Griffith et al v. Aleman et al
Filing
15
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO REMAND 8 . Signed by Chief Judge J. Daniel Breen on 5/17/16. (Breen, J.)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION
CYNTHIA GRIFFITH,
CARISSA GRIFFITH, and
NICHOLAS RIPLEY,
Plaintiffs,
v.
No. 15-1302
JUAN MANUEL ALEMAN and
CCS TRUCKING, INC.,
Defendants.
_____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO REMAND
_____________________________________________________________________________
I. INTRODUCTION AND FACTS ALLEGED
Plaintiff, Nicholas Ripley,1 initiated this action against the Defendants, CCS Trucking
(“CCS”)2 and its truck driver, Juan Manuel Aleman, on November 4, 2015, in the Madison County,
Tennessee, Circuit Court. (D.E. 1.) The case arises from an automobile accident in Jackson,
Tennessee, between Cynthia Griffith’s vehicle and an eighteen-wheel tractor-trailer driven by
Aleman and owned by CCS Trucking. (D.E. 1-1 at 1-2.) The complaint alleged that Aleman acted
negligently in his operation of the tractor-trailer. CCS’s liability is predicated on the allegation that
Aleman was performing its business and was “acting within the scope and course of his
employment,” with CCS’s “knowledge, permission, and consent.” (D.E. 1-1 at 5.) The complaint
stated that, as a result of one or more of negligent acts, Ripley suffered:
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The Motion to Remand states that Plaintiffs, Cynthia Griffith and Carissa Griffith, have
settled with both Defendants. (Docket Entry “D.E.” 8.) Plaintiffs affirm their intent to file for
dismissal of the Griffiths’ claims in the appropriate court upon the issuance of this order.
Accordingly, the Court will refer to Ripley as the sole remaining plaintiff.
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Of the two named defendants, thus far, only Aleman has been served.
a) severe and permanent injuries, caused, precipitated and/or aggravated by the wrong
complained of, including but not limited to injuries to his head, neck, back, and right
knee;
b) physical pain, both past and future;
c) significant medical expenses, both past and future;
d) mental and emotional anguish, both past and future;
e) fright and shock; and
f) impairment of the ability to enjoy normal pleasure of life.
(D.E. 1-1 at 6.) As a result of these losses, Plaintiff seeks “compensatory damages of an amount to
be determined by the jury that will fairly and justly compensate him . . . .” (Id.)
On December 11, 2015, Aleman removed the lawsuit to this Court, invoking diversity
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (D.E. 1.) According to the original complaint and
Defendant’s removal notice, Ripley is a citizen and resident of Tennessee, Aleman is a citizen and
resident of Texas, and CCS is a Texas corporation with its principle place of business there. (D.E. 1
at 2.) Thus, complete diversity exists between the parties.
Plaintiff moved to remand the case to state court on February 29, 2016, based on his intended
filing of an amended complaint in state court, in which he limits the damages sought to no more than
$74,000. Additionally, Plaintiff, through his attorney, stipulates that the value of his damages do not
exceed $74,000. (D.E. 8 at 3.)
III. JURISDICTION
Removal of cases from state to federal court is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), which
provides that
any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United
States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants,
to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the
place where such action is pending.
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A federal district court has original jurisdiction over any civil action “arising under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or “where the matter in controversy exceeds
the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different
States,” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). A defendant requesting removal pursuant to § 1441(a) on diversity
grounds “need include only a plausible allegation that the amount in controversy exceeds the
jurisdictional threshold” in the removal notice. Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens,
135 S. Ct. 547, 554 (2014). However, “[e]vidence establishing the amount is required by [28 U.S.C.]
§ 1446(c)(2)(B) only when the plaintiff contests, or the court questions, the defendant’s allegation.”
Id. The United States Supreme Court held in Owens that
[i]f the plaintiff contests the defendant’s allegation, § 1446(c)(2)(B) instructs:
“[R]emoval ... is proper on the basis of an amount in controversy asserted” by the
defendant “if the district court finds, by the preponderance of the evidence, that the
amount in controversy exceeds” the jurisdictional threshold. This provision, added to
§ 1446 as part of the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011
(JVCA), clarifies the procedure in order when a defendant’s assertion of the amount
in controversy is challenged. In such a case, both sides submit proof and the court
decides, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the amount-in-controversy
requirement has been satisfied.
Id. at 553-54. Since the amount in controversy has been contested by Plaintiff, the Court must
determine whether the threshold has been met.
A court should determine the amount in controversy of a case from the perspective of the
plaintiff, Smith v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 505 F.3d 401, 407 (6th Cir. 2007), at the
time of removal, Rogers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 230 F.3d 868, 872 (6th Cir. 2000). Where the
plaintiff’s complaint includes a specific monetary demand, that sum typically sets the amount in
controversy. Everett v. Verizon Wireless, Inc., 460 F.3d 818, 822 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Gafford v.
Gen. Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 156 (6th Cir. 1993), abrogated on other grounds by Hertz Corp. v.
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Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2010)). Thus, a claim for less than the jurisdictional threshold should generally
preclude removal. See Gafford, 997 F.2d at 157. However,
[s]tate counterparts to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(c) might enable a plaintiff to claim in [his]
complaint an amount lower than the federal amount in controversy but nevertheless
seek and recover damages exceeding the amount prayed for. Tennessee has one such
rule. Its Civil Procedure Rule 54.03 provides that, except in the case of default,
“every final judgment shall grant relief to which the party in whose favor it is
rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in the party’s
pleadings.” In such situations, the removing defendant must show that it is “more
likely than not” that the plaintiff’s claims meet the amount in controversy
requirement.
Rogers, 230 F.3d at 871 (quoting Gafford, 997 F.2d at 158).
Jurisdictional questions can also arise in cases such as this one, where the plaintiff does not
originally state a specific amount of damages in the complaint. See Everett, 460 F.3d at 822.
“Failure to adequately plead the amount in controversy requirement may be cured by the presence of
clear allegations . . . that the case involved a sum well in excess of the $75,000 minimum.” Hayes,
266 F.3d at 573 (quoting Cook v. Winfrey, 141 F.3d 322, 326 (7th Cir. 1998)). In such a case,
“where plaintiffs seek to recover some unspecified amount that is not self-evidently greater or less
than the federal amount-in-controversy requirement, the defendant satisfies its burden when it proves
that the amount in controversy ‘more likely than not’ exceeds $75,000.” Everett, 460 F.3d at 822.
IV. ANALYSIS
To meet his burden under § 1446 to show that the amount in controversy threshold has
been met and that removal was proper, Defendant relies on the following allegations: 1) the
claims and relief sought in Ripley’s complaint are sufficient to meet the jurisdictional threshold;
2) Plaintiff’s own valuation of the case, as expressed in the demand letter to CCS’s insurance
carrier, was for $150,000 (D.E. 9-1); and 3) the post-removal stipulation and amendment are
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insufficient to divest this Court of jurisdiction. (D.E. 9.) Ripley argues that the stipulation
limiting compensatory damages to $74,000 serves to deprive this Court of diversity jurisdiction
and is evidence of his valuation of the case. (D.E. 8 & 9-1.) He further maintains that, because
Plaintiff’s letter was addressed to CCS’s insurance carrier and not to Aleman, the letter is not
conclusive in determining the amount in controversy in the claim against the individual
Defendant. (D.E. 10-1.)
Plaintiff has included specific economic damage—thus far, totaling $23,500 in medical
bills—as well as unspecified damages for past and future expenses, injuries, and mental and
emotional damage. (D.E. 1-1 at 7.) His original complaint requested “compensatory damages of
an amount to be determined by the jury . . . . ” (Id. at 7.) Given the serious nature of the injuries
and the alleged damages, it appears to the Court that the amount in controversy more likely than
not exceeded $75,000 at the time of removal. See Everett, 460 F.3d at 822; Gantzer v. Langley,
No. 2:09-CV-295, 2009 WL 1604799, at *3 (S.D. Ohio June 2, 2009) report and recommendation
adopted, No. CIV.A.2:09-CV-00295, 2009 WL 1921069 (S.D. Ohio July 1, 2009) (holding by a
preponderance of the evidence that where plaintiff incurred $27,500 in medical bills from a
tractor-trailer accident, the total of the past and future damages alleged exceeded $75,000);
Partlow v. Jones Motor Co., Inc., 736 F. Supp. 744, 745 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (making an
independent evaluation of the amount in controversy based on the injuries alleged in an
automobile accident case).
Aside from the Court’s independent determination of the likely amount in controversy, it
would appear that Ripley’s own valuation of his case exceeds the jurisdictional threshold. See
Smith, 505 F.3d at 407 (holding that the amount in controversy is determined from the
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perspective of the plaintiff). Two days before Defendant filed for removal, Plaintiff’ s counsel
submitted a letter to CCS’s insurance carrier demanding $150,000.
Rogers, 230 F.3d at 872
(holding that the amount in controversy is determined at the time of removal). Although the
demand letter is not competent evidence “to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a
disputed claim,” Fed. R. Evid. 408(a), a court may consider it for “another purpose,” Fed. R.
Evid. 408(b), such as inquiring into the whether the jurisdictional threshold of the amount in
controversy has been met, see Rising-Moore v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., 435 F.3d 813, 816 (7th Cir.
2006); Cohn v. Petsmart, Inc., 281 F.3d 837, 840 (9th Cir. 2002).
Ripley insists that because the demand letter was made to the insurance carrier for CCS
and not Aleman, it cannot be used to establish the amount in controversy in this case. Plaintiff,
attempting to draw parallels to Billingsley v. McGriff Transp., Inc., No. 05-4397-CV-C-NKL,
2006 WL 51188 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 10, 2006) (finding that demand letter sent to unrelated third
party did not establish amount in controversy), casts CCS in the role of a third party—unrelated
to Aleman. However, Defendant avers that the letter is relevant because 1) it discussed the
liability of both CCS and Aleman, and 2) as Aleman’s employer, CCS’s responsibility is
predicated solely on the theory of vicarious liability for Aleman’s torts. (D.E. 12-1 at 3.) There
are no independent claims against CCS. In the letter, Ripley’s attorneys state that they “have
factored in the clear liability on the part of Juan Aleman and CCS Trucking, Inc.” in order to
reach the “reasonable settlement value of $150,000.” (D.E. 9-1 at 2.) This correspondence and
the complaint, taken together, make it clear that the claims against CCS and Aleman were one
and the same. It is only after removal that Plaintiff has attempted, although unsuccessfully, to
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distinguish between the two parties. Accordingly, the letter is competent evidence to establish
the amount in controversy against Aleman.
Ripley next argues that even if this Court properly had subject matter jurisdiction at the
time of removal, the post-removal stipulation serves to divest the Court of jurisdiction. This is
not the case. Plaintiff cites Tankersley v. Martinrea Heavy Stampings, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 3d 775
(E.D. Ky. 2014), for the proposition that “[w]hen a post-removal stipulation is the first specific
statement of the alleged damages then it is considered a clarification, rather than a reduction, and
the case may be remanded.” Contrary to the facts in Tankersley, the demand letter, not the
damages stipulation, served as Ripley’s first expression of the amount of damages sought. Thus,
the case is not persuasive. Furthermore, to remand the case on the basis of the post-removal
stipulation would run counter to the policy expressed by the Sixth Circuit in discouraging forum
shopping:
Because jurisdiction is determined as of the time of removal, events occurring
after removal that reduce the amount in controversy do not oust jurisdiction.
Therefore, consistent with [United States Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit
precedent], we hold that a post-removal stipulation reducing the amount in
controversy to below the jurisdictional limit does not require remand to state
court. This rule is grounded not only in precedent, but also in sound policy. If
plaintiffs were able to defeat jurisdiction by way of a post-removal stipulation,
they could unfairly manipulate proceedings merely because their federal case
begins to look unfavorable. Moreover, the interests of simplicity and uniformity
dictate that post-removal stipulations be treated just like any other post-removal
event.
Rogers, 230 F.3d at 872 (referencing St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303
U.S. 283 (1938)).
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IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Court finds that removal was proper at the time it occurred,
and that Plaintiff’s attempts to remand are without merit. Thus, Plaintiff’s motion to remand is
DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 17th day of May 2016.
s/ J. DANIEL BREEN
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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