Beecham v. Benton County Jail et al

Filing 11

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, CERTIFYING AN APPEAL WOULD NOT BE TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH AND NOTIFYING PLAINTIFF OF APPELLATE FILING FEE. Signed by Judge James D. Todd on 4/27/16. (Todd, James)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION
JOSHUA NORMAN BEECHAM,
Plaintiff,

VS.

BENTON COUNTY, ET AL.,
Defendants.

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No. 15-1127-JDT-egb

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT,
CERTIFYING AN APPEAL WOULD NOT BE TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH
AND NOTIFYING PLAINTIFF OF APPELLATE FILING FEE

On May 15, 2015, Plaintiff Joshua Norman Beecham (“Beecham”), who is
currently incarcerated at the Humphreys County Jail in Waverly, Tennessee, filed a pro
se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, accompanied by a motion to proceed in forma
pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1 & 2). In an order issued May 18, 2015, the Court granted leave to
proceed in forma pauperis and assessed the civil filing fee pursuant to the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b). (ECF No. 4.) The Clerk
shall record the Defendants as Benton County and the State of Tennessee.1

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Beecham’s claims against the Benton County Jail are construed as claims against
Benton County. In addition, the claims against the Tennessee Department of Correction
(“TDOC”) and the Tennessee Board of Parole (identified in the complaint and formerly known
as the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole) as claims against the State of Tennessee.

I. The Complaint
At the time the complaint was filed, Beecham was incarcerated at the Benton
County Jail (“Jail”). (ECF No. 1 at 2.) He alleges that while he was there, someone at
the Jail used “white-out” to change the sentence from “concurrent” to “consecutive” on
his judgment of conviction. (Id.) He further alleges that his time was “hindered” because
he was not turned over to the TDOC. (Id.) Although Beecham worked as a trustee at the
Jail, he was never given credits for it. (Id.) Beecham filed a petition for habeas corpus
in state court, through counsel, on November 14, 2014 (id.; see also ECF No. 1-1), and
Circuit Court Judge Creed McGinley issued an order on November 21, 2014, directing
that Beecham be released from the custody of the Benton County Sheriff (ECF No. 1 at
2; see ECF No. 1-2). Beecham states he was then placed back on parole. (ECF No. 1 at
2.)

Beecham subsequently was charged with a parole violation (id.), and Judge

McGinley issued an order on April 16, 2015, dismissing the parole violation warrant with
prejudice and terminating Beecham’s parole (id.; see also ECF No. 1-3). However, as of
the date the complaint in this case was filed, Beecham had not been released from the
Jail. (ECF No. 1 at 2; ECF No. 1-4.) Beecham seeks monetary compensation for the
time he lost while he was allegedly wrongfully imprisoned. (ECF No. 1 at 3.)
II. Analysis
The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint,
or any portion thereof, if the complaint—
(1)
is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted; or
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(2)
such relief.

seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may
be granted, the court applies the standards under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71
(6th Cir. 2010). “Accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, the
Court ‘consider[s] the factual allegations in [the] complaint to determine if they plausibly
suggest an entitlement to relief.’” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011)
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681) (alteration in original). “[P]leadings that . . . are no more
than conclusions . . . are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions
can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual
allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (“Rule
8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.
Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could
satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the claim, but
also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.”).
“A complaint can be frivolous either factually or legally. Any complaint that is
legally frivolous would ipso facto fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
Hill, 630 F.3d at 470 (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 328-29 (1989)).
Whether a complaint is factually frivolous under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and
1915(e)(2)(B)(i) is a separate issue from whether it fails to state a claim for
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relief. Statutes allowing a complaint to be dismissed as frivolous give
“judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the
complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual
contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S. Ct. 1827
(interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1915). Unlike a dismissal for failure to state a
claim, where a judge must accept all factual allegations as true, Iqbal, 129
S. Ct. at 1949-50, a judge does not have to accept “fantastic or delusional”
factual allegations as true in prisoner complaints that are reviewed for
frivolousness. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28, 109 S. Ct. 1827.
Id. at 471.
“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at
383 (quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants and
prisoners are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, No. 092259, 2011 WL 285251, at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se
complaint for failure to comply with “unique pleading requirements” and stating “a court
cannot ‘create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’”) (quoting
Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975)) (alteration in
original); Payne v. Sec’y of Treas., 73 F. App’x 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming sua
sponte dismissal of complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and stating, “[n]either
this court nor the district court is required to create Payne’s claim for her”); cf. Pliler v.
Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004) (“District judges have no obligation to act as counsel or
paralegal to pro se litigants.”); Young Bok Song v. Gipson, 423 F. App’x 506, 510 (6th
Cir. 2011) (“[W]e decline to affirmatively require courts to ferret out the strongest cause
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of action on behalf of pro se litigants. Not only would that duty be overly burdensome, it
would transform the courts from neutral arbiters of disputes into advocates for a
particular party. While courts are properly charged with protecting the rights of all who
come before it, that responsibility does not encompass advising litigants as to what legal
theories they should pursue.”).
Beecham filed his complaint on the court-supplied form for actions under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial
officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity,
injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was
violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this
section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of
Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a
deprivation of rights secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States (2)
committed by a defendant acting under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,
398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).
Although Beecham has sued the Benton County Jail, he has no valid claim against
Benton County. When a § 1983 claim is made against a municipality or county, the court
must analyze two distinct issues: (1) whether the plaintiff’s harm was caused by a
constitutional violation; and (2) if so, whether the municipality is responsible for that
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violation. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992). The second
issue is dispositive of Beecham’s claims against Benton County.
A local government “cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—
or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat
superior theory.” Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); see also
Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1994); Berry v. City of Detroit, 25
F.3d 1342, 1345 (6th Cir. 1994). A municipality cannot be held responsible for a
constitutional deprivation unless there is a direct causal link between a municipal policy
or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-92; Deaton
v. Montgomery Cnty., Ohio, 989 F.2d 885, 889 (6th Cir. 1993).

To demonstrate

municipal liability, a plaintiff “must (1) identify the municipal policy or custom, (2)
connect the policy to the municipality, and (3) show that his particular injury was
incurred due to execution of that policy.” Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir.
2003) (citing Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)). “Where
a government ‘custom has not received formal approval through the body’s official
decisionmaking channels,’ such a custom may still be the subject of a § 1983 suit.”
Alkire, 330 F.3d at 815 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91). The policy or custom
“must be ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation’ in order to establish the
liability of a government body under § 1983.” Searcy, 38 F.3d at 286 (quoting Polk Cnty.
v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981) (citation omitted)). “[T]he touchstone of ‘official
policy’ is designed ‘to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the
municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to action for
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which the municipality is actually responsible.’” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S.
112, 138 (1988) (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479-80 (1986)).
Although civil rights plaintiffs are not required to plead the facts demonstrating
municipal liability with particularity, see Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics
Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1993), the complaint must be
sufficient to put the municipality on notice of the plaintiff’s theory of liability, see, e.g.,
Fowler v. Campbell, No. 3:06CV-P610-H, 2007 WL 1035007, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 30,
2007); Oliver v. City of Memphis, No. 04-2074-B, 2004 WL 3316242, at *4 (W.D. Tenn.
Dec. 2, 2004); cf. Raub v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., No. 06-13942, 2008 WL 160611, at *2
(E.D. Mich. Jan. 15, 2008) (denying motion to dismiss where complaint contained
conclusory allegations of a custom or practice); Chidester v. City of Memphis, No. 022556 MA/A, 2006 WL 1421099, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. June 15, 2005). The allegations of
the complaint fail to identify an official policy or custom of Benton County which caused
injury to Beecham.
Beecham cannot sue the State of Tennessee under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The

Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he Judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State,
or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. The Eleventh
Amendment has been construed to prohibit citizens from suing their own states in federal
court. Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 472 (1987);
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984); Employees of
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Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Mo. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279,
280 (1973); see also Va. Office for Protection & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247,
253-54 (2011) (“A State may waive its sovereign immunity at its pleasure, and in some
circumstances Congress may abrogate it by appropriate legislation. But absent waiver or
valid abrogation, federal courts may not entertain a private person’s suit against a State.”
(citations omitted)). By its terms, the Eleventh Amendment bars all suits, regardless of
the relief sought. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 100-01. Tennessee has not waived its sovereign
immunity. Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-13-102(a). Moreover, a state is not a person within the
meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535
U.S. 613, 617 (2002); Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
On June 3, 2015, Beecham notified the Court that he had been transferred to the
Humphreys County Jail. (ECF No. 10.) The Court presumes his current incarceration is
unrelated to the prior confinement in Benton County. However, even if it is related, the
Court cannot order Beecham’s release.

When a prisoner seeks to challenge his

conviction and the validity and/or duration of his confinement, his sole remedy is a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973); see
also Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004) (per curiam) (“Challenges to the
validity of any confinement or to particulars affecting its duration are the province of
habeas corpus.”). The Court expressly declines to address the complaint as a habeas
petition because Beecham cannot demonstrate that he has exhausted his state remedies.
For all of the foregoing reasons, Beecham’s complaint is subject to dismissal in its
entirety for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.
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III. Standard for Leave to Amend
The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may allow a prisoner to amend his
complaint to avoid a sua sponte dismissal under the PLRA. LaFountain v. Harry, 716
F.3d 944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013); see also Brown v. R.I., No. 12-1403, 2013 WL 646489, at
*1 (1st Cir. Feb. 22, 2013) (per curiam) (“Ordinarily, before dismissal for failure to state
a claim is ordered, some form of notice and an opportunity to cure the deficiencies in the
complaint must be afforded.”). Leave to amend is not required where a deficiency cannot
be cured. Brown, 2013 WL 646489, at *1; Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. United States, 257 F.3d
31, 37 (1st Cir. 2001) (“This does not mean, of course, that every sua sponte dismissal
entered without prior notice to the plaintiff automatically must be reversed. If it is crystal
clear that the plaintiff cannot prevail and that amending the complaint would be futile,
then a sua sponte dismissal may stand.”); Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103,
114 (3d Cir. 2002) (“in forma pauperis plaintiffs who file complaints subject to dismissal
under Rule 12(b)(6) should receive leave to amend unless amendment would be
inequitable or futile”); Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We agree
with the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a meritless complaint that cannot be
salvaged by amendment comports with due process and does not infringe the right of
access to the courts.”). In this case, because the deficiencies in Beecham’s complaint
cannot be cured, leave to amend is not warranted.
IV. Conclusion
The Court DISMISSES Beecham’s complaint for failure to state a claim on which
relief can be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii) and 1915A(b)(1)9

(2). Leave to amend is DENIED because the deficiencies in Beecham’s complaint cannot
be cured.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(3), the Court must also consider whether an appeal
by Beecham in this case would be taken in good faith. The good faith standard is an
objective one. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). The test for whether
an appeal is taken in good faith is whether the litigant seeks appellate review of any issue
that is not frivolous. Id. It would be inconsistent for a district court to determine that a
complaint should be dismissed prior to service on the Defendants, but has sufficient merit
to support an appeal in forma pauperis. See Williams v. Kullman, 722 F.2d 1048, 1050
n.1 (2d Cir. 1983). The same considerations that lead the Court to dismiss this case for
failure to state a claim also compel the conclusion that an appeal would not be taken in
good faith. Therefore, it is CERTIFIED, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any
appeal in this matter by Beecham would not be taken in good faith.
The Court must also address the assessment of the $505 appellate filing fee if
Beecham nevertheless appeals the dismissal of this case. A certification that an appeal is
not taken in good faith does not affect an indigent prisoner plaintiff’s ability to take
advantage of the installment procedures contained in § 1915(b).

See McGore v.

Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 610-11 (6th Cir. 1997), partially overruled on other
grounds by LaFountain, 716 F.3d at 951. McGore sets out specific procedures for
implementing the PLRA, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)-(b). Therefore, Beecham is instructed that
if he wishes to take advantage of the installment procedures for paying the appellate
filing fee, he must comply with the procedures set out in McGore and § 1915(a)(2) by
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filing an updated in forma pauperis affidavit and a current, certified copy of his inmate
trust account for the six months immediately preceding the filing of the notice of appeal.
For analysis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) of future filings, if any, by Beecham, this
is the first dismissal of one of his cases as frivolous or for failure to state a claim. This
“strike” shall take effect when judgment is entered. Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct.
1759, 1763-64 (2015).
The Clerk is directed to prepare a judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ James D. Todd
JAMES D. TODD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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