Vaughn v. Hickerson
Filing
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ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND. Signed by Judge James D. Todd on 8/4/16. (Todd, James)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION
CORDELL R. VAUGHN,
Plaintiff,
VS.
PERRY COUNTY SHERIFF”S OFFICE,
Defendant.
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No. 15-1241-JDT-egb
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND
On September 25, 2015, Plaintiff Cordell R. Vaughn (“Vaughn”), who is currently an
inmate at the Bledsoe County Correctional Complex in Pikeville, Tennessee, filed a pro se
complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 accompanied by a motion to proceed in forma pauperis
regarding allegations in Perry County, Tennessee. (ECF Nos. 1 & 2). In an order issued
September 25, 2015, the Court granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis and assessed the civil
filing fee pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b). (ECF No. 4)
The Clerk shall record the defendant as Perry County.1
I. The Complaint
Vaughn alleges that on February 17, 2014, Perry County Sheriff’s Deputy Robert
Dilingham seized property at Vaughn’s residence “unlawfully and without a warrant.” (Compl.
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Vaughn’s letter of January 28, 2016 (ECF No.5) makes it clear he is not suing the Perry
County Sheriff individually. Instead, he is suing the Perry County Sheriff’s Office as an entity,
and such claims are properly brought against Perry County.
at 1, ECF No. 1.) 2 Vaughn states that on July 23, 2014, charges for receiving stolen property
were dismissed. (Id.) Thereafter, Vaughn contacted former Perry County Sheriff Tommy
Hickerson by letter asking for return of the seized property; he included an itemized list of the
seized property, which he had been given by the Sheriff’s Office. (Id.) Sheriff Hickerson
responded by telling Vaughn that a large amount of the property seized from Vaughn’s residence
had been returned to its rightful owners. (Id.)
Vaughn alleges that while he was incarcerated at Perry County Jail at an unspecified time
he observed trustees using lawnmowers, weedeaters and a bar-b-que grill.
(Id.)
Vaughn
contends that he contacted Sheriff Hickerson a second time on May 14, 2015, informing him that
Vaughn was the rightful owner of fourteen of the items that were reportedly returned to their
rightful owners and that Hickerson should reply to the letter in a timely fashion or Vaughn would
take legal action. (Id.)
Vaughn further alleges that he sought relief through the Tennessee Claims
Administration Department but was told the claim did not fall within their jurisdiction because it
involved the Perry County Sheriff’s Department. Vaughn seeks punitive damages in the amount
of $2,149. (Id. at 2.)
II. Analysis
A.
Screening and Standard
The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint, or any
portion thereof, if the complaint—
2
In paragraph 1 of the complaint, Vaughn alleges the property was seized on February
17, 2005. However, in paragraph he states it was February 17, 2014. (ECF No. 1 at 1.) The
Court believes Vaughn intended both dates to read February 17, 2014.
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(1)
is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted; or
(2)
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may be
granted, the court applies standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as stated in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555-57 (2007). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). “Accepting all wellpleaded allegations in the complaint as true, the Court ‘consider[s] the factual allegations in [the]
complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.’” Williams v. Curtin,
631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681) (alteration in original).
“[P]leadings that . . . are no more than conclusions . . . are not entitled to the assumption of truth.
While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by
factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (“Rule
8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief. Without
some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the
requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on
which the claim rests.”).
“A complaint can be frivolous either factually or legally. Any complaint that is legally
frivolous would ipso facto fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Hill, 630 F.3d
at 470 (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 328-29 (1989)).
Whether a complaint is factually frivolous under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and
1915(e)(2)(B)(i) is a separate issue from whether it fails to state a claim for relief.
Statutes allowing a complaint to be dismissed as frivolous give “judges not only
the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory,
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but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations
and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke,
490 U.S. at 327, 109 S. Ct. 1827 (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1915). Unlike a
dismissal for failure to state a claim, where a judge must accept all factual
allegations as true, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50, a judge does not have to accept
“fantastic or delusional” factual allegations as true in prisoner complaints that are
reviewed for frivolousness. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28, 109 S. Ct. 1827.
Id. at 471.
“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383
(quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants and prisoners
are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown,
891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, No. 09-2259, 2011 WL
285251, at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for failure to
comply with “unique pleading requirements” and stating “a court cannot ‘create a claim which [a
plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’”) (quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co.,
518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975)) (alteration in original); Payne v. Sec’y of Treas., 73 F.
App’x 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of complaint pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and stating, “[n]either this court nor the district court is required to create Payne’s
claim for her”); cf. Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004) (“District judges have no obligation
to act as counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants.”); Young Bok Song v. Gipson, 423 F. App’x 506,
510 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e decline to affirmatively require courts to ferret out the strongest cause
of action on behalf of pro se litigants. Not only would that duty be overly burdensome, it would
transform the courts from neutral arbiters of disputes into advocates for a particular party. While
courts are properly charged with protecting the rights of all who come before it, that
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responsibility does not encompass advising litigants as to what legal theories they should
pursue.”).
B.
§ 1983 Claim
Vaughn filed his complaint pursuant to actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983
provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that
in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in
such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation
of rights secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States (2) committed by a
defendant acting under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150
(1970).
The Court construes claims against the Perry County Sheriff’s Office as claims against
Perry County. The complaint does not assert a valid claim against Perry County. When a § 1983
claim is made against a municipality, the court must analyze two distinct issues: (1) whether the
plaintiff’s harm was caused by a constitutional violation; and (2) if so, whether the municipality
is responsible for that violation. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120
(1992).
Even if it were assumed that the complaint alleged a violation of Vaughn’s
constitutional rights, the second issue would be dispositive of Vaughn’s claims against Perry
County.
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A local government “cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—or, in
other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.”
Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); see also Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38
F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1994); Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1345 (6th Cir. 1994). A
municipality cannot be held responsible for a constitutional deprivation unless there is a direct
causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation.
Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-92; Deaton v. Montgomery Cnty., Ohio, 989 F.2d 885, 889 (6th Cir.
1993). To demonstrate municipal liability, a plaintiff “must (1) identify the municipal policy or
custom, (2) connect the policy to the municipality, and (3) show that his particular injury was
incurred due to execution of that policy.” Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir. 2003)
(citing Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)). “Where a government
‘custom has not received formal approval through the body’s official decisionmaking channels,’
such a custom may still be the subject of a § 1983 suit.” Alkire, 330 F.3d at 815 (quoting Monell,
436 U.S. at 690-91). The policy or custom “must be ‘the moving force of the constitutional
violation’ in order to establish the liability of a government body under § 1983.” Searcy, 38 F.3d
at 286 (quoting Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981) (citation omitted)). “[T]he
touchstone of ‘official policy’ is designed ‘to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of
employees of the municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to action
for which the municipality is actually responsible.’” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S.
112, 138 (1988) (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479-80 (1986)).
Although civil rights plaintiffs are not required to plead the facts demonstrating
municipal liability with particularity, Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence &
Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1993), the complaint must be sufficient to put the
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municipality on notice of the plaintiff’s theory of liability, see, e.g., Fowler v. Campbell, Civil
Action No. 3:06CV-P610-H, 2007 WL 1035007, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 30, 2007); Yeackering v.
Ankrom, No. 4:05-CV-00018-M, 2005 WL 1877964, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 5, 2005); Oliver v.
City of Memphis, No. 04-2074-B, 2004 WL 3316242, at *4 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 2, 2004); cf. Raub
v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., No. 06-13942, 2008 WL 160611, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 15, 2008)
(denying motion to dismiss where complaint contained conclusory allegations of a custom or
practice); Cleary v. Cnty. of Macomb, No. 06-15505, 2007 WL 2669102, at *20 (E.D. Mich.
Sept. 6, 2007) (same); Morningstar v. City of Detroit, No. 06-11073, 2007 WL 2669156, at *8
(E.D. Mich. Sept. 6, 2007) (same); Chidester v. City of Memphis, No. 02-2556 MA/A, 2006 WL
1421099, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. June 15, 2005). The complaint does not allege that Vaughn suffered
any injury arising from an unconstitutional policy or custom of Perry County.
III.
LEAVE TO AMEND
The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may allow a prisoner to amend his
complaint to avoid a sua sponte dismissal under the PLRA. LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944,
951 (6th Cir. 2013); see also Brown v. R.I., No. 12-1403, 2013 WL 646489, at *1 (1st Cir. Feb.
22, 2013) (per curiam) (“Ordinarily, before dismissal for failure to state a claim is ordered, some
form of notice and an opportunity to cure the deficiencies in the complaint must be afforded.”).
Leave to amend is not required where a deficiency cannot be cured. Brown, 2013 WL 646489, at
*1; Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. United States, 257 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 2001) (“This does not mean, of
course, that every sua sponte dismissal entered without prior notice to the plaintiff automatically
must be reversed. If it is crystal clear that the plaintiff cannot prevail and that amending the
complaint would be futile, then a sua sponte dismissal may stand.”); Grayson v. Mayview State
Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002) (“in forma pauperis plaintiffs who file complaints
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subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) should receive leave to amend unless amendment would
be inequitable or futile”); Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We agree with
the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged by
amendment comports with due process and does not infringe the right of access to the courts.”).
IV.
CONCLUSION
The Court DISMISSES the complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief can be
granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). However, the court cannot
conclude that any amendment to Vaughn’s claims would be futile as a matter of law. Therefore,
Vaughn is GRANTED leave to amend his complaint. Any amendment must be filed within
thirty (30) days after the date of this order. Vaughn is advised that an amended complaint
supersedes the original complaint and must be complete in itself without reference to the prior
pleadings. The text of the complaint must allege sufficient facts to support each claim without
reference to any extraneous document. Any exhibits must be identified by number in the text of
the amended complaint and must be attached to the complaint. All claims alleged in an amended
complaint must arise from the facts alleged in the original complaint or the first amended
complaint. Each claim for relief must be stated in a separate count and must identify each
defendant sued in that count. If Vaughn fails to file an amended complaint within the time
specified, the Court will assess a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and enter judgment.
Vaughn shall promptly notify the Clerk, in writing, of any change of address or extended
absence. Failure to comply with these requirements, or any other order of the Court, may result
in the dismissal of this case without further notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ James D. Todd
JAMES D. TODD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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