Taylor v. City of Brownsville et al

Filing 34

ORDER DISMISSING DEFENDANTS CITY OF BROWNSVILLE, MAYOR BILL RAWLS, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY, CHIEF BARRY DIEBOLD, IN HIS OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, AND OFFICER DAVID SCOTT, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY, CLAIMS AGAINST UNNAMED DEFENDANTS, AND DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS UNDER THE TENNESSEE CONSTITUTION. Signed by Judge J. Daniel Breen on 11/8/18. (skc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION
MELVIN LEMARK TAYLOR,
Plaintiff,
v.

No. 1:18-cv-02445-JDB-egb

CITY OF BROWNSVILLE, et al,
Defendant.
______________________________________________________________________________
ORDER DISMISSING DEFENDANTS CITY OF BROWNSVILLE, MAYOR BILL RAWLS,
IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY, CHIEF BARRY DIEBOLD, IN HIS OFFICIAL AND
INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, AND OFFICER DAVID SCOTT, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY,
CLAIMS AGAINST UNNAMED DEFENDANTS, AND DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S
CLAIMS UNDER THE TENNESSEE CONSTITUTION
______________________________________________________________________________
This action was filed on June 30, 2018 by Plaintiff, Melvin LeMark Taylor, alleging
violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by the Defendants, along with state law claims, stemming from
Taylor’s arrest in Brownsville, Tennessee. (D.E. 7.) Before the Court is the September 14,
2018, motion of Defendants, City of Brownsville, Mayor Bill Rawls, and Chief Diebold, for
judgment on the pleadings. (Docket Entry (“D.E.”) 26.)
In their motion, Defendants argue that all official-capacity claims should be dismissed as
superfluous; that Plaintiff has failed to state claims against the City of Brownsville and
Defendants, Mayor Rawls and Chief Diebold, in their individual capacities; and that he has failed
to state a claim under the Tennessee Constitution. 1 (D.E. 26.) In his response to the motion, 2

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Defendants additionally contend that the claims against the unnamed defendants should
be dismissed as time-barred, (D.E. 26), but Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed them in his second
reply, rendering this argument moot. (D.E. 31.)
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Taylor only answers the arguments for dismissal of Defendant, City of Brownsville. (D.E. 31.)
Furthermore, because the movants adequately demonstrated deficiencies in Plaintiff’s claims as
to the remaining Defendants other than Officer Scott, (D.E. 26), and because Taylor does not
dispute the dismissal of his official-capacity claims or the individual-capacity claims against
Mayor Rawls and Chief Diebold, those claims are DISMISSED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that, on the evening of July 2, 2017, he went to visit Pastor David
Jackson at his home in Brownsville, Tennessee, but the minister was not there. (D.E. 7 at ¶ 12.)
Taylor waited in the driveway and began excitedly praying, prompting a concerned neighbor to
call the authorities. (Id. at ¶ 13.) When the police arrived, Plaintiff was unresponsive and
continued praying. (Id. at ¶ 14.) Eventually, he heard an officer and turned around. (Id.) At this
point, Taylor asserts that he put his hands up, but despite his compliance, the officers threw him
to the ground, beat him, and tasered him. (Id. at ¶ 16–18.) Plaintiff maintains that throughout
the confrontation he broke no laws and responded to the police’s commands to the best of his
physical and mental abilities. (Id. at ¶ 15–17.) Taylor’s complaint states that he sustained severe
injuries as a result of the altercation, some of which are chronic. (Id. at ¶ 19–20.)
Plaintiff further alleges that the City of Brownsville, in this instance and other, unnamed
occurrences, has systematically failed to appropriately investigate the purported constitutional
violations of its officers. (Id. at ¶ 25.) The municipality’s ratification of this conduct by its
indifference, Taylor maintains, has emboldened the police to engage in more egregious conduct.
(Id. at ¶ 26–27.) This acquiescence, Plaintiff asserts, rises to the level of an impermissible failure
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Plaintiff filed a response to the motion on October 23, 2018, (D.E. 29) and filed a
successive, virtually identical version the next day. (D.E. 31.) The only difference between the
two is that the second response contains language voluntarily dismissing the unnamed
Defendants. (D.E. 31.) The Court will reference the more recent response in this order.
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to train, and cultivated a policy, practice, or custom of maintaining a “code of silence” regarding
such complaints, which demonstrates the City’s deliberate indifference. (Id. at ¶ 23, 27, 53–68.)
LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 12(c) provides that “[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay
trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” A Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on
the pleadings is governed by the same standards as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Lindsey v.
Yates, 498 F.3d 434, 437 n.5 (6th Cir. 2007). Thus, when a party moves for judgment on the
pleadings, “all well-pleaded material allegations of the pleadings of the opposing party must be
taken as true, and the motion may be granted only if the moving party is nevertheless clearly
entitled to judgment.” JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 510 F.3d 577, 581 (6th Cir. 2007)
(quoting S. Ohio Bank v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 479 F.2d 478, 480 (6th
Cir. 1973)). As with a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), although “detailed factual allegations” are
unnecessary, a plaintiff must still “provide the grounds of [her] entitlement to relief” beyond just
“labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted). Thus, “[t]he ‘Court need not accept the plaintiff’s legal conclusions or unwarranted
factual inferences as true.’” Barany-Snyder v. Weiner, 539 F.3d 327, 332 (6th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Commercial Money Ctr., Inc.. v. Illinois Union Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 327, 336 (6th Cir.
2007)). The motion must be “granted when no material issue of fact exists and the party making
the motion is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Winget, 510 F.3d at 582 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Paskvan v. City of Cleveland Civil Serv. Comm’n, 946 F.2d
1233, 1235 (6th Cir. 1991)).

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ANALYSIS
Municipal Liability
“A municipality or other local government may be liable under [§ 1983] if the
governmental body itself subjects a person to a deprivation of [constitutional] rights or causes a
person to be subjected to such deprivation.” Richmond v. Huq, 885 F.3d 928, 948 (6th Cir.
2018) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted), reh’g en banc denied (May 17,
2018). “A municipality may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its
employees or agents.” Stanfield v. City of Lima, 727 F. App'x 841, 851 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting
Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013)). Because municipalities do not incur
respondeat superior liability under § 1983, “a plaintiff must adequately plead (1) that a violation
of a federal right took place, (2) that the defendants acted under color of state law, and (3) that a
municipality’s policy or custom caused that violation to happen” to avoid dismissal under Rule
12(c). Bright v. Gallia Cnty., Ohio, 753 F.3d 639, 660 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Lambert v.
Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 439 (6th Cir. 2008)).
A plaintiff can make a showing of an illegal policy or custom by demonstrating
one of the following: (1) the existence of an illegal official policy or legislative
enactment; (2) that an official with final decision making authority ratified illegal
actions; (3) the existence of a policy of inadequate training or supervision; or (4)
the existence of a custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights violations.
Nouri v. Cty. of Oakland, 615 F. App'x 291, 296 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Burgess, 735 F.3d at
478). Plaintiff’s complaint contains boilerplate language that seems to embrace all four theories
of municipal liability outlined in Nouri, (D.E. 7 at ¶ 53–68), but his response to the instant
motion suggests that he, in fact, only wishes to advance the latter three, (D.E. 31 at PageID 170–
71.)

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A.

Ratification of Illegal Actions
Proof of the ratification theory requires a plaintiff to show that “(1) a final municipal

policymaker approved an investigation . . . (2) . . . so inadequate as to constitute a ratification of
the[] alleged constitutional violation.” Rush v. City of Mansfield, 771 F. Supp. 2d 827, 861–62
(N.D. Ohio 2011) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wright v.
City of Canton, Ohio, 138 F. Supp. 2d 955, 966 (N.D. Ohio 2001)). As the Sixth Circuit noted,
“[a] single decision can constitute a policy, if that decision is made by an official who ‘possesses
final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered.’” Flagg v. City of
Detroit, 715 F.3d 165, 174 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469,
480–81 (1986)). This “means that [the official’s] decisions [must be] ‘final and unreviewable
and . . . not constrained by the official policies of superior officials.’” Id. at 175 (quoting Miller
v. Calhoun Cnty., 408 F.3d 803, 814 (6th Cir. 2005)).
Although Plaintiff presents the Court with an adequate policymaker in Defendant, Chief
Diebold, he does not allege that Diebold made a decision regarding an investigation or that he
was even made aware of the incident. Thus, the Court is inclined to agree with the movants that
“Taylor has failed to push his claim across the line between possibility and probability.” (D.E.
26-1 at PageID 150.) For this reason, Plaintiff’s ratification argument fails.
B.

Inadequate Training or Supervision
Inadequate training or supervision will give rise to municipal liability, “[i]n limited

circumstances, [where] a local government’s decision not to train certain employees about their
legal duty to avoid violating citizens’ rights . . . rise[s] to the level of an official government
policy for purposes of § 1983.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011). To establish “a
failure to train or supervise claim,” a plaintiff must sufficiently plead that “(1) the training or

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supervision was inadequate for the tasks performed; (2) the inadequacy was the result of the
municipality’s deliberate indifference; and (3) the inadequacy was closely related to or actually
caused the injury.” Regets v. City of Plymouth, 568 F. App’x 380, 394 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Ellis ex rel. Pendergrass v. Cleveland Mun. Sch. Dist., 455 F.3d 690, 700 (6th Cir. 2006)); see
also DeSoto v. Bd. of Parks & Recreation, 64 F. Supp. 3d 1070, 1084–86 (M.D. Tenn. 2014)
(applying Regets in the context of a 12(b)(6) motion). The legal standards for a claim of
inadequate supervision and one of inadequate training are essentially the same. See Okolo v.
Metro. Gov. of Nashville, 892 F. Supp. 2d 931, 943 (M.D. Tenn. 2012) (“Liability for
unconstitutionally inadequate supervision or discipline is treated, for all intents and purposes, as
a failure to train.”).
Taylor’s complaint asserts that the City underfunded the police department’s training
program; that the curriculum was substantively inadequate; and that there was no supervision of
the named and unnamed officers. (D.E. 31 at ¶ 56.) He then states that the City was aware of
these deficiencies, (Id. at ¶ 57), and that they caused Taylor’s resulting harm, (Id. at ¶ 68.) If
taken at face value, Plaintiff’s complaint appears to allege the necessary elements set forth in
Regets above. However, these accusations never depart the elemental framework of a failure to
train claim because no plausible factual contentions accompany them. Thus, the statements
amount to no more than either “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements,” Foster v. Michigan, 573 F. App’x 377, 387 (6th Cir.
2014) (quoting Iqbal, 566 U.S. at 678), or “legal conclusions masquerading as factual
allegations,” Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co. v. Youth Alive, Inc., 732 F.3d 645, 649 (6th Cir. 2013)
(quoting Terry v. Tyson Farms, Inc., 604 F.3d 272, 275–76 (6th Cir. 2010)), and they do not aid
Plaintiffs in establishing a factually plausible claim.

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C.

Custom of Tolerance of or Acquiescence to Federal Rights Violations
For purposes of Monell liability, a “custom” is a practice that “may fairly subject a

municipality to liability on the theory that the relevant practice is so widespread as to have the
force of law,” even though it is not formally approved. Ford v. Cty. of Grand Traverse, 535 F.3d
483, 495–96 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bd. Of the Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty., Oklahoma v.
Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403–04 (1997); see also Doe v. Claiborne Cty., Tenn. ex rel. Claiborne
Cty. Bd. Of Educ., 103 F.3d 495, 508 (6th Cir. 1996) (“In short, a ‘custom’ is a ‘legal institution’
not memorialized by written law.”). A meritorious complaint must “demonstrate[] a pattern of
inadequate investigation of similar claims . . . .” Burgess, 735 F.3d at 478 (citing Thomas v. City
of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426, 433 (6th Cir. 2005)). Likewise, a “purported failure to discipline
a single officer, as opposed to a systematic policy, cannot support a claim of municipal liability.”
Sexton v. Kenton Cnty. Det. Ctr., 702 F. Supp. 2d 784, 791 (E.D. Ky. 2010) (quoting Meas v.
City & Cty. of San Francisco, 681 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2010)).
Taylor avers that the offending custom perpetrated by the City is its fostering of a “code
of silence” within its police department that allowed officers to violate citizens’ constitutional
rights without regard to consequences, and that it failed to investigate and discipline the resulting
misconduct (D.E. 7 at ¶ 56, 58.) What Plaintiff’s complaint fails to do is furnish examples of the
City of Brownsville operating in this manner. Therefore, the Court finds that these allegations
amount to nothing more than the type of “unwarranted factual inferences” that it is not required
to accept as true. Barany-Snyder, 539 F.3d at 332.
Claims Under the Tennessee Constitution
Taylor also attempts to bring claims against Defendants under the Tennessee
Constitution. (D.E. 7 at ¶ 20.) However, the law is well-settled that the Tennessee Constitution

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affords no cause of action for constitutional violations. Bowden Bldg. Corp. v. Tennessee Real
Estate Comm’n, 15 S.W.3d 434, 446 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). Furthermore, Plaintiff failed to
respond to Defendants’ arguments on this point, so the claims may have been abandoned. In any
event, these claims are DISMISSED.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings is
GRANTED in its entirety. Defendants, City of Brownsville, Chief Barry Diebold, and Mayor
Bill Rawls are DISMISSED. Any official capacity claims as to Officer David Scott are also
DISMISSED. Furthermore, all claims made under the Tennessee Constitution are DISMISSED.
Because Plaintiff dismissed the unidentified officers, the only remaining defendant is Officer
David Scott, in his individual capacity.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 8th day of November 2018.
s/ J. DANIEL BREEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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