Sikes v. Gibson County Correctional Complex

Filing 9

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND. Signed by Judge James D. Todd on 4/19/16. (Todd, James)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION
SAMUEL CLAY SIKES,
Plaintiff,
VS.
GIBSON COUNTY,
Defendant.

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No. 15-1078-JDT-egb

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND

On April 8, 2015, Plaintiff Samuel Clay Sikes (“Sikes”), who was, at the time,
incarcerated at the Gibson County Correctional Complex (“GCCC”) in Trenton,
Tennessee, filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1.) After
Sikes submitted the required documentation (ECF No. 4), the Court issued an order on
April 20, 2015, granting leave to proceed in forma pauperis and assessing the civil filing
fee pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b)
(ECF No. 5). Sikes subsequently filed a motion for appointment of counsel (ECF No. 6),
which was denied (ECF No. 7).1 The Clerk shall record the Defendant as Gibson
County.2

1

The order denying appointment of counsel was returned as undeliverable on April 4,
2016, marked “Return to Sender,” “Attempted – Not Known,” and “Unable to Forward.” (ECF
No. 8.) However, Sikes has submitted no change of address.
2

The allegations against the GCCC are construed as allegations against Gibson County.

I. The Complaint
In the complaint, which consists of a single paragraph, Sikes alleged that on
March 31, 2015, he informed the medical staff at the GCCC that he has Hepatitis C.
(ECF No. 1.) However, the medical staff told him the GCCC did not provide treatment
for Hepatitis C, so unless he was transferred to a Tennessee Department of Correction
facility, there was no possibility of treatment. (Id.) Sikes contended that failure to treat
his Hepatitis C would put his life and health in jeopardy. (Id.) He alleged this was cruel
and unusual punishment. (Id.) Sikes did not seek any specific relief.
II. Analysis
The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint,
or any portion thereof, if the complaint—
(1)
is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted; or
(2)
such relief.

seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may
be granted, the court applies the standards under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71
(6th Cir. 2010). “Accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, the
Court ‘consider[s] the factual allegations in [the] complaint to determine if they plausibly
suggest an entitlement to relief.’” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011)
2

(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681) (alteration in original). “[P]leadings that . . . are no more
than conclusions . . . are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions
can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual
allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (“Rule
8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.
Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could
satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the claim, but
also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.”).
“A complaint can be frivolous either factually or legally. Any complaint that is
legally frivolous would ipso facto fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
Hill, 630 F.3d at 470 (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 328-29 (1989)).
Whether a complaint is factually frivolous under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and
1915(e)(2)(B)(i) is a separate issue from whether it fails to state a claim for
relief. Statutes allowing a complaint to be dismissed as frivolous give
“judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the
complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual
contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S. Ct. 1827
(interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1915). Unlike a dismissal for failure to state a
claim, where a judge must accept all factual allegations as true, Iqbal, 129
S. Ct. at 1949-50, a judge does not have to accept “fantastic or delusional”
factual allegations as true in prisoner complaints that are reviewed for
frivolousness. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28, 109 S. Ct. 1827.
Id. at 471.
“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at
383 (quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants and
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prisoners are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, No. 092259, 2011 WL 285251, at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se
complaint for failure to comply with “unique pleading requirements” and stating “a court
cannot ‘create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’”) (quoting
Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975)) (alteration in
original); Payne v. Sec’y of Treas., 73 F. App’x 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming sua
sponte dismissal of complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and stating, “[n]either
this court nor the district court is required to create Payne’s claim for her”); cf. Pliler v.
Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004) (“District judges have no obligation to act as counsel or
paralegal to pro se litigants.”); Young Bok Song v. Gipson, 423 F. App’x 506, 510 (6th
Cir. 2011) (“[W]e decline to affirmatively require courts to ferret out the strongest cause
of action on behalf of pro se litigants. Not only would that duty be overly burdensome, it
would transform the courts from neutral arbiters of disputes into advocates for a
particular party. While courts are properly charged with protecting the rights of all who
come before it, that responsibility does not encompass advising litigants as to what legal
theories they should pursue.”).
Sikes filed his hand-written complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983
provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
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liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial
officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity,
injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was
violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this
section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of
Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a
deprivation of rights secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States (2)
committed by a defendant acting under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,
398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).
Sikes complains that he was told his Hepatitis C would not be treated while he was
at the GCCC.

For a convicted prisoner, such a claim arises under the Eighth

Amendment, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishments. See generally Wilson v.
Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991). For pretrial detainees, “the ‘cruel and unusual punishment’
proscription of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution does not apply,” because “as a
pre-trial detainee [the plaintiff is] not being ‘punished,’” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d
99, 106 (2d Cir. 2000). Instead, a person detained prior to conviction receives protection
against mistreatment at the hands of prison officials under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment if held in state custody. Caiozzo v. Koreman, 581 F.3d 63, 69
(2d Cir. 2009); Liscio v. Warren, 901 F.2d 274, 275–76 (2d Cir.1990). However, even if
Sikes was a pretrial detainee during the events at issue, the court will analyze the claims
regarding his medical care under Eighth Amendment principles because the rights of
pretrial detainees are equivalent to those of convicted prisoners. Thompson v. Cnty. of

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Medina, 29 F.3d 238, 242 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Roberts v. City of Troy, 773 F.2d 720,
723 (6th Cir. 1985).3
An Eighth Amendment claim consists of both objective and subjective
components. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Hudson v. McMillian, 503
U.S. 1, 8 (1992); Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298; Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d at 383; Mingus v.
Butler, 591 F.3d 474, 479-80 (6th Cir. 2010). The objective component requires that the
deprivation be “sufficiently serious.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8;
Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298.
Under Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976), “deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain,’. . . proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” However, not “every claim by a
prisoner that he has not received adequate medical treatment states a violation of the
Eighth Amendment.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. “In order to state a cognizable claim, a
prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs.

It is only such indifference that can offend

‘evolving standards of decency’ in violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Id., at 106.
3

On June 22, 2015, the Supreme Court held, in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466
(2015), that excessive force claims brought by pretrial detainees must be analyzed under a
Fourteenth Amendment standard of objective reasonableness, rejecting a subjective standard that
takes into account a defendant’s state of mind. Id. at 2472-73. It is unclear whether or to what
extent the holding in Kingsley may affect the deliberate indifference standard for claims
concerning an inmate’s health or safety, which the Sixth Circuit applies to both pretrial detainees
and convicted prisoners. See Morabito v. Holmes, 628 F. App’x 353, 356-58 (6th Cir. 2015)
(applying, even after the decision in Kingsley, the objective reasonableness standard to pretrial
detainee’s excessive force claims and the Eighth Amendment’s deliberate indifference standard
to denial of medical care claim). Absent further guidance, the Court will continue to apply the
deliberate indifference analysis to claims concerning a pretrial detainee’s health and safety.
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Within the context of Estelle claims, “[a] medical need is serious if it is one that
has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that
even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Ramos
v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 575 (10th Cir. 1980) (quoting Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp.
269, 311 (D.N.H. 1977)). For purposes of this order, the Court presumes that Sikes’s
Hepatitis C was a serious medical need.
To make out a claim of an Eighth Amendment Estelle violation, a prisoner must
plead facts showing that “prison authorities have denied reasonable requests for medical
treatment in the face of an obvious need for such attention where the inmate is thereby
exposed to undue suffering or the threat of tangible residual injury.” Westlake v. Lucas,
537 F.2d 857, 860 (6th Cir. 1976).

The Supreme Court clarified the meaning of

deliberate indifference in Farmer v. Brennan, as the reckless disregard of a substantial
risk of serious harm; mere negligence will not suffice. Id. 511 U.S. at 835-36. Thus,
[a] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for
denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official
knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the
official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be
drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw
the inference. This approach comports best with the text of the Eighth
Amendment as our cases have interpreted it. The Eighth Amendment does
not outlaw cruel and unusual “conditions”; it outlaws cruel and unusual
“punishments.” An act or omission unaccompanied by knowledge of a
significant risk of harm might well be something society wishes to
discourage, and if harm does result society might well wish to assure
compensation. The common law reflects such concerns when it imposes
tort liability on a purely objective basis. . . . But an official’s failure to
alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not, while
no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as the
infliction of punishment.
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Id. at 837-38 (emphasis added; citations omitted); see also Garretson v. City of Madison
Heights, 407 F.3d 789, 796 (6th Cir. 2005) (“If the officers failed to act in the face of an
obvious risk of which they should have known but did not, then they did not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment.”). “‘[D]eliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious
harm to a prisoner is the equivalent of recklessly disregarding that risk.’” Comstock v.
McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 703 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836).
Sikes’s complaint was executed on April 1, 2015, the day after he allegedly was
told his Hepatitis C would not be treated, and it was mailed from the GCCC on April 6,
2015. At best, Sikes has alleged only a theoretical risk of harm. There is no allegation
that his condition required immediate medical treatment and no allegation that anyone at
the GCCC knew that Sikes was at a substantial risk of serious harm if he did not receive
immediate medical treatment for his Hepatitis C.
Furthermore, Sikes has sued only the GCCC, which is a suit against Gibson
County. When a § 1983 claim is made against a municipality, the court must analyze two
distinct issues: (1) whether plaintiff’s harm was caused by a constitutional violation; and
(2) if so, whether the municipality is responsible for that violation. Collins v. City of
Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992). The second issue is dispositive of
Plaintiff’s claim against Gibson County.
A local government “cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—
or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat
superior theory.” Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (emphasis in
original); see also Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1994); Berry v.
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City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1345 (6th Cir. 1994). A municipality cannot be held
responsible for a constitutional deprivation unless there is a direct causal link between a
municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation. Monell, 436 U.S.
at 691-92; Deaton v. Montgomery Co., Ohio, 989 F.2d 885, 889 (6th Cir. 1993). To
demonstrate municipal liability, a plaintiff “must (1) identify the municipal policy or
custom, (2) connect the policy to the municipality, and (3) show that his particular injury
was incurred due to execution of that policy.” Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th
Cir. 2003) (citing Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)).
“Where a government ‘custom has not received formal approval through the body’s
official decisionmaking channels,’ such a custom may still be the subject of a § 1983
suit.” Alkire, 330 F.3d at 815 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91). The policy or
custom “must be ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation’ in order to establish
the liability of a government body under § 1983.” Searcy, 38 F.3d at 286 (quoting Polk
Co. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. at 326 (citation omitted)). “[T]he touchstone of ‘official policy’
is designed ‘to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the
municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to action for
which the municipality is actually responsible.’” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S.
112, 138 (1988) (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479-80 (1986))
(emphasis in original).
Although civil rights plaintiffs are not required to plead the facts demonstrating
municipal liability with particularity, Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty Narcotics Intelligence
& Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1993), the complaint must be sufficient to
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put the municipality on notice of the plaintiff’s theory of liability, see, e.g., Fowler v.
Campbell, No. 3:06CV-P610-H, 2007 WL 1035007, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 30, 2007);
Yeackering v. Ankrom, No. 4:05-CV-00018-M, 2005 WL 1877964, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Aug.
5, 2005); Oliver v. City of Memphis, No. 04-2074-B, 2004 WL 3316242, at *4 (W.D.
Tenn. Dec. 2, 2004); cf. Raub v. Correctional Med. Servs., Inc., No. 06-13942, 2008 WL
160611, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 15, 2008) (denying motion to dismiss where complaint
contained conclusory allegations of a custom or practice); Cleary v. Cnty of Macomb, No.
06-15505, 2007 WL 2669102, at *20 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 6, 2007) (same); Morningstar v.
City of Detroit, No. 06-11073, 2007 WL 2669156, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 6, 2007)
(same); Chidester v. City of Memphis, No. 02-2556 MA/A, 2006 WL 1421099, at *3
(W.D. Tenn. June 15, 2005). The allegations of the complaint fail to identify an official
policy or custom of Gibson County which caused injury to Sikes. Instead, it appears that
Sikes is suing Gibson County because he was confined in a county institution and the
County employed persons who allegedly violated his rights.
For all of the foregoing reasons, Sikes’s complaint is subject to dismissal in its
entirety for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.
III. Leave to Amend
The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may allow a prisoner to amend his
complaint to avoid a sua sponte dismissal under the PLRA. LaFountain v. Harry, 716
F.3d 944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013); see also Brown v. R.I., No. 12-1403, 2013 WL 646489, at
*1 (1st Cir. Feb. 22, 2013) (per curiam) (“Ordinarily, before dismissal for failure to state
a claim is ordered, some form of notice and an opportunity to cure the deficiencies in the
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complaint must be afforded.”). Leave to amend is not required where a deficiency cannot
be cured. Brown, 2013 WL 646489, at *1; Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. United States, 257 F.3d
31, 37 (1st Cir. 2001) (“This does not mean, of course, that every sua sponte dismissal
entered without prior notice to the plaintiff automatically must be reversed. If it is crystal
clear that the plaintiff cannot prevail and that amending the complaint would be futile,
then a sua sponte dismissal may stand.”); Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103,
114 (3d Cir. 2002) (“in forma pauperis plaintiffs who file complaints subject to dismissal
under Rule 12(b)(6) should receive leave to amend unless amendment would be
inequitable or futile”); Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We agree
with the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a meritless complaint that cannot be
salvaged by amendment comports with due process and does not infringe the right of
access to the courts.”). In this case, the Court cannot conclude that any amendment to
Sikes’s claims would be futile as a matter of law.
IV. Conclusion
The Court DISMISSES Sikes’s complaint for failure to state a claim on which
relief can be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).
However, leave to amend is GRANTED. Any amended complaint must be filed within
thirty (30) days after the date of this order. Sikes is advised that an amended complaint
will supersede the original pleadings and and must be complete in itself without reference
to those prior pleadings. The text of the complaint must allege sufficient facts to support
each claim without reference to any extraneous document.

Any exhibits must be

identified by number in the text of the amended complaint and must be attached to the
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complaint. All claims alleged in an amended complaint must arise from the facts alleged
in the original complaint. Each claim for relief must be stated in a separate count and
must identify each defendant sued in that count. If Sikes fails to file an amended
complaint within the time specified, the Court will assess a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(g) and enter judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ James D. Todd
JAMES D. TODD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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