Robertson v. United States of America

Filing 10

ORDER DIRECTING UNITED STATES TO RESPOND TO PETITION AND ORDER DENYING RELIEF UNDER JOHNSON V UNITED STATES. Signed by Chief Judge J. Daniel Breen on 10/17/16. (Breen, J.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION
EDWARD LEE ROBERTSON,
Plaintiff,
v.

No.: 15 1229

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant.
______________________________________________________________________________
ORDER DIRECTING UNITED STATES TO RESPOND TO PETITION AND ORDER
DENYING RELIEF UNDER JOHNSON V UNITED STATES
______________________________________________________________________________
Before the Court is the pro se petition of Petitioner, Edward Lee Robertson, for habeas
corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (the “Petition”). The United States has been served and is
DIRECTED to file a response to the Petition within twenty-eight days of the entry of this order.
This case had been referred to the pro se unit for handling; however, before any action
was taken by the staff attorney, a text entry was entered by the Clerk’s office indicating that
Robertson had requested relief pursuant to Johnson v United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
(D.E. 4). In reviewing the Petition, the only reference to a “Johnson” case was to United States
v. Johnson, 430 F.3d 383 (6th Cir. 2005), which had no relationship to the United States
Supreme Court decision concerning the constitutionality of the residual clause under the Armed
Career Criminal Act.
Nonetheless, in order to resolve any such potential Johnson claim, the Court will review
the procedural history of his sentencing. Robertson was sentenced on February 5, 2015, on one
count of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). He was not

determined to be an armed career criminal under § 4B1.4 of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines (“U.S.S.G. _____”), and his guidelines were computed under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1. The
prior convictions used to determine his base offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2) were all
controlled substances offenses as defined under § 4B1.2(b) (see Application Note 1,
Commentary to § 2K2.1). The residual clause was not a factor in determining Robertson’s
sentence. Consequently, Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), provides no relief for
Petitioner.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 17th day of October 2016.

s/ J. DANIEL BREEN
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE