Adams et al v. Adient US LLC et al

Filing 156

ORDER Addressing Motions to Substitute. Signed by Judge John T. Fowlkes, Jr. on 9/25/2024. (Fowlkes, J.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
CHARLES E. ADAMS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

v.

ADIENT US LLC, et al.,
Defendants.

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No. 1:20-cv-01197-JTF-jay

ORDER ADDRESSING MOTIONS TO SUBSTITUTE
Nearly six years ago, Plaintiffs commenced this environmental mass tort action in the
Circuit Court of Henderson County, Tennessee. (ECF No. 1-1, 2.) Since then, the case has moved
at a glacial pace. Now before the Court are four motions. First, is Plaintiffs’ Supplement in Support
of Motion to Substitute Deceased and Incapacitated Plaintiffs (“First Motion to Substitute”), 1 filed
on May 23, 2024, to which Defendants responded on June 11, 2024. (ECF Nos. 125 & 132.)
Second is Plaintiffs’ June 18, 2024 Motion for Leave to File a Reply to Defendants’ Response,
which Defendants filed a response in opposition to on June 25, 2024. (ECF Nos. 133 & 135.) Third
is Plaintiffs’ Motion to Substitute Virmeka Jefferson for Her Deceased Parents, Wilbert and
Virginia Jefferson (“Second Motion to Substitute”), filed on June 19, 2024; Defendants responded
on July 1, 2024. (ECF No. 134 & 139.) Fourth is Plaintiffs unopposed Motion for Leave to File a
Reply to this Response, filed on July 8, 2024. (ECF No. 140.) For the reasons set forth below,
Plaintiffs’ motions for leave to file replies are GRANTED; Plaintiffs’ First Motion to Substitute
The original or first motion to substitute was filed on April 4, 2024. (ECF No. 117.) Defendants
responded on April 18, 2024. (ECF No. 120.)
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is GRANTED as to all proposed substitutions except Virmeka Jefferson for the Jeffersons; and
Plaintiffs’ Second Motion to Substitute is DENIED.
I.

BACKGROUND

This case arises out of injuries allegedly sustained from Defendants’ past and ongoing
improper storage, discharge release, and inadequate remediation of toxic chemicals because of
chemical releases and related conduct at an industrial facility located in Lexington, Tennessee.
(ECF No. 57 (citation omitted).) On January 8, 2024, Defendants submitted a suggestion of death
for eight plaintiffs. (ECF No. 101.) Plaintiffs timely filed their First Motion to Substitute on April
4, 2024, requesting that seven of the identified deceased Plaintiffs and three deceased Plaintiffs
not identified by Defendants be substituted for next-of-kin. (ECF No 117, 2.) They also requested
that an incapacitated Plaintiff be substituted with her niece who holds a power of attorney. (Id. at
2-3.) Defendants filed a response on April 18, 2024. (ECF No. 120.) There, Defendants argued
that the Motion should be denied based on numerous deficiencies in Plaintiffs’ motion to
substitute. (Id.)
On May 9, 2024, the parties appeared for a status conference. During the conference, the
Court informed Plaintiffs that it found many of Defendants’ concerns with the pending motion to
substitute to be well taken and that their proposed reply was inadequate. (Id.) The parties agreed
that Plaintiffs should have another opportunity to reply and meaningfully address those issues.
(Id.) Accordingly, the Court permitted Plaintiffs to file a renewed reply, and granted Defendants
leave to file a sur-reply. (ECF No. 124.) Plaintiffs filed their renewed reply on May 23, 2024. (ECF
No. 125.) As evidenced by their Response, Defendants continue to oppose Plaintiff’s Motions.
(ECF No. 132.) Specifically, Defendants maintain that Plaintiffs have still not made the affirmative
showing required to perform a substitution, and that Plaintiffs improperly inserted a substitute for

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two deceased plaintiffs in their “renewed reply.” (ECF No. 132, 3 & 8.) Plaintiffs then sought
leave to file a reply to Defendants’ Response. (ECF No. 133.) Defendants opposed that motion.
(ECF No. 135.)
In response to Defendants’ challenge to the propriety of including a substitution of two
plaintiffs not mentioned in the First Motion to Substitute, Plaintiffs filed their Second Motion to
Substitute on June 19, 2024. (ECF No. 134.) This Motion seeks to substitute Virmeka Jefferson
for her deceased parents, Wilbert and Virginia Jefferson. (Id. at 1.) Defendants oppose the relief
sought therein, contending that the Motion is time-barred and that Plaintiffs have failed to show
that Virmeka Jefferson is the proper party. (ECF No. 139, 3-9.) In Plaintiffs’ proposed Reply
attached to their unopposed Motion for Leave to File a Reply, they argue that the motion is timely
because the substitution limitations period begins to run once suggestion of death is made on the
record, and that Virmeka is the proper party. (ECF No. 140.)
II.

LEGAL STANDARD

A request for substitution is made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a)(1)
which provides that:
If a party dies and the claim is not extinguished, the court may order substitution of the
proper party. A motion for substitution may be made by any party or by the decedent's
successor or representative. If the motion is not made within 90 days after service of a
statement noting the death, the action by or against the decedent must be dismissed.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(a)(1).
“The language of Rule 25 is permissive and the decision to substitute a party lies within
the sound discretion of the Court.” Turnage v. Oldham, No. 2:16-CV-2907-SHM-TMP, 2019 WL
5424425, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 22, 2019) (quoting Watts v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., No. 08-cv2354, 2015 WL 1456647, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 30, 2015)). Rule 25(a)(1) sets forth the procedure
for substituting a party, but the survivorship law of the forum state determines whether a claim
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brought under state law survives a plaintiff's death. 7C Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice
and Procedure § 1954 (3d ed. 2019). Provided that the action survives the plaintiff’s death, the
proper party inquiry is similarly a substantive issue for which state law provides the rule. See Watts
v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., No. 08-cv-2354, 2015 WL 1456647, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 30, 2015)
(quoting In re Baycol Products Litigation, 616 F.3d 778, 783 (8th Cir. 2010)).
In Tennessee, “[n]o civil action commenced, whether founded on wrongs or contracts,
except actions for wrongs affecting the character of the plaintiff, shall abate by the death of either
party, but may be revived.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-102. Revival by heirs of the decedent, as
sought here, is permissible “if no person will administer on the estate of a deceased plaintiff.”
Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-104. A decedent’s heirs include “those persons, including the surviving
spouse, who are entitled under the statutes of intestate succession to the property of a decedent.”
Tenn. Code Ann. § 31-1-101(5) “Because the survival statute abrogates the common law rule, the
statutory method for preserving either an existing action or a vested cause of action not yet
commenced must be strictly followed.” Timmins v. Lindsey, 310 S.W.3d 834, 840 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2009) (citations omitted). Tennessee courts have held that for an heir to revive an action under §
20-5-104, she must make an “affirmative showing” that no person is willing or available to
administer the estate of the deceased litigant. Dubis v. Loyd, 540 S.W.3d 4, 9 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2016) (citing McDonald v. City of Nashville, 114 Tenn. 540, 86 S.W. 317 (1905)). The caselaw
provides little guidance as to what “an affirmative showing” requires, beyond stating that such a
showing would rely upon “affidavits or other evidence tending to show that no person was willing
to administer [the estate].” Id. at 11.

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III.

ANALYSIS

As things stand with respect to the First Motion to Substitute, the dispute is centered on
proof necessary to satisfy the substitution requirements set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-104.
Thus, the Court will first address Defendants’ arguments pertaining to all proposed substitutes.
Thereafter, each category of proposed substitutions will be addressed, recognizing that the
Jeffersons and Sandra Croom will be considered separately because each presents a unique
evidentiary issue.
A. Whether Substitution Requires a Real Party in Interest Analysis or Appointment
of an Administrator Ad Litem
In their First Motion to Substitute and accompanying affidavits, all but one of Plaintiffs’
proposed substitutes are described as being heirs to the decedents. (ECF No. 125.) According to
Defendants, that relationship does not satisfy the requirements for substitution. They maintain that
Plaintiffs must demonstrate that each proposed substitute is the sole heir for each decedent, or
appoint an administrator ad litem under Tenn. Code Ann. § 30-1-109. This would protect
Defendants from the possibility of other heirs seeking to relitigate the claims in the future. (ECF
No. 132, 4-8.) Much of Defendants’ argument relies on an expansive interpretation of the holding
in Guyear v. Blalock, No. M2012-01562-COA-R3CV, 2014 WL 3697564, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App.
July 23, 2014). The Court considers the relevance of that case below.
In Guyear, a widow sued to collect the unpaid balance on a promissory note belonging to
her late husband. Id. at *1. She first attempted to do this by suing in the name of her husband’s
estate, even though the estate had never been opened. Id. When that was unsuccessful, she
amended her complaint to reflect that she was suing in her capacity as the decedent’s wife and next
friend. Id. The note’s obligors sought dismissal based on the widow’s failure to demonstrate that
she was a proper plaintiff, or had any right to collect on the note. Id. The obligors prevailed in the
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trial court and on appeal. Id. The widow then argued that she and the deceased were business
partners, and as the only surviving member of the partnership, she had become the sole owner of
the note. Id. at *3. She believed that this theory gave her the right to collect on the note in her own
name and/or on behalf of the partnership. Id.
With respect to the widow suing in her capacity as the only surviving member of the
partnership, the trial court dismissed the complaint because “[c]ases going back more than 100
years in Tennessee jurisprudence had held that such a note is an asset of the deceased's estate and
can only be collected by the properly appointed personal representative of the estate.” Id. (citations
omitted). On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals conducted a real party in interest analysis to
resolve issues specific to the promissory note and to reconcile the numerous inconsistent theories
that plaintiff was pursuing. Id. at *4. The court of appeals reasoned that although the widow had
some rights to her deceased husband’s property, she could not be his sole heir in the absence of a
probated will because the decedent’s daughter would be entitled to a share. Id. Without any
definitive proof that the widow could take the promissory note free and clear of the daughter’s
interest, the court held that the widow had not established ownership of the note that belonged to
the estate under Tennessee law, meaning that she lacked standing to sue for the debt. Id.
Defendants read Guyear to mean that a substitute must be either the decedent’s estate
administrator, sole heir, or appointed administrator ad litem under Tenn. Code Ann. § 30-1-109.
(ECF No. 132, 5-6.) Plaintiffs argue that Guyear does not pertain to substitution under Tenn. Code
Ann. § 20-5-104, which is the rule at issue in this case. (ECF No. 133-2, 1.) In support, they point
out that no case addressing substitution under Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-104 has held that the
requirements set forth in Guyear are applicable. (Id. at 2.) Although Plaintiffs concede that the
Dubis court cited Guyear in recounting the history of Tennessee’s revival rule, Tenn. R. Civ. P.

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25.01(1), Plaintiffs contend that this was non-binding dicta. (Id.) Regardless of Guyear’s
applicability, Plaintiffs conclude that appointment of an administrator ad litem under Tenn. Code
Ann. § 30-1-109, is not a requirement of Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-104. (Id. at 2-3.)
The Court does not find Guyear applicable to this case for two reasons. First, Guyear does
not involve substitution under Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-104. Second, as reflected in the analysis
above, the Tennessee Court of Appeals conducted a real party in interest analysis for reasons that
were specific to the facts of Guyear. Defendants make no attempt to explain how those facts relate
to the case at hand. Defendants’ arguments regarding the applicability of Tenn. Code Ann. § 301-109, are similarly without legal support. For these reasons, the Court does not read any of
Guyear’s requirements into Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-104.
B. Proposed Substitutions (1)-(9)
In their First Motion to Substitute, Plaintiffs seek to substitute: (1) Donna Cagle for Jeff
Cagle; (2) Linda Ferrington for Shelby Ferrington; (3) Jeanette Guider for Geneva Williams; (4)
Doris Carrington for Freddie Carrington; (5) Tammie Todd for Patricia Britt; (6) James Nicks for
Evelyn Nicks; (7) Allison Nicole Woods for Brandon Woods; (8) Donna Ross for Mary Lou Davis;
(9) Carrie Lovins Jones for Margie Lovins Wigginton; (10) Virmeka Jefferson for Wilbert
Jefferson; (11) Virmeka Jefferson for Virginia Jefferson; and (12) Rachel Arnold for Sandra
Croom. (ECF No. 125, 4-8.) The Court considers proposed substitutions (1)-(9) below. 2
For each of the proposed substitutions (1)-(9), there is a supporting affidavit from the
proposed substitute stating generally that an estate was not opened for the deceased, that no one is
willing or interested in opening an estate, and that they are an heir to the deceased. (See generally
The Court does not consider the inconsistencies that Defendants identify in proposed substitute Linda
Ferrington’s affidavits, because it appears that Ferrington merely made a mistake that she corrected in her
subsequent affidavit (ECF No. 132, 3.) Furthermore, the inconsistency does not affect the Court’s disposition.
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ECF Nos. 125-1 – 125-11.) Defendants take issue with the fact that the substitutes are not the
deceased Plaintiffs’ only heirs. (ECF No. 132, 11-15.) This could be a problem if the Court were
to apply the rule from Guyear. However, as explained above, the Court does not find Guyear to
be applicable. Plaintiffs need not show that the proposed substitutes are the sole heirs of the
deceased to meet their burden under Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-104.
Each affidavit sets forth the requirements for substitution under Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5104. Moreover, Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiffs have failed to comply with the procedural
requirements set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 25. Consistent with these findings, the Court GRANTS
the First Motion to Substitute with respect to proposed substitutes (1)-(9).
C. Proposed Substitutions (10) & (11)
Proposed substitutions (10) and (11) are factually nearly identical to proposed substitutions
(1)-(9); husband and wife Wilbert and Virginia Jefferson have passed away, neither had a will, and
no person is willing or available to administer their estates. (ECF No. 125, 7-8.) Plaintiffs therefore
seek to substitute their daughter, Virmeka Jefferson, who is their primary heir under Tennessee
intestate succession laws. (Id.)
Defendants raise two arguments in objection to these proposed substitutions. The first relies
on the same arguments relative to Tennessee’s survivorship law that the Court has already
considered and rejected. (ECF No. 132, 7-8.) The Court rejects the argument here as well. Their
second argument is that the motion should be denied as to the Jeffersons because plaintiffs failed
to seek these substitutions in their initial motion back on April 4, 2024. (Id. at 8.) Defendants insist
that this is fatal to the motion because Plaintiffs had 90-days from the day Defendants filed the
Suggestion of Death as to the Jeffersons, January 8, 2024, to move for substitution under Fed. R.

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Civ. P. 25(a)(1). If that is so, the deadline to move for substitution would have been on April 7,
2024, meaning that the motion is untimely.
Plaintiffs presumably filed their Second Motion to Substitute to assuage any concerns that
they were “sneaking” the Jefferson substitutions in via their supplement. (ECF No. 134.)
Defendants responded to this motion, making largely the same arguments that they made in their
initial response, and Plaintiffs sought leave to file a reply. (ECF Nos. 139 & 140-2.) Because the
Court has already considered and rejected Defendants arguments pertaining to Guyear, the
Jefferson substitution comes down to the timeliness issues.
The parties dispute whether the clock had started for Plaintiffs to file motions for
substitution as to the Jeffersons. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a)(1) advises that “If the
motion [for substitution] is not made within 90 days after service of a statement noting the death,
the action by or against the decedent must be dismissed.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(a)(1). Defendants
contend that the clock started on January 8, 2024, when they filed suggestions of death on the
record for Wilbert and Virginia Jefferson. (ECF No. 101.) Plaintiffs point to several cases that
appear to hold that Rule 25(a)(1)’s clock starts when parties and nonparty successors are served
with the notice. (ECF No. 134-1, 3-4.) However, Plaintiffs fail to acknowledge that these cases
rest on a crucial distinction. In one of the leading cited cases, Atkins v. City of Chicago, Judge
Posner concluded that although the general rule was that a nonparty must be served with notice for
the 90-day clock to start running, the filing of a suggestion of death is sufficient to start the clock
where the opposing party files that suggestion and does not know who the successor or
representative to be noticed is. 547 F.3d 869, 873 (7th Cir. 2008) (collecting cases) (citing George
v. United States, 208 F.R.D. 29, 32 (D.Conn.2001)); see also George v. United States, 208 F.R.D.
29, 32 (D. Conn. 2001) (same). That exception makes sense, insofar as it puts the burden on the

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party who is in the best position to know the identity of the interested nonparty to be served with
notice, counsel for the deceased.
Defendants contend that the exception recognized in George is relevant here. The Court
agrees. Defendants filed the suggestion of death for the opposing parties, the Jeffersons, and could
not reasonably be expected to know the identity of any interested nonparty to whom notice should
be served. The 90-day clock to move to substitute the Jeffersons therefore started on January 8,
2024, when Defendants filed the Suggestion of Death. (ECF No. 101.) If Plaintiffs were having
difficulty identifying the nonparties themselves, they could have filed a motion for extension of
time within the 90-day window. They did not. The Court need not resolve whether Plaintiffs’ first
request to substitute the Jeffersons within their supplement filed on May 23, 2024 suffices as a
motion to substitute, or if their June 19, 2024 filing is the only operative motion to substitute
because the motion would be untimely either way. Although dismissal of actions on timeliness
grounds may seem harsh, it is worth noting that the Jeffersons both passed away nearly four years
ago. Plaintiffs’ counsel had far more than the 90-days contemplated in Rule 25(a)(1) to arrange for
a proper substitution.
Plaintiffs’ Second Motion to Substitute is DENIED. Because the Court does not grant
substitutions as to Wilbert and Virginia Jefferson, their claims must be DISMISSED.
D. Proposed Substitution (12)
Plaintiffs seek to have Rachel Arnold substituted for plaintiff Sandra Croom. (ECF No.
ECF No. 125, 11.) This request differs from the other putative substitutions insofar as Sandra
Croom is not deceased. (Id.) Plaintiffs submit that Croom has advanced dementia, rendering her
incapacitated. (Id.) As such, Plaintiffs seek to substitute Rachel Arnold, her niece with a power of
attorney, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 17. (Id.) Defendants do not oppose this substitution so long

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as Arnold is appointed as Croom’s General Guardian pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c)(1)(A). (ECF
No. 132, 2.)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(b) provides that “[i]f a party becomes incompetent, the
court may, on motion, permit the action to be continued by or against the party's representative.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(b).
An incompetent person without a “duly appointed representative,” such as a conservator,
may sue by a next friend or by a guardian ad litem. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c)(2). “The court must
appoint a guardian ad litem—or issue another appropriate order—to protect a minor or
incompetent person who is unrepresented in an action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c)(2). Because the
“purpose of Rule 17(c) is to protect an incompetent person's interests in prosecuting or defending
a lawsuit,” the Court has “broad discretion to fashion an appropriate safeguard that will protect an
incompetent person's interest.” Harris v. Mangum, 863 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing
Davis v. Walker, 745 F.3d 1303, 1310 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Mate v. Fields, No. 16-2730, 2017
WL 6398028, at *2 (6th Cir. June 20, 2017) (same).
The Court finds that it is appropriate to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent Croom in
this action. Upon review of Rachel Arnold’s verified statement and the Durable Power of Attorney
instrument, Rachel Arnold appears fit to serve as Croom’s guardian at litem in this action. Pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P 17(c)(2), Rachel Arnold is hereby appointed as Croom’s guardian at litem, and
substituted for Croom via Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(b). Consistent with this decision, the Court ORDERS
that the caption be amended to reflect Croom’s involvement in this action as “Sandra Croom, an
incapacitated person, by and through Rachel Arnold, as Guardian Ad Litem.”

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IV.

CONCLUSION

Consistent with the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ motions for leave to file replies are GRANTED;
Plaintiffs’ First Motion to Substitute is GRANTED as to all proposed substitutions except
Virmeka Jefferson for the Jeffersons; and Plaintiffs’ Second Motion to Substitute is DENIED.
Because the Court does not grant substitutions as to Wilbert and Virginia Jefferson, their claims
must be DISMISSED. The following substitutions are approved:
(1) Donna Cagle for Jeff Cagle;
(2) Linda Ferrington for Shelby Ferrington;
(3) Jeanette Guider for Geneva Williams;
(4) Doris Carrington for Freddie Carrington;
(5) Tammie Todd for Patricia Britt;
(6) James Nicks for Evelyn Nicks;
(7) Allison Nicole Woods for Brandon Woods;
(8) Donna Ross for Mary Lou Davis;
(9) Carrie Lovins Jones for Margie Lovins Wigginton; and
(10) Rachel Arnold for Sandra Croom.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 25th day of September, 2024.
s/John T. Fowlkes, Jr.
JOHN T. FOWLKES, JR.
United States District Judge

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