McGee v. Madison County, Tennessee et al

Filing 31

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' JOINT 22 MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS. Signed by Chief Judge J. Daniel Breen on 6/10/15. (Breen, J.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION

DENNIS CHADWICK MCGEE, as Personal
Representative/Administrator of the Estate
of DILLON C. MCGEE, deceased,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MADISON COUNTY, TENNESSEE,
JOHN MEHR, Individually and in his
Official Capacity as Sheriff of Madison
County, and THOMAS KNOLTON,
Individually and in his Official Capacity as
a Deputy Sheriff of the Madison County
Sheriff’s Office,
Defendants.

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No. 1:15-cv-01069

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS

Before the Court is the joint motion of Defendants, Madison County, Tennessee, John
Mehr, individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff of Madison County, and Thomas
Knolton, individually and in his official capacity as a deputy sheriff of the Madison County
Sheriff’s Office, to stay this action pending the resolution of a civil rights investigation by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”).

(Docket Entry (“D.E.”) 22.)

Plaintiff, Dennis

Chadwick McGee, as personal representative/administrator of the estate of Dillon C. McGee, has
responded in opposition. (D.E. 27.) For the reasons discussed below, the motion is GRANTED.
Background
Plaintiff filed suit on March 30, 2015, alleging, among other things, that Knolton, acting
under color of state law, violated state and federal law when he shot and killed his son, Dillon C.

McGee, on September 26, 2014. (D.E. 1 at 1–3.) The Tennessee Bureau of Investigation opened
an inquiry into the shooting, and, on February 2, 2015, evidence was presented to the Madison
County, Tennessee grand jury, which returned no true bills. (Dec. of Sheriff John Mehr (“Mehr
Dec.”) ¶ 3.)

On February 9, 2015, Todd McCall, Special Agent in Charge of the FBI’s

Memphis, Tennessee division, informed Sheriff Mehr that the United States Department of
Justice had instructed him to open a civil rights investigation into the September 26, 2014
incident.

(Id. ¶ 4.)

According to Sheriff Mehr, that investigation is ongoing.

(Id. ¶ 5.)

Defendants move to stay this matter until the investigation is concluded.
Law and Analysis
I.

Motion to Stay
A court’s “‘power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to

control the disposition of the causes in its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for
counsel and for litigants, and the entry of such an order ordinarily rests with the sound discretion
of the District Court.’” FTC v. EMA Nationwide, Inc., 767 F.3d 611, 626–27 (6th Cir. 2014)
(quoting Ohio Envtl. Council v. U.S. Dist. Court, S. Dist. of Ohio, E. Div., 565 F.2d 393, 396 (6th
Cir. 1977)). However, “‘nothing in the Constitution requires a civil action to be stayed in the
face of a pending or impending criminal indictment.’” Id. at 627 (quoting Chao v. Fleming, 498
F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1037 (W.D. Mich. 2007)).
Instead, courts “generally consider and balance certain factors when determining whether
a stay of civil proceedings is appropriate in a given case: 1) the extent to which the issues in the
criminal case overlap with those presented in the civil case; 2) the status of the case, including
whether the defendants have been indicted; 3) the private interests of the plaintiff[] in proceeding
expeditiously weighed against the prejudice to [a] plaintiff[] caused by the delay; 4) the private

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interests of and burden on the defendants; 5) the interests of the courts; and 6) the public
interest.’” Id. (quoting Chao, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 1037). Courts “‘should [also] consider the
extent to which the defendant’s [F]ifth [A]mendment rights are implicated.’”

Id. (quoting

Keating v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 45 F.3d 322, 324 (9th Cir. 1995)). The party seeking the
stay has the burden of showing “‘that there is pressing need for delay, and that neither the other
party nor the public will suffer harm from entry of the order.’” Id. at 627–28 (quoting Ohio
Envtl. Council, 565 F.2d at 396). The Court will address each factor in turn.
A.

Overlap of Issues and Status of Criminal Case

Defendants contend that the substantial overlap of the FBI’s investigation and this civil
action makes it very likely that deputy Knolton, absent a stay, will have to choose between
potentially incriminating himself during discovery and trial, or invoking his right against selfincrimination under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and risk the adverse
inferences that might result.

(D.E. 22-1 at 4–5.)

Defendants insist that any civil rights

investigation into the September 26, 2014 shooting would naturally have Knolton as a primary
target. (Id.) As to the status of the criminal case, Defendants concede that while Knolton has not
been indicted, the Court still possesses broad discretion to grant a stay. (Id.)
McGee maintains that because there have been no charges, and it is uncertain that the
investigation will lead to any, Defendants’ request is premature. (D.E. 27 at 5.) He maintains
that as there is no pending criminal case to overlap with his civil action, only an investigation of
unknown length and purpose exists. (Id.) McGee notes that Defendants have not provided any
evidence that they are the targets of the investigation or any information as to the focus of the
investigation. (Id. at 5–6.)
Recognizing that “courts generally do not stay proceedings in the absence of an

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indictment,” EMA Nationwide, 767 F.3d at 628 (citation omitted), Defendants cite to Walsh
Secs., Inc. v. Cristo Prop. Mgmt., Ltd., 7 F. Supp. 2d 523 (D.N.J. 1998) as an example of a
district court granting a motion to stay civil proceedings even though no defendant had been
formally charged. Id. at 527. In Walsh, the United States Attorney, who was not a party to the
civil suit, was conducting a parallel investigation into whether some defendants had engaged in
criminal conduct. Id. at 526. The defendants claimed that they could not participate in civil
discovery while simultaneously protecting their Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination. Id. In holding that the matters overlapped even though no party had been
indicted, the court found that the criminal investigation and civil case focused on the same
allegations of misconduct and entered a temporary stay of a few months. Id. at 527–29.
Defendants also reference United States v. Any and All Assets of that Certain Business
Known as Shane Co., 147 F.R.D. 99 (M.D.N.C. 1992), where a district court stayed a civil
forfeiture proceeding until a criminal investigation of the claimants was finished. Id. at 100–02.
The government moved to stay the civil case out of a concern that the defendants might use the
liberal discovery rules to obtain information that could jeopardize the ongoing criminal
investigation. Id. at 100. As in Walsh, none of the defendants in Any and All Assets had been
indicted. Id. Finally, Defendants rely on Brock v. Tolkow, 109 F.R.D. 116 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), in
which a district court granted a stay of civil proceedings brought by the Department of Labor
pending the resolution of a parallel criminal investigation by the United States Department of
Justice. Id. at 117.
McGee seeks to distinguish Walsh from the present case on the grounds that, in that case,
the government informed the court that absent a stay, information turned over during discovery
might harm the pending criminal investigation. (D.E. 27 at 6.) Plaintiff contends that there is no

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such concern here since the government is not a party to this action. (Id.) While the Walsh court
noted the government’s concern about civil discovery jeopardizing the criminal investigation, the
majority of its analysis focused on whether the defendants would have to choose between
exercising their Fifth Amendment rights or participating in discovery. 7 F. Supp. 2d at 527–28.
Based on that concern, and even though no indictments had been obtained, the court granted a
temporary stay. Id. at 527–29.
Plaintiff is correct that in United States v. Any and All Assets of that Certain Business
Known as Shane Co., the government was the movant for a stay in order to protect a parallel
criminal investigation.

(D.E. 27 at 7.)

He believes this circumstance makes that holding

inapplicable to this matter because here the government is not a party, and there is no way to
confirm whether there is a criminal investigation that must be protected from the civil discovery
rules. (Id.) However, the court in Any and All Assets granted a temporary stay based not only on
the government’s belief that their criminal investigation might be compromised, but also because
the defendants might invoke their Fifth Amendment rights during discovery, which could cause a
substantial delay. 147 F.R.D. at 102.
Here, the Court finds that these two matters share a common basis, as McGee’s civil suit
and the FBI’s investigation both arise out of the September 26, 2014 incident. “[T]he extent to
which the issues in the criminal case overlap with those in the civil case, is regarded as ‘the most
important factor’ because ‘[i]f there is no overlap, then there would be no danger of selfincrimination and no need for a stay.’” Chao, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 1039 (quoting Metzler v.
Bennett, No. 97-CV-148 (RSP/GJD), 1998 WL 187454, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 1998)). Any
indictment handed down as a result of the investigation will be based on the same factual
circumstances that Plaintiff alleges in his complaint. The extent to which these two undertakings

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overlie creates a danger of self-incrimination on the part of Knolton. This factor strongly
supports granting the motion.
As to the status of the criminal case, both parties agree that the Court has broad discretion
to grant a stay, even in the absence of an indictment. According to Sheriff Mehr, the FBI is
currently investigating the September 26, 2014 incident. (Mehr Dec. ¶¶ 4–5.) However, no
party can offer any information about the investigation because, according to McGee, the United
States Attorney for the Western District of Tennessee has an official policy of refusing to
comment on active investigations. He notes that no one has been charged as a result of the FBI’s
investigation, but, as the court held in Chao, “[a]lthough Defendants have not been indicted, it
appears that the issues framed by any indictment to be handed down will be coextensive with
those in this [civil] case . . . .” Chao, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 1039. While true that, “the fact that a
defendant has not been indicted generally weighs against a stay . . . other considerations
discussed below render this factor less significant.” Id. at 1038–39. The overlap of the matters,
and the other factors considered, weigh in favor of granting the motion.
B.

Plaintiff’s Interest in Proceeding Expeditiously versus Prejudice in Delay and
Private Interests and Burden on the Defendants

Plaintiff maintains that his strong interest in prosecuting this case in a timely manner, and
his concern that any delay could result in witnesses moving away, or memories fading,
outweighs any burden on Defendants. (D.E. 27 at 8–9.) McGee notes that Knolton’s Fifth
Amendment rights will not be protected once the FBI concludes this investigation, as any state or
federal agency could decide to investigate this incident in the future, and present that evidence to
a grand jury. (Id.) He insists that Defendants should not be allowed to use the possibility of
Knolton having to choose between his Fifth Amendment rights or defending this action as a way
to indefinitely stay this case. (Id.)
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Defendants believe that a stay will only temporarily delay Plaintiff’s civil suit, but have
provided no details as to the scope of the FBI’s investigation. (D.E. 22-1 at 6.) Defendants
contend that denying their request will force Knolton to choose between exercising his
constitutional rights or defending this action. (Id.) Sheriff Mehr and Madison County state that
their defense to Plaintiff’s suit relies heavily on Knolton’s ability to participate meaningfully in
discovery and trial. (Id.)
Considering the concerns raised by the parties, the Court finds that a stay of limited
duration is appropriate in this matter. A limited stay allays Plaintiff’s concern about the potential
loss of discoverable material due to unavailable or forgetful witnesses, while allowing the family
a timely resolution of this matter. Defendants’ interests are protected by a limited stay, as Mehr
and Madison County might suffer prejudice if Knolton could not participate in discovery and
trial because of the invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights. However, Defendants’ request for
an indefinite stay is inappropriate because no indictments have been returned, and the Court has
no way of knowing when the FBI will conclude their investigation. A limited stay also allows
the FBI to continue its investigation into the September 26, 2014 incident. On balance, these
factors support granting the motion and entering a temporary stay.
C.

Court’s Interest

Defendants believe that the FBI will complete its investigation in a timely matter and
notify the Court immediately, so an indefinite stay would not waste time or judicial resources.
(D.E. 22-1 at 7.) McGee insists that no one knows when the investigation will be completed.
(D.E. 27 at 9.) He contends that an indefinite stay will not further the Court’s interest in
resolving matters in a timely fashion. (Id.)
The Court finds that entering a limited stay will allow it to manage its docket and resolve

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the matters before it in a timely fashion. A temporary stay permits the FBI’s investigation to
continue, and could result in an indictment, which “may ultimately reduce or eliminate the need
for discovery or result in a settlement of this case . . . .” Chao, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 1040. A
temporary stay also promotes judicial economy, as “the parties and the Court would have to
consume time and resources to determine the precise contours of Defendant[’s] Fifth
Amendment Rights.” Coley v. Lucas Cnty, Ohio, No 3:09 CV 0008, 2011 WL 5838190, at *4
(N.D. Ohio Nov. 18, 2011). Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of granting the motion.
D.

Public Interest

Defendants aver that if the FBI’s investigation results in Knolton’s indictment, the
public’s interest will be advanced just as much, if not more than it would by Plaintiff’s civil
action. (D.E. 22-1 at 7.) Plaintiff maintains that the public interest is best served by permitting
his case to proceed to discovery and trial because this suit is the only current means to hold
Defendants accountable to the public. (D.E. 27 at 10.) The Court finds that the public interest
could be advanced either by this civil action or any potential criminal prosecution that might
result from the FBI’s investigation. This factor weighs in favor of neither party.
Conclusion
Considering all of the factors, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to stay.
Defendants have established that there is a sufficient need for a short delay and that neither party
nor the public will suffer harm from entry of this stay. See EMA Nationwide, 767 F.3d at 627–
28. This matter is temporarily stayed for sixty days from the date of entry of this order. After
sixty days, the Defendants must file responsive pleadings. Following that, the parties will
conduct a scheduling conference with Magistrate Judge Edward G. Bryant and exchange initial
disclosures as required under Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Should the FBI’s

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investigation result in an indictment, or be closed in the interim, the parties shall notify the Court
immediately.
IT IS SO ORDERED this the 10th day of June, 2015.
s/ J. DANIEL BREEN
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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