Shabazz v. Schofield et al

Filing 101

ORDER granting 69 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Samuel H. Mays, Jr on 1/7/2022.(Mays, Samuel)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
OMOWALE ASHANTI SHABAZZ,
a/k/a FRED DEAN
Plaintiff,
v.
DERRICK SCHOFIELD, et al.,
Defendants.

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No. 15-cv-1149

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This is a prisoner’s rights case.

Pro se Plaintiff

Omowale Ashanti Shabazz filed his complaint pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc, et seq.
At the time of filing, Shabazz was incarcerated at the
Northwest Correctional Complex (“NWCX”) in Tiptonville,
Tennessee.

The only remaining claim is against NWCX Chaplain

Terry (Mike) Lavender in his individual capacity.

Before the

Court is Defendant Lavender’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
(ECF No 69.)
I.

For the following reasons, the Motion is GRANTED.

Background
The following facts are undisputed.

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In 1995, Shabazz was incarcerated in the custody of the
Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC.”)
Shabazz’s name was Fred Dean.

At that time,

In 1997, he legally changed his

name to Omowale Ashanti Shabazz.

Shabazz is Muslim and follows

a diet consistent with his religious beliefs.

Lavender, as

prison Chaplain at NWCX, processed prisoner forms requesting
religious accommodations, including religious meals.

Lavender

concluded that TDOC Policy 506.13 required Shabazz to put his
legal name (Omowale Ashanti Shabazz) and committed name (Fred
Dean) on internal requests.

TDOC Policy 506.13 states:

In cases of a court ordered name change, verification
must be provided by the institutional records office
that the inmate has received a legal name change. The
inmate’s new legal name shall be considered an alias
and entered in the AKA field on the inmate
identification card and on Offender Aliases. All
correspondence generated by the TDOC Management
Information Systems (MIS) will continue to use the
committed name and TOMIS ID.
TDOC Policy 506.13(VI)(D)(4).

(ECF No. 1-5.)

Shabazz did not want to put his committed name, Fred Dean,
on his religious accommodation forms.

When he did not include

his committed name, the forms were not processed, and he did
not receive a religious meal.

When he put his committed name,

he received the requested meals.
On

May

11,

2017,

Shabazz

filed

suit

against

TDOC

Commissioner Tony Parker, Institutional Warden Michael Parris,
2

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NWCX Chaplain Kurt Gross, and Lavender in their official and
individual capacities. (ECF No. 36.)

He alleged that Defendants

had violated his First Amendment rights and RLUIPA.

In May 2020,

Shabazz notified the Court that he had been released from prison.
(ECF No. 95.)

On May 28, 2020, the Court dismissed all of

Shabazz’s claims except the § 1983 claim against Lavender.
No. 96.)
the

The Court asked for supplemental briefing on whether

doctrine

liability.
17, 2020.
II.

(ECF

of

(Id.)

qualified

immunity

shields

Lavender

from

Lavender filed his supplemental brief on June

(ECF No. 97.)

Shabazz has not supplemented his brief.

Standard of Review
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a court shall

grant a party’s motion for summary judgment “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Civ. P. 56(a).

Fed. R.

“The burden of demonstrating the absence of a

genuine dispute of material fact first rests with the moving
party.”

George v. Youngstown St. Univ., 966 F.3d 446, 458 (6th

Cir. 2020) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323
(1986)). The moving party can meet this burden by showing the
Court that the nonmoving party, having had sufficient opportunity
for discovery, has no evidence to support an essential element
of its case.

Id. (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23).

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When

confronted

with

a

properly-supported

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motion

for

summary judgment, the nonmoving party must set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine dispute for trial.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

See

“A genuine dispute exists when the

plaintiff presents significant probative evidence on which a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for her.”

EEOC v. Ford

Motor Co., 782 F.3d 753, 760 (6th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks
omitted).

The nonmoving party must do more than simply “show

that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”
Adcor Indus., Inc. v. Bevcorp, LLC, 252 F. App’x 55, 61 (6th
Cir. 2007) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)).

When evaluating a motion for

summary judgment, a court must view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the party opposing the motion.

George, 966

F.3d at 458 (citing Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (1986)).
A party may not oppose a properly supported summary judgment
motion by mere reliance on the pleadings.

See Beckett v. Ford,

384 F. App’x 435, 443 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex Corp., 477
U.S. at 324).

Instead, the nonmoving party must adduce concrete

evidence on which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in
its favor.
2000);

Stalbosky v. Belew, 205 F.3d 890, 895 (6th Cir.

see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).

The Court does not have

the duty to search the record for such evidence.

4

See Fed. R.

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Civ. P. 56(c)(3);

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InterRoyal Corp. v. Sponseller, 889 F.2d 108,

111 (6th Cir. 1989).
Although summary judgment must be used carefully, it “is an
integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed
to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action[,] rather than a disfavored procedural shortcut.”
FDIC v. Jeff Miller Stables, 573 F.3d 289, 294 (6th Cir. 2009)
(quotation marks and citations omitted).
III. Analysis
“[O]fficers are entitled to qualified immunity under §
1983 unless (1) they violated a federal statutory or
constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct
was clearly established at the time.” District of Columbia v.
Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018).

The Court may conduct the

two-party inquiry in either order.

Crawford v. Tilley, 15

F.4th 752, 760 (6th Cir. 2021) (citing Pearson v. Callahan 555
U.S. 223, 236 (2009)).

If one element is lacking, the Court

need not address the other.

Id.

“Although a defendant

ordinarily bears the burden of proof for an affirmative
defense, a plaintiff bears the burden of overcoming qualified
immunity.”

Id.

Shabazz has failed to assert a clearly established right.
“For a right to be ‘clearly established,’ the contours of the
right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official
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would understand that his or her conduct violates that right.”
Durham v. Nu’Man, 97 F.3d 862, 866 (6th Cir. 1996).

“The

unlawfulness of the official or employee’s conduct must be
apparent in light of pre-existing law.”

Id.

“A right is not

considered clearly established unless it has been
authoritatively decided by the United States Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, or the highest court of the state in which
the alleged constitutional violation occurred.”

Id.

“[T]hese

decisions must both point unmistakably to the
unconstitutionality of the conduct complained of and be so
clearly foreshadowed by applicable direct authority as to leave
no doubt in the mind of a reasonable officer that his conduct,
if challenged on constitutional grounds, would be found
wanting.”

Ohio Civ. Serv. Emp. Ass’n v. Seiter 858 F.2d 1171,

1177 (6th Cir. 1988).
Shabazz argues that he has a First Amendment right to use
only his legal name, and not his committed name, on internal
prison forms to receive religious accommodations.

He relies on

Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282 (6th Cir. 2010) and Alexander v.
Carrick, 31 F. App’x 176 (6th Cir. 2002).

Colvin and Alexander

were both § 1983 cases addressing prisoners’ rights to
religious dietary accommodations.

The cases acknowledge that

an inmate has a constitutional right not to eat food offensive
to his religious beliefs, Alexander, 31 F. App’x at 179, and
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that “prison administrators must provide an adequate diet
without violating the inmate's religious dietary restrictions.”
Colvin, 605 F.3d at 290 (quoting Alexander, 31 F. App’x at
179).

Colvin and Alexander follow a long line of Sixth Circuit

precedent that clearly establishes a prisoner’s constitutional
right to a diet consistent with the prisoner’s religious
beliefs.

See Alexander, 31 F. App’x at 179 (collecting cases).

A prisoner’s right to a religious diet is not the right
that Shabazz asserts.

NWCX offered religious meals to Shabazz.

He did not receive the meals because he did not comply with the
TDOC Policy requiring inmates to include both their committed
and legal names on internal religious request forms.

Shabazz

asserts that he has a First Amendment right to use only his
legal name on internal documents.
clearly establishes that right.
burden.
IV.

He cites no case law that
Shabazz has not satisfied his

Qualified immunity bars his claim.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED this 7th day of January, 2022.

/s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr.
SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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