Clifton v. Schofield, et al

Filing 39

ORDER DENYING POST-JUDGMENT MOTIONS 35 36 37 . Signed by Chief Judge J. Daniel Breen on 2/28/17. (Breen, J.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION
TERRY LEE CLIFTON,
Petitioner,
v.

No. 1:15-cv-01189-JDB-egb

DERRICK SCHOFIELD, et al.,
Respondents.
ORDER DENYING POST-JUDGMENT MOTIONS
Before the Court are the post-judgment motions of Petitioner, Terry Lee Clifton, for relief
from judgment (ECF No. 35) and for leave to file claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF Nos. 36
and 37.) For the reasons that follow, the motions are DENIED.
On July 18, 2014, Clifton filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 raising
constitutional challenges to his custody pursuant to a parole revocation. (ECF No. 1.) On March
10, 2016, the Court denied the petition as moot because Clifton was granted a new parole
revocation hearing in his companion case. (ECF No. 34) (citing Clifton v. Easterling, No. 11-cv1347, ECF No. 81.) The Court entered judgment in this case on March 11, 2016. (ECF No. 34.)
On April 18, 2016, Petitioner filed a motion to reconsider the order denying the petition.
(ECF No. 35.) Clifton requests that the case be reopened to allow him to add a claim that his
September 30, 2015, pre-parole rescission hearing violated his right to due process. Because
Petitioner filed his motion more than a month after entry of the order and judgment, and because
he does not actually argue for reconsideration of the order, but instead seeks relief from the
judgment so that he may pursue an additional claim, the Court construes Petitioner’s motion to
reconsider as a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Under Rule 60(b),
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“the court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for
the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud . . .,
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an
earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is
no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
Clifton’s desire to add a claim relating to a 2015 parole hearing is not a ground
warranting relief from judgment. Moreover, Clifton’s new claim is moot for the same reason
that his original claim is moot: in his companion case, the Court found that Clifton was entitled
to a new revocation hearing. The issue raised in Petitioner’s motion is moot for the additional
reason that the Tennessee Board of Parole subsequently granted Clifton release onto parole. (See
Clifton v. Easterling, No. 11-cv-1347, ECF No. 98.) A search of the Tennessee Felony Offender
website confirms that Clifton is currently on parole. For all of these reasons, Petitioner’s motion
is DENIED.
The motions for leave to file § 2254 claims are also DENIED. If Clifton still wishes to
pursue his § 2254 claims, he must do so by initiating a new case and paying the filing fee, or
seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 28th day of February, 2017.
s/ J. Daniel Breen________
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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