Batchelor v. Byrd et al

Filing 27

ORDER GRANTING 18 DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS. Signed by Chief Judge J. Daniel Breen on 11/25/15. (Breen, J.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION AT JACKSON
______________________________________________________________________________
MICHAEL BATCHELOR,
Plaintiff,
v.

Docket No. 15-1099

DALLAS BYRD, Individually and in
His Official Capacity, THE BROWNSVILLE
POLICE DEPARTMENT, and THE CITY
OF BROWNSVILLE, TENNESSEE,
Defendants.
______________________________________________________________________________
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION TO DISMISS
______________________________________________________________________________
On April 14, 2015, Plaintiff, Michael Batchelor, brought this civil action under 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1983 and 1988 as well as state law against Defendants, Dallas Byrd, in his individual and
official capacities; the Brownsville (Tennessee) Police Department; and the City of Brownsville,
Tennessee, arising from injuries occurred during his arrest on April 24, 2014. (Docket Entry
(“D.E.”) 1-1.) Plaintiff originally filed suit in the Circuit Court of Fayette County, Tennessee,
and Defendants timely removed the case to this Court on April 29, 2015. (D.E. 1.) Before the
Court is a motion to dismiss by Defendants pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. (D.E. 18.) For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED.
I.

Factual Background

Plaintiff alleges the following facts. During the relevant time, Byrd was a Brownsville,
Tennessee police officer. (D.E. 1-1 at ¶ 1.) Defendant is a Caucasian male, and Plaintiff is an

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African American male. (Id. at ¶ 9.) On April 24, 2014, Byrd activated his patrol car lights
while traveling behind Batchelor in Brownsville. (Id. at ¶ 1.) In response, Plaintiff pulled off the
road into a tobacco store. (Id. at ¶ 2.) Defendant approached Batchelor’s car with his gun
pulled, “barking out confusing and irrational commands.” (Id. at ¶ 3.) After exiting the car,
Plaintiff was body slammed by Byrd, causing a brain injury and/or exacerbating a pre-existing
condition. (Id. at ¶ 4.) Plaintiff was charged with resisting arrest. (Id. at ¶ 7.)
II.

Standard of Review

Rule 12(b)(6) permits dismissal of a lawsuit for “failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Rule 8(a)(2) instructs that the complaint include “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Rule
12(b)(6) requires that the Court “accept all material allegations as true and construe them in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Top Flight Entm’t, Ltd. V. Schuette, 729 F.3d
623, 630 (6th Cir. 2013). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does
not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his
‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007). “[T]o survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain either direct or inferential
allegations respecting all material elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal
theory.” Terry v. Tyson Farms, Inc., 604 F.3d 272, 275-76 (6th Cir. 2010).
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the United States Supreme Court delineated a
two-prong test for analyzing 12(b)(6) motions. First, the reviewing court should consider what
allegations are merely “legal conclusions” and disregard them when ruling on the motion. Id. at
678. Second, the court should evaluate the remaining well-pleaded facts and determine whether

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they give rise to a “plausible claim for relief.” Id. at 679. “The plausibility standard is not akin
to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’
a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). “A well-pleaded complaint may
proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and ‘that a
recovery is very remote and unlikely.’” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
III.

Legal Analysis

A. Official Capacity Claims
This action by Plaintiff was brought against Byrd in both his individual and official
capacities. Batchelor also brought suit against the City of Brownsville. “In an official capacity
action, the plaintiff seeks damages not from the individual officer, but from the entity for which
the officer is an agent. An official capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated
as a suit against the entity.” Cady v. Arenac Cnty., 574 F.3d 334, 342 (6th Cir. 2009); see
Tillman v. Decatur County, No. 15-01068, 2015 WL 5675843, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 25,
2015). As the allegations against Byrd in his official capacity are in effect a suit against
Brownsville City, these claims are DISMISSED. See Cox v. Reagan, No. 3:06-CV-250, 2009
WL 2579655, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 17, 2009) (holding that an official capacity claim against
an officer was essentially a suit against the defendant municipality and thus, dismissal of the
officer was appropriate).
B. Claims Against Brownsville Police Department
The Defendants seek dismissal of the claims against the Brownsville Police Department
on the grounds that it is not a suable entity. As it is an established rule of law that police

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departments are not suable entities, the claims are DISMISSED. See Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d
1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994) (because police department was not an entity which could be sued,
the county was the proper party to address allegations of plaintiff’s § 1983 complaint); Moore v.
Henderson Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 13-1243, 2014 WL 1745017, at *13 (W.D. Tenn. April 30,
2014); Johnson v. Wichita Cnty., Tex. Sheriff’s Office, No. 1:12–CV–394, 2013 WL 3833667, at
*10 (E.D. Tenn. July 23, 2013) (noting that district courts in Tennessee “hold law enforcement
agencies are inappropriate defendants; plaintiffs must sue the municipalities the agencies
represent”).
C. Cruel and Unusual Punishment Claims
A § 1983 plaintiff must establish the deprivation of a constitutional right in order to have
a valid claim. See Wittstock v. Mark A. Van Sile, Inc., 330 F.3d 899, 902 (6th Cir. 2003); Phebus
v. City of Memphis, 340 F. Supp. 2d 874, 879 (W.D. Tenn. 2004). In the instant motion,
Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims for “cruel and unusual punishment.” The Eighth
Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment in connection with the use of excessive
force during an arrest. See Bass v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 1041, 1048 (6th Cir. 1999). It is not
implicated, however, if the alleged misconduct occurs prior to the plaintiff’s conviction. Id. at
1048-49. As the United States Supreme Court articulated in Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,
671 n.40 (1977), “the State does not acquire the power to punish with which the Eighth
Amendment is concerned until after it has secured a formal adjudication of guilt in accordance
with due process of law.” See also Graham v. Cnty. of Washtenaw, 358 F.3d 377, 382 n.3 (6th
Cir. 2004) (Eighth Amendment has no application to pretrial detainees); Bass, 167 F.3d at 104849 (Eighth Amendment comes into play post conviction); Phebus, 340 F. Supp. 2d at 879
(same); Davenport v. Simmons, 192 F. Supp. 2d 812, 821 (W.D. Tenn. 2001) (same).

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It is

undisputed Batchelor had not been convicted prior to the alleged incident in this case. Thus, he
has no Eighth Amendment claim, and it is DISMISSED.1
D. Fourteenth Amendment Claims
Plaintiff also asserts violations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process
clause.2 “Substantive due process bars the government from acting in a way that shocks the
conscience or interferes with rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” Heike v. Guevara,
519 F. App’x 911, 923 (6th Cir. 2013), cert. denied sub nom. Heiki v. Guevara, 134 S. Ct. 341
(2013).

The government does not possess any procedural protection if it violates this

proscription. See id.; Pittman v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Dep’t Children & Family Servs., 640 F.3d 716,
728 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Substantive due process serves the goal of preventing governmental power
from being used for purposes of oppression, regardless of the fairness of the procedures used.”).
“[C]ourts [are, however,] to carefully scrutinize so-called substantive due process claims
brought under § 1983 because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area
are scarce and open-ended.” Upsher v. Grosse Pointe Pub. Sch. Sys., 285 F.3d 448, 452 (6th Cir.
2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 880 (2002); see Jenkins v. Hardeman Cnty., Tenn., No. 13-2054,
2013 WL 5593048, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 10, 2013), cert. denied sub nom. Jenskins v.
Hardeman Cnty., Tenn., No. 13-2054, 2014 WL 3568340 (W.D. Tenn. July 18, 2014). “Where a

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Moreover, Plaintiff failed to respond in his brief to Defendants’ arguments in opposition
to his Eighth Amendment claim, which also results in abandonment. See Morris v. City of
Memphis, No. 11-2928-STA-CGC, 2012 WL 3727149, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 27, 2012)
(“Because Plaintiff does not contest the dismissal of his Fifth Amendment, Eighth Amendment
and Tennessee constitution claims, the Court finds that Plaintiff has abandoned those claims.”).
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It is unclear from Plaintiff’s complaint if he attempts to allege a Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection violation. (D.E. 1-1 at ¶ 9.) Regardless, Batchelor has not sufficiently raised
such a claim. As evidence, he merely stated that the arresting officer is Caucasian and he is
African American. This would fall significantly short of the Twombly/Iqbal pleading standards.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
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particular [a]mendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a
particular sort of government behavior, that [a]mendment, not the more generalized notion of
‘substantive due process,’ must be the guide for analyzing such a claim.” Albright v. Oliver, 510
U.S. 266, 266 (1994), reh’g denied (Mar. 21, 1994).

If such an amendment exists, the

substantive due process claim is properly dismissed. Heike, 519 F. App’x at 923.
The Sixth Circuit has consistently held that a plaintiff may “allege use of excessive force
[during an arrest] even where the physical contact between the parties did not leave excessive
marks or cause extensive physical damage.” Miller v. Sanilac Cnty., 606 F.3d 240, 253-53 (6th
Cir. 2010) (quoting Morrison v. Bd. Of Trs. Of Green Twp., 583 F.3d 394, 407 (6th Cir. 2009));
see also Holmes v. City of Massillon, 78 F.3d 1041, 1048 (6th Cir. 1996). A claim of excessive
force during arrest falls under the purview of the Fourth Amendment. See Miller, 606 F.3d at
252. In determining whether there has been a violation of the Fourth Amendment, courts must
not consider the “extent of the injury inflicted,” but whether an officer subjects a detainee to
“gratuitous violence.” Id. “The question whether force is excessive turns on the objective
reasonableness of the officer's conduct under the circumstances.” Id.; see Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
Thus, when a plaintiff alleges use of excessive force during an arrest, the Fourth
Amendment governs and is the constitutional basis of suit.

See Miller, 606 F.3d at 252.

Plaintiff, however, does not claim a Fourth Amendment violation. Batchelor relies on a Fifth
Circuit opinion, Shillingford v. Holmes, 634 F.2d 263 (1981), for the proposition that the
Fourteenth Amendment may be the basis for an allegation of excessive force used during an
arrest. (D.E. 22 at 1-2.) In 1993, however, the Fifth Circuit abrogated that ruling, reasoning that
although the Fourth Amendment does not extend to excessive force utilized after the initial

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arrest, it does control “the initial act of restraining an individual’s liberty, such as an
investigatory stop or arrest.” Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1443-44 (5th Cir. 1993). As
the Fourth Amendment “provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against”
the alleged excessive force used against Plaintiff during the arrest, the Fourteenth Amendment is
not an appropriate basis for recovery. See Heike, 519 F. App’x at 923. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s
Fourteenth Amendment claim is DISMISSED.
E. Malicious Prosecution
In his response to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Batchelor for the first time raises a
malicious prosecution claim. (D.E. 22 at 2-3.) He has not sought leave from the Court to amend
his complaint to include this contention. See Hunter v. City of Copperhill, Tenn., No. 1:09-cv238, 2011 WL 5980292, at *7 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 29, 2011) (dismissing a new claim the plaintiff
brought for the first time in his response to the defendant’s motion to dismiss, or in the
alternative, for summary judgment). “[T]o survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must
contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all material elements to sustain a
recovery under some viable legal theory.” Terry, 604 F.3d at 275-76. Despite including an
allegation of malicious prosecution in his response, Plaintiff provides no basis for such a claim in
his complaint. As such, Batchelor’s malicious prosecution claim is DISMISSED.
F. Section 1983 Claims
Plaintiff also alleges that the City of Brownsville failed to properly train Byrd in the use
of force and that his actions were the result of the City’s official policies. (D.E. 1-1 at ¶¶ 3-4.)
The Supreme Court has ruled that “the inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for
§ 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of
persons with whom the police come into contract.” City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S.

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378, 388 (1989). “Proving deliberate indifference for failure to train typically requires proof that
the municipality was aware of prior unconstitutional actions by its employees and failed to take
corrective measures.” Amerson v. Waterford Twp., 562 F. App’x 484, 490 (6th Cir. 2014). In
Amerson, the plaintiff argued that the township defendant “failed to adequately train its police
officers as to the proper use of force to apply during an arrest.” Id. In support of his argument,
the plaintiff asserted the township’s “non-lethal force policy [had] not been renewed since
completion of field training; it [had] not offered training on when to intervene; and excessiveforce training [was] not part of new field training.” Id. at 491. The Sixth Circuit rejected the
plaintiff’s argument, finding that none of his allegations demonstrated the township “was
deliberately indifferent to whether its officers applied the proper amount of force in effectuating
arrests.” Id. In its reasoning, the court highlighted that the plaintiff failed to “present any
evidence of prior misconduct in the form of excessive force,” and that “it is not enough for [the
plaintiff] to show that his injury could have been avoided if the officer had more or better
training.” Id.
In the instant matter, Plaintiff concedes in his response to the motion to dismiss that “he
is weak on the training or lack of training aspects of his complaint.” (D.E. 22 at 3.) He further
states that “Byrd may or may not have been trained, but it appears more likely that he simply let
his temper get out of control and slid into a simple tort.” (Id.) It appears to the Court that
Batchelor is abandoning his failure-to-train claim by not defending it with facts or case law.
Even assuming arguendo that Plaintiff did not concede this allegation, the complaint contains
nothing more than labels and conclusions, lacking the needed “well-pleaded facts” to give rise to
a “plausible claim for relief.” See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. In his complaint, Batchelor claims that
“what Byrd did in effecting the arrest was the result of inadequate or failing to train Dallas Byrd

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in the use of force.” (D.E. 1-1 at ¶ 4.) This type of statement is “merely [a] legal conclusion,”
which this Court must disregard in ruling on a motion to dismiss. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Plaintiff has provided no specific facts that the City of Brownsville was “aware of prior
unconstitutional actions by its employees and failed to take corrective measures” and has not
presented any evidence of prior acts of excessive force by Byrd or any other officers. See
Amerson, 562 F. App’x at 491. Therefore, Batchelor has failed to allege a proper failure-to-train
claim against the City of Brownsville.
Plaintiff also alleges that the alleged unconstitutional behavior of Byrd was a result of the
City’s policies. The Supreme Court in Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of
New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), “established that municipalities are subject to liability under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of federally protected rights carried out in accordance with official
policy or custom.” Langston v. Charter Twp. of Redford, No. 14-1664, 2015 WL 4645851, at
*10 (6th Cir. Aug. 6, 2015). To establish municipal liability, a plaintiff must: “(1) identify a
municipal policy of custom; (2) connect that policy or custom to the municipality; and (3) show
that the execution of the policy or custom caused a constitutional injury.” Id.; see Garner v.
Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993).
In the instant matter, Defendants contend in their motion to dismiss that Plaintiff failed to
adequately plead “that Brownsville’s policies or customs caused the alleged violation.” (D.E.
18-1 at 5.) In his response, Batchelor does not refute Defendants’ assertion or provide any
argument as to why this claim should not be dismissed. As such, the Court finds that Plaintiff
has abandoned his claim that Brownsville’s policies caused the alleged constitutional violation.
See Morris, 2012 WL 3727149, at *2.
For these reasons, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are DISMISSED.

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G. GTLA and State Law Claims
Batchelor alleges both negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress against
Defendants. State law claims against governmental entities and their employees are governed by
the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”). See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-101.
These contentions would ordinarily confer supplemental jurisdiction in this Court because they
arise out of the same facts and form part of the same case or controversy. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(a). However, GTLA claims must be brought in “strict compliance” with the terms of the
state statute. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-201(c). The GTLA expressly states that Tennessee
“circuit courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction” over claims brought pursuant to its
provisions. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-307.
A district court may, in its discretion, decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law
claim even if jurisdiction would otherwise be proper under § 1367(a). Section 1367(c)(4) allows
a district court to “decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a)
if . . . (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining
jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4). The Sixth Circuit has held that “the Tennessee legislature
expressed a clear preference that [GTLA] claims be handled by its own state courts. This
unequivocal preference of the Tennessee legislature is an exceptional circumstance [under
§ 1367(c)(4)] for declining jurisdiction.” Gregory v. Shelby Cnty., Tenn., 220 F.3d 433, 446 (6th
Cir. 2000). Consequently, district courts in Tennessee have regularly declined to exercise its
supplemental jurisdiction over GTLA claims, and this Court finds no compelling reason to act
differently with regards to the instant case. See, e.g., Hullett v. DeKalb Cnty., Tenn., No. 2:110016, 2012 WL 398288, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 7, 2012); Cunningham v. Reid, 337 F. Supp. 2d
1064, 1069-70 (W.D. Tenn. 2004).

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As Plaintiff’s GTLA claims should be tried in state court, all of his state law claims
should be consolidated into one proceeding for the sake of judicial economy and convenience.
See Alexander v. Byrd, No. 14-1022, 2014 WL 5449626, at *10 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 24, 2014).
Therefore, this Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s GTLA and
state law claims. See Ables v. Shelby Cnty., Tenn., No. 2:10-CV-02169-JPM-dkv, 2010 WL
3024959, at *5 (W.D. Tenn. July 29, 2010) (state law claims dismissed in light of Sixth Circuit’s
finding that Tennessee legislature’s preference that GTLA claims be addressed in state courts
was an exceptional circumstance under § 1327(c)(4) supporting order declining jurisdiction).
Thus, the Court will not exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law
claims, and they are REMANDED back to state court.
IV.

Conclusion

For the reasons discussed herein, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the federal allegations is
GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s state law claims are REMANDED to the Circuit Court of Fayette
County, Tennessee. The Clerk is DIRECTED to prepare a Judgment incorporating this decision.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 25th day of November 2015.

s/ J. DANIEL BREEN
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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