Crafton v. Benton County Sheriff's Department et al

Filing 9

ORDER PARTIALLY DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND DIRECTING THAT PROCESS BE ISSUED AND SERVED ON THE REMAINING DEFENDANTS. Signed by Judge James D. Todd on 4/28/16. (Todd, James)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION
JOEL DENNIS CRAFTON,
Plaintiff,

VS.

BENTON COUNTY, ET AL.,
Defendants.

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No. 15-1131-JDT-egb

ORDER PARTIALLY DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND DIRECTING THAT PROCESS BE
ISSUED AND SERVED ON THE REMAINING DEFENDANTS

On May 27, 2015, Plaintiff Joel Dennis Crafton (“Crafton”), who is presently confined at
the Northwest Correctional Complex in Tiptonville, Tennessee, filed a pro se complaint pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1 & 2.) The
complaint concerns Crafton’s previous incarceration at the Benton County Jail (“Jail”) in
Camden, Tennessee. On May 29, 2015, the Court granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis
and assessed the civil filing fee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b). (ECF No. 4.) The Clerk
shall record the Defendants as Benton County;1 Jail Administrator Pat Chandler; Lt. Debbie
Beard; Sergeant (“Sgt.”) Joyce Douglas; Nurse Sheila Kennedy;2 and Correctional Officer
(“C.O.”) Mike Hill.

1

The Court construes the claims against the Benton County Sheriff’s Department as
claims against Benton County.
2

This Defendant’s last name is misspelled “Kenndy” in the complaint.

I. THE COMPLAINT
Crafton alleges that on August 4, 2014, he was taken to the Jail. Upon arrival, he
informed the jailers that he needed medical attention for pain in his side and lower stomach as a
result of having been kicked repeatedly. (Statement of Claim, ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 1, at 1.) Crafton
was denied medical attention at that time and told that he would see the Jail nurse in one to
fourteen days. (Id.) On August 5, 2014, Crafton was moved from a booking cell to a holding
cell by himself, at which time he asked to see the nurse and again was told that he would be seen
in one to fourteen days. (Id. ¶ 2.) On August 6, 2014, Crafton spoke with Defendant Nurse
Kennedy, who was passing out medication to other inmates, and told her he was in pain. (Id.
¶ 3.) Defendant Kennedy responded that she was busy and would see him within one to fourteen
days unless he was dying. (Id.) Defendant Kennedy said that Crafton could fill out a $20 co-pay
form to see a nurse practitioner, but he would still have to wait until that person came in;
however, Crafton never received the form. (Id.)
Crafton asked to speak with Defendant Chandler, but instead spoke with Defendant
Beard. (Id. ¶ 4.) Crafton told Defendant Beard that he needed to see a doctor, but again was told
that he would be seen in one to fourteen days. (Id.) When Crafton told Defendant Beard that he
had been denied a grievance form several times, she informed Crafton his case was not grievable
because he was not dying and that he would be seen within one to fourteen days. (Id., at 2.)
On August 7th or 8th, Crafton was brought out to see the nurse and nurse practitioner.
(Id. ¶ 5.) Crafton explained his situation and asked about medical treatment and x-rays, but he
was told it would need to be approved by Defendant Chandler and that approval was unlikely.
(Id.)

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Between August 9 and 10, 2014, Crafton was moved to an open pod with other inmates,
who needed to help him get out of bed because of the pain. (Id. ¶ 6.) On August 11, 2014,
Crafton spoke with Defendant Kennedy, telling her that he was unable to relieve himself. (Id.
¶ 7.) Defendant Kennedy told Crafton to fill out the co-pay form with the $20 payment in order
to be seen, but Crafton never received the form. (Id.) From August 12 through the 14, Crafton
repeatedly asked for medical attention and for the co-pay forms but was denied. (Id. ¶ 8.)
During those three days, Crafton was unable to relieve himself and was throwing up. (Id. ¶ 9, at
2-3.)
On August 14, 2014, Crafton got up begging for medical help. (Id. ¶ 10, at 3.) Crafton
was informed by Defendants Douglas and Hill and an unknown officer named Joe that he needed
to fill out a $20 co-pay form to see the nurse practitioner, but he would need to wait for her to
come to the jail on her scheduled day. (Id.) Crafton never received a form and also never
received a requested grievance form. (Id.)
All day on August 14th and into the evening, Crafton was in such severe pain, throwing
up and unable to relieve himself, that he could only lie on the floor by the toilet. (Id. ¶ 11.)
Inmate French called the jailers and Crafton’s family to try to get help. (Id.) Between 9:00 p.m.
and 9:30 p.m. that night, when jailers came to check on him, Crafton told jailers Kevlin and
Wess, who are not parties to this complaint, that he needed help, and Kevlin returned to
Crafton’s cell with a pill the nurse told him to give Crafton; however, Kevlin returned twenty
minutes later to find that Crafton was not feeling any better and was still throwing up. Kevlin
left again and returned with more pills the nurse told him to give Crafton. (Id. ¶ 12, at 3-4.)
Between 9:30 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. Kevlin returned with a $20 co-pay form for Crafton to
sign before they would help him and get him to the hospital. (Id. ¶ 13, at 4.) Between 10:30

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p.m. and 11:30 p.m. Crafton was taken to the hospital, where he was given pain medicine and a
CAT scan was performed. (Id. ¶ 14.) He was then taken by ambulance to the Jackson Madison
County General Hospital, where he underwent emergency surgery for twisted “small bowels”
and scar tissue. (Id.)
Crafton was hospitalized for five to seven days, during which he could not eat and lost
twenty to thirty pounds. (Id. ¶ 15.) When he was released from the hospital, he was returned to
the Jail with staples in his stomach and pain medications. (Id.) When he arrived back at the Jail,
Crafton was told that he needed to be in lockdown so he would not get assaulted by other
inmates for his pain medication. (Id. ¶ 16, at 4-5.) Crafton informed them he did not want to go
in lockdown because if anything happened he would not be able to get help. (Id. at 5.) He also
pointed out that medications were given outside the cells, so the other inmates would not know
what he was taking. (Id.) Crafton informed them he wanted to be in an open pod where he
would be able to get help; however, he was told that if he wanted to be in an open pod he would
have to sign a paper stating that he was refusing his medication. (Id.)
Crafton seeks compensation for his pain and suffering. (ECF No. 1 at 3.)
III. ANALYSIS
A.

Screening and Standard
The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint, or any

portion thereof, if the complaint—
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

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In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may be
granted, the court applies the standards under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as
stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). “Accepting
all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, the Court ‘consider[s] the factual allegations
in [the] complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.’” Williams v.
Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681) (alteration in
original). “[P]leadings that . . . are no more than conclusions . . . are not entitled to the
assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they
must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555 n.3 (“Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to
relief. Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could
satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the claim, but also
‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.”).
“A complaint can be frivolous either factually or legally. Any complaint that is legally
frivolous would ipso facto fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Hill, 630 F.3d
at 470 (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 328-29 (1989)).
Whether a complaint is factually frivolous under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and
1915(e)(2)(B)(i) is a separate issue from whether it fails to state a claim for relief.
Statutes allowing a complaint to be dismissed as frivolous give “judges not only
the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory,
but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations
and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke,
490 U.S. at 327, 109 S. Ct. 1827 (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1915). Unlike a
dismissal for failure to state a claim, where a judge must accept all factual
allegations as true, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50, a judge does not have to accept
“fantastic or delusional” factual allegations as true in prisoner complaints that are
reviewed for frivolousness. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28, 109 S. Ct. 1827.

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Id. at 471.
“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383
(quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants and prisoners
are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown,
891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, No. 09-2259, 2011 WL
285251, at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for failure to
comply with “unique pleading requirements” and stating “a court cannot ‘create a claim which [a
plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’”) (quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co.,
518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975)) (alteration in original); Payne v. Sec’y of Treas., 73 F.
App’x 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of complaint pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and stating, “[n]either this court nor the district court is required to create Payne’s
claim for her”); cf. Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004) (“District judges have no obligation
to act as counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants.”); Young Bok Song v. Gipson, 423 F. App’x 506,
510 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e decline to affirmatively require courts to ferret out the strongest cause
of action on behalf of pro se litigants. Not only would that duty be overly burdensome, it would
transform the courts from neutral arbiters of disputes into advocates for a particular party. While
courts are properly charged with protecting the rights of all who come before it, that
responsibility does not encompass advising litigants as to what legal theories they should
pursue.”).
B.

§ 1983 Claim
Crafton filed his complaint on the court-supplied form for actions under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Section 1983 provides:

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Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in
any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such
officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation
of rights secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States (2) committed by a
defendant acting under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150
(1970).
The complaint contains no factual allegations against Defendant Chandler. The only
references to Chandler are that Crafton asked to speak to Chandler about his situation but spoke
to Defendant Beard instead (ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 4, at 1) and that Defendant Kennedy did not think
Chandler would approve any medical testing or x-rays (id. ¶ 5, at 2). When a complaint fails to
allege any action by a defendant, it necessarily fails to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on
its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
Additionally, Defendant Chandler cannot be held liable as a supervisor. Under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, “[g]overnment officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their
subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; see also
Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984). Thus, “a plaintiff must plead that each
Government-official defendant, through the official’s own official actions, violated the
Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.

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There must be a showing that the supervisor encouraged the specific instance of
misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it. At a minimum, a
§ 1983 plaintiff must show that a supervisory official at least implicitly
authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of
the offending subordinates.
Bellamy, 729 F.2d at 421 (citation omitted).

A supervisory official who is aware of the

unconstitutional conduct of her subordinates, but fails to act, generally cannot be held liable in
his individual capacity. Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575-76 (6th Cir. 2008); Gregory v. City
of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 751 (6th Cir. 2006); Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir.
1999); Lillard v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 727-28 (6th Cir. 1996). Therefore,
Crafton cannot sue Defendant Chandler even if a subordinate violated his rights.
Crafton’s claims against the Sheriff’s Department are claims against Benton County.
When a § 1983 claim is made against a municipality or county, the court must analyze two
distinct issues: (1) whether the plaintiff’s harm was caused by a constitutional violation; and (2)
if so, whether the municipality is responsible for that violation. Collins v. City of Harker
Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992). The second issue is dispositive of Crafton’s claims
against Shelby County.
A local government “cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—or, in
other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.”
Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); see also Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38
F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1994); Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1345 (6th Cir. 1994). A
municipality cannot be held responsible for a constitutional deprivation unless there is a direct
causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation.
Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-92; Deaton v. Montgomery Cnty., Ohio, 989 F.2d 885, 889 (6th Cir.
1993). To demonstrate municipal liability, a plaintiff “must (1) identify the municipal policy or

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custom, (2) connect the policy to the municipality, and (3) show that his particular injury was
incurred due to execution of that policy.” Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir. 2003)
(citing Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)). “Where a government
‘custom has not received formal approval through the body’s official decisionmaking channels,’
such a custom may still be the subject of a § 1983 suit.” Alkire, 330 F.3d at 815 (quoting Monell,
436 U.S. at 690-91). The policy or custom “must be ‘the moving force of the constitutional
violation’ in order to establish the liability of a government body under § 1983.” Searcy, 38 F.3d
at 286 (quoting Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981) (citation omitted)). “[T]he
touchstone of ‘official policy’ is designed ‘to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of
employees of the municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to action
for which the municipality is actually responsible.’” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S.
112, 138 (1988) (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479-80 (1986)).
Although civil rights plaintiffs are not required to plead the facts demonstrating
municipal liability with particularity, see Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence &
Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1993), the complaint must be sufficient to put the
municipality on notice of the plaintiff’s theory of liability, see, e.g., Fowler v. Campbell, No.
3:06CV-P610-H, 2007 WL 1035007, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 30, 2007); Oliver v. City of Memphis,
No. 04-2074-B, 2004 WL 3316242, at *4 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 2, 2004); cf. Raub v. Corr. Med.
Servs., Inc., No. 06-13942, 2008 WL 160611, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 15, 2008) (denying motion
to dismiss where complaint contained conclusory allegations of a custom or practice); Chidester
v. City of Memphis, No. 02-2556 MA/A, 2006 WL 1421099, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. June 15, 2005).
The allegations of the complaint fail to identify an official policy or custom of Benton County
which caused injury to Crafton.

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Crafton alleges the Defendants refused to provide him with needed medical treatment. It
appears Crafton may have been a pretrial detainee while he was at the Jail; however, for both
pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners, the Sixth Circuit has analyzed claims for failure to
provide adequate medical care under the Eighth Amendment’s deliberate indifference standard,
even after the decision in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015).3 See Morabito v.
Holmes, 628 F. App’x 353, 356-58 (6th Cir. 2015) (applying the objective reasonableness
standard to pretrial detainee’s excessive force claims and deliberate indifference standard to
claim for denial of medical care).
An Eighth Amendment claim consists of both objective and subjective components.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992);
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991); Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d at 383; Mingus v.
Butler, 591 F.3d 474, 479-80 (6th Cir. 2010).

The objective component requires that the

deprivation be “sufficiently serious.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8; Wilson,
501 U.S. at 298. In the context of an Eighth Amendment claim based on a lack of medical care,
the objective component requires that a prisoner have a serious medical need. Blackmore v.
Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 895 (6th Cir. 2004); Brooks v. Celeste, 39 F.3d 125, 128 (6th
Cir. 1994). “[A] medical need is objectively serious if it is one that has been diagnosed by a
physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would readily
recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 897 (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Johnson v. Karnes, 398 F.3d 868, 874 (6th Cir. 2005). The complaint
sufficiently alleges that Crafton suffered from a serious medical condition.
3

In Kingsley, the Supreme Court held that excessive force claims brought by pretrial
detainees must be analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment’s standard of objective
reasonableness, rejecting a subjective standard that takes into account a defendant’s state of
mind. Id. at 2472-73.
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To establish the subjective component of an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner
must demonstrate that the official acted with the requisite intent, that is, that he had a
“sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; see also Wilson, 501 U.S. at 30203. The plaintiff must show that the prison officials acted with “deliberate indifference” to a
substantial risk that the prisoner would suffer serious harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Wilson,
501 U.S. at 303; Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 550 (6th Cir. 2009); Woods v.
Lecureux, 110 F.3d 1215,1222 (6th Cir. 1997); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814
(6th Cir. 1996); Taylor v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 69 F.3d 76, 79 (6th Cir. 1995). “[D]eliberate
indifference describes a state of mind more blameworthy than negligence.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at
835.

A prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment unless he

subjectively knows of an excessive risk of harm to an inmate’s health or safety and also
disregards that risk. Id. at 837. “[A]n official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he
should have perceived but did not” does not state a claim for deliberate indifference. Id. at 838.
For purposes of screening, Crafton has stated a plausible claim for denial of medical care
against Defendants Kennedy, Beard, Douglas and Hill.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court DISMISSES Crafton’s claims against Defendants Benton County and
Chandler for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). Process will be issued for Defendants Kennedy, Beard,
Douglas and Hill on Crafton’s claims for denial of medical care.
The Clerk is ORDERED to issue process for the remaining Defendants, Nurse Shelia
Kennedy, Lt. Debbie Beard, Sgt. Joyce Douglas and C.O. Mike Hill and deliver that process to
the U.S. Marshal for service. Service shall be made on Defendants Kennedy, Beard, Douglas

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and Hill pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) and Tennessee Rules of Civil
Procedure 4.04(1) and (10), either by mail or personally if mail service is not effective. All costs
of service shall by advanced by the United States.
It is further ORDERED that Crafton shall serve a copy of every subsequent document he
files in this cause on the attorneys for the Defendants or on any unrepresented Defendant.
Crafton shall make a certificate of service on every document filed. Crafton shall familiarize
himself with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court’s Local Rules.4
Crafton shall promptly notify the Clerk of any change of address or extended absence.
Failure to comply with these requirements or any other order of the Court may result in the
dismissal of this case without further notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ James D. Todd
JAMES D. TODD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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A copy of the Local Rules may be obtained from the Clerk. The Local Rules are also
available on the Court’s website at www.tnwd.courts.gov/pdf/content/LocalRules.pdf.
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