Forrester v. Taylor

Filing 6

ORDER TO ISSUE AND SERVE PROCESS ON DEFENDANT TAYLOR. Signed by Judge James D. Todd on 7/29/15. (Todd, James)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION
CHRISTOPHER S. FORRESTER,
Plaintiff,
vs.

No. 1:14-cv-1330-JDT-egb

LT. EARL TAYLOR,
Defendant.

ORDER TO ISSUE AND SERVE PROCESS ON DEFENDANT TAYLOR

On December 8, 2014, Plaintiff Christopher S. Forrester (“Forrester”), an inmate at the
Whiteville Correctional Facility in Whiteville Tennessee, filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1 & 2.) In an order
issued December 9, 2014, the Court granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis and assessed the
civil filing fee pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(a)-(b). (ECF No. 4.) The Clerk shall record the Defendant as Lieutenant (Lt.) Earl
Taylor.
I. THE COMPLAINT
In the complaint, Forrester alleges that on November 5, 2014, Lt. Taylor repeatedly
slammed the metal slider of the tray slot or “pie flap” onto Forrester’s arm. (ECF No. 1 at
PageID 4.) In the grievance attached to his complaint, he elaborates that Lt. Taylor had directed
Sergeant (Sgt.) Amos, who is not a party in this action, to cuff Forrester and Forrester’s cellmate.
(ECF No. 1-1 at PageID 9.) They were taken to the shower while their cell was searched. (Id.)
When Forrester was returned to his cell, he noticed that a few things were missing that he was

permitted to have, and he stuck his arm through the pie flap and asked to speak to Captain Harris,
the shift supervisor, who is not a party to this action. (Id.) Lt. Taylor then allegedly told
Forrester to move his arm. (Id.) When Forrester refused, Lt. Taylor allegedly slammed the
metal slider of the pie flap against Forrester’s arm six or seven times, cutting “a big hunk of
meat” out of his arm (id.) and causing it to drip blood (ECF No. 1 at PageID 4). Forrester alleges
Lt. Taylor called him names and walked away. (ECF No. 1-1 at PageID 9.) Sgt. Amos called
medical to see to Forrester’s arm. (Id.)
Forrester requests $3,500,000 in monetary damages and immediate release from prison.
(ECF No. 1 at PageID 5.)
II. ANALYSIS
A.

Screening and Standard
The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint, or any

portion thereof, if the complaint—
(1)

is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted; or

(2)

seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may be
granted, the court applies the standards under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as
stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). “Accepting
all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, the Court ‘consider[s] the factual allegations
in [the] complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.’” Williams v.
Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681) (alteration in

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original). “[P]leadings that . . . are no more than conclusions . . . are not entitled to the
assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they
must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555 n.3 (“Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to
relief. Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could
satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the claim, but also
‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.”).
“A complaint can be frivolous either factually or legally. Any complaint that is legally
frivolous would ipso facto fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Hill, 630 F.3d
at 470 (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 328-29 (1989)).
Whether a complaint is factually frivolous under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and
1915(e)(2)(B)(i) is a separate issue from whether it fails to state a claim for
relief. Statutes allowing a complaint to be dismissed as frivolous give “judges
not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless
legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s
factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are
clearly baseless.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S. Ct. 1827 (interpreting 28
U.S.C. § 1915). Unlike a dismissal for failure to state a claim, where a judge
must accept all factual allegations as true, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50, a judge
does not have to accept “fantastic or delusional” factual allegations as true in
prisoner complaints that are reviewed for frivolousness. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at
327-28, 109 S. Ct. 1827.
Id. at 471.
“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383
(quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants and prisoners
are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown,
891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, No. 09-2259, 2011 WL
285251, at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for failure to
comply with “unique pleading requirements” and stating “a court cannot ‘create a claim which [a
plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’”) (quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co.,

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518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975)) (alteration in original); Payne v. Sec’y of Treas., 73 F.
App’x 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of complaint pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and stating, “[n]either this court nor the district court is required to create Payne’s
claim for her”); cf. Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004) (“District judges have no obligation
to act as counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants.”); Young Bok Song v. Gipson, 423 F. App’x 506,
510 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e decline to affirmatively require courts to ferret out the strongest cause
of action on behalf of pro se litigants. Not only would that duty be overly burdensome, it would
transform the courts from neutral arbiters of disputes into advocates for a particular party. While
courts are properly charged with protecting the rights of all who come before it, that
responsibility does not encompass advising litigants as to what legal theories they should
pursue.”).
B.

§ 1983 Claim
Forrester filed his complaint on the court-supplied form for actions under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that
in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in
such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation
of rights secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States (2) committed by a
defendant acting under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150
(1970).

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Forrester’s claim against Lt. Taylor arises under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits
cruel and unusual punishments. See generally Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991). An Eighth
Amendment claim consists of both objective and subjective components. Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992); Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298;
Williams v. Curtin, 633 F.3d at 383; Mingus v. Butler, 591 F.3d 474, 479-80 (6th Cir. 2010).
The objective component requires that the deprivation be “sufficiently serious.” Farmer, 511
U.S. at 834; Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8; Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298.
To satisfy the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must show
that he “is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm,” Farmer, 511
U.S. at 834; see also Miller v. Calhoun Cnty., 408 F.3d 803, 812 (6th Cir. 2005), or that he has
been deprived of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298
(quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)); see also Hadix v. Johnson, 367 F.3d
513, 525 (6th Cir. 2004).
To establish the subjective component of an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner
must demonstrate that the official acted with the requisite intent, that is, that he had a
“sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; see also Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297,
302-03. With regard to claims of excessive force by prison officials, “[t]he test for whether the
use of force violates the Eighth Amendment requires a court to determine if the defendant’s
conduct caused the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Griffin v. Hardrick, 604 F.3d
949, 953 (6th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). That question “ultimately turns on
whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously
and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21
(1986) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-7.

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For purposes of screening, the allegations that Lt. Taylor deliberately slammed the metal
slider on Forrester’s arm six or seven times, causing him injury, sufficiently state an Eighth
Amendment claim for excessive force.
III.

CONCLUSION

Process will be issued for Defendant Taylor on Forrester’s Eighth Amendment claim for
the use of excessive force. It is ORDERED that the Clerk shall issue process for Defendant
Taylor and deliver that process to the U.S. Marshal for service. Service shall be made on
Defendant Taylor pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) and Tennessee Rules of Civil
Procedure 4.04(1) and (10), either by mail or personally if mail service is not effective. All costs
of service shall by advanced by the United States.
It is further ORDERED that Forrester shall serve a copy of every subsequent document
he files in this cause on the attorneys for Defendant Taylor or on Defendant Taylor if he is
unrepresented. Forrester shall make a certificate of service on every document filed. Forrester
shall familiarize himself with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court’s Local Rules.1
Jelks shall promptly notify the Clerk of any change of address or extended absence.
Failure to comply with these requirements, or any other order of the Court may result in the
dismissal of this case without further notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ James D. Todd
JAMES D. TODD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

1

A copy of the Local Rules may be obtained from the Clerk. The Local Rules are also
available on the Court’s website at www.tnwd.courts.gov/pdf/content/LocalRules.pdf.

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