Adams et al v. Diversicare Leasing Corp et al
Filing
40
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' 26 MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED AND SUBSTITUTED COMPLAINT and Denying Defendants' 20 Motion to Dismiss as Moot. Signed by Chief Judge J. Daniel Breen on 7/10/15. (Breen, J.)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION
ALLISON ADAMS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
No. 14-2990
DIVERSICARE LEASING CORP.,
et al.,
Defendants.
_____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED AND
SUBSTITUTED COMPLAINT
_____________________________________________________________________________
Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a second 1 amended and substituted
complaint pursuant to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which has been fully
briefed by the parties. (Docket Entries (“D.E.”) 26–28.) For the reasons discussed below, the
motion is GRANTED.
Background 2
On December 16, 2014, forty seven 3 Plaintiffs filed this joint action against Defendants,
Diversicare Leasing Corp., Diversicare Management Services Co., Advocat, Inc. n/k/a
Diversicare Healthcare Services, Inc., and John Does 1–30 (“Defendants”), alleging violations of
the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. (“FLSA”) and Tennessee law. (D.E. 1.)
Plaintiffs are current and former hourly, non-exempt employees who held various positions at
1
Plaintiffs move to file a first amended complaint; however, they filed a first amended complaint as of
right on December 16, 2014. (See D.E. 3.)
2
The factual allegations are taken from the proposed complaint (D.E. 26-1), and are accepted as true for the
purposes of this motion. See Shaughnessy v. Interpublic Grp. of Cos., Inc., 506 F. App’x 369, 373–74 (6th Cir.
2012).
3
Forty six Plaintiffs are joined in the proposed complaint now before the Court as Brenda Schatz has been
dismissed because she was not employed at a Tennessee facility owned by the Defendants. (D.E. 26 at 1.)
skilled nursing facilities in Tennessee that are owned and operated by the Defendants. They
were typically scheduled to work exactly forty hours per week and were subject to an automatic
thirty-minute meal deduction policy even though they often performed compensable work during
this break. They were also required to complete work-related tasks before and after their shifts
without compensation. These policies caused Plaintiffs to work more than forty hours per week,
in violation of the FLSA.
Plaintiffs also claim that Defendants were unjustly enriched by receiving the benefit of
the work performed during breaks and off-the-clock without paying for it. Finally, Defendants
are liable under a theory of promissory estoppel because they unambiguously promised to pay
Plaintiffs, who reasonably relied on this promise and materially changed their position, for the
time they worked during their breaks or off-the-clock.
Defendants moved to dismiss the first amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), Rule
12(b)(3) and Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (D.E. 20.) Plaintiffs filed this
motion, which Defendants oppose, contending that amendment would be futile. (D.E. 26–28.)
Legal Standard
Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure directs that courts “should freely give
leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “[D]enying leave is
appropriate in instances of ‘undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant,
repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the
opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.’” Glazer v.
Chase Home Fin. LLC, 704 F.3d 453, 458 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S.
178, 182 (1962)).
2
When a court denies a party leave to amend based on futility, it is determining that the
proposed complaint “‘could not withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.’” Williams v. City
of Cleveland, 771 F.3d 945, 949 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Riverview Health Inst. LLC v. Med.
Mut. of Ohio, 601 F.3d 505, 512 (6th Cir. 2010)). On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),
courts must construe the proposed complaint “in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and
accept all allegations as true.” Keys v. Humana, Inc., 684 F.3d 605, 608 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing
Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 575 (6th Cir. 2005)). Therefore, the dispositive question
becomes whether the proposed complaint contains “‘sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Williams, 771 F.3d at 949 (quoting
D’Ambrosio v. Marino, 747 F.3d 378, 383 (6th Cir. 2014)).
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets out a liberal pleading standard,
requiring only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). However, “‘[c]onclusory allegations or legal conclusions
masquerading as factual allegations will not suffice.’” Bright v. Gallia Cnty., Ohio, 753 F.3d
639, 652 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Eidson v. Tenn. Dep’t of Children’s Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 634
(6th Cir. 2007)). The proposed complaint “must go beyond ‘labels and conclusions’ or a mere
‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,’” to survive a motion to dismiss. SFS
Check, LLC v. First Bank of Del., 774 F.3d 351, 355 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
Analysis
Defendants present two arguments supporting their contention that amendment would be
futile: (1) the proposed complaint is subject to dismissal for misjoinder; and (2) the proposed
complaint fails to state a claim for relief under Rule 8.
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I.
Misjoinder
Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows for the permissive joinder of
plaintiffs in a single action if:
(A)
they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative with
respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of
transactions or occurrences; and
(B)
any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in the action.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(1). These two requirements must be satisfied before joinder is proper. See
7 Charles A. Wright, et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 1653 (3d ed. 2015). “Under the
Rules, the impulse is toward entertaining the broadest possible scope of action consistent with
fairness to the parties; joinder of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged.” United
Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966); Brown v. Worthington Steel, Inc., 211
F.R.D. 320, 324 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (“Courts liberally permit joinder under Rule 20(a).”).
However, even if plaintiffs satisfy these two requirements, a court has discretion to deny
joinder “in the interest of avoiding prejudice and delay, . . . ensuring judicial economy, . . . or
safeguarding principles of fundamental fairness.” Acevedo v. Allsup’s Convenience Stores, Inc.,
600 F.3d 516, 521 (5th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that,
[m]isjoinder of parties is not a ground for dismissing an action. On motion or on
its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party. The court
may also sever any claim against a party.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 21; Wright, supra, at § 1684 (“If a party is improperly joined, the appropriate
remedy is to move under Rule 21 either to drop the party or for a severance of the claim by or
against the party.”).
4
At the outset, Defendants’ contention that amendment is futile because the proposed
complaint is subject to dismissal for misjoinder is without merit because, “[m]isjoinder of parties
is not sufficient to dismiss an action as a whole” under Rule 21, but “it can be sufficient to
dismiss misjoined parties.” Harris v. Gerth, No. 08-CV-12374, 2008 WL 5424134, at *4 (E.D.
Mich. Dec. 30, 2008). Defendants’ remaining misjoinder argument focuses on the fact that the
Plaintiffs worked at different Tennessee facilities, for different supervisors, at different times,
and that each facility had variations in the rules related to compensable work performed by
employees during their breaks and off-the-clock. (D.E. 27 at 9.) Defendants aver that Plaintiffs’
claims of uniform time and payroll policies across the Tennessee facilities are unsupported legal
conclusions masquerading as factual allegations. (Id.)
While not specifically asking the Court to take judicial notice, the Defendants’ misjoinder
argument relies on the analysis found in a decertification order entered by the United States
District Court for the Western District of Arkansas in Hamilton v. Diversicare Leasing Corp.,
No. 1:12-cv-1069, 2014 WL 4955799 (W.D. Ark. Oct. 1, 2014). (D.E. 27 at 8–9.) “The factual
record that the Court may consult in ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is
generally limited to the facts in the complaint and exhibits attached to it.” AutoZone, Inc. v.
Glidden Co., 737 F. Supp. 2d 936, 942 (W.D. Tenn. 2010) (citing Passa v. City of Columbus,
123 F. App’x 694, 697 (6th Cir. 2005)). However, “‘documents incorporated into the complaint
by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice,” can also be considered
when ruling on a motion to dismiss. Id. (quoting Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.,
551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007)). Matters such as other court proceedings are an appropriate subject of
which courts may take judicial notice. Id. (citing Buck v. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch., 597 F.3d
812, 816 (6th Cir. 2010)). The Court will take judicial notice of the Hamilton decertification
5
order because it is referenced throughout the proposed complaint, and is a proper type of other
court proceeding of which the Court may take judicial notice.
However, the analysis contained in the decertification order is unhelpful to the
determination of whether permissive joinder of the Plaintiffs is proper in this case. In Hamilton,
the district court was considering whether 1,592 opt-in plaintiffs—from eight states and
numerous facilities—were so similarly situated that they could bring their FLSA claims as a
collective action. See Hamilton, 2014 WL 4955799, at *1–5. The court found they were not,
because the plaintiffs failed to offer any evidence that the defendants did not properly
compensate their employees for missed breaks anywhere besides Arkansas, and because of the
disparate employment settings and individualized defenses. Id. at *4–5.
By contrast, most of the Plaintiffs here are current or former hourly, non-exempt
employees of Defendants’ Tennessee facilities who allege that because of certain policies, they
typically worked more than forty hours per week, without receiving the appropriate overtime
pay, in violation of the FLSA. (Proposed Am. Compl. ¶¶ 84–86, 131–35, 143–45, 155–57.)
Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants are liable under theories of unjust enrichment and
promissory estoppel. (Id. ¶¶ 158–68.)
Turning now to the Rule 20 requirements, determining if a particular factual situation
constitutes the same transaction or occurrence for the purposes of permissive joinder requires a
case-by-case analysis of the facts alleged in the complaint. Wright, supra, § 1653. The Sixth
Circuit has held that “[t]he words ‘transaction or occurrence’ are [to be] given a broad and liberal
interpretation in order to avoid a multiplicity of suits.’” LASA Per L’Industria Del Marmo
Societa Per Azioni of Lasa, Italy v. Alexander, 414 F.2d 143, 147 (6th Cir. 1969) (citation
omitted). Plaintiffs’ allegations, taken as true for the purposes of this motion, arise out of the
6
same transactions or occurrences—their employment at Defendants’ Tennessee facilities, and the
application of uniform workplace policies which caused them to work in excess of forty hours
per week in violation of the FLSA, or work without being compensated in violation of state law.
“The second requisite that must be satisfied to sustain permissive joinder of parties is that
a question of law or fact common to all the parties will arise in the action.” Wright, supra, §
1653. This does not require that every question of law or fact be common among the parties,
only that there be at least one common law or fact question. Id.; Worldwide Digital Entm’t, LLC
v. Woodstone Deli and Sports Grill, No. 2:13-CV-136, 2014 WL 2442634, at *2 (E.D. Tenn.
May 30, 2014) (“The common question test does not require that all questions of law and fact
raised by the dispute be common.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). “This
test is usually easy to satisfy.” Id. Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ workplace policies
violated the FLSA and Tennessee law. Accepting these allegations as true, the Court finds that
the Plaintiffs have shown that their federal and state law claims will share at least one common
question of law or fact, such that permissive joinder is proper.
Finally, the Court finds that allowing the Plaintiffs to proceed jointly under Rule 20
would not result in prejudice to the Defendants as this case is relatively new, the parties just
conducted a scheduling conference and entered a scheduling order, and it is not fundamentally
unfair to Defendants because the Plaintiffs are not alleging new claims or adding new parties, but
merely adding factual support to the claims already before the Court.
II.
Failure to State a Claim
A.
FLSA
Defendants contend that the addition of some of the Plaintiffs’ job titles and information
about which facilities they worked in is still insufficient to state a plausible claim to relief under
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the FLSA, making amendment futile. (D.E. 27 at 1–3.) Defendants note that while the Sixth
Circuit has not yet ruled on what factual allegations must be pled to state a plausible claim under
the FLSA following the Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. 544
(2007), and Iqbal v. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), they ask the Court to adopt the holdings of
the First, Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits. (Id. at 4–7.) Plaintiffs state that the proposed
complaint adds sufficient factual matter to state a FLSA claim that satisfies Rule 8’s standards,
and they are not required to identify specific dates and times they actually worked in excess of
forty hours to plausibly state a FLSA claim. (D.E. 28 at 1–4.)
In Landers v. Quality Commc’ns, Inc., 771 F.3d 638 (9th Cir. 2014), the Ninth Circuit
noted that prior to Twombly and Iqbal, in order to bring a claim under the FLSA, a plaintiff need
only “allege that the employer failed to pay the employee minimum wages or overtime wages.”
Id. at 641 (citation omitted). However, following Twombly and Iqbal, courts must now consider
whether a complaint contains sufficient factual allegations that plausibly state a claim for relief.
Id. Observing that other courts considering this issue in the context of FLSA claims have been
divided, the Landers court articulated some common themes, including that “[n]o circuit court
has interpreted Rule 8 as requiring FLSA plaintiffs to plead in detail the number of hours
worked, their wages, or the amount of overtime owed to state a claim for unpaid minimum wages
or overtime wages.” Id. at 641–42. Beyond that, the Ninth Circuit noted that there was “no
consensus on what facts must be affirmatively pled to state a viable FLSA claim post-Twombly
and Iqbal.” Id. at 642.
Summarizing opinions from the First, Second, and Third Circuits, the Landers court
concluded that in order to survive a motion to dismiss, “a plaintiff asserting a claim to overtime
payments must allege that [they] worked more than forty hours in a given workweek without
8
being compensated for the overtime hours worked during that workweek.”
Id. at 644–45
(citations omitted). Like the other circuits that had previously addressed the issue, the Landers
court “decline[d] to make the approximation of overtime hours the sine qua non of plausibility
for claims brought under the FLSA[,]” because most of the relevant information concerning a
plaintiff’s wages and schedule is in the employer’s control.
Id. at 645.
However, “at a
minimum, a plaintiff asserting a violation of the FLSA overtime provisions must allege that
[they] worked more than forty hours in a given workweek without being compensated for the
hours worked in excess of forty during that week.” Id. (citations omitted).
District courts in the Sixth Circuit confronting the issue of whether to embrace the First,
Second, Third, and Ninth Circuit’s holdings have adopted a more lenient course in determining
what facts must be pled to state a plausible FLSA claim. In Pope v. Walgreen Co., No. 3:14-CV439, 2015 WL 471006 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 4, 2015), the district court, while recognizing that
“‘[t]he level of detail necessary to plead a FLSA overtime claim . . . [is] one that has divided
courts around the country[,]’” id. at *2 (quoting Davis v. Abington Mem’l Hosp., 765 F.3d 236,
241 (3d Cir. 2014)), noted that “district courts within the Sixth Circuit have applied a less strict
approach.” Id. at *3–4 (collecting cases). The court found that the plaintiffs’ factual allegations
that they were employed by the defendant and worked regularly and repeatedly in excess of
forty-four hours per week without receiving overtime pay was sufficient to state a claim for relief
under Rule 8. Id. at *4. The complaint “provid[ed] Defendants with sufficient notice of the
allegations to form a response.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
Further, “[t]o require the present plaintiffs to each specify in their complaint a particular week in
which they worked more than 40 hours without overtime pay would, again, be rigidly harsh and
inconsistent with Iqbal and Twombly.” Id. at *5.
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Similarly, in Doucette v. DIRECTV, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-2800-STA-tmp, 2015 WL 2373271
(W.D. Tenn. May 18, 2015), the court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that the
plaintiffs’ allegations that the defendants’ policies caused them to constantly work in excess of
forty hours per week was sufficient to state a claim under the FLSA, even though they failed to
provide any calculations of the unpaid overtime wages owed, or to allege a specific workweek in
which they worked more than forty hours without being paid overtime. Id. at *6–8.
Here, Plaintiffs contend that they and Defendants meet the FLSA’s definitions of
employee and employer. (Proposed Am. Compl. ¶¶ 84–96, 122–23, 152–54.) They insist that
they were typically scheduled to work exactly forty hours per week. (Id. ¶ 131.) Defendants
implemented a companywide break deduction policy that automatically deducted thirty minutes
per shift, and a policy that required Plaintiffs to perform work off-the-clock. (Id. ¶¶ 130, 143.)
Plaintiffs further argue that they were required to work through their meal breaks and off-theclock, which caused them to work in excess of forty hours per week, in violation of the FLSA.
(Id. ¶¶ 133–45.) While close, these factual allegations are sufficient to give rise to a “plausible
suggestion” of a claim under the FLSA. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 566. Defendants have sufficient
notice of the factual allegations supporting the FLSA claims in which to form a response. See
Pope, 2015 WL 471006, at *4.
While Defendants argue that no Plaintiff has identified any specific week in which they
worked uncompensated overtime, what their actual schedules were, or identified any meals
actually missed, at this stage of the litigation that type of specificity is not required, especially
where the relevant information is in the custody and control of the Defendants. See Landers, 771
F.3d at 645. Also, unlike the plaintiffs in Lundy v. Catholic Health Sys. of Long Island Inc., 711
F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 2013), who failed to allege any week in which they worked in excess of forty
10
hours, id. at 114–15, Plaintiffs assert that they were typically scheduled to work exactly forty
hours per week, but were required to do compensable work during breaks and off-the-clock,
which caused them to work in excess of forty hours. These allegations state a plausible claim for
relief under the FLSA. Therefore, granting leave to file an amended complaint would not be
futile.
B.
Promissory Estoppel
Defendants also maintain that amendment would be futile as to Plaintiffs’ promissory
estoppel claims because they would still be subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim for
relief. (D.E. 27 at 7–8.) In Tennessee, promissory estoppel is described as “‘[a] promise which
the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and
substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or
forbearance.’” Shedd v. Gaylord Entm’t Co., 118 S.W.3d 695, 700 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003)
(quoting Alden v. Presley, 637 S.W.2d 862, 864 (Tenn. 1982)). This promise “is binding if
injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citation omitted). A plaintiff must show “(1) that a promise was made; (2) that the
promise was unambiguous and not unenforceably vague; and (3) that they reasonably relied upon
the promise to their detriment.” Chavez v. Broadway Elec. Serv. Corp., 245 S.W.3d 398, 404
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants maintained an unambiguous and clear policy and
promise to pay their employees for all the time they worked. (Proposed Am. Compl. ¶¶ 165–66.)
They reasonably relied on this promise, and materially changed their positions, by performing
compensable work during their breaks, and before and after their shifts, such that it would be
unjust to allow the Defendants to retain that benefit without compensating them. (Id. ¶¶ 167–
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68.) Accepting these allegations as true, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have plausibly stated a
promissory estoppel claim.
C.
Unjust Enrichment
In Tennessee, “[t]he theory of unjust enrichment is ‘founded on the principle that a party
receiving a benefit desired by him, under circumstances rendering it inequitable to retain it
without making compensation, must do so.’” MDT Servs. Grp., LLC v. Cage Drywall, Inc., No
3:12-CV-1080, 2015 WL 736932, at *9 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 20, 2015) (quoting Paschall’s, Inc. v.
Dozier, 407 S.W.2d 150, 154 (Tenn. 1996)). Plaintiffs bringing an unjust enrichment claim must
establish three elements: “1) ‘[a] benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff’; 2)
‘appreciation by the defendant of such benefit’; and 3) ‘acceptance of such benefit under such
circumstances that it would be inequitable for him to retain the benefit without payment of the
value thereof.’” Id. (quoting Freeman Indus., LLC v. Eastman Chem. Co., 172 S.W.3d 512, 525
(Tenn. 2005)).
Here, Plaintiffs allege that they provided a valuable service by performing compensable
work during their breaks and before and after their shifts, and Defendants knew they were
providing this service with the expectation that they would be paid, and unjustly accepted this
benefit without paying them. (Proposed Am. Compl. ¶¶ 159, 161–62.) Again, accepting these
allegations as true, the Plaintiffs have adequately stated a plausible claim of promissory estoppel.
See Carter v. Jackson-Madison Cnty. Hosp. Dist., No. 1:10-cv-01155-JDB-egb, 2011 WL
1256625, at *7–8 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2011) (finding that the plaintiffs had sufficiently stated
an unjust enrichment claim when they alleged that the Defendant failed to pay them for tasks
performed during automatically deducted meal breaks).
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III.
Deficiencies in Proposed Complaint 4
Thirteen Plaintiffs have not provided any information about which Tennessee facility
they worked at, whether they worked during their breaks or before and after their shifts without
being paid for that time and, instead, only allege that they consented to join the dismissed FLSA
collective action in Hamilton and again do so here. (See Proposed Am. Compl. ¶¶ 11, 18, 31, 38,
45, 48–49, 54–55, 70–71, 74, 83.) However, this is not a collective action; instead, each
Plaintiff’s claims are individually before the Court. Without more, these specific Plaintiffs have
failed to plead sufficient facts to give rise to a plausible suggestion that Defendants’ actions
violated the FLSA or Tennessee law. Defendants do not know if these Plaintiffs worked in
Tennessee, worked off-the-clock, or worked during their mandatory break. Even under the Rule
8’s liberal pleading standards, these allegations are insufficient to state a viable claim for relief.
Plaintiffs have fourteen days from the entry of this order to provide the necessary information to
support their claims. Failure to do so will result in their dismissal from this action.
Finally, Defendants maintain that the claims of two Plaintiffs should be dismissed
because they were members of a FLSA collective action that settled. (D.E. 27 at 3.) Defendants
provided copies of consents these two Plaintiffs allegedly submitted in the prior matter. (D.E.
27-1 and 27-2.) However, these consents are not the kind of subject the Court may take judicial
notice of as they are not court proceedings, and were not referenced throughout the Plaintiffs’
proposed complaint.
Further, the consents do not conclusively establish that these two
individuals are the same Plaintiffs joined in this action. However, if it is later determined that
4
Defendants contend that some of the Plaintiffs’ job titles might categorize them as management-level
employees, which are exempt from the FLSA. (D.E. 27 at 9–10.) As FLSA exemptions are “affirmative defense[s]
on which the employer has the burden of proof,” Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196–97 (1974),
the Court finds that Defendants’ assertion on this issue, without more, is insufficient to show that amendment would
be futile.
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those two individuals’ claims were resolved, Defendants may move to dismiss them under Rule
21 as misjoined.
IV.
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Because the Court grants the motion for leave to file an amended complaint, Defendants’
motion to dismiss is DENIED AS MOOT.
Conclusion
The motion for leave to file an amended complaint is GRANTED. Plaintiffs are directed
to file an amended complaint consistent with this Court’s ruling no later than fourteen days after
entry of this order.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 10th day of July, 2015.
s/ J. DANIEL BREEN
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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