Chandler v. Colvin

Filing 15

ORDER Affirming the Commissioner's Decision. Signed by Magistrate Judge Tu M. Pham on 5/14/2018. (Pham, Tu)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
_________________________________________________________________
JASON TODD CHANDLER,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
No. 16-1203-TMP
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING
)
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
)
SECURITY,
)
)
Defendant.
)
________________________________________________________________
ORDER AFFIRMING THE COMMISSIONER’S DECISION
_________________________________________________________________
Before the Court is plaintiff Jason Todd Chandler’s appeal
from a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security1
(“Commissioner”) denying his application for disability insurance
benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (“Act”), 42
U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq.

(ECF No. 1.)

The parties have consented to

the jurisdiction of the United States magistrate judge pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

(ECF No. 9.)

undersigned on March 13, 2017.

The case was reassigned to the
For the following reasons, the

Commissioner’s decision is affirmed.
I.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Chandler applied for disability insurance benefits in June

1

Carolyn W. Colvin was the Acting Commissioner of Social Security
at the time this action was filed.

2013, alleging an onset date of August 20, 2012.2

(R. 157.)

claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration.

His

(R. 96; 103.)

At Chandler’s request, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) held a
hearing and issued a written decision.

(R. 14-27.)

Both Chandler

and a vocational expert (“VE”) testified at the hearing.

(R. 17.)

In his written decision, the ALJ first found that Chandler has not
engaged in substantial gainful employment since his alleged onset
date.
the

(R. 19.)

following

disease;

Next, the ALJ found that Chandler suffered from
severe

lumbar

impairments:

degenerative

disc

cervical

degenerative

disease;

degenerative joint disease; and obesity.

right

(R. 19.)

disc

shoulder

The ALJ found

that these impairments, individually and/or combined did not meet
or medically equal the severity of one of the listed impairments in
20 C.F.R. part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

(R. 19.)

The ALJ also

found that Chandler retained the residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) to:
perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a)
except the claimant cannot climb ladders, ropes, or
scaffolds; can occasionally climb ramps and stairs; can
occasionally balance, crouch, stoop, kneel, and crawl;
can occasionally reach overhead bilaterally, and can
frequently
reach
in
all
other
directions;
can
occasionally push or pull within the limits of sedentary
work; can sit for 30 minutes at a time and then would
need to stand for 10 minutes before sitting again.
2

Chandler also applied for supplemental security income benefits
under Title XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1391 et seq. (R. 164.)
His Title XVI application was denied on technical eligibility
grounds for excess resources (R. 88), and is not at issue in this
appeal. (ECF No. 11-1 at 1.)
-2-

(R. 20.)

In making this RFC determination, the ALJ specifically

considered Chandler’s testimony at the hearing.

Chandler testified

that his neck is painful at extreme ranges of motion, but that his
pain

medication

medication
sleeping.

helps

caused

sometimes;

drowsiness

(R. 21.)

and

he
he

also

testified

has

that

consistent

the

trouble

He also testified that his back hurts daily,

and that walking, lifting, pushing, pulling, or doing anything with
his left side causes his neck and back to hurt.

(R. 21.)

Chandler

further testified that he could sit for 30-60 minutes before
needing to stand; stand and/or walk for 30-60 minutes before
needing to sit; and lift 10 pounds.

(R. 21.)

The ALJ determined

that while Chandler’s medically-determinable impairments could
reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms, Chandler’s
testimony as to the intensity, persistence and limiting effects was
not entirely credible.

(R. 21.)

In making his RFC determination, the ALJ also reviewed the
relevant

medical

records.

Significantly,

Dr.

Lovell

treated

Chandler from 2009-2013 for his degenerative disc disease, shoulder
pain, and obesity; Chandler underwent a cervical fusion on February
1, 2010, as part of this treatment, and reached maximum medical
improvement

on

April

26

of

that

year.

(R.

21.)

Chandler

complained of right shoulder pain to Dr. Gladwell after having
surgery; at a January 26, 2011, visit, Chandler stated that while
he had no complaints about his right shoulder, he was suffering
-3-

from neck pain.

(R. 21.)

Chandler again saw Dr. Lovell for neck

pain in February 2011, but Dr. Lovell noted good range of motion
and no other problems and advised Chandler that he could still work
full duty.

(R. 22.)

An independent medical examination by Dr.

Dalal on April 7, 2011 found the totality of Chandler’s neck and
right shoulder impairments equaled 17% of his body as a whole, and
that he should not lift more than 25 pounds.

(R 22.)

Chandler

underwent an MRI at Dr. Lovell’s direction on February 1, 2012,
after which Dr. Lovell diagnosed degenerative disc disease and
recommended a steroid injection.

(R. 22.)

On May 11, 2012, Dr.

Lovell reviewed the past MRI and a new MRI, taken on April 23,
2012, with Chandler; Dr. Lovell noted three disc herniations that
are intermittently symptomatic ranging from minimal to significant,
according to Chandler.

Dr. Lovell placed Chandler at maximum

medical improvement and released him without restrictions.
22.)

(R.

After undergoing another spinal surgery on August 20, 2012,

Dr. Lovell noted at a follow up that Chandler was improving well.
(R. 22.)

Dr. Lovell sent Chandler to physical therapy for 3 days a

week for 3 weeks; his progress report indicated that his pain was
down to 2 out of 10, he was sleeping better, had a hard time
driving, and had to make frequent positional changes.

(R. 22-23.)

Dr. Bradberry treated Chandler from 2008 to 2014, primarily
for high blood pressure and other issues not related to his
disability, such as colds and fevers.
-4-

(R. 23; 340-63; 440-70.)

Dr. Bradberry also filled out a Medical Assessment of Ability to do
Work Related Activities on April 15, 2014.

(R. 455-58.)

The ALJ

noted that the doctor’s name was illegible, and there was no
indication of what the doctor reviewed in making his determination.
(R. 24.)

Even so, the ALJ gave partial weight to the opinion,

because it was generally in consensus with the medical record and
Chandler’s testimony, and because the ALJ’s RFC determination
already accounted for the doctor’s postural limitations and the
sit/stand option in the RFC determination was less restrictive.
(R. 24.)

Dr. Bradberry also opined in a separate letter that

Chandler could not sit or stand for more than 20 minutes and could
not, in his opinion, engage in sedentary work; the ALJ gave little
weight to Dr. Bradberry’s opinion regarding Chandler’s capacity to
perform sedentary work because that determination is reserved for
the commissioner, and some weight to Dr. Bradberry’s opinion
regarding Chandler’s ability to sit and stand, noting that this
limitation is accounted for in the RFC determination.

(R. 24.)

Finally, the ALJ determined that, while Chandler was unable to
perform past relevant work, jobs exist in significant numbers in
the national economy that Chandler can perform.

(R. 25-26.)

Because Chandler’s ability to perform all or substantially all of
the requirements of the sedentary level was work was impeded by
additional limitations not contemplated by the Medical-Vocational
Guidelines, the ALJ relied upon the VE’s testimony in making this
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determination.

(R. 26.)

The ALJ specifically noted that the VE’s

opinion accounted for jobs with the included overhead-reaching and
sit/stand limitations.

(R. 26.)

Chandler is not disabled.

Thus, the ALJ determined that

(R. 26-27.)

The Social Security

Administration’s (“SSA”) Appeals Council denied Chandler’s request
for review, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the
Commissioner.

(R. 1.)

Chandler filed the instant action on July 12, 2016.
1.)

(ECF No.

Chandler argues that the ALJ erred by (1) failing to give

substantial deference, or assign greater weight, to Dr. Bradberry’s
opinion, and (2) failing to take Chandler’s testimony regarding his
ability to maintain concentration and need for frequent breaks into
account in his RFC determination.
II.
A.

(ECF No. 11-1 at 5; 8.)

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Standard of Review
Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a claimant may obtain judicial

review of any final decision made by the Commissioner after a
hearing to which he or she was a party.

“The court shall have

power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a
judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the
cause for a rehearing.”
the

Commissioner’s

42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

decision

is

limited

to

Judicial review of
whether

there

is

substantial evidence to support the decision and whether the
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Commissioner used the proper legal criteria in making the decision.
Id.; Winn v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 615 F. App’x 315, 320 (6th Cir.
2015); Cole v. Astrue, 661 F.3d 931, 937 (6th Cir. 2011); Rogers v.
Comm’r

of

Soc.

Sec.,

486

F.3d

234,

241

(6th

Cir.

2007).

Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of evidence but less
than

a

preponderance,

and

is

“such

relevant

evidence

as

a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Kirk v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524, 535 (6th Cir.
1981) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)).
In

determining

whether

substantial

evidence

exists,

the

reviewing court must examine the evidence in the record as a whole
and “must ‘take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts
from its weight.’”

Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 923 (6th Cir.

1990) (quoting Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 388 (6th Cir.
1984)).

If

Commissioner’s

substantial
decision,

evidence
however,

is
the

found
court

to

support

the

must

affirm

that

decision and “may not even inquire whether the record could support
a decision the other way.”

Barker v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 789, 794

(6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Smith v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,
893 F.2d 106, 108 (6th Cir. 1989)).

Similarly, the court may not

try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or decide
questions of credibility.

Ulman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 693 F.3d

709, 713 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509
(6th Cir. 2007)).

Rather, the Commissioner, not the court, is
-7-

charged with the duty to weigh the evidence, to make credibility
determinations, and to resolve material conflicts in the testimony.
Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997);
Crum v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 642, 644 (6th Cir. 1990); Kiner v.
Colvin, No. 12-2254-JDT, 2015 WL 1295675, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. Mar.
23, 2015).
B.

The Five-Step Analysis
The Act defines disability as the “inability to engage in any

substantial

gainful

activity

by

reason

of

any

medically

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to
result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for
a continuous period of not less than 12 months.”
423(d)(1).

42 U.S.C. §

Additionally, section 423(d)(2) of the Act states that:

An individual shall be determined to be under a
disability only if his physical or mental impairment or
impairments are of such severity that he is not only
unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering
his age, education, and work experience, engage in any
other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in
the national economy, regardless of whether such work
exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or
whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether
he would be hired if he applied for work. For purposes
of the preceding sentence (with respect to any
individual), “work which exists in the national economy”
means work which exists in significant numbers either in
the region where such individual lives or in several
regions of the country.
Under

the

Act,

the

claimant

bears

establishing an entitlement to benefits.

the

burden

of

Oliver v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., 415 F. App’x 681, 682 (6th Cir. 2011).
-8-

ultimate

The initial burden is

on the claimant to prove she has a disability as defined by the
Act.

Siebert v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 105 F. App’x 744, 746 (6th

Cir. 2004) (citing Walters, 127 F.3d at 529); see also Born v.
Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 923 F.2d 1168, 1173 (6th Cir.
1990).
the

If the claimant is able to do so, the burden then shifts to

Commissioner

to

demonstrate
with

the

the

existence

claimant’s

of

available

employment

compatible

disability

and

background.

Born, 923 F.2d at 1173; see also Griffith v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., 582 F. App’x 555, 559 (6th Cir. 2014).
Entitlement to social security benefits is determined by a
five-step sequential analysis set forth in the Social Security
Regulations.

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 & 416.920.

First, the

claimant must not be engaged in substantial gainful activity.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b) & 416.920(b).

See

Second, a finding must be

made that the claimant suffers from a severe impairment.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii) & 416.920(a)(5)(ii).

20 C.F.R.

In the third step, the

ALJ determines whether the impairment meets or equals the severity
criteria set forth in the Listing of Impairments contained in the
Social

Security

Regulations.

404.1525, 404.1526.

See

20

C.F.R.

§§

404.1520(d),

If the impairment satisfies the criteria for a

listed impairment, the claimant is considered to be disabled.

On

the other hand, if the claimant’s impairment does not meet or equal
a listed impairment, the ALJ must undertake the fourth step in the
analysis and determine whether the claimant has the RFC to return
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to any past relevant work.
404.1520(e).

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv) &

If the ALJ determines that the claimant can return to

past relevant work, then a finding of not disabled must be entered.
Id.

But if the ALJ finds the claimant unable to perform past

relevant work, then at the fifth step the ALJ must determine
whether the claimant can perform other work existing in significant
numbers

in

the

national

404.1520(a)(4)(v),

economy.

404.1520(g)(1),

See

20

C.F.R.

416.960(c)(1)-(2).

§§

Further

review is not necessary if it is determined that an individual is
not disabled at any point in this sequential analysis.

20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(a)(4).
C.

Whether the ALJ’s Assessment of Chandler’s Treating Physician,
Dr. Samuel Bradberry, Was Supported By Substantial Evidence
Chandler first argues that the ALJ erred by not assigning

controlling weight to the opinion of his treating physician, Dr.
Bradberry.
medical

(ECF No. 11-1 at 5-6.)

sources

who

have

or

Treating sources are accepted

have

had

an

“ongoing

treatment

relationship” with a claimant. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(a)(2).

ALJs

assess a treating source’s opinion to determine if it is consistent
with the medical records and is well-supported by clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(2).

If it

is, the ALJ will give the opinion controlling weight; if it is not,
the ALJ will apply a set of regulatory factors to the opinion to
determine what weight to give it.

Id.

ALJs should “always give

good reasons” in their decisions for the weight that they gave the
-10-

opinion of a treating source.

Id.

However, in certain instances,

such as when the “Commissioner adopts the opinion of the treating
source or makes findings consistent with the opinion[,]” it amounts
to a harmless error for an ALJ to fail to comply with these
regulatory requirements.

See Wilson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 378

F.3d 541, 546–47 (6th Cir. 2004).

In addition, “a treating

source’s opinion may be given little weight if it is unsupported by
sufficient clinical findings and is inconsistent with the rest of
the evidence.”

Morr v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 616 F. App’x 210, 211

(6th Cir. 2015) (citing Bogle v. Sullivan, 998 F.2d 342, 347-48
(6th Cir. 1993)); see also Keeler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 511 F.
App’x 472, 473 (6th Cir. 2013).
Chandler

initially

complains

that

the

ALJ

noted

in

his

decision that one of the letters that Dr. Bradberry submitted
included an “illegible signature.”

Chandler also argues that Dr.

Bradberry’s assessment compels a finding of disabled because he
opined that Chandler could only sit for three hours total in a work
day, and stand and walk for four hours.

(ECF No. 11-1 at 7.)

Thus, Chandler argues that he cannot perform substantial gainful
employment at any exertional level, because he cannot sit, stand,
and walk, in sum, for eight hours a day.

See SSR 96-8p.

However,

the ALJ clarified the identity of the author of the letter at the
hearing, and his decision discussed the rationale in deciding what
weight to assign it.

Specifically, the ALJ observed that the note
-11-

did not include any discussion of the evidence the doctor relied on
in reaching this conclusion.

(R. 456-58.)

The ALJ assigned

partial weight to the opinion and noted that other limitations
noted by this letter were accounted for in the RFC.

(R. 24.)

The

ALJ’s decision to give little weight to this opinion where it was
not supported by adequate explanation was proper.

See 20 C.F.R. §

404.1527(c)(3) (“The better an explanation a source provides for a
medical

opinion,

the

more

weight

we

will

give

that

medical

opinion.”).
Furthermore,

the

ALJ

observed

that

Dr.

Bradberry

was

Chandler’s primary care physician and mostly treated Chandler for
ailments

unrelated

to

his

alleged

disabilities

(although

Dr.

Bradberry did take over Chandler’s pain medication for pack pain
and helped manage his back pain starting in January 2014).
C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)(ii).

See 20

In addition, the ALJ identified other

medical records in this case that differed from Dr. Bradberry:
specifically, two non-examining state agency doctors opined that
Chandler could sit stand and/or walk for 6 hours in an 8 hour
workday.

(R. 24-25.)

The ALJ noted that Chandler’s testimony and

other medical evidence suggested greater limitations existed and
therefore gave these assessments little weight in this regard.
25.)

(R.

Even so, these assessments differ from Dr. Bradberry’s, and

the ALJ properly identified inconsistencies within the record in
compliance

with

20

C.F.R.

§

404.1527(c)(4).

-12-

And,

the

ALJ

accommodated the impairments that Dr. Bradberry identified in his
RFC determination, including the ability to stand and/or sit for 30
minutes at a time.

See Turk, 647 F. App’x at 640-41.

Finally, the ultimate decision of whether Chandler could
perform sedentary work is reserved for the Commissioner.
ALJ

properly

afforded

Bradberry’s letter.

little

weight

to

this

Thus, the

portion

of

Dr.

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d); Turk v. Comm’r

Soc. Sec., 647 F. App’x 638, 640 (6th Cir. 2016).

The ALJ’s

discussion of his rationale for assigning Dr. Bradberry’s opinions
the weight that he did was sufficient to provide good reasons.

See

Allen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 561 F.3d 646, 651 (6th Cir. 2009);
Bledsoe v. Barnhart, 165 F. App’x 408, 412 (6th Cir. 2006).

This

decision was supported by substantial evidence, and accordingly
must be affirmed.
D.

Whether the ALJ’s RFC
Substantial Evidence

Determination

was

Supported

by

Chandler next argues that the ALJ erred by stating that he
found Chandler’s testimony regarding his ability to concentrate and
need to take frequent breaks through the day to be credible, but
failing to fully include these limitations in his RFC finding.
(ECF No. 11-1 at 8-9.)

The Sixth Circuit has “‘held that an

administrative law judge's credibility findings are virtually
unchallengeable’ absent compelling reasons.”

Shepard v. Comm'r of

Soc. Sec., No. 17-1237, 2017 WL 4251707, at *4 (6th Cir. Sept. 26,
2017) (quoting Ritchie v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 540 F. App’x 508,
-13-

511 (6th Cir. 2013)).

Those compelling reasons appear when ALJs’

credibility

determinations

are

not

“supported

evidence.”

Rogers, 486 F.3d at 249.

by

substantial

When making a credibility

determination, ALJs “must consider the entire case record and give
specific

reasons

statements.”

for

the

weight

given

to

the

individual's

SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *4 (July 2, 1996).

In

the event that “an individual's statements about pain or other
symptoms are not substantiated by the objective medical evidence,
the adjudicator must consider all of the evidence in the case
record . . . .”

Id.

Beyond objective medical evidence, the SSA

has identified several specific considerations for ALJs.

These

include the claimant’s daily activities; the location, duration,
frequency and intensity of the symptoms; aggravating factors; type,
dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of medications; treatment
other than medication that the claimant receives; and any other
information

relevant

to

these

that

symptoms.

“the

20

C.F.R.

§

404.1529(c)(3)(i)–(vii).
Chandler

asserts

ALJ

specifically

articulated

‘[a]fter a thorough review of the same, the undersigned finds the
claimant to be credible . . .’”

(ECF No. 11-1 at 9.)

Chandler

essentially argues that, simply because the ALJ made one passing
statement
testimony

as

to

should

determination.

his

credibility,

have

been

the

entirety

reflected

in

of

the

Chandler’s
ALJ’s

RFC

However, Chandler misconstrues the ALJ’s decision:
-14-

the ALJ specifically stated that while he found Chandler credible,
he nonetheless found his impairments not disabling, and also stated
that he found Chandler’s testimony “concerning the intensity,
persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms . . . not
entirely credible for the reasons explained in this decision.”
21; 23.)

(R.

Those reasons included inconsistencies in the medical

record, and a lack of any clinical findings to support Chandler’s
contentions regarding concentration and his ability to fall asleep.
(R. 20-23.)

Chandler’s submission to this court fails to point to

any objective medical evidence that would support this claim.
Thus, the ALJ properly did not include subjective complaints which
were not supported by objective medical evidence in his RFC
determination.3

Accordingly, the ALJ’s assessment of Chandler’s

credibility

proper

was

and

his

RFC

determination,

which

was

supported by substantial evidence, must be affirmed.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner’s decision is
affirmed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Tu M. Pham
TU M. PHAM
United States Magistrate Judge
3

The court notes that, where Chandler’s testimony regarding his
condition was supported by objective medical evidence, such
testimony was reflected in the RFC determination. For example, the
ALJ’s RFC determination reflects Chandler’s testimony regarding his
ability to stand for a half hour at a time, and lift up to 10
pounds.
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May 14, 2018
Date

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