Knolton v. Colvin

Filing 16

ORDER Affirming the Commissioner's Decision. Signed by Magistrate Judge Tu M. Pham on 6/19/2018. (Pham, Tu)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
_________________________________________________________________
WESLEY KNOLTON,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
No. 16-1269-TMP
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
)
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
)
SECURITY,
)
)
Defendant.
)
________________________________________________________________
ORDER AFFIRMING THE COMMISSIONER’S DECISION
_________________________________________________________________
Before the Court is plaintiff Wesley Knolton’s appeal from a
final

decision

of

the

Commissioner

of

Social

Security1

(“Commissioner”) denying his application for disability insurance
benefits and supplemental security income (SSI) under Titles II and
XVI of the Social Security Act (Act), 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-434, 13811385.

(ECF No. 1.)

The parties have consented to the jurisdiction

of the United States magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
636(c).

(ECF

No.

10.)

For

the

following

reasons,

the

Commissioner’s decision is affirmed.
I.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Knolton applied for disability insurance benefits and SSI on
May 24, 2013, with an alleged onset date of November 16, 2012.

1

(R.

Carolyn W. Colvin was the Acting Commissioner of Social Security
at the time this action was filed.

47.)

The claims were denied initially and upon reconsideration.

(R. 95-97; 143-46.)

At Knolton’s request, an Administrative Law

Judge (“ALJ”) held a hearing and issued a written decision.
44-57.)

(R.

In her written decision, the ALJ first found that Knolton

had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged
onset date.

(R. 49.)

Second, the ALJ determined that Knolton had

the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease of the
lumbar spine, mood disorder and personality disorder.

(R. 49.)

Third, the ALJ determined that Knolton did not have an impairment
or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the
severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1.

(R. 50.)

The ALJ also determined that

Knolton retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to:
perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and
416.967(b) except can lift and carry 20 pounds
occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; he can sit, stand,
and walk 6 hours each in an 8 workday; he needs a
sit/stand option at will while remaining on task at the
work station; he can frequently balance; he can
occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl and climb ramps
and stairs, he cannot climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds;
he can understand, remember, and carry out simple and
detailed,
but
not
executive
functions;
he
has
concentration, persistence, and pace for these activities
with normal breaks throughout the day; he can tolerate
occasional interaction with the public, co-workers, and
supervisors; and he can tolerate occasional changes in
the workplace.
(R. 51.)

In making this RFC determination, the ALJ considered

Knolton’s history of degenerative disc disease, which began with a
workplace injury in 2010.

(R. 52.)
-2-

Knolton underwent multiple

surgeries and epidural steroid injections.

In January of 2013,

Knolton reported only sporadic leg pain with an overall marked
improvement, and Lowell Stonecipher, M.D., noted that “everything
looks fine.”

(R. 53.)

In March 2013, Dr. Stonecipher advised

Knolton to begin an exercise regimen to include minimum walking,
and his notes revealed that Knolton continued to improve in this
regard in the following months.

(R. 52.)

Knolton began seeing

Frank Jordan at Comprehensive Pain Specialists in January 2014.
(R. 52.)

Over the next year he visited Dr. Jordan on multiple

occasions; by January 2015, Knolton revealed that he was satisfied
with the MS Contin prescription because it helped relieve his pain
most

of

the

time.

(R.

52-53.)

All

of

the

records

from

Comprehensive Pain Specialists note that Knolton has a normal gait
and station.

(R. 53.)

An MRI from September 2014 revealed no disc

herniation or canal stenosis.

(R. 53.)

The ALJ noted that Knolton

also had a brief history of mental health treatment at Pathways of
Tennessee.

(R. 53.)

Throughout his treatment there, staff

assigned him a global assessment of functioning (GAF) score which
indicated only moderate symptoms.

(R. 53.)

In October 2012,

Knolton was prescribed Xanax for anxiety, gabapentin for peripheral
neuropathy, and omeprazole for gastrointestinal reflux disease.
(R. 53.)

Staff noted that Knolton’s pain was the root of his

emotional issues.

(R. 53.)

Regarding opinion evidence, Dr. Jordan stated that Knolton
-3-

could not lift greater than 10 pounds, could not frequently bend or
sit continuously, and could not walk, stand, or sit for prolonged
periods.

(R. 53.)

The ALJ noted that in his narrative, Dr. Jordan

noted that Knolton would be restricted to no greater than 30
pounds.

(R. 53.)

The ALJ also found Dr. Jordan’s statement

“inconsistent with the general efficacy of [Knolton]’s medication
regimen, pain clinic treatment notes, and with the record as a
whole,” and accordingly assigned it little weight.

(R. 53.)

Carol

Newman, FNP, of the Tucker Clinic of Bemis, stated that Knolton’s
medication for chronic pain and anxiety would cause significant
sedation which would make work difficult and possibly dangerous.
(R. 53.)

The ALJ noted that Knolton testified that he had no side

effects as a result of these medications.

(R. 53.)

The ALJ also

found that Ms. Newman “is not an acceptable medical source as
defined in SSR 063-p” and therefore assigned her opinion no weight.
(R. 53.)

Dr. Stonecipher opined that Knolton could not perform his

former job, but could work in a light position with lifting 20
pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; the ALJ determined
this was consistent with the record and accordingly afforded it
great weight.

(R. 53.)

Steve Weaver, M.D., examined Knolton in

connection with the claim and noted that Knolton’s strength was 5/5
in all major muscle groups, except his legs which were 4/5.
53.)
spine

(R.

Knolton exhibited decreased ranges of motion in the lumbar
but

got

into

and

off

the
-4-

examination

chair

without

difficulty.

Dr. Weaver opined that Knolton could never lift or

carry any weight, and could occasionally sit and reach but could
never stand, walk, stoop, kneel, or climb stairs.

(R. 53-54.)

The

ALJ determined that this opinion was not consistent with the
examination and afforded it little weight.

(R. 54.)

Charles

Settle, M.D., and Thomas Thrush, M.D., Disability Determination
Service (“DDS”) physicians, reviewed the record and opined that
Knolton could lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds
frequently, and could sit, stand and walk 6 hours in an 8 hour
workday

with

normal

breaks.

The

ALJ

found

these

opinions

consistent with the record and gave them great weight.

(R. 54.)

Dennis Wilson, Ph.D., a psychological consultant, examined Knolton
and

administered

interview.

a

(R. 54.)

mental

status

examination

and

clinical

Dr. Wilson diagnosed mood and personality

disorder, but indicated only moderate symptoms and opined that
Knolton was mildly impaired in his ability to understand and
remember,

moderately

concentration,

impaired

persistence,

and

in

the

pace;

ability

to

sustain

moderately

to

markedly

limited in his ability to interact with others; and moderately
limited in his ability to adapt to changes and requirements.
54.)

(R.

The ALJ found that Dr. Wilson’s opinion was “not expressed in

appropriate functional terms” and thus assigned it little weight in
her RFC determination.

(R. 54.)

In light of the above, the ALJ

found that Knolton’s “allegations and contentions regarding the
-5-

nature

and

severity

of

the

impairment-related

symptoms

and

functional limitations” to be partially credible, and found that
while “the allegations of back pain, depression, and personality
disorder” were supported by the record, the “contentions regarding
the severity thereof and related functional restrictions” were not.
(R. 54-55.)
Fourth, the ALJ determined that Knolton could not perform any
past relevant work.

(R. 55.)

Finally, the ALJ determined that,

considering Knolton’s age, education, work experience, and RFC,
jobs existed in significant numbers in the national economy which
he could perform.

(R. 55-56.)

In making this determination, the

ALJ utilized a vocational expert (“VE”), who opined that, given the
RFC finding, Knolton would be able to perform unskilled occupations
with a light exertional requirement such as an assembler, collator
operator, and marker.
was not disabled.

(R. 56.)

(R. 56.)

Thus, the ALJ found that Knolton

The Social Security Administration’s

(“SSA”) Appeals Council denied Knolton’s request for review, making
the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner.

(R.

33.)
Knolton filed the instant action on October 14, 2016.
No. 1.)

(ECF

Knolton first argues that the record, findings and

opinions of Dr. Jordan and Dr. Weaver, and his own testimony
establish that he is disabled.

(ECF No. 14 at 12.)

Next, Knolton

argues that the ALJ erred by assigning controlling weight to the
-6-

form statements provided by DDS examiners while failing to properly
credit Knolton’s examining physicians.

(Id. at 13.)

Third,

Knolton argues the ALJ’s RFC determination was erroneous because
she did not adhere to SSR 96-8p.

(Id. at 16.)

Fourth, Knolton

argues that the need to speculate as to the meaning of a “marked”
limitation in the context of Knolton’s ability to interact with
others requires remand.

(Id. at 18.)

Based on these arguments,

Knolton asserts that the ALJ’s decision was not supported by
substantial evidence and accordingly must be remanded. (Id. at 19.)

II.
A.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Standard of Review
Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a claimant may obtain judicial

review of any final decision made by the Commissioner after a
hearing to which he or she was a party.

“The court shall have

power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a
judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the
cause for a rehearing.”
the

Commissioner’s

42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

decision

is

limited

to

Judicial review of
whether

there

is

substantial evidence to support the decision and whether the
Commissioner used the proper legal criteria in making the decision.
Id.; Winn v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 615 F. App’x 315, 320 (6th Cir.
2015); Cole v. Astrue, 661 F.3d 931, 937 (6th Cir. 2011); Rogers v.
-7-

Comm’r

of

Soc.

Sec.,

486

F.3d

234,

241

(6th

Cir.

2007).

Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of evidence but less
than

a

preponderance,

and

is

“such

relevant

evidence

as

a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Kirk v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524, 535 (6th Cir.
1981) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)).
In

determining

whether

substantial

evidence

exists,

the

reviewing court must examine the evidence in the record as a whole
and “must ‘take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts
from its weight.’”

Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 923 (6th Cir.

1990) (quoting Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 388 (6th Cir.
1984)).

If

Commissioner’s

substantial
decision,

evidence
however,

is
the

found
court

to

support

the

must

affirm

that

decision and “may not even inquire whether the record could support
a decision the other way.”

Barker v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 789, 794

(6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Smith v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,
893 F.2d 106, 108 (6th Cir. 1989)).

Similarly, the court may not

try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or decide
questions of credibility.

Ulman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 693 F.3d

709, 713 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509
(6th Cir. 2007)).

Rather, the Commissioner, not the court, is

charged with the duty to weigh the evidence, to make credibility
determinations, and to resolve material conflicts in the testimony.
Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997);
-8-

Crum v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 642, 644 (6th Cir. 1990); Kiner v.
Colvin, No. 12-2254-JDT, 2015 WL 1295675, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. Mar.
23, 2015).
B.

The Five-Step Analysis
The Act defines disability as the “inability to engage in any

substantial

gainful

activity

by

reason

of

any

medically

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to
result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for
a continuous period of not less than 12 months.”
423(d)(1).

42 U.S.C. §

Additionally, section 423(d)(2) of the Act states that:

An individual shall be determined to be under a
disability only if his physical or mental impairment or
impairments are of such severity that he is not only
unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering
his age, education, and work experience, engage in any
other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in
the national economy, regardless of whether such work
exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or
whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether
he would be hired if he applied for work. For purposes
of the preceding sentence (with respect to any
individual), “work which exists in the national economy”
means work which exists in significant numbers either in
the region where such individual lives or in several
regions of the country.
Under

the

Act,

the

claimant

bears

establishing an entitlement to benefits.

the

ultimate

burden

of

Oliver v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., 415 F. App’x 681, 682 (6th Cir. 2011).

The initial burden is

on the claimant to prove she has a disability as defined by the
Act.

Siebert v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 105 F. App’x 744, 746 (6th

Cir. 2004) (citing Walters, 127 F.3d at 529); see also Born v.
-9-

Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 923 F.2d 1168, 1173 (6th Cir.
1990).
the

If the claimant is able to do so, the burden then shifts to

Commissioner

to

demonstrate
with

the

the

existence

claimant’s

of

available

employment

compatible

disability

and

background.

Born, 923 F.2d at 1173; see also Griffith v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., 582 F. App’x 555, 559 (6th Cir. 2014).
Entitlement to social security benefits is determined by a
five-step sequential analysis set forth in the Social Security
Regulations.

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 & 416.920.

First, the

claimant must not be engaged in substantial gainful activity.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b) & 416.920(b).

See

Second, a finding must be

made that the claimant suffers from a severe impairment.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii) & 416.920(a)(5)(ii).

20 C.F.R.

In the third step, the

ALJ determines whether the impairment meets or equals the severity
criteria set forth in the Listing of Impairments contained in the
Social

Security

Regulations.

404.1525, 404.1526.

See

20

C.F.R.

§§

404.1520(d),

If the impairment satisfies the criteria for a

listed impairment, the claimant is considered to be disabled.

On

the other hand, if the claimant’s impairment does not meet or equal
a listed impairment, the ALJ must undertake the fourth step in the
analysis and determine whether the claimant has the RFC to return
to any past relevant work.
404.1520(e).

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv) &

If the ALJ determines that the claimant can return to

past relevant work, then a finding of not disabled must be entered.
-10-

Id.

But if the ALJ finds the claimant unable to perform past

relevant work, then at the fifth step the ALJ must determine
whether the claimant can perform other work existing in significant
numbers

in

the

404.1520(a)(4)(v),

national

economy.

404.1520(g)(1),

See

20

C.F.R.

416.960(c)(1)-(2).

§§

Further

review is not necessary if it is determined that an individual is
not disabled at any point in this sequential analysis.

20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(a)(4).
C.

Whether the ALJ’s Credibility and Opinion Determinations Were
Supported by Substantial Evidence
First, Knolton argues that his own testimony, along with the

medical evidence submitted, establishes that he is disabled.
No. 14 at 12.)

(ECF

The ALJ determined that Knolton’s “allegations and

contentions regarding the nature and severity of the impairmentrelated

symptoms

and

functional

limitations”

were

partially

credible, but found that while “the allegations of back pain,
depression, and personality disorder” were supported by the record,
the

“contentions

regarding

the

severity

functional restrictions” were not.
that

an

administrative

law

thereof

and

related

The Sixth Circuit has “‘held

judge's

credibility

findings

virtually unchallengeable’ absent compelling reasons.”

are

Shepard v.

Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 17-1237, 2017 WL 4251707, at *4 (6th Cir.
Sept. 26, 2017) (quoting Ritchie v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 540 F.
App’x 508, 511 (6th Cir. 2013)).
when

ALJs’

credibility

Those compelling reasons appear

determinations
-11-

are

not

“supported

by

substantial evidence.”

Rogers, 486 F.3d at 249.

When making a

credibility determination, ALJs “must consider the entire case
record and give specific reasons for the weight given to the
individual's statements.”
2, 1996).

SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *4 (July

In the event that “an individual's statements about pain

or other symptoms are not substantiated by the objective medical
evidence, the adjudicator must consider all of the evidence in the
case record . . . .”

Id. Beyond objective medical evidence, the

SSA has identified several specific considerations for ALJs.

These

include the claimant’s daily activities; the location, duration,
frequency and intensity of the symptoms; aggravating factors; type,
dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of medications; treatment
other than medication that the claimant receives; and any other
information

relevant

to

these

symptoms.

20

C.F.R.

§

404.1529(c)(3)(i)–(vii).
Here, the ALJ appropriately evaluated Knolton’s testimony, and
provided

good

reasons

for

her

credibility

determination.

Specifically, the ALJ identified several instances in the record
where Knolton explained that his pain and symptoms were improving
due to treatment and medication.

Furthermore, the ALJ discussed

the medical evidence in the record and noted discrepancies between
Knolton’s testimony and the objective medical evidence.
Knolton also argues that Dr. Weaver and Dr. Jordan opined that
Knolton could perform less than sedentary work and that these
-12-

opinions were entitled to controlling weight as a matter of law.
(ECF No. 14 at 12-13.)

The ultimate decision of whether Knolton is

disabled is reserved for the Commissioner.

Walker v. Sec. of

Health and Human Servs., 980 F.2d 1066, 1070 (6th Cir. 1992).

An

opinion on a matter reserved to the Commissioner, such as whether a
plaintiff is disabled, is not entitled to “any particular weight,”
even where the opinion is from a treating physician.

Johnson v.

Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 535 F. App’x 498, 505 (6th Cir. 2013).

Thus,

the ALJ was not required to assign any particular weight to this
portion Dr. Weaver or Dr. Jordan’s opinion.

See 20 C.F.R. §

404.1527(d); Turk v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 647 F. App’x 638, 640 (6th
Cir. 2016).

Knolton also points out that the ALJ did not include

Dr. Stonecipher’s complete opinion statement from June 2013, which
noted that Knolton “probably needs to sign up for his disability.”
(R. 503.)

This argument likewise fails to account for the entirety

of Dr. Stonecipher’s statement: he also noted that Knolton “only
needs a light classification of 20 pounds occasionally and 10
pounds frequently,” and that he agreed with the functional capacity
evaluation that Knolton had recently undergone.

(R. 503.)

The

record therefore does not support Knolton’s contention that Dr.
Stonecipher asserted that he was disabled and, even if it did, the
ALJ would not be required to credit such an opinion where it
intrudes on the ALJ’s ultimate decision.
at 505; Walker, 980 F.2d at 1070.
-13-

See Johnson, 535 F. App’x

The ALJ’s decision in this

regard

was

therefore

supported

by

substantial

evidence,

and

accordingly must be affirmed.
D.

Whether the ALJ’s Assessment of the Medical Evidence Was
Supported by Substantial Evidence
Next, Knolton argues that the ALJ failed to comply with the

Social

Security

regulations

in

treating physicians’ opinions.

evaluating

the

examining

(ECF No. 14 at 13.)

and

Treating

sources are accepted medical sources who have or have had an
“ongoing treatment relationship” with a claimant. 20 C.F.R. §
416.927(a)(2).

ALJs

assess

a

treating

source’s

opinion

to

determine if it is consistent with the medical records and is wellsupported by clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. 20
C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(2).

If it is, the ALJ will give the opinion

controlling weight; if it is not, the ALJ will apply a set of
regulatory factors to the opinion to determine what weight to give
it.

Id.

ALJs should “always give good reasons” in their decisions

for the weight that they give the opinion of a treating source.
Id.

However, in certain instances, such as when the “Commissioner

adopts the opinion of the treating source or makes findings
consistent with the opinion[,]” it amounts to a harmless error for
an ALJ to fail to comply with these regulatory requirements.

See

Wilson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 546–47 (6th Cir.
2004).

In addition, “a treating source’s opinion may be given

little weight if it is unsupported by sufficient clinical findings
and is inconsistent with the rest of the evidence.”
-14-

Morr v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., 616 F. App’x 210, 211 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Bogle
v. Sullivan, 998 F.2d 342, 347-48 (6th Cir. 1993)); see also Keeler
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 511 F. App’x 472, 473 (6th Cir. 2013).
Here, substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s assessment of
Dr. Stonecipher and Dr. Jordan’s opinions concerning Knolton’s
physical

limitations.

The

ALJ

gave

great

weight

to

Dr.

Stonecipher’s opinion that Knolton could perform “light” work, lift
20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently.

This opinion was

from the relevant time period, after Knolton alleged his disability
began.

Also, while Knolton alleges that the opinion only addresses

the ability to lift and carry, Dr. Stonecipher’s opinion speaks to
the ability to perform “light” work generally.

Accordingly, the

ALJ was entitled to assign it the weight that she did.

Because the

ALJ’s determination as to Dr. Stonecipher’s opinion was supported
by substantial evidence, the ALJ was also entitled to weigh it
against the opinion of Dr. Jordan.

Dr. Jordan opined in 2015 that

Knolton could not lift more than 10 pounds and could perform “no
excessive

or

frequent

bending,

no

continuous

sitting

without

opportunities to change positions as required for pain alleviation,
and no prolonged standing, walking, or sitting.”

But it is the

ALJ’s responsibility to resolve conflicts in the record and, where
that decision is supported by substantial evidence, it cannot be
overturned.

See Justice v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 515 F. App’x 583,

588 (6th Cir. 2013).

Furthermore, the ALJ explained that Dr.
-15-

Jordan’s suggested limitations were inconsistent with his own
treatment notes.

(R. 53.)

Such discussion is sufficient to

provide “good reasons” for assigning the opinion the weight that
she did.

See Allen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 561 F.3d 646, 651 (6th

Cir. 2009); Bledsoe v. Barnhart, 165 F. App’x 408, 412 (6th Cir.
2006).
Similarly, the ALJ explained that Dr. Weaver’s opinion that
Knolton could “never to rarely” lift even 10 pounds and could stand
or walk “never to a very limited distance” was unsupported by his
own examination record.

Dr. Weaver examined Knolton only once,

thus his opinion was not entitled to controlling weight and the ALJ
did not need to discuss his findings in detail.

See Norris v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 461 F. App’x 433, 439 (6th Cir. 2012).
Nonetheless, the ALJ noted Dr. Weaver’s findings that Knolton’s
arms had full and normal strength and nearly normal leg strength,
and

he

could

difficulty.

get

on

and

off

the

examination

table

without

Thus, the ALJ discussed other evidence in the record

that contradicted Dr. Weaver’s conclusions, and such discussion was
sufficient to establish “good reasons” under the regulations.
E.

Whether the ALJ’s RFC
Substantial Evidence

Determination

was

Supported

by

Knolton next argues that the ALJ’s RFC determination was
flawed because she improperly dismissed the opinions of Dr. Jordan
and Dr. Weaver, the testimony of Knolton, and the statement from
Dr. Stonecipher.

(ECF No. 14 at 16.)
-16-

As explained above, the

ALJ’s

assessment

substantial

of

each

evidence.

of

these

Knolton

factors

further

was

argues

supported

that,

when

by

“the

proper” – that is, based on the treating physicians and DDS
examiners’ opinions – “RFC was proffered as a hypothetical, the VE
opined disability.”

(ECF No. 14 at 16-17.)

Again, the ultimate

decision as to disability is reserved for the ALJ.

Accordingly,

Knolton’s arguments on this point are unpersuasive, and the ALJ’s
RFC determination will be affirmed.
F.

Whether the
Limitations

ALJ

Properly

Evaluated

Knolton’s

Social

Knolton finally asserts that the ALJ erred by failing to
contact Dr. Wilson for clarification regarding his psychological
evaluation.

(ECF No. 14 at 18.)

Dr. Wilson’s report specifically

concluded, in part, that Knolton was “[m]oderately to markedly”
limited in his ability to interact with others.

(R. 536.)

The ALJ

gave “little weight” to this conclusion because it was “not
expressed in appropriate functional terms.”

(R. 54.)

Knolton

argues that there was some confusion at the hearing regarding the
meaning of “markedly” in the functional context, and that the ALJ
should have called Dr. Wilson to clarify or ask for guidance in the
translation rather than speculate as to its meaning.
at 18-19.)

(ECF No. 14

However, the ALJ was not required to contact Dr. Wilson

for clarification, and substantial evidence otherwise supports the
ALJ’s evaluation of Knolton’s social limitations.
-17-

Specifically, the ALJ assessed Knolton’s general level of
limitation
explained

under
why

the

that

“special
he

found

technique”
Knolton

at

had

step

only

a

three,

and

“moderate”

limitation in this area due to his ability to function normally in
day-to-day activities.

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(c)(3), (d)(1);

416.920a(c)(3), (d)(1); 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1,
§12.00C.

While this finding is not to be directly used in

formulating the RFC, see SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *4, the ALJ
must still consider “all of the relevant evidence in the case
record,” including reports of daily activities.

Id. at *5.

The

ALJ’s findings regarding Knolton’s daily activities are therefore
relevant to the RFC determination.

Furthermore, Dr. Wilson was not

a treating physician, and the ALJ was not required to contact him
for clarification.

See SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183, at *2.

Even if Dr. Wilson were a treating physician, the record
contained sufficient evidence to render a decision as to Knolton’s
social limitations without seeking clarification.

See Ferguson v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 628 F.3d 269, 274 (6th Cir. 2010);

Poe v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 342 F. App’x 149, 156 n.3 (6th Cir. 2009).
Specifically,

the ALJ relied on two other DDS mental health

professionals in formulating Knolton’s RFC in this regard.
54.)

(R.

Both opined that Knolton could interact with peers and

supervisors on at least an infrequent basis.

The ALJ credited

these findings in her RFC determination, which limits Knolton to
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“occasional

interaction

supervisors[.]”

(R. 51.)

with

the

public,

co-workers,

and

The evidence in the record was therefore

sufficient to assess Knolton’s social limitations without seeking
further

evidence

and,

in

making

the

ALJ

considered all the evidence in the case record, as required.

See

SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183, at *3.

the

determination,

Because substantial evidence

supports the ALJ’s determination, it will be affirmed.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner’s decision is
affirmed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Tu M. Pham
TU M. PHAM
United States Magistrate Judge
June 19, 2018
Date

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