Jelks v. Klutz et al

Filing 9

ORDER TO MODIFY THE DOCKET, DISMISSING CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS NURSE ADAM, GRAY AND MURCER AND DIRECTING THAT PROCESS BE ISSUED AND SERVED ON DEFENDANTS KLUTZ AND STEWART. Signed by Judge James D. Todd on 7/24/15. (Todd, James)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION
_____________________________________________________________________________
TONNIE JELKS,
Plaintiff,
vs.

No. 1:15-cv-1062-JDT-egb

OFFICER KLUTZ, ET AL.,
Defendants.

ORDER TO MODIFY THE DOCKET,
DISMISSING CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS NURSE ADAM, GRAY AND MURCER
AND DIRECTING THAT PROCESS BE ISSUED AND SERVED ON
DEFENDANTS KLUTZ AND STEWART

On March 25, 2015, Plaintiff Tonnie Jelks (“Jelks”), who is confined in the Madison
County Jail in Jackson, Tennessee, filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a
motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1 & 2.) After Jelks submitted the
required documentation (ECF No. 5), the Court granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis  on
April 16, 2015, assessing the civil filing fee pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b) (ECF No. 6). The Clerk shall record the defendants as Officer First Name
Unknown (“FNU”) Klutz, Officer FNU Stewart, 1 Nurse Adam,2 Dr. FNU Gray, and Nurse FNU
Murcer.

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Although Defendant Stewart’s name is spelled “Steward” in the case caption, it is
spelled “Stewart” all throughout the body of the complaint. Therefore, the Clerk is directed to
MODIFY the docket to reflect that this Defendant’s last name is Stewart.
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name.

It is unclear from the complaint whether Adam is Nurse Adam’s first name or last

I. THE COMPLAINT
In his complaint, Jelks alleges that, on November 30, 2014, he was assaulted by
Defendants Klutz and Stewart at the Madison County Jail. (ECF No. 1-1 at PageID 4.). Jelks
alleges that after he told the “J.P.A.” that his handcuffs were too tight, Klutz took Jelks to a room
where his handcuffs were removed and he was told to remove his underwear. (Id.) Jelks asked
him to hold on a minute, but then two other officers, one of whom was Stewart, came in the
room. (Id.) The three officers then allegedly threw Jelks head first against the wall, causing
pressure on his neck and back. (Id.) Jelks further alleges that the officers then handcuffed him
and threw him, while naked, into a holding cell. (Id.) Jelks alleges that Klutz then put his knee
on Jelks’s back and the other on his neck, causing more force and pressure. (Id.). Jelks
maintains that he was not resisting at any time. (Id.) Jelks alleges that his neck has a knot in it,
he has pain in his back from his neck to his legs, and he cannot hold his head down for a long
time. (Id.) Jelks asks for the defendants to be fired and to be paid for his pain and suffering.
(Id.)
II. ANALYSIS
A.

Screening and Standard
The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint, or any

portion thereof, if the complaint—
(1)

is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted; or

(2)

seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

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In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may be
granted, the court applies the standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as
stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). “Accepting
all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, the Court ‘consider[s] the factual allegations
in [the] complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.’” Williams v.
Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681) (alteration in
original). “[P]leadings that . . . are no more than conclusions . . . are not entitled to the
assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they
must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555 n.3 (“Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to
relief. Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could
satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the claim, but also
‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.”).
“A complaint can be frivolous either factually or legally. Any complaint that is legally
frivolous would ipso facto fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Hill, 630 F.3d
at 470 (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 328-29 (1989)).
Whether a complaint is factually frivolous under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and
1915(e)(2)(B)(i) is a separate issue from whether it fails to state a claim for
relief. Statutes allowing a complaint to be dismissed as frivolous give “judges
not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless
legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s
factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are
clearly baseless.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S. Ct. 1827 (interpreting 28
U.S.C. § 1915). Unlike a dismissal for failure to state a claim, where a judge
must accept all factual allegations as true, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50, a judge
does not have to accept “fantastic or delusional” factual allegations as true in
prisoner complaints that are reviewed for frivolousness. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at
327-28, 109 S. Ct. 1827.
Id. at 471.

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“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383
(quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants and prisoners
are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown,
891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, No. 09-2259, 2011 WL
285251, at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for failure to
comply with “unique pleading requirements” and stating “a court cannot ‘create a claim which [a
plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’”) (quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co.,
518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975)) (alteration in original); Payne v. Sec’y of Treas., 73 F.
App’x 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of complaint pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and stating, “[n]either this court nor the district court is required to create Payne’s
claim for her”); cf. Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004) (“District judges have no obligation
to act as counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants.”); Young Bok Song v. Gipson, 423 F. App’x 506,
510 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e decline to affirmatively require courts to ferret out the strongest cause
of action on behalf of pro se litigants. Not only would that duty be overly burdensome, it would
transform the courts from neutral arbiters of disputes into advocates for a particular party. While
courts are properly charged with protecting the rights of all who come before it, that
responsibility does not encompass advising litigants as to what legal theories they should
pursue.”).
B.

§ 1983 Claim
Jelks filed his complaint on the court-supplied form for actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes

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to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that
in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in
such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation
of rights secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States (2) committed by a
defendant acting under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150
(1970).
1.

Twombly Standard

The complaint contains no factual allegations against defendants Adam, Dr. Gray, and
Nurse Murcer. When a complaint fails to allege any action by a defendant, it necessarily fails to
“state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
2.

Eighth Amendment: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

The Supreme Court has held that “the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain . . .
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.” Whitley v.
Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has
applied this standard to uses of force by prison officials, explaining that “the question whether
the measure taken inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering ultimately turns on
‘whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously
and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.’” Id. at 320-21 (citation omitted); see also
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. at 6-7. In Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7-9, the Supreme Court held that
a significant physical injury is not required to establish the objective component of an Eighth

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Amendment claim. However, the Supreme Court made clear that trivial physical contact does
not violate the Eighth Amendment:
That is not to say that every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives
rise to a federal cause of action. See Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d [1028,] 1033
[(2d Cir. 1973)] (“Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem
unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chamber, violates a prisoner’s
constitutional rights”). The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and
unusual” punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de
minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort
“‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Whitley, 475 U.S., at 327 . . .
(quoting Estelle, supra, 429 U.S., at 106 . . . (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 9-10. For purposes of screening, Jelks has alleged a plausible claim for violation of the
Eighth Amendment against Officers Klutz and Stewart.
III. CONCLUSION
The Court DISMISSES Jelks’s complaint against Defendants Adams, Gray, and Murcer
for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). Process will be issued for Defendants Klutz and Stewart
on Jelks’s Eighth Amendment claim for the use of excessive force.
It is ORDERED that the Clerk shall issue process for Defendants Klutz and Stewart and
deliver that process to the U.S. Marshal for service. Service shall be made on Defendants Klutz
and Stewart pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) and Tennessee Rules of Civil
Procedure 4.04(1) and (10), either by mail or personally if mail service is not effective. All costs
of service shall by advanced by the United States.
It is further ORDERED that Jelks shall serve a copy of every subsequent document he
files in this cause on the attorneys for Defendants Officer Klutz and Officer Stewart or on any
unrepresented Defendant. Jelks shall make a certificate of service on every document filed.

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Jelks shall familiarize himself with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court’s Local
Rules.3
Jelks shall promptly notify the Clerk of any change of address or extended absence.
Failure to comply with these requirements, or any other order of the Court may result in the
dismissal of this case without further notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ James D. Todd
JAMES D. TODD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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A copy of the Local Rules may be obtained from the Clerk. The Local Rules are also
available on the Court’s website at www.tnwd.courts.gov/pdf/content/LocalRules.pdf.

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