Tillman v. Decatur County et al
Filing
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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS. Pamela Brasher and Roy Wyatt terminated. Signed by Chief Judge J. Daniel Breen on 9/25/15. (Breen, J.)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION
JOSH TILLMAN,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
DECATUR COUNTY, ROY WYATT, in his
)
Individual and Official Capacities, PAMELA
)
BRASHER, in her Individual and Official
)
Capacities, ADVANCED CORRECTIONAL
)
HEALTHCARE, DEPUTY JOSH BLANKENSHIP )
in his Individual and Official capacities,
)
)
Defendants.
)
No. 15-01068 JDB-egb
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff, Josh Tillman, brought this civil proceeding for damages against Defendants,
Decatur County, Tennessee; Decatur County Sheriff Roy Wyatt; former Decatur County Jail
Administrator Pamela Brasher; former Decatur County Deputy Josh Blankenship; and Advanced
Correctional Healthcare (“ACH”), arising from injuries incurred from a seizure following
medication withdrawal after being incarcerated from March 29, 2014 to April 2, 2014. (Compl.,
Docket Entry (“D.E.”) 1.)
Tillman brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, negligence by
Defendant ACH, state law tort claims of negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress,
and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Decatur County and the individual
Defendants, and a demand for punitive damages. Before the Court is a partial motion to dismiss
by Defendants, Decatur County, Tennessee, Wyatt, Brasher, and Blankenship pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (D.E. 23.) For the reasons set forth below, the
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Defendants’ motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
I.
Factual Background
Plaintiff alleges the following facts. During the relevant times, Wyatt was Sheriff of
Decatur County, Brasher was the Jail Administrator, Blankenship was a Deputy in Decatur
County Sheriff’s Department, and ACH was Decatur County’s medical provider. (D.E. 1 ¶¶ 36.) Prior to incarceration, Tillman was prescribed Xanax by his family doctor to be taken twice
daily to treat an anxiety disorder. (Id. at ¶ 13.) Plaintiff’s prescription was well-known to jail
staff and been documented in his medical file. (Id. at ¶ 13, 15.) During previous periods of
incarceration, Tillman had been denied access to Xanax by Lisa Hatch Hubbard, a physician’s
assistant and employee of ACH, pursuant to the “no narcotics” rule established by the Decatur
County Jail Policy Manual. (Id. at ¶16.) Hubbard signed the medical denial forms as a physician
even though she was not. (Id.) Abrupt discontinuance of Xanax is known to lead to withdrawal,
which could result in serious bodily harm or death. (Id. at ¶ 14.) Long-term users cannot safely
discontinue the medication unless the dosage is tapered off slowly while the patient is
appropriately monitored. (Id.)
On March 29, 2014, Tillman was incarcerated in the Decatur County Jail pursuant to a
sentence which he was serving on the weekends. (Id. at ¶¶ 13, 15.) On going through medical
intake upon being booked, it was noted he was on “nerve medication”—a colloquialism for
anxiety disorder medication—on a questionnaire completed by Blankenship. (Id. at ¶ 17.) The
deputy did not document the specific medication or dosages prescribed to Tillman, did not take
his vital signs, and failed to monitor Plaintiff for any indication of withdrawal symptoms or warn
other corrections staff to do so. (Id. at ¶ 18.)
Blankenship did not notify a physician of Tillman’s prescription. (Id. at ¶ 24.) Two days
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after he was admitted to the jail, Plaintiff began experiencing withdrawal symptoms. (Id. at ¶
21.) He requested his medication several times and “indicated . . . that he would continue to
have withdrawal symptoms if his medications continued to be denied.” (Id. at ¶ 22.)
On April 2, 2014, Plaintiff was on a work detail with the Decatur County Sheriff’s
Department, when he suffered a grand mal seizure, causing him to fall. (Id. at ¶ 26.) Tillman
was taken to a local hospital and then transported to Jackson-Madison County General Hospital,
where he was given his Xanax medication. (Id. at ¶¶ 26-27.) The cause of the seizure was
identified as acute Xanax withdrawal. (Id. at ¶ 27.)
II.
Standard of Review
Rule 12(b)(6) permits dismissal of a lawsuit for “failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Rule 8(a)(2) instructs that the complaint include “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Rule
12(b)(6) requires the Court to “‘construe the complaint in light most favorable to the plaintiff,
accept all of the complaint’s factual allegations as true, and determine whether the plaintiff
undoubtedly can prove no set of facts in support of the claims that would entitle relief.’”
Alattiyat v. City of Memphis, No. 06-2437, 2007 WL 838129, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 15, 2007)
(quoting Grindstaff v. Green, 133 F.3d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1998)). “While a complaint attacked
by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s
obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations omitted). “To avoid dismissal
under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations with respect
to all the material elements of the claim.” Wittstock v. Mark A. Van Sile, Inc., 330 F.3d 899, 902
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(6th Cir. 2003).
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the United States Supreme Court delineated a
two-prong test for analyzing 12(b)(6) motions. First, the reviewing court should consider what
allegations are merely “legal conclusions” and disregard them when ruling on the motion. Id. at
678. Second, the court should evaluate the remaining well-pleaded facts and determine whether
they give rise to a “plausible claim for relief.” Id. at 679. “The plausibility standard is not akin
to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’
a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). “A well-pleaded complaint may
proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and ‘that a
recovery is very remote and unlikely.’” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Official Capacity Claims
This action by Plaintiff was brought against the three individual Defendants in both their
individual and official capacities.1 The individual Defendants contend that the official capacity
claims should be dismissed because these assertions are redundant as Decatur County itself is a
party to the action. The Court agrees. “In an official capacity action, the plaintiff seeks damages
not from the individual officer, but from the entity for which the officer is an agent. An official
capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.” Cady v.
Arenac Cnty., 574 F.3d 334, 342 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal citations & quotation marks omitted).
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The Defendants in their Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Partial Motion
to Dismiss (D.E. 23-1) pointed out that in the Complaint (D.E. 1) caption, it listed Brasher as
being sued in her individual and official capacities, but in Paragraph 4 stated she was only being
sued in her individual capacity. The Court is proceeding under the assumption Plaintiff intended
to sue Brasher in her official capacity as well.
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As the allegations against Wyatt, Brasher, and Blankenship in their official capacities are in
effect a suit against Decatur County, these claims are DISMISSED. See Cox v. Reagan, No.
3:06-CV-250, 2009 WL 2579655, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 17, 2009) (holding that an official
capacity claim against an officer was essentially a suit against the defendant municipality and
thus, dismissal of the officer was appropriate).
B. Section 1983 Claims Against Wyatt and Brasher
Wyatt and Brasher assert that the claims against them in their individual capacities also
should be dismissed as there are no allegations that they were personally involved in the events
leading to this action. “Because § 1983 liability cannot be imposed under a theory of respondeat
superior, proof of personal involvement is required for a supervisor to incur personal liability.”
Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Miller v. Calhoun Cnty., 408 F.3d
803, 817 n.3 (6th Cir. 2005)). To establish personal liability under § 1983, it must be shown that
the official acted to “cause[] the deprivation of a [federal] right.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.
159, 166 (1985); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (explaining that, because there is no vicarious
liability in § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each government defendant, “through the
official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution”). “[E]ven if a plaintiff can prove
a violation of his constitutional rights, his § 1983 claim must fail against a supervisory official
unless ‘the supervisor encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way
directly participated in it.’” Cardinal v. Metrish, 564 F.3d 794, 802-03 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Combs v. Wilkinson, 315 F.3d 548, 558 (6th Cir. 2002)). “At a minimum a plaintiff must show
that the official at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the
unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.” Combs, 315 F.3d at 558 (quoting Hays v.
Jefferson Cnty., Ky., 668 F.2d 869, 874 (6th Cir. 1982)). The liability of supervisors cannot be
based solely on the right to control employees, Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir.
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1984), or “simple awareness of employees’ misconduct,” Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888, 903
(6th Cir. 2003).
Here, Plaintiff asserts nothing in his complaint alleging any personal involvement by
Wyatt or Brasher. His theory of why these defendants should be held personally liable is
centered on his contention that they were the “policymakers,” and that the “rules, regulations,
customs, policies and procedures of the Defendants were inadequate and unreasonable, and were
the moving force behind the constitutional deprivations suffered by Plaintiff.” (D.E. 1 ¶¶ 37-38.)
Tillman argues that “[t]he policy made and enforced by Wyatt and Brasher is the clearest form of
authorization and approval that could exist.” (D.E. 33 at 5.) He attempts to conflate a § 1983
claim of individual supervisory liability with a claim of municipal liability. It is the municipality
that “can be liable under Section 1983 . . . where its policies are the ‘moving force [behind] the
constitutional violation.’” Dillingham v. Millsaps, 809 F. Supp. 2d 820, 848 (E.D. Tenn. 2011)
(quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)). Policies promulgated by officials
with final policymaking authority may be the basis for attaching municipality liability as opposed
to individual liability. Miller, 408 F.3d at 813 (emphasis added). Although policies furthered by
supervisors may also give rise to supervisory liability, the policies must be specifically advanced
by them. See Bennett v. City of Eastpointe, 410 F.3d 810, 821 (6th Cir. 2005) (a supervisor
giving specific directions regarding a policy to officers may give rise to supervisory liability).
Here, Plaintiff does not allege either Defendant affirmatively engaged in any instruction or gave
any direction to any of the deputies or jail officers involved; the policy simply existed.
Therefore, while Tillman’s allegations regarding the jail’s policies may give rise to a claim for
municipality liability, it does not give rise to a claim for individual liability.
Additionally, Plaintiff also accuses Wyatt and Brasher of failing to properly train the
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employees. (D.E. 1 at ¶ 36.) However, failing to train employees cannot give rise to § 1983
liability as a claim “must be based on active unconstitutional behavior and cannot be based upon
‘a mere failure to act.’” Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999). “A supervisor is
not liable under § 1983 for failing to train unless the supervisor ‘either encouraged the specific
incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.’” Everson v. Leis, 556
F.3d 484 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Hays, 668 F.2d at 874). In Harvey v. Campbell County,
Tennessee, the Sixth Circuit held a supervisor cannot be “held liable for [an officer’s] acts on a
theory of respondeat superior.” Harvey v. Campbell Cnty., Tenn., 453 F. App’x. 557, 562 (6th
Cir. 2011). The court explained that “[t]he County may, however, be held liable under § 1983 if
it maintained a policy or custom that caused the violation of [the plaintiff]’s rights.”
Id.
(emphasis added). Further, “[t]he County may be held liable if [the officer]’s actions can be
attributed to its failure to adequately train [the officers] and this failure amounts to ‘deliberate
indifference’ to the rights of members of the public . . . .” Id. Without personal involvement,
“failure-to-train claims against individual defendants are properly deemed brought against them
in their official capacities, to be treated as claims against the county.” Id. at 563 (citing Miller,
408 F.3d at 817 n.3). The court concluded that even if the plaintiff was able to show that the
supervisors were “County policymaker[s] on matters of training and [were] so deliberately
indifferent to the need for more comprehensive training as to render the training deficiency a
matter of de facto County policy, [the supervisors] would be liable, if at all, in [their] official
capacit[ities], i.e. rendering the County liable.” Id.
Nothing in the complaint alleges personal involvement or knowledge by either of these
Defendants when Tillman was in custody. Allegations that the correctional officers were not
properly trained are more appropriately submitted as support for a failure-to-train theory against
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the municipality itself and not against the supervisors in their individual capacities. See Harris,
489 U.S. at 385 (recognizing that a systematic failure to train officers adequately as a custom or
policy may lead to city liability). While an individual supervisor may still be held liable in his or
her individual capacity under a failure-to-train theory, Plaintiff must point to a specific action by
the supervisor for liability to be incurred. Nothing in the complaint alleges personal involvement
or knowledge by Wyatt or Brasher; rather, it merely asserts that they were supervisory officials.
Because of this, neither can be held individually liable under either a theory of failure-to-train or
supervisory liability. Therefore, Defendants’ motion to dismiss § 1983 claims against them is
GRANTED.
C. GTLA and State Law Claims
Plaintiff alleges both negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress against
Decatur County and intentional infliction of emotional distress against the individual
Defendants.2 State law claims against governmental entities and their employees are governed
by the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”).
§ 29-20-101.
See Tenn. Code Ann.
These claims would ordinarily confer supplemental jurisdiction in this Court
because they arise out of the same facts and form part of the same case or controversy. See 28
U.S.C. § 1367(a). However, GTLA claims must be brought in “strict compliance” with the terms
of the state statute. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-201(c). The GTLA expressly states that
Tennessee “circuit courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction” over claims brought pursuant
to its provisions. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29–20–307. A district court may, in its discretion, decline
supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim even if jurisdiction would otherwise be proper
under § 1367(a). Section 1367(c)(4) allows a district court to “decline to exercise supplemental
2
Tillman concedes that he does not intend to bring a claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress against Decatur County, and thus, any question of such a claim being included
in this lawsuit is moot.
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jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if . . . (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are
other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4). The Sixth Circuit
has held that “the Tennessee legislature expressed a clear preference that [GTLA] claims be
handled by its own state courts. This unequivocal preference of the Tennessee legislature is an
exceptional circumstance [under § 1367(c)(4)] for declining jurisdiction.” Gregory v. Shelby
Cnty., Tenn., 220 F.3d 433, 446 (6th Cir. 2000). Consequently, district courts in Tennessee have
regularly declined to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over GTLA claims, and this Court
finds no compelling reason to act differently with regards to the instant case. See, e.g., Hullett v.
DeKalb Cnty., Tenn., No. 2:11-0016, 2012 WL 398288, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 7, 2012);
Cunningham v. Reid, 337 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1069-70 (W.D. Tenn. 2004). As Plaintiff’s GTLA
claims should be tried in state court, all of his state law claims should be consolidated into one
proceeding for the sake of judicial economy and convenience. See Alexander v. Byrd, No. 141022, 2014 WL 5449626, at *10 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 24, 2014). Therefore, this Court declines to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s GTLA and state law claims. See Ables v.
Shelby Cnty., Tenn., No. 2:10–CV–02169–JPM–dkv, 2010 WL 3024959, at *5 (W.D. Tenn. July
29, 2010) (state law claims dismissed in light of Sixth Circuit’s finding that Tennessee
legislature’s preference that GTLA claims be addressed in state courts was an exceptional
circumstance under § 1327(c)(4) supporting order declining jurisdiction).
For these reasons, the Court will not exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s
state law claims, and they are DISMISSED without prejudice.
D. Plaintiff’s Request for Punitive Damages
Defendants primarily focus their argument for dismissal of Plaintiff’s request for punitive
damages on the inability to recover punitive damages in a § 1983 claim against a municipality
(D.E. 23-1 at 10-11); Tillman agrees with Defendants and argues that his demand for punitive
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damages lies only against the individual Defendants. (D.E. 33 at 16.) Punitive damages are
appropriate in a § 1983 action “‘when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil
motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected
rights of others.’” King v. Zamiara, 788 F.3d 207, 216 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Smith v. Wade,
461 U.S. 30, 56, 103 (1983)). “Because punitive damages are a mechanism for punishing the
defendant for “willful or malicious conduct,” they may be granted “only on a showing of the
requisite intent.” Id. (quoting Memphis Cmmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 306 n. 9
(1986)). “Although punitive damages may be available upon a showing of “evil motive or
intent” or “callous indifference,” punitive damages are also appropriate when a defendant’s
action involves even reckless disregard of the plaintiff’s rights.” See Smith, 461 U.S. at 56.
Here, Tillman alleges “Defendant Blankenship failed to document the specific
medications prescribed and their dosages and frequency; failed to take Plaintiff’s vital signs;
failed to take any other steps to monitor Plaintiff’s condition for withdrawal symptoms or to
warn other staff to monitor Plaintiff for withdrawal symptoms.” (D.E. 1 at ¶ 18.) Additionally,
Plaintiff claims that he requested his medication multiple times, that all requests were denied,
and that he “indicated to Jail staff on March 31, 2014, that he would continue to have withdrawal
symptoms if his medications continued to be denied.” (Id. at ¶ 22.) Despite this, “no employee
of Decatur County Jail monitored Plaintiff as a person who could experience withdrawal from
benzodiazepines. Deputy Blankenship did not notify other jail staff to monitor the Plaintiff for
withdrawal symptoms, as medical protocols would dictate.” (Id. at ¶ 23.) As a result of his
withdrawal, Tillman suffered a “violent grand mal seizure.” (Id. at ¶¶ 26-27.) Construing the
complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, this behavior could be deemed as reckless.
Therefore, as Tillman has made sufficient allegations to state a claim for punitive damages
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against the individual defendants under § 1983, Defendants’ motion to dismiss that claim is
DENIED.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed herein, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against
Wyatt, Brasher, and Blankenship in their official capacities and against Defendants Wyatt and
Brasher under § 1983 is GRANTED.
The Court declines to exercise its supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s GTLA and state law claims and therefore orders that they be
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s request for
punitive damages against the individual defendants is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 25th day of September 2015.
s/ J. DANIEL BREEN
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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