Johnson v. Corizon Health Inc. et al

Filing 24

ORDER GRANTING 22 SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO CORIZON DEFENDANTS 23 . Signed by Judge James D. Todd on 3/23/16. (Todd, James)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION
BOBBY JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
VS.
CORIZON HEALTH, INC., ET AL.,
Defendants.

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No. 14-1306-JDT-egb

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO CORIZON DEFENDANTS

The pro se Plaintiff, Bobby Johnson a/k/a Bobbie Johnson, who was, at the time, a Tennessee
Department of Correction (“TDOC”) prisoner at the Northwest Correctional Complex (“NWCX”)
in Tiptonville, Tennessee, filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on November 6, 2014,
accompanied by a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1 & 2.) The Court
granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis and assessed the civil filing fee pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(a)-(b). (ECF No. 4.) Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on November 26, 2014. (ECF
No. 6.) On February 10, 2015, the Court issued an order dismissing both the complaint and
amended complaint but granting leave to file a second amended complaint. (ECF No. 10.) Plaintiff
filed his second amended complaint on February 27, 2015. (ECF No. 11.) Defendants Corizon
Health, Inc. and Corizon, Inc. (collectively “Corizon”) filed an answer to the second amended
complaint on March 24, 2015. (ECF No. 12.) On April 16, 2015, Plaintiff notified the Court that
he had been released from prison and provided his new address. (ECF No. 17.) In compliance with

an order of the Court (ECF No. 20), Plaintiff paid the outstanding balance of the filing fee on August
7, 2015. (ECF No. 21.)
In the order of dismissal, the Court concluded that the allegations in the original complaint
concerning Plaintiff’s medical care from August 2011 though August 15, 2013, were barred by the
one-year statute of limitations in Tennessee Code Annotated § 28-3-104(a)(3). (ECF No. 10 at
13-14.) Plaintiff’s second amended complaint concerns his medical treatment at the NWCX only
from January 14, 2014, through December 11, 2014. (ECF No. 11 at 6-8.) In addition to other
claims, Plaintiff alleges that his injuries were the result of the policies, practices and/or customs of
Corizon, which contracted with the State of Tennessee to provide medical services to inmates at the
NWCX. (Id. at 8-10.)
On August 10, 2015, Corizon filed a motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 22.) In
accordance with Local Rule 56.1(b), a response to the motion was due within twenty-eight days.
However, Plaintiff did not file a response and did not seek an extension of time in which to do so.
Therefore, the motion is ripe for disposition.
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “[T]he burden on the moving party may be discharged by
‘showing’–that is, pointing out to the district court–that there is an absence of evidence to support
the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). In Celotex Corp.,
the Supreme Court explained that Rule 56:
mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and
upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will
bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be “no genuine issue
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as to any material fact,” since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential
element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.
The moving party is “entitled to judgment as a matter of law” because the
nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of
[his] case with respect to which [he] has the burden of proof.
477 U.S. at 322-23. In considering whether to grant summary judgment, “the evidence as well as
the inferences drawn therefrom must be read in the light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion.” Kochins v. Linden-Alimak, Inc., 799 F.2d 1128, 1133 (6th Cir. 1986); see also Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986) (same).
A genuine issue of material fact exists “if the evidence [presented by the non-moving party]
is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
Corizon contends that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because it had no
involvement with Plaintiff’s medical care at the NWCX during the relevant time period. Therefore,
his alleged injuries cannot have been caused by Corizon’s policies, practices or customs. In support
of this assertion, Corizon has submitted the Affidavit of Wes Landers, the Chief Financial Officer
for the TDOC. (Landers Aff., ECF No. 22-3.) Landers states that he is responsible for “directing
and monitoring the formation, execution and termination of contracts between the TDOC and private
medical and mental health service providers.” (Id. ¶ 3, at 1.) He further states that prior to
September 2013, Corizon contracted with TDOC to provide both physical and mental health services
to inmates at TDOC facilities, including the NWCX. (Id. ¶ 4.) However, Corizon’s contract with
TDOC to provide physical health services was terminated as of September 8, 2013; therefore,
Corizon had no involvement in providing physical health services for inmates at the NWCX after
that date. (Id. ¶ 5.)

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As Plaintiff has not responded to the motion for summary judgment, he has failed to refute
Landers’s Affidavit. Therefore, Corizon is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and the motion
for summary judgment is GRANTED. Corizon’s motion to ascertain the status of the motion (ECF
No. 23) is now MOOT.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ James D. Todd
JAMES D. TODD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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