Maze v. Colvin

Filing 18

ORDER Affirming the Commissioner's Decision. Signed by Magistrate Judge Tu M. Pham on 7/27/2018. (Pham, Tu)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION

SABRINA MAZE,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN COLVIN, ACTING
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant.

16-cv-1138-TMP

ORDER AFFIRMING THE COMMISSIONER’S DECISION

Before the court is plaintiff Sabrina Maze’s appeal from a
final

decision

by

the

Commissioner

of

Social

Security1

(“Commissioner”) denying her application for disability insurance
benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (“Act”), 42
U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq.

On September 26, 2016, the parties consented

to the jurisdiction of the United States magistrate judge pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

(ECF No. 13.)

This case was subsequently

reassigned to the undersigned on March 13, 2017.

For the reasons

set forth below, the decision of the Commissioner is affirmed.
I.

1Carolyn

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

W. Colvin was the Acting Commissioner of Social Security
at the time this case was filed.

Maze’s disability application record spans thirty years and
shows that at various times she has applied for supplemental
security income, childhood disability benefits, and disability
insurance benefits.

(R. at 27–37, 929–38, 947–60.)

missing several documents.

The record is

Some of these omissions, such as the

absence of a childhood disability benefits reconsideration form,
are acknowledged by the record, (R. at 959), while others, such as
the

absence

discussed

of

either

the
in

original
the

Title

record

or

II

applications,

the

parties’

are

briefs.

not
In

addition, several of the Social Security forms contain obvious
impossibilities — such as the initial disability determination
forms stating Maze applied for disability on May 31, 1983, and
alleged the disability began on January 31, 2003.
32, 34.)

(R. at 27, 29,

Despite these technical defects in the record, Maze’s

Title II claim for disability insurance benefits appears to have
followed the requisite procedural steps.

The Social Security

Administration (“SSA”) denied her application initially and upon
reconsideration.

(R. at 27–34, 45.)

At Maze’s request, a hearing

was held before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on September
15, 2014.

(R. at 961–76.)

During this hearing, Maze amended her

alleged disability onset date to December 1, 2010.

(R. at 965.)

On October 31, 2014, the ALJ issued a decision denying Maze’s
request for benefits after finding that Maze was not under a
disability because she retained the residual functional capacity

-2-

(“RFC”) to perform work existing in significant numbers in the
national economy. (R. at 13–26.) The SSA’s Appeals Council denied
Maze’s request for review.

(R. at 8.)

Therefore, the ALJ’s

decision became the final decision of the Commissioner.

(Id.)

Subsequently, on June 6, 2016, Maze filed the instant action. (ECF
No. 1.)

Maze argues that the ALJ erred by (1) improperly weighing

the medical source opinions in the record, (2) improperly finding
that she did not need to use a cane, (3) improperly evaluating the
scope and effects of her mental limitations, and (4) improperly
applying the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
Subpart P, App'x 2 (“grids”).
II.
A.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Standard of Review
Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a claimant may obtain judicial

review of any final decision made by the Commissioner after a
hearing to which she or he was a party.

“The court shall have

power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record,
a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the
cause for a rehearing.”
the

Commissioner’s

42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

decision

is

limited

to

Judicial review of
whether

there

is

substantial evidence to support the decision and whether the
Commissioner used the proper legal criteria in making the decision.
Id.; Burton v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 16-4190, 2017 WL 2781570,

-3-

at *2 (6th Cir. June 27, 2017); Cole v. Astrue, 661 F.3d 931, 937
(6th Cir. 2011); Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241
(6th Cir. 2007).

Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of

evidence but less than a preponderance and is “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.”

Kirk v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 667 F.2d

524, 535 (6th Cir. 1981) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.
389, 401 (1971)).
In

determining

whether

substantial

evidence

exists,

the

reviewing court must examine the evidence in the record as a whole
and “must ‘take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts
from its weight.’”

Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 923 (6th

Cir. 1990) (quoting Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 388 (6th Cir.
1984)).

If

Commissioner’s

substantial
decision,

evidence
however,

is
the

found
court

to

support

must

affirm

the
that

decision and “may not even inquire whether the record could support
a decision the other way.”

Barker v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 789, 794

(6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Smith v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,
893 F.2d 106, 108 (6th Cir. 1989)).

Similarly, the court may “not

try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in the evidence or decide
questions of credibility.”

Ulman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 693 F.3d

709, 713 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506,
509 (6th Cir. 2007)).

The Commissioner, not the court, is charged

with the duty to weigh the evidence and to resolve material

-4-

conflicts in the testimony.

Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127

F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997); Crum v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 642, 644
(6th

Cir.

1990);

Prater

v.

Comm'r

of

Soc.

Sec.,

No.

114CV01221STATMP, 2017 WL 2929479, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. July 10,
2017).
B.

The Five-Step Analysis
The Act defines disability as the “inability to engage in any

substantial

gainful

activity

by

reason

of

any

medically

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected
to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last
for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.”
423(d)(1).

42 U.S.C. §

Additionally, section 423(d)(2) of the Act states,

An individual shall be determined to be under a
disability only if his physical or mental impairment or
impairments are of such severity that he is not only
unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering
his age, education, and work experience, engage in any
other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in
the national economy, regardless of whether such work
exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or
whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether
he would be hired if he applied for work. For purposes
of the preceding sentence (with respect to any
individual), “work which exists in the national economy”
means work which exists in significant numbers either in
the region where such individual lives or in several
regions of the country.
Under

the

Act,

the

claimant

bears

establishing an entitlement to benefits.

the

ultimate

burden

of

Oliver v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., 415 F. App’x 681, 682 (6th Cir. 2011).

The initial burden

is on the claimants to prove they have a disability as defined by

-5-

the Act.

Siebert v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 105 F. App’x 744, 746

(6th Cir. 2004) (citing Walters, 127 F.3d at 529); see also Born
v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 923 F.2d 1168, 1173 (6th Cir.
1990).

If the claimant is able to do so, the burden then shifts

to the Commissioner to demonstrate the existence of available
employment
background.

compatible

with

the

claimant’s

disability

and

Born, 923 F.2d at 1173; see also Griffith v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., 582 F. App’x 555, 559 (6th Cir. 2014).
Entitlement to social security benefits is determined by a
five-step sequential analysis set forth in the Social Security
Regulations.

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.

First, the claimant must

not be engaged in substantial gainful activity.
404.1520(b).

See 20 C.F.R. §

Second, a finding must be made that the claimant

suffers from a severe impairment.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii).

In the third step, the ALJ determines whether the impairment meets
or equals the severity criteria set forth in the Listing of
Impairments contained in the Social Security Regulations.
C.F.R. § 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526.

See 20

If the impairment

satisfies the criteria for a listed impairment, the claimant is
considered to be disabled.

On the other hand, if the claimant’s

impairment does not meet or equal a listed impairment, the ALJ
must undertake the fourth step in the analysis and determine
whether the claimant has the RFC to return to any past relevant
work.

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), (e).

-6-

If the ALJ

determines that the claimant can return to past relevant work,
then a finding of not disabled must be entered.

Id.

But if the

ALJ finds the claimant unable to perform past relevant work, then
at the fifth step the ALJ must determine whether the claimant can
perform other work existing in significant numbers in the national
economy.

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v), (g).

Further review

is not necessary if it is determined that an individual is not
disabled at any point in this sequential analysis.

20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(a)(4).
C.

Weight Given to Medical Source Opinions
Maze argues that the ALJ gave too much weight to the joint

opinion of medical examiners Paula Miller, Ph.D., and William
Fulliton, Ph.D., and to the opinion of medical consultant Edward
Sachs, Ph.D.
10, 2013.

Dr. Miller and Dr. Fulliton examined Maze on April
(R. at 345–49.)

They noted that she had adequate

hygiene, appropriate eye contact, and an unimpaired gait.
345.)

(R. at

During the interview, Maze told them she graduated high

school in 1992 and received special education while in school.
(R. at 346.)

She also stated that she worked from 2000 to 2010 at

an appliance factory but left work after the factory closed and
had not worked since.
condition,

Maze

(Id.)

informed

With respect to her psychological

them

that

she

had

been

previously

hospitalized for psychiatric reasons and had also attempted to
receive outpatient mental health treatment in 2012 but was unable

-7-

to receive such treatment for financial reasons. (R. at 346, 348.)
She

reported

that

she

has

experienced

hallucinations ever since she was a child.

auditory

and

visual

(R. at 347.)

Due to

her description of the hallucinations, Dr. Miller and Dr. Fulliton
noted that they appeared to be dreams and not psychotic symptoms.
(R. at 347.)

Maze attributed her depression and anxiety to her

hallucinations and to several other traumatic life experiences.
(Id.)

She stated that she was taking Citalopram for depression

and Ativan to help her sleep.

(R. at 346.)

Regarding her activity

level, Maze indicated that she can grocery shop on her own using
a mobile shopping cart, can perform household chores with her son’s
help, and has one friend who visits her occasionally.

(R. at 347.)

She also stated that her mental condition makes it challenging for
her to sleep and that she does not socialize with family.

(Id.)

During the mental status examination, Dr. Miller and Dr.
Fulliton observed that Maze was alert and oriented.

(R. at 347.)

She had no articulation problems and communicated with clear
thought processes.
memory

by

correctly

(Id.)

She demonstrated adequate long-term

recalling

personal

information

difficulty analyzing complex verbal abstractions.
Dr.

Miller

and

Dr.

Fulliton

concluded

that

but

had

(R. at 348.)

Maze

has

mild

impairments affecting her abilities to interact with others and
understand

work-related

instructions,

moderate

impairments

affecting her abilities to sustain concentration and persistence,

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and no impairment affecting her ability to adapt to changes in a
work environment.

(Id.)

They assigned her a Global Assessment of

Functioning (“GAF”) score of 60.

(Id.)

Dr. Sachs reviewed Maze’s medical records and provided an
opinion regarding her mental health condition on April 30, 2013.
(R. at 347–432.)

Most of this opinion consists of checked boxes

and addresses time periods prior to the revised alleged disability
onset date.

(Id.)

However, for the relevant time period, Dr.

Sachs provided a written evaluation in which he described Maze’s
psychological history, including her self-reported psychological
condition, a psychological evaluation completed by her high school
when she was 18, and the opinion of Dr. Miller and Dr. Fulliton.
(R.

at

414.)

Dr.

Sachs

noted

that

Maze

did

not

receive

psychological treatment or take medication for her psychological
conditions.

(Id.)

Dr. Sachs concluded that Maze suffers from

depression and anxiety of mild to moderate severity but has no
marked

limitations

resulting

from

her

preclude basic work-related functions.

condition
(Id.)

that

might

Dr. Sachs also

indicated that Maze has moderately limited abilities to understand
and

remember

detailed

instructions,

carry

out

detailed

instructions, maintain attention and concentration for extended
periods of time, and respond appropriately to changes in the work
setting.

(R. at 416–17.)

-9-

After
health

these

treatment

opinions
from

professional counselor

were

a

written,

nurse

Maze

received

practitioner

and

a

licensed

at Pathways Behavioral Health Services

(“Pathways”) from September 3, 2013, to July 23, 2014.
437–51, 740–817.)

health

(R. at

Maze attended a total of seven sessions that

lasted an average of an hour.
mental

mental

care

(Id.)

providers

At these sessions, Maze’s

consistently

demonstrated signs of depression and anxiety.

noted

that

she

(R. at 437, 450–

51, 768, 780, 788–89, 791, 793, 796, 798–99, 802, 805.)

They

repeatedly assigned her a GAF score of 48 and provided her with a
Loxapine prescription to help with her hallucinations.
448, 740, 748–49, 760, 772–73, 783, 785, 813, 815.)

(R. at

However, they

also noted that she was always alert and oriented.

(R. at 744,

755, 767, 779.)

Her concentration and impulse control were nearly

always intact.

(R. at 744, 755, 767, 779, 808.)

And, while her

speech was at times childish or hesitant, she was able to actively
engage in the sessions and communicate clearly.

(R. at 445–46,

744, 756, 768, 779, 793, 799, 804.)
The ALJ gave great weight to the opinions of Dr. Miller, Dr.
Fulliton, and Dr. Sachs.

(R. at 24.)

He explained that these

opinions were consistent with the case records and supported by
clinical findings.

(Id.)

He also noted that the new evidence

received into the record after Dr. Sachs formed his opinion did
not

provide

any

new

or

material

-10-

information

that

would

significantly alter the opinion.

(Id.)

In addition, the ALJ

considered the treatment notes from Pathways and pointed out that
the every-three-months or as-needed approach to the appointment
scheduling suggested that the Pathway care providers did not
consider Maze’s mental health condition to be severe.

(R. at 22.)

An ALJ employs a “sliding scale of deference” for medical
opinions depending upon each opinion’s source.

Norris v. Comm'r

of Soc. Sec., 461 F. App'x 433, 439 (6th Cir. 2012).

Opinions

from treating sources typically merit the most deference, followed
by opinions from examining sources, and then from non-examining
sources.

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1)–(2).

When weighing

medical source opinions, the ALJ must consider various factors,
including the length and nature of the relationship, the frequency
of exams, the evidence upon which the medical source bases her or
his opinion, the opinion’s consistency with the record as a whole,
whether the source has specialized in her or his area of practice,
and any other relevant factor.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)–(6).

Maze argues that Dr. Miller’s, Dr. Fulliton’s, and Dr. Sachs’s
opinions cannot support the ALJ’s decision because they were formed
before Maze received mental health treatment at Pathways.

She

also argues that Dr. Miller and Dr. Fulliton’s opinion cannot
provide support because it was formed without them having access
to Maze’s complete medical records. The court finds that the ALJ’s
analysis complied with necessary procedural requirements.

-11-

He

evaluated both opinions by applying all of the relevant statutory
factors.

He also considered the effect the Pathway notes might

have on Dr. Sachs’s opinion and determined it would not have
significantly altered the opinion.

The court recognizes that the

ALJ’s evaluation of the effect of the Pathways treatment notes
could be disputed because there are portions of the Pathways notes
that contradict the earlier opinions.

For example, the notes

indicate that Maze truly does suffer from hallucinations.
740–45, 751, 763, 798, 805.)

(R. at

However, a reasonable mind could

accept that the ALJ’s decision was correct. Therefore, substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s decision.

See Gibbens v. Comm'r of

Soc. Sec., 659 F. App'x 238, 243 (6th Cir. 2016) (“Substantial
evidence lies between a preponderance and a scintilla; it refers
to relevant evidence that ‘a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.’” (quoting Rogers, 486 F.3d at
241)).
Turning

to

Maze’s

arguments

about

Dr.

Miller

and

Dr.

Fulliton’s access to her medical records, the court finds that her
claim lacks evidentiary support.

When the SSA asks a claimant to

submit to a consultative examination, the SSA is required to
provide the examiner with “any necessary background information”
about the claimant’s condition. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1517. Maze claims
that the opinion’s failure to reference relevant school records
documenting her mental health limitations amounts to proof that

-12-

the examiners did not have access to these school records.

For

support, she cites Brantley v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 637 F. App'x
888, 895 (6th Cir. 2016).
from Brantley.

Maze’s situation is distinguishable

In Brantley, the Sixth Circuit held that the SSA

violated 20 C.F.R. § 404.1517 when it did not provide examining
doctors with any background information about a claimant’s medical
history.

Id. at 894–97.

The opinion of one of the doctors in

Brantley made it clear that the records were missing by stating,
“It would be very helpful to have some objective medical records
to further explain [the claimant’s] difficulties.”

Id. at 890.

Unlike in Brantley, Dr. Miller and Dr. Fulliton stated in their
opinion that they performed a “Review of Records.”

(R. at 345.)

Maze has not provided any evidence to show that 20 C.F.R. §
404.1517 has been violated.

Thus, the court finds that the ALJ

complied with all requirements when analyzing Dr. Miller’s, Dr.
Fulliton’s, and Dr. Sachs’s opinions and properly relied upon them
as

part

of

the

substantial

evidence

supporting

the

RFC

determination.
D.

Maze’s Cane Usage
Maze argues that the ALJ erred in finding that her need to

use a cane does not impede her ability to perform a full range of
sedentary work.

The record is filled with conflicting information

about Maze’s ability to walk.

On the one hand, there are her

personal descriptions of her limited ability to walk, (R. at 82,

-13-

93–94, 967, 979), a doctor’s prescription for a cane, (R. at 104),
and observations by various health care providers that Maze has a
slow or limping gait, (R. at 631, 772, 784, 883.)

On the other

hand, there are descriptions from a physician who examined Maze
that suggest she fakes her walking limitations, (R. at 342), xrays showing no abnormalities in her back or right hip, (R. at
654), and observations by various health care providers that she
walks

normally,

(R.

at

213,

703,

706,

710,

713.)

Further

complicating this medical history are the records showing that she
attended thirteen physical therapy sessions focused on improving
her mobility and that she experienced mildly positive results.
(R. at 882–910.)

After reviewing the record, the ALJ found that

the record does not show evidence of a prescription for a cane or
that any type of ambulation aid was necessary.

(R. at 22.)

The ALJ was mistaken in finding that the record lacks evidence
of a prescription for a cane.

Nonetheless, a plethora of evidence

still undermines Maze’s claim that she needs a cane, and as
mentioned in the standard of review section, it is the duty of the
ALJ, not the court, to resolve conflicts in evidence.

See Perry

v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 17-4182, 2018 WL 2470915, at *2 (6th
Cir. June 4, 2018).

Because substantial evidence in the record

supports the ALJ’s conclusion, the court finds that the ALJ did
not err when determining that Maze does not need to use a cane.
See Shepard v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 705 F. App'x 435, 442 (6th

-14-

Cir. 2017) (“Our job is only to ensure that the Commissioner's
determination is supported by substantial evidence.”).
E.

Maze’s Mental Health Limitations
Maze claims

hallucinations,

that the ALJ erred
limitations

in

by determining that her

concentration,

borderline

intellectual functioning, and low GAF score do not impede her
ability to perform a full range of sedentary work.

Although Maze

claims that the ALJ erred at step five, this claim amounts to a
step-four argument challenging the ALJ’s RFC determination.

The

ALJ found that Maze “has the residual functional capacity to
perform the full range of unskilled sedentary work . . . except
[Maze] can perform only simple, routine tasks and would work better
with objects versus people.”
explaining

his

RFC

(R. at 20.)

determination,

the

ALJ

In the analysis
discussed

the

significance of all of the evidence in the record related to Maze’s
mental

health,

including

reviewing

the

treatment

notes

from

Pathways, assessing the importance of the various GAF scores
assigned to Maze, evaluating the Maze’s descriptions of her mental
health limitations, and weighing the opinions of the medical
sources.

(R. at 22–24.)

The ALJ found it significant that Maze

stopped working due to the factory shutting down rather than as a
result of her health limitations.

(R. at 24.)

A claimant’s RFC is “the most [the claimant] can still do
despite

[the

claimant’s]

limitations.”

-15-

20

C.F.R.

§

404.1545(a)(1).
all

of

the

The ALJ must assess the claimant’s RFC based on

relevant

evidence

in

the

record.

20

C.F.R.

§

404.1545(a)(3); see also SSR 96-8P, 1996 WL 374184, at *3 (“The
RFC assessment is a function-by-function assessment based upon all
of the relevant evidence of an individual's ability to do workrelated

activities.”).

responsibility

of

“[T]he

evaluating

the

ALJ

is

medical

charged
evidence

with

the

and

the

claimant’s testimony to form an ‘assessment of [her] residual
functional capacity.’”

Webb v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 368 F.3d 629,

633 (6th Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting 20 C.F.R. §
416.920(a)(4)(iv)).

While ALJs may not “cherry pick[] evidence,”

they may “neutrally . . . weigh[] the evidence.”

White v. Comm'r

of Soc. Sec., 572 F.3d 272, 284 (6th Cir. 2009).
For the reasons discussed above, the ALJ did not err when
weighing the medical source opinions in the case.

Furthermore,

the ALJ properly considered all of the evidence in the record,
including the mental health counseling sessions at Pathways and
Maze’s reason for leaving her last job.

See Maloney v. Apfel, 211

F.3d 1269, 2000 WL 420700, at *2 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding it
indicative that a claimant’s impairments were not severe when the
claimant “stopped working for reasons other than her illness”).
The ALJ also properly assessed the significance of the GAF
score of 48 that Pathways healthcare providers assigned to Maze.
“A GAF score of 41–50 ‘reflects the assessor's opinion that the

-16-

subject has serious symptoms or serious impairment of social or
occupational functioning.’”

Miller, 811 F.3d at 832 (quoting

Keeton v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 583 F. App’x 515, 520 n.2 (6th Cir.
2014)).

However, the Sixth Circuit takes a “case-by-case approach

to the value of GAF scores” by looking the scores’ consistency
with the record.

Id. at 836.

the basis of a claimant’s RFC.

A GAF score, on its own, cannot be
See Myland v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.,

No. 17-1592, 2017 WL 5632842, at *1 (6th Cir. Nov. 13, 2017).

In

this case, the ALJ determined that the GAF score of 48 was not
supported by Maze’s mental health treatment record, especially in
light of the absence of the serious symptoms associated with so
low of a score, such as an inability to keep a job, suicidal
ideation, or repeated criminal behavior.

(R. at 23.)

Thus, the

court finds that the ALJ properly evaluated Maze’s mental health
limitations.
F.

Application of the Medical Vocational Guidelines
Maze

argues

significant

that,

number

of

when

determining

jobs

that

she

whether
can

work

there

are

despite

a

her

limitations, the ALJ should not have treated the grids found at 20
C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App'x 2 as mandatory, but rather
employed them as a framework for his analysis. Maze further claims
that, because the grids only apply to her as a framework, the ALJ
should have consulted with a vocational expert.

-17-

The grids specify whether a claimant should be found disabled
by considering the claimant’s exertional capacity, age, education,
and previous work experience.

See Amir v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.,

705 F. App'x 443, 451 (6th Cir. 2017).

“The grids account for

only exertional limitations, which are defined as the limitations
‘imposed by [the claimant's] impairment(s) and related symptoms,
such as pain, that affect only [the claimant's] ability to meet
the

strength

demands

404.1569a(b)).

If

of

a

jobs.’”

claimant

Id.
has

(quoting

significant

20

C.F.R.

§

nonexertional

limitations, then the finding on the grids is no longer mandatory.
See Collins v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 357 F. App'x 663, 670 (6th
Cir. 2009); SSR 85-15, 1985 WL 56857, at *1 (S.S.A. 1985); SSR 8314, 1983 WL 31254, at *1 (S.S.A. 1983).
the grids as a framework.

Instead, the ALJ applies

See SSR 85-15, 1985 WL 56857, at *1;

SSR 83-14, 1983 WL 31254, at *1.

“In these situations, the ALJ

must elicit additional evidence, such as expert testimony, to
identify jobs in the national economy which the claimant could
perform.”
Here,

Amir, 705 F. App'x at 451.
the

ALJ

recognized

that

Maze

has

nonexertional

limitations that allow her to “perform only simple, routine tasks,”
preferably while working with “objects versus people.”
20.)

(R. at

Nevertheless, the ALJ still treated the grids as requiring

him to find Maze not disabled.

This was appropriate because the

nonexertional limitations the ALJ found Maze to possess did not

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“significantly

limit

the

range

of

work

permitted

by

[her]

exertional limitations,” as evidenced by how she worked for many
years despite having these mental health limitations.

Collins,

357 F. App'x at 671 (quoting Cole v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs.,
820 F.2d 768, 771 (6th Cir. 1987)); Strimel v. Berryhill, No. 2:16CV-226-MCLC, 2017 WL 4127610, at *7–8 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 15, 2017)
(“An

allegation

of

a

nonexertional

limit

is

insufficient

to

eliminate the grids as an option; rather the key factor is ‘whether
the alleged impairment is severe enough to alter the conclusion
that the claimant could do a full range of work at the specified
level.’” (quoting Cole, 820 F.2d at 772)); see also Maloney, 211
F.3d 1269, 2000 WL 420700, at *2.

Because the ALJ was required to

rely on the grids, he did not need to elicit additional evidence,
such as the expert testimony of a vocational expert, to show
whether there is sufficient work still available to Maze.

Thus,

the court finds that the ALJ properly found Maze’s RFC allowed her
to perform a significant number of jobs existing in the national
economy.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner’s decision that
Maze is not disabled is affirmed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Tu M. Pham
TU M. PHAM
United States Magistrate Judge

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July 27, 2018
Date

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