Wilson v. Minter et al

Filing 10

ORDER DENYING 9 MOTION FOR RECUSAL AND DIRECTING UNITED STATES TO RESPOND TO ISSUE OF TIMELINESS. Signed by Judge James D. Todd on 10/29/15.(skc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION
JANALEE ANNETTE WILSON,
Movant,
VS.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

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Civ. No. 15-1156-JDT-egb
Crim. No. 00-10065-JDT

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECUSAL AND
DIRECTING UNITED STATES TO RESPOND TO ISSUE OF TIMELINESS

On October 13, 2015, the Court issued an order directing the Movant, Janalee Annette
Wilson, to show cause why her motion to vacate sentence, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255,
should not be dismissed as barred by the one-year statute of limitations. (ECF No. 7.) Movant filed
a response on October 28, 2015. (ECF No. 8.) Movant’s response to the show cause order was
accompanied by a motion for recusal of the undersigned Judge. (ECF No. 9.)
Movant’s only reason for requesting recusal is that the undersigned also presided in her
federal criminal proceeding. One of the issues raised in this § 2255 motion is that judicial
misconduct tainted the criminal trial; therefore, she argues that it would be a denial of due process
for the undersigned to preside in this case. However, the Court notes that Rule 4 of the Rules
Governing § 2255 Proceedings specifically provides that a § 2255 motion should be assigned, if
possible, “to the judge who conducted the trial and imposed sentence.”
Furthermore, even in the absence of Rule 4, recusal would not be necessary. Motions for
recusal are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 144 and 28 U.S.C. § 455. Section 144 provides:

Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and
sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal
bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall
proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such
proceeding.
In addition, § 455(a) provides that a judge shall be disqualified “in any proceeding in which his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Circumstances under which a judge must be
disqualified include:
(1)
(2)

(3)

(4)
(5)

Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings;
Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy,
or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served during such
association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer
has been a material witness concerning it;
Where he has served in governmental employment and in such capacity
participated as counsel, adviser, or material witness concerning the
proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular
case . . . ;
He knows that he . . . has a financial interest in the subject matter in
controversy;
He or his spouse . . . :
(i)
Is a party to the proceeding . . . ;
(ii)
Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected
by the outcome of the proceeding;
(iv)
Is to the judge’s knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding.

Id. § 455(b).
A judge must be recused if, knowing all of the circumstances, a reasonable, objective person
would question the judge’s impartiality. United States v. Sammons, 918 F.2d 592, 599 (6th Cir.
1990). “The standard is an objective one; hence, the judge need not recuse himself based on the
‘subjective view of a party’ no matter how strongly that view is held.” Id. (citation omitted). Bias
sufficient to justify recusal must be personal, arising out of the judge’s background, and not based
on the judge’s interpretation of the law. Browning v. Foltz, 837 F.2d 276, 279 (6th Cir. 1988). A
2

judge’s participation in the proceedings or prior contact with related cases cannot support a demand
for recusal. Sammons, 918 F.2d at 599. Sections 144 and 455 are to be read in pari materia to
require that disqualification be predicated upon extrajudicial conduct, rather than judicial conduct,
and to require that the alleged bias and prejudice be personal rather than judicial.1 Ullmo ex rel.
Ullmo v. Gilmour Acad., 273 F.3d 671, 681 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Story, 716 F.2d 1088,
1096 (6th Cir. 1983). A judge is presumed to be impartial, and a party seeking disqualification bears
the burden of alleging facts that would lead a reasonable person to question the neutrality of the
judge. United States v. Adams, 38 F.3d 1217, 1994 WL 589509 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Holt v. KMI
Continental, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 846, 847 (D. Conn.1993)).
Here, Movant’s motion for recusal is based solely on the undersigned’s participation in the
criminal proceedings, not on any extrajudicial conduct. She has submitted no affidavit setting forth
any facts that would call into question this Judge’s impartiality. Therefore, the motion for recusal
is DENIED.
In her response to the order to show cause, Movant seems to make an argument that she is
entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations due to her claims of actual innocence and a
fundamental miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, the United States is DIRECTED to file a response
to Movant’s arguments regarding the timeliness of her § 2255 motion within 21 days after the date
of this order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ James D. Todd
JAMES D. TODD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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The Supreme Court has held that § 455(b)’s “extrajudicial source” doctrine also applies
to § 455(a). Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 554-55 (1994).
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