Brown v. Carroll County Sheriff's Department et al

Filing 8

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, CERTIFYING AN APPEAL WOULD NOT BE TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH AND NOTIFYING PLAINTIFF OF APPELLATE FILING FEE. Signed by Judge James D. Todd on 8/10/18. (skc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION
TERRY THOMAS BROWN,
Plaintiff,
VS.
CARROLL COUNTY, ET AL.,
Defendants.

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No. 17-1053-JDT-cgc

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT,
CERTIFYING AN APPEAL WOULD NOT BE TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH
AND NOTIFYING PLAINTIFF OF APPELLATE FILING FEE

On March 22, 2017, Plaintiff Terry Thomas Brown, who is incarcerated at the
Carroll County Jail in Huntingdon, Tennessee, filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1 & 2). After Brown
filed the required documentation (ECF No. 5), the Court granted leave to proceed in forma
pauperis and assessed the civil filing fee pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b) (ECF No. 6). The Clerk shall record the Defendants as
Carroll County, Humphreys County,1 Judge Logan, Judge Parrish, and District Attorney
Adam Jowers.

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The Court construes claims against the Carroll County Sheriff’s Department and the
Humphreys County Sheriff’s Department as claims against the counties themselves.

The allegations of Brown’s complaint are confusing. He alleges that he was
released from one department, only to be “chased down like a dog” and picked up by
another department without proper paperwork. (ECF No. 1 at 3.) Brown alleges that
Humphreys County wrongfully released him in order to cause him harm, and that Carroll
County wrongfully incarcerated him. (Id.) Mistakes were made in his time, which was
not sent to Nashville (presumably a reference to TDOC), causing him not to get parole.
(Id. at 2.) Brown further contends that Defendants Logan, Parish, and Jowers wrongfully
charged him and used illegal procedure in his case. (Id.) He seeks money damages and to
be properly credited with all of his jail time. (Id. at 3.)
The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint,
or any portion thereof, if the complaint—
(1)
is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted; or
(2)
such relief.

seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may
be granted, the court applies the standards under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),
as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir.
2010).

“Accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, the Court

‘consider[s] the factual allegations in [the] complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest
an entitlement to relief.’” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting
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Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681) (alteration in original). “[P]leadings that . . . are no more than
conclusions . . . are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can
provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (“Rule 8(a)(2) still requires
a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief. Without some factual
allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirement
of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which
the claim rests.”).
“A complaint can be frivolous either factually or legally. Any complaint that is
legally frivolous would ipso facto fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
Hill, 630 F.3d at 470 (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 328-29 (1989)).
Whether a complaint is factually frivolous under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and
1915(e)(2)(B)(i) is a separate issue from whether it fails to state a claim for
relief. Statutes allowing a complaint to be dismissed as frivolous give
“judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the
complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual
contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S. Ct. 1827
(interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1915). Unlike a dismissal for failure to state a
claim, where a judge must accept all factual allegations as true, Iqbal, 129 S.
Ct. at 1949-50, a judge does not have to accept “fantastic or delusional”
factual allegations as true in prisoner complaints that are reviewed for
frivolousness. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28, 109 S. Ct. 1827.
Id. at 471.
“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at
383 (quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants and
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prisoners are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, No. 092259, 2011 WL 285251, at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se
complaint for failure to comply with “unique pleading requirements” and stating “a court
cannot ‘create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’”) (quoting
Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975)) (alteration in
original); Payne v. Sec’y of Treas., 73 F. App’x 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming sua
sponte dismissal of complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and stating, “[n]either this
court nor the district court is required to create Payne’s claim for her”); cf. Pliler v. Ford,
542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004) (“District judges have no obligation to act as counsel or paralegal
to pro se litigants.”); Young Bok Song v. Gipson, 423 F. App’x 506, 510 (6th Cir. 2011)
(“[W]e decline to affirmatively require courts to ferret out the strongest cause of action on
behalf of pro se litigants. Not only would that duty be overly burdensome, it would
transform the courts from neutral arbiters of disputes into advocates for a particular party.
While courts are properly charged with protecting the rights of all who come before it, that
responsibility does not encompass advising litigants as to what legal theories they should
pursue.”).
Brown filed his complaint on the court-supplied form for actions under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
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to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial
officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity,
injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated
or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any
Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be
considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a
deprivation of rights secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States (2)
committed by a defendant acting under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,
398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).
Brown has sued both Carroll County and Humphreys County. When a § 1983 claim
is made against a municipality or other local governmental entity, the court must analyze
two distinct issues: (1) whether plaintiff’s harm was caused by a constitutional violation;
and (2) if so, whether the municipality is responsible for that violation. Collins v. City of
Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992). The second issue is dispositive of
Plaintiff’s claims in this case.
A local government “cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—
or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat
superior theory.” Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); see also Searcy
v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1994); Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342,
1345 (6th Cir. 1994). A municipality cannot be held responsible for a constitutional
deprivation unless there is a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and
the alleged constitutional deprivation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-92; Deaton v. Montgomery
Co., Ohio, 989 F.2d 885, 889 (6th Cir. 1993). To demonstrate municipal liability, a
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plaintiff “must (1) identify the municipal policy or custom, (2) connect the policy to the
municipality, and (3) show that his particular injury was incurred due to execution of that
policy.” Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Garner v. Memphis
Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)). “Where a government ‘custom has not
received formal approval through the body’s official decisionmaking channels,’ such a
custom may still be the subject of a § 1983 suit.” Alkire, 330 F.3d at 815 (quoting Monell,
436 U.S. at 690-91). The policy or custom “must be ‘the moving force of the constitutional
violation’ in order to establish the liability of a government body under § 1983.” Searcy,
38 F.3d at 286 (quoting Polk Co. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. at 326 (citation omitted)). “[T]he
touchstone of ‘official policy’ is designed ‘to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts
of employees of the municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited
to action for which the municipality is actually responsible.’”

City of St. Louis v.

Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 138 (1988) (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 47980 (1986)) (emphasis in original).
Although civil rights plaintiffs are not required to plead the facts demonstrating
municipal liability with particularity, Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty Narcotics Intelligence
& Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1993), the complaint must be sufficient to put
the municipality on notice of the plaintiff’s theory of liability, see, e.g., Fowler v.
Campbell, No. 3:06CV-P610-H, 2007 WL 1035007, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 30, 2007);
Yeackering v. Ankrom, No. 4:05-CV-00018-M, 2005 WL 1877964, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Aug.
5, 2005); Oliver v. City of Memphis, No. 04-2074-B, 2004 WL 3316242, at *4 (W.D. Tenn.

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Dec. 2, 2004). The allegations of the complaint fail to identify an official policy or custom
of either Carroll County or Humphreys County which caused injury to Brown.
Brown cannot sue Defendant Jowers for money damages arising from the institution
of criminal proceedings against him or from actions taken during the criminal proceeding
itself. Prosecutors are absolutely immune from suit for actions taken in initiating and
pursuing criminal prosecutions because that conduct is “intimately associated with the
judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976).
“A prosecutor’s decision to initiate a prosecution, including the decision to file a criminal
complaint or seek an arrest warrant, is protected by absolute immunity.” Howell v.
Sanders, 668 F.3d 344, 351 (6th Cir. 2012). Any claim for money damages against
Defendant Jowers for these activities is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Id. at
427-28; Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 490-492 (1991); Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135,
1137 (6th Cir. 1989); Jones v. Shankland, 800 F.2d 77, 80 (6th Cir. 1986). Therefore, he
cannot be sued for malicious prosecution. O’Neal v. O’Neal, 23 F. App’x 368, 370 (6th
Cir. 2001); see also Spurlock v. Thompson, 330 F.3d 791, 797 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that
"prosecutors are absolutely immune from many malicious prosecution claims"); Roybal v.
State of Tenn. Dist. Attorney’s Office, 84 F. App’x 589 (6th Cir. 2003).
Likewise, Brown has no claims against Defendants Logan and Parrish. It is well
settled that judges, in the performance of their judicial functions, are absolutely immune
from civil liability. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-10 (1991); Stump v. Sparkman, 435
U.S. 349, 363 (1978); Bright v. Gallia Cnty., Ohio, 753 F.3d 639, 648-49 (6th Cir. 2014);
Leech v. DeWeese, 689 F.3d 538, 542 (6th Cir. 2012). Whether a judge or other official is
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entitled to absolute immunity in a given case turns on a “functional” analysis. Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 810-11 (1982). The “touchstone” for applicability of absolute
judicial immunity is “performance of the function of resolving disputes between parties, or
of authoritatively adjudicating private rights.” Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S.
429, 435-36 (1993). Brown’s complaint does not allege that either Judge Logan or Judge
Parrish took any action that was not within the scope of their judicial function; therefore,
Brown’s claims against Defendants Logan and Parrish are barred by judicial immunity.
For the foregoing reasons, Brown’s complaint is subject to dismissal in its entirety
for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.
The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may allow a prisoner to amend his
complaint to avoid a sua sponte dismissal under the PLRA. LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d
944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013); see also Brown v. R.I., No. 12-1403, 2013 WL 646489, at *1 (1st
Cir. Feb. 22, 2013) (per curiam) (“Ordinarily, before dismissal for failure to state a claim
is ordered, some form of notice and an opportunity to cure the deficiencies in the complaint
must be afforded.”). Leave to amend is not required where a deficiency cannot be cured.
Brown, 2013 WL 646489, at *1; Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. United States, 257 F.3d 31, 37 (1st
Cir. 2001) (“This does not mean, of course, that every sua sponte dismissal entered without
prior notice to the plaintiff automatically must be reversed. If it is crystal clear that the
plaintiff cannot prevail and that amending the complaint would be futile, then a sua sponte
dismissal may stand.”); Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002)
(“in forma pauperis plaintiffs who file complaints subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)
should receive leave to amend unless amendment would be inequitable or futile”); Curley
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v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We agree with the majority view that sua
sponte dismissal of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged by amendment comports
with due process and does not infringe the right of access to the courts.”). In this case, the
Court concludes that leave to amend is not warranted.
The Court DISMISSES Brown’s complaint for failure to state a claim on which
relief can be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). Leave
to amend is DENIED.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(3), the Court must also consider whether an appeal
by Jefferson in this case would be taken in good faith. The good faith standard is an
objective one. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). The test for whether
an appeal is taken in good faith is whether the litigant seeks appellate review of any issue
that is not frivolous. Id. It would be inconsistent for a district court to determine that a
complaint should be dismissed prior to service on the Defendants, but has sufficient merit
to support an appeal in forma pauperis. See Williams v. Kullman, 722 F.2d 1048, 1050 n.1
(2d Cir. 1983). The same considerations that lead the Court to dismiss this case for failure
to state a claim also compel the conclusion that an appeal would not be taken in good faith.
Therefore, it is CERTIFIED, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal in this
matter by Brown would not be taken in good faith.
The Court must also address the assessment of the $505 appellate filing fee if Brown
nevertheless appeals the dismissal of this case. A certification that an appeal is not taken
in good faith does not affect an indigent prisoner plaintiff’s ability to take advantage of the
installment procedures contained in § 1915(b). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d
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601, 610-11 (6th Cir. 1997), partially overruled on other grounds by LaFountain, 716 F.3d
at 951. McGore sets out specific procedures for implementing the PLRA, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)-(b). Therefore, Brown is instructed that if he wishes to take advantage of the
installment procedures for paying the appellate filing fee, he must comply with the
procedures set out in the PLRA and McGore by filing an updated in forma pauperis
affidavit and a current, certified copy of his inmate trust account for the six months
immediately preceding the filing of the notice of appeal.
For analysis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) of future filings, if any, by Brown, this is
the first dismissal of one of his cases as frivolous or for failure to state a claim. This “strike”
shall take effect when judgment is entered. Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759, 176364 (2015).
The Clerk is directed to prepare a judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ James D. Todd
JAMES D. TODD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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