rights of all who

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come before it, that responsibility does not encompass advising litigants as to what legal
theories they should pursue.”).
Johnson filed his complaint on the court-supplied form for actions under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial
officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity,
injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was
violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this
section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of
Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a
deprivation of rights secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States (2)
committed by a defendant acting under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,
398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).
Johnson has sued only Haywood County. When a § 1983 claim is made against a
municipality or county, the court must analyze two distinct issues: (1) whether the
plaintiff’s harm was caused by a constitutional violation; and (2) if so, whether the
municipality is responsible for that violation. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503
U.S. 115, 120 (1992).

The second issue is dispositive of Johnson’s claim against

Haywood County.

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A local government “cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—
or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat
superior theory.” Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); see also
Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1994); Berry v. City of Detroit, 25
F.3d 1342, 1345 (6th Cir. 1994). A municipality cannot be held responsible for a
constitutional deprivation unless there is a direct causal link between a municipal policy
or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-92; Deaton
v. Montgomery Cnty., Ohio, 989 F.2d 885, 889 (6th Cir. 1993).

To demonstrate

municipal liability, a plaintiff “must (1) identify the municipal policy or custom, (2)
connect the policy to the municipality, and (3) show that his particular injury was
incurred due to execution of that policy.” Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir.
2003) (citing Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)). “Where
a government ‘custom has not received formal approval through the body’s official
decisionmaking channels,’ such a custom may still be the subject of a § 1983 suit.”
Alkire, 330 F.3d at 815 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91). The policy or custom
“must be ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation’ in order to establish the
liability of a government body under § 1983.” Searcy, 38 F.3d at 286 (quoting Polk Cnty.
v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981) (citation omitted)). “[T]he touchstone of ‘official
policy’ is designed ‘to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the
municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to action for
which the municipality is actually responsible.’” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S.
112, 138 (1988) (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479-80 (1986)).
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Although civil rights plaintiffs are not required to plead the facts demonstrating
municipal liability with particularity, Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty Narcotics Intelligence
& Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1993), the complaint must be sufficient to
put the municipality on notice of the plaintiff’s theory of liability, see, e.g., Fowler v.
Campbell, No. 3:06CV-P610-H, 2007 WL 1035007, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 30, 2007);
Yeackering v. Ankrom, No. 4:05-CV-00018-M, 2005 WL 1877964, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Aug.
5, 2005); Oliver v. City of Memphis, No. 04-2074-B, 2004 WL 3316242, at *4 (W.D.
Tenn. Dec. 2, 2004); cf. Raub v. Correctional Med. Servs., Inc., No. 06-13942, 2008 WL
160611, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 15, 2008) (denying motion to dismiss where complaint
contained conclusory allegations of a custom or practice); Cleary v. Cnty of Macomb, No.
06-15505, 2007 WL 2669102, at *20 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 6, 2007) (same); Morningstar v.
City of Detroit, No. 06-11073, 2007 WL 2669156, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 6, 2007)
(same); Chidester v. City of Memphis, No. 02-2556 MA/A, 2006 WL 1421099, at *3
(W.D. Tenn. June 15, 2005). The allegations of the complaint fail to identify an official
policy or custom which caused injury to Johnson.

While Johnson complains that

overcrowding caused him to be placed in a maximum security pod with dangerous
inmates, he does not allege that the overcrowding was the result of any official policy or
that the overcrowding caused other inmates to assault him. Instead, it appears that
Johnson is suing Haywood County because he was confined in a county institution when
the inmate assault took place.
For the foregoing reasons, Johnson’s complaint is subject to dismissal in its
entirety for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.
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IV. Standard for Leave to Amend
The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may allow a prisoner to amend his
complaint to avoid a sua sponte dismissal under the PLRA. LaFountain v. Harry, 716
F.3d 944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013); see also Brown v. R.I., No. 12-1403, 2013 WL 646489, at
*1 (1st Cir. Feb. 22, 2013) (per curiam) (“Ordinarily, before dismissal for failure to state
a claim is ordered, some form of notice and an opportunity to cure the deficiencies in the
complaint must be afforded.”). Leave to amend is not required where a deficiency cannot
be cured. Brown, 2013 WL 646489, at *1; Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. United States, 257 F.3d
31, 37 (1st Cir. 2001) (“This does not mean, of course, that every sua sponte dismissal
entered without prior notice to the plaintiff automatically must be reversed. If it is crystal
clear that the plaintiff cannot prevail and that amending the complaint would be futile,
then a sua sponte dismissal may stand.”); Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103,
114 (3d Cir. 2002) (“in forma pauperis plaintiffs who file complaints subject to dismissal
under Rule 12(b)(6) should receive leave to amend unless amendment would be
inequitable or futile”); Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We agree
with the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a meritless complaint that cannot be
salvaged by amendment comports with due process and does not infringe the right of
access to the courts.”). In this case, the Court cannot conclude that any amendment of
Plaintiff’s claims would be futile as a matter of law.
V. Conclusion
The Court DISMISSES Johnson’s complaint for failure to state a claim on which
relief can be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).
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However, because the Court cannot conclude that an amendment would be futile, leave to
amend is GRANTED. Any amended complaint must be filed within thirty (30) days after
the date of this order. Johnson is advised that an amended complaint will supersede the
original pleading and must be complete in itself without reference to that prior pleading.
The text of the complaint must allege sufficient facts to support each claim without
reference to any extraneous document. Any exhibits must be identified by number in the
text of the amended complaint and must be attached to the complaint. All claims alleged
in an amended complaint must arise from the facts alleged in the original complaint.
Johnson may add additional defendants provided that the claims against the new parties
arise from the acts and omissions set forth in the original complaint. Each claim for relief
must be stated in a separate count and must identify each defendant sued in that count. If
Johnson fails to file an amended complaint within the time specified, the Court will
assess a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and enter judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ James D. Todd
JAMES D. TODD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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