McGill v. Hardeman County Correctional Facility

Filing 11

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND. Signed by Judge James D. Todd on 6/13/16. (Todd, James)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION
TIMOTHY MCGILL,

Plaintiff,
VS.
CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF
AMERICA,

Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. 15-1181-JDT-egb

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND

On July 22, 2015, Plaintiff Timothy McGill (“McGill”), who is presently incarcerated at
the Morgan County Correctional Complex (“MCCX”) in Wartburg, Tennessee, filed a pro se
complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 accompanied by a motion to proceed in forma pauperis.
(ECF Nos. 1 & 2.) The Court subsequently issued an order granting leave to proceed in forma
pauperis and assessing the civil filing fee pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b). (ECF No. 4.) The complaint concerns Plaintiff’s previous
incarcaration at the Hardeman County Correctional Facility (“HCCF”) in Whiteville, Tennessee.
Therefore, the Clerk shall record the Defendant as Corrections Corporation of America (“CCA”),
which operates the HCCF.1

1

The Court construes the allegations against the HCCF as an attempt to assert a claim
against CCA.

I. The Complaint
McGill alleges that the HCCF has violated his rights “due to medical neglect.” (ECF No.
1 at 4.) He alleges that his medical records show a “huge gap” in treatment for a known medical
problem and that he has been a diabetic since he was thirteen years old. (ECF No. 1-1 at 5.)2
McGill states that he has a witness he wants to subpoena. He alleges that HCCF failed to
provide treatment and medication for his known medical condition, interfered with and delayed
medical care, failed to provide qualified medical staff and made medical decisions based on nonmedical factors. McGill seeks $250,000 in compensation for the alleged medical neglect. (ECF
No. 1 at 5; ECF No. 1-1 at 8.)
II. Analysis
The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint, or any
portion thereof, if the complaint—
(1)
is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted; or
(2)

seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may be
granted, the court applies the standards under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as
stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). “Accepting

2

Plaintiff has attached to his form §1983 complaint a form “Petition for Common Law
Writ of Certiorari to Acency [sic] Decision,” which invokes jurisdiction under Tennessee Code
Annotated § 27-8-101. (ECF No. 1-1 at 3.) However, such a petition is not the proper method of
raising the claim asserted in this case. Furthermore, a petition for certiorari under Tennessee law
may be brought only in an appropriate Tennessee state court.
2

all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, the Court ‘consider[s] the factual allegations
in [the] complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.’” Williams v.
Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681) (alteration in
original). “[P]leadings that . . . are no more than conclusions . . . are not entitled to the
assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they
must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555 n.3 (“Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to
relief. Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could
satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the claim, but also
‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.”).
“A complaint can be frivolous either factually or legally. Any complaint that is legally
frivolous would ipso facto fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Hill, 630 F.3d
at 470 (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 328-29 (1989)).
Whether a complaint is factually frivolous under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and
1915(e)(2)(B)(i) is a separate issue from whether it fails to state a claim for relief.
Statutes allowing a complaint to be dismissed as frivolous give “judges not only
the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory,
but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations
and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke,
490 U.S. at 327, 109 S. Ct. 1827 (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1915). Unlike a
dismissal for failure to state a claim, where a judge must accept all factual
allegations as true, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50, a judge does not have to accept
“fantastic or delusional” factual allegations as true in prisoner complaints that are
reviewed for frivolousness. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28, 109 S. Ct. 1827.
Id. at 471.
“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383
(quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants and prisoners

3

are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown,
891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, No. 09-2259, 2011 WL
285251, at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for failure to
comply with “unique pleading requirements” and stating “a court cannot ‘create a claim which [a
plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’”) (quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co.,
518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975)) (alteration in original); Payne v. Sec’y of Treas., 73 F.
App’x 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of complaint pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and stating, “[n]either this court nor the district court is required to create Payne’s
claim for her”); cf. Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004) (“District judges have no obligation
to act as counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants.”); Young Bok Song v. Gipson, 423 F. App’x 506,
510 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e decline to affirmatively require courts to ferret out the strongest cause
of action on behalf of pro se litigants. Not only would that duty be overly burdensome, it would
transform the courts from neutral arbiters of disputes into advocates for a particular party. While
courts are properly charged with protecting the rights of all who come before it, that
responsibility does not encompass advising litigants as to what legal theories they should
pursue.”).
McGill filed his complaint on the court-supplied form for actions under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in
any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such
officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
4

District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation
of rights secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States (2) committed by a
defendant acting under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150
(1970).
As indicated, supra, note 1, McGill’s claim against HCCF is properly asserted against
CCA, which operates the facility. However, the complaint does not assert a valid claim against
CCA. “A private corporation that performs the traditional state function of operating a prison
acts under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.” Thomas v. Coble, 55 F. App’x 748, 748
(6th Cir. 2003) (citing Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996)); see also
Parsons v. Caruso, 491 F. App’x 597, 609 (6th Cir. 2012) (corporation that provides medical
care to prisoners can be sued under § 1983). The Sixth Circuit has applied the standards for
assessing municipal liability to claims against private corporations that operate prisons or
provide medical care to prisoners. Thomas, 55 F. App’x at 748-49; Street, 102 F.3d at 817-18;
Johnson v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 26 F. App’x 386, 388 (6th Cir. 2001). CCA “cannot be held
liable under a theory of respondeat superior.” Braswell v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 419 F. App’x 622,
627 (6th Cir. 2011). Instead, to prevail on a § 1983 claim against CCA, Plaintiff “must show that
a policy or well-settled custom of the company was the ‘moving force’ behind the alleged
deprivation” of his rights. Id. The complaint does not allege that McGill suffered any injury
because of an unconstitutional policy or custom of CCA.
McGill alleges the Defendant violated his rights due to medical negligence. To the extent
he is attempting to state a constitutional claim for lack of medical care, such a claim would arise
under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. See generally
5

Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991). An Eighth Amendment claim consists of both objective
and subjective components.

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Hudson v.

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). The objective
component requires that the deprivation be “sufficiently serious.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834;
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8; Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298. In the context of an Eighth Amendment claim
based on a lack of medical care, the objective component requires that a prisoner have a serious
medical need. Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 895 (6th Cir. 2004). “[A] medical
need is objectively serious if it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating
treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would readily recognize the necessity
for a doctor’s attention.” Id. at 897 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Johnson v.
Karnes, 398 F.3d 868, 874 (6th Cir. 2005).
To establish the subjective component of an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner
must demonstrate that prison officials acted with the requisite intent, that is, that they had a
“sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; see also Wilson, 501 U.S. at 30203. This requires a showing that the prison officials acted with “deliberate indifference” to a
substantial risk that the prisoner would suffer serious harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Wilson,
501 U.S. at 303. The prisoner must plead facts showing that “prison authorities have denied
reasonable requests for medical treatment in the face of an obvious need for such attention where
the inmate is thereby exposed to undue suffering or the threat of tangible residual injury.”
Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 (6th Cir. 1976). Such “deliberate indifference describes a
state of mind more blameworthy than negligence.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835.
In this case, McGill alleges only that he was the victim of medical negligence; he does
not contend that any prison official or employee acted with deliberate indifference to his serious

6

medical needs. He does not allege that he requested medical treatment from any particular
individual, that any particular individual denied treatment, or the specific circumstances of any
such denial. McGill also fails to set forth with any specificity his claims that HCCF failed to
provide qualified medical staff and made medical decisions based on non-medical factors. Thus,
he has failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim for denial of adequate medical care.
For the foregoing reasons, McGill’s complaint is subject to dismissal in its entirety for
failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.
III. Leave to Amend
The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may allow a prisoner to amend his
complaint to avoid a sua sponte dismissal under the PLRA. LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944,
951 (6th Cir. 2013); see also Brown v. R.I., No. 12-1403, 2013 WL 646489, at *1 (1st Cir. Feb.
22, 2013) (per curiam) (“Ordinarily, before dismissal for failure to state a claim is ordered, some
form of notice and an opportunity to cure the deficiencies in the complaint must be afforded.”).
Leave to amend is not required where a deficiency cannot be cured. Brown, 2013 WL 646489, at
*1; Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. United States, 257 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 2001) (“This does not mean, of
course, that every sua sponte dismissal entered without prior notice to the plaintiff automatically
must be reversed. If it is crystal clear that the plaintiff cannot prevail and that amending the
complaint would be futile, then a sua sponte dismissal may stand.”); Grayson v. Mayview State
Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002) (“in forma pauperis plaintiffs who file complaints
subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) should receive leave to amend unless amendment would
be inequitable or futile”); Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We agree with
the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged by
amendment comports with due process and does not infringe the right of access to the courts.”).

7

In this case, the Court cannot conclude that any amendment to McGill’s claims would be futile
as a matter of law.
IV. Conclusion
The Court DISMISSES McGill’s complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief
can be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). However, leave to
amend is GRANTED. Any amended complaint must be filed within thirty (30) days after the
date of this order. McGill is advised that an amended complaint will supersede the original
pleadings and and must be complete in itself without reference to those prior pleadings. The text
of the complaint must allege sufficient facts to support each claim without reference to any
extraneous document. Any exhibits must be identified by number in the text of the amended
complaint and must be attached to the complaint. All claims alleged in an amended complaint
must arise from the facts alleged in the original complaint. Each claim for relief must be stated
in a separate count and must identify each defendant sued in that count. If McGill fails to file an
amended complaint within the time specified, the Court will assess a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(g) and enter judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ James D. Todd
JAMES D. TODD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

8