Pruitt v. Ford et al

Filing 6

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND. Signed by Judge James D. Todd on 8/24/18. (mbm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION
A.T. PRUITT,
Plaintiff,
VS.
TAMMY FORD, ET AL.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. 17-1134-JDT-cgc

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND
On July 11, 2017, Plaintiff A.T. Pruitt, who is currently incarcerated at the Whiteville
Correctional Facility (WCF) in Whiteville, Tennessee, filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1 & 2.)

The Court

subsequently granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis and assessed the civil filing fee pursuant
to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b). (ECF No. 4.) The Clerk
shall record the Defendants as former WCF Warden Tammy Ford and Chief of Security Conrad
Artis.
The allegations of the complaint, in their entirety, are as follows:
I’ve been in the segregation unit since 5/17/17 & since my placement I haven’t
been able to communicate with my love[d] ones & it’s been over a month now since
I’ve last checked it & it still say my PIN# to my phone is invalid for reasons
unknown. Per they policy I am allowed to us[e] the phone & I’m pending transfer
to another facility. Warden Tammy Ford conspired with Chief Conrad Artis to
de-activate my phone.
The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint, or any
portion thereof, if the complaint—

(1)
is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted; or
(2)

seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may be
granted, the standards under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007), are applied.
Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). “Accepting all well-pleaded allegations in
the complaint as true, the Court ‘consider[s] the factual allegations in [the] complaint to determine
if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.’” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir.
2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). “[P]leadings that . . . are no more than conclusions, are
not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a
complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (“Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket
assertion, of entitlement to relief. Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to
see how a claimant could satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of
the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.”).
“A complaint can be frivolous either factually or legally.” Hill, 630 F.3d at 470 (citing
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989)). “Any complaint that is legally frivolous would
ipso facto fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Id. (citing Neitzke, 490 U.S. at
328-29).
Whether a complaint is factually frivolous under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and
1915(e)(2)(B)(i) is a separate issue from whether it fails to state a claim for relief.
Statutes allowing a complaint to be dismissed as frivolous give judges not only the
2

authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but
also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and
dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless. Unlike a
dismissal for failure to state a claim, where a judge must accept all factual
allegations as true, a judge does not have to accept “fantastic or delusional” factual
allegations as true in prisoner complaints that are reviewed for frivolousness.
Id. at 471 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting
Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants, however, are not exempt
from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591,
594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 612, 613 (6th Cir. Jan. 31,
2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for failure to comply with “unique pleading
requirements” and stating “a court cannot ‘create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in
his pleading’” (quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir.
1975))); Payne v. Sec’y of Treas., 73 F. App’x 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming sua sponte
dismissal of complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and stating, “[n]either this court nor the
district court is required to create Payne’s claim for her”); cf. Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231
(2004) (“District judges have no obligation to act as counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants.”);
Young Bok Song v. Gipson, 423 F. App’x 506, 510 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e decline to affirmatively
require courts to ferret out the strongest cause of action on behalf of pro se litigants. Not only
would that duty be overly burdensome, it would transform the courts from neutral arbiters of
disputes into advocates for a particular party. While courts are properly charged with protecting
the rights of all who come before it, that responsibility does not encompass advising litigants as to
what legal theories they should pursue.”).
3

Plaintiff filed his complaint on the court-supplied form for actions under 42 U.S.C. §1983.
Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was
violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section,
any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be
considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation of rights
secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States (2) committed by a defendant acting
under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).
Pruitt claims that the Defendants conspired to de-activate his phone, or at least to
de-activate a PIN number required for use of a prison telephone system,1 which has prevented him
from calling his loved ones. Such a claim may arise under both the Eighth Amendment and the
First Amendment.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishments, see generally Wilson v.
Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991), and an Eighth Amendment claim consists of both objective and
subjective components. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Hudson v. McMillian,
503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992); Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298; Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d at 383; Mingus v.
Butler, 591 F.3d 474, 479-80 (6th Cir. 2010).

1

The objective component requires that the

It would be highly unlikely for Pruitt to have a cell phone, which is prohibited and
considered contraband in most prison facilities.
4

deprivation be “sufficiently serious.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8; Wilson,
501 U.S. at 298.
To satisfy the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must show
that he “is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm,” Farmer, 511
U.S. at 834; see also Miller v. Calhoun Cnty., 408 F.3d 803, 812 (6th Cir. 2005), or that he has
been deprived of the “‘minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,’” Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298
(quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)); see also Hadix v. Johnson, 367 F.3d 513,
525 (6th Cir. 2004). The Constitution “‘does not mandate comfortable prisons.’” Wilson, 501
U.S. at 298 (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349). “[R]outine discomfort ‘is part of the penalty that
criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.’” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9 (quoting
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347).

Thus, “extreme deprivations are required to make out a

conditions-of-confinement claim.” Id.
Pruitt alleges that he has been unable to use the phone since he was placed in the
segregation unit.2 However, use of a phone is not a basic human need, and the denial of privileges
such as the use of a phone while in segregation does not constitute the type of extreme deprivation
required for an Eighth Amendment claim. Evans v. Vinson, 427 F. App’x 437, 443 (6th Cir.
2011) (“Although the list is not exhaustive, we have found the minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities to include food, clothing, shelter, medical treatment, and reasonable safety.”); Dallas v.
Chippewa Corr. Facility, No. 2:17-cv-198, 2018 WL 3829203, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 13, 2018).
Alternatively, Pruitt does not allege that he suffered any physical injury due to the loss of
his cell phone privileges. Therefore, the Eighth Amendment claim also is barred by 42 U.S.C.
2

Although it is not specifically stated by Pruitt, the Court surmises that severely restricted
phone usage may be a condition placed on WCF prisoners who are in segregation.
5

§ 1997e(e), which provides: “No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a
jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody
without a prior showing of physical injury or the commission of a sexual act.”
Prisoners have a First Amendment right to communicate with family and friends, and
under certain circumstances the denial of access to a telephone or writing materials may violate
that right. See Washington v. Reno, 35 F.3d 1093, 1100 (6th Cir. 1994) (prisoners have a right to
“reasonable” access to a telephone). However, there is “no right to unlimited telephone use.” Id.
(quoting Benzel v. Grammer, 869 F.2d 1105, 1108 (8th Cir. 1989)). “Instead, a prisoner’s right to
telephone access is ‘subject to rational limitations in the face of legitimate security interests of the
penal institution.’” Id. (quoting Strandberg v. City of Helena, 791 F.2d 744, 747 (9th Cir. 1986));
see also Almahdi v. Ashcroft, 301 F. App’x 519 521-22 (3d Cir. 2009) (prison’s restriction of
inmate

to one phone call per month as a disciplinary sanction did not violate the First

Amendment). In this case, Pruitt does not allege that he could not communicate with his family
and friends by letter. The Court finds he has failed to state a claim under the First Amendment.
Pruitt also does not sufficiently allege a claim for civil conspiracy. As the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals has explained:
In Spadafore v. Gardner, 330 F.3d 849 (6th Cir. 2003), we stated the standard
governing a § 1983 conspiracy claim:
A civil conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons to injure
another by unlawful action. Express agreement among all the conspirators
is not necessary to find the existence of a civil conspiracy. Each
conspirator need not have known all of the details of the illegal plan or all of
the participants involved. All that must be shown is that there was a single
plan, that the alleged coconspirator shared in the general conspiratorial
objective, and that an overt act was committed in furtherance of the
conspiracy that caused injury to the complainant.

6

330 F.3d at 854 (quoting Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935, 943–44 (6th Cir. 1985)).
Although circumstantial evidence may prove a conspiracy, “[i]t is well-settled that
conspiracy claims must be pled with some degree of specificity and that vague and
conclusory allegations unsupported by material facts will not be sufficient to state
such a claim under § 1983.” Id. (quoting Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1538
(6th Cir. 1987)); accord Farhat v. Jopke, 370 F.3d 580, 599 (6th Cir. 2004). That
pleading standard is “relatively strict.” Fieger v. Cox, 524 F.3d 770, 776 (6th Cir.
2008).
Heyne v. Metro. Nashville Pub. Sch., 655 F.3d 556, 563 (6th Cir. 2011).

An assertion,

unaccompanied by supporting facts, that parties conspired with each other is a legal conclusion
that a court need not accept as true. Id. at 563-64 (collecting cases). Allegations of “a plan or
agreement to violate [the plaintiff’s] constitutional rights” is required. Id. at 564. Pruitt’s
allegations that the Defendants conspired with each other are entirely devoid of supporting facts.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the complaint is subject to dismissal in its entirety for
failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.
The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may allow a prisoner to amend his complaint
to avoid a sua sponte dismissal under the PLRA. LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th
Cir. 2013); see also Brown v. Rhode Island, 511 F. App’x 4, 5 (1st Cir. Feb. 22, 2013) (per curiam)
(“Ordinarily, before dismissal for failure to state a claim is ordered, some form of notice and an
opportunity to cure the deficiencies in the complaint must be afforded.”). Leave to amend is not
required where a deficiency cannot be cured. Brown, 511 F. App’x at 5; Gonzalez-Gonzalez v.
United States, 257 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 2001) (“This does not mean, of course, that every sua
sponte dismissal entered without prior notice to the plaintiff automatically must be reversed. If it
is crystal clear that the plaintiff cannot prevail and that amending the complaint would be futile,
then a sua sponte dismissal may stand.”); Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d
Cir. 2002) (“in forma pauperis plaintiffs who file complaints subject to dismissal under Rule
7

12(b)(6) should receive leave to amend unless amendment would be inequitable or futile”); Curley
v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We agree with the majority view that sua sponte
dismissal of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged by amendment comports with due
process and does not infringe the right of access to the courts.”). In this case, the Court cannot
conclude that leave to amend would be futile.
In conclusion, the Court DISMISSES the complaint for failure to state a claim on which
relief can be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). However,
leave to amend is GRANTED. Pruitt is advised that any amended complaint will supersede the
original complaint and must be complete in itself without reference to the prior pleadings. The
text of the complaint must allege sufficient facts to support each claim without reference to any
extraneous document. Any exhibits must be identified by number in the text of the amended
complaint and must be attached to the complaint. All claims alleged in an amended complaint
must arise from the facts alleged in the original complaint. Each claim for relief must be stated in
a separate count and must identify each defendant sued in that count. If Pruitt fails to file an
amended complaint within the time specified, the Court will assess a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(g) and enter judgment.
Pruitt is reminded that he must promptly notify the Clerk, in writing, of any change of
address or extended absence.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ James D. Todd
JAMES D. TODD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

8