Cameron v. Vantell et al

Filing 32

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS & SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION TO DISMISS, DISMISSING AMENDED § 2254 PETITION WITH PREJUDICE, DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY, CERTIFYING APPEAL IS NOT TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH, AND DENYING LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS ON APPEAL 26 31 . Signed by Judge S. Thomas Anderson on 8/30/24. (skc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION

IAN J. CAMERON,
Petitioner,
v.
JERRY WARDLOW
Respondents.

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Case No. 1:22-cv-01228-STA-jay

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISIMISS
& SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION TO DISMISS, DISMISSING AMENDED § 2254
PETITION WITH PREJUDICE, DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY,
CERTIFYING APPEAL IS NOT TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH, AND
DENYING LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS ON APPEAL
Before the Court is the amended pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition of Petitioner Ian J.
Cameron, Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) prisoner number 348064, who is
confined at the Hardeman County Correctional Facility (“HCCF”) in Whiteville, Tennessee.
(ECF No. 18.) Respondent Warden Jerry Wardlow filed a motion to dismiss on January 8, 2024.
(ECF No. 26.) Respondent argued that Petitioner’s claims challenging his prison disciplinary
proceedings were unexhausted because Petitioner’s petition for writ of certiorari was still pending
in the Davidson County Circuit Court. (ECF No. 26-1 at PageID 262.)
While Respondent’s motion was pending, the petition for writ of certiorari was dismissed,
and the case was closed on March 4, 2024. (See ECF No. 27 at PageID 293.) The Court ordered
Respondent to supplement the motion to dismiss to address the proceedings in the Davidson
County Circuit Court. (Id. at PageID 293-94.)

Respondent filed a supplemental motion to dismiss on June 4, 2024, along with the state
court record for the proceedings from the Davidson County Circuit Court. (ECF Nos. 30 & 31.)
Petitioner did not file a response to the motion to dismiss or to the supplemental motion to dismiss,
and the time to do so has expired.
For the reasons that follow, the motion to dismiss (ECF No. 26) and the supplemental
motion to dismiss (ECF No. 31) are GRANTED, and the amended § 2254 petition is DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.
I. Background & Procedural History
Petitioner’s habeas claims arise from an incident that occurred at the HCCF in 2022.
(See ECF 18 at PageID 83.) According to the incident report, on the evening of July 28, 2022,
Petitioner exited his cell during “pill call” and “advanced towards” a corrections officer,
demanding that the officer “take him to the parking lot so that he [could] go home.” (ECF No.
25-2 at PageID 187.) Petitioner was given “multiple directives to step back into his pod,” but he
refused and “push[ed] [the corrections officer] out of his way with his hands.” (Id.) The
corrections officer, Julius Lasisi, charged Petitioner with “assault on staff without [a] weapon.”
(Id.)
TDOC records indicate that a disciplinary hearing was held on August 4, 2022. (Id. at
PageID 189-90.) Petitioner was found guilty of the offense as changed. (Id. at PageID 189.)
Petitioner appealed this decision on September 6, 2022, and again on October 3, 2022. (Id. at
PageID 191-94.) His internal appeals were denied, and his conviction was affirmed on October
19, 2022. (Id. at PageID 192.) Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the
Davidson County Circuit Court on February 13, 2023. (ECF No. 30-1 at PageID 302-13.)
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Petitioner had been granted parole on July 28, 2022, the same day as his assault of the
corrections officer. (See ECF No. 25-1 at PageID 181.) Petitioner received notice of the parole
board’s decision granting parole on August 17, 2022. (Id.) On September 29, 2022, the parole
board notified Petitioner that because of his disciplinary infraction, a pre-parole recission hearing
had been set for November 14, 2022, to determine whether a new parole hearing should be held.
(See id. at PageID 182.) Following the pre-parole recission hearing, Petitioner’s parole was
rescinded. (Id. at PageID 184.) Petitioner received notice of the decision on November 22,
2022. (Id.)
On October 19, 2022, Petitioner filed his initial § 2254 petition. (ECF No. 1.) Following
preliminary review, the Court ordered Petitioner to file an amended petition using the district’s
official form. (ECF No. 16.) Petitioner filed his amended § 2254 petition on March 22, 2023.
(ECF No. 18). He raises three grounds for relief. (Id. at PageID 87-90.) First, Petitioner alleges
that the corrections officer falsely accused him of assault on July 28, 2022, resulting in the recission
of his parole. (ECF No. 18 at PageID 87.) Second, he alleges that he did not receive notice of
any disciplinary action following the alleged assault or of the related hearing where his parole was
rescinded, in violation of the prison’s policies and procedures and of his constitutional right to due
process. (ECF No. 18 at PageID 87-89.)
Petitioner alleges in his third claim that his classification was changed to “close custody”
without notice or an opportunity to attend the hearing in violation of his right to due process.
(ECF No. 18 at PageID 90.) He claims that his new classification means that he is “on 24/7
lockdown.” (Id.) Petitioner states that he was able to file a prison grievance but that “nothing
has been done” to address his grievance. (Id.) He further claims that prison officials at the HCCF
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have “refused any and all types of appeal process” and have denied him access to the law library.
(Id.) As a result, he claims that he was prevented from exhausting both his administrative
remedies and his state court remedies. (Id.)
Even if Petitioner had exhausted his administrative and state court remedies on his third
claim, “a prisoner does not have a constitutional right to be placed in a specific security
classification.” Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 576 (6th Cir. 2005). As such, the Court
dismissed Petitioner’s third claim on the merits and directed Respondent to file a response to the
remaining claims in the amended § 2254 petition. (ECF No. 20 at PageID 167-68.)
On January 8, 2024, Respondent filed the state court record and a motion to dismiss.
(ECF Nos. 25 & 26.) Respondent argued that Petitioner’s Claims 1 and 2 were either unexhausted
or procedurally barred and should be dismissed. (ECF No. 26-1 at PageID 261.) Petitioner did
not file a response. Respondent later filed a supplemental motion to dismiss, arguing that
Petitioner’s claims are procedurally barred. (ECF No. 31.) Petitioner did not file a response.
II.

Legal Standards

A federal court may not issue a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a state prisoner “unless,
with certain exceptions, the applicant has exhausted state remedies.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563
U.S. 170, 181 (2011). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c), a petitioner seeking federal habeas
relief must first present the claims in his petition to the state courts. See id. The petitioner must
“fairly present” each claim to all levels of state court review. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29
(2004).
“Where a petitioner fails to submit a claim to the state courts, a district court must dismiss
his petition so that he might go back to the state court and properly present the claims.” Rayner
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v. Mills, 685 F.3d 631, 643 (6th Cir. 2012).

The exhaustion doctrine “preserves orderly

administration of state judicial business, preventing the interruption of state adjudication by federal
habeas proceedings.” Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 490 (1973).
The procedural default doctrine is ancillary to the exhaustion requirement. See Edwards
v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 452 (2000) (noting interplay between exhaustion rule and procedural
default doctrine). If a petitioner fails to properly exhaust a claim in state court and state law bars
proper exhaustion, the petitioner has technically exhausted the claim through procedural default
because “there are no state remedies any longer ‘available’ to him.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501
U.S. 722, 732 (1991) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A)).
“As a general rule, claims forfeited under state law may support federal habeas relief only
if the prisoner demonstrates cause for the default and prejudice from the asserted error.” House
v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536 (2006). A petitioner establishes cause by “show[ing] that some
objective factor external to the defense”—a factor that “cannot be fairly attributed to” the
petitioner—“impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule.” Davila v.
Davis, 582 U.S. 521, 528 (2017) (internal quotations marks and citation omitted). “To establish
actual prejudice, a petitioner must show not merely that the errors at his trial created a possibility
of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire
trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” Garcia-Dorantes v. Warren, 801 F.3d 584, 598
(6th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
A petitioner may avoid the procedural bar, and the necessity of showing cause and
prejudice, by demonstrating “that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental
miscarriage of justice.”

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.
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This exception only applies in the

“extraordinary case” and requires a petitioner to establish that “a constitutional violation has
probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S.
298, 321 (1995) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A credible claim of actual
innocence “requires [a] petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional error with new
reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts,
or critical physical evidence—that was not presented at trial.” Id. at 324.
III.

Analysis

Petitioner alleges that he did not receive notice of any disciplinary action following his
alleged assault of the corrections officer or of the related hearing where his parole was rescinded,
in violation of the prison’s policies and procedures and his constitutional right to due process.
(ECF No. 18 at PageID 87-89.)

Respondent argues that Petitioner’s claims concerning his

disciplinary proceedings are unexhausted and procedurally barred. (ECF No. 31-1 at PageID
385.)
In Tennessee, “[t]he proper procedure for a prisoner seeking review of a disciplinary action
of the [TDOC] is by petition for writ of certiorari.” Bishop v. Conley, 894 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1994). The deadline for filing a petition for writ of certiorari is 60 days from the entry
of the order or judgment for which review is sought or, if a timely administrative appeal is pursued,
within 60 days of entry of the final decision from the administrative appeal. See Tenn. Code.
Ann. § 27-9-102; see also Hawkins v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., 127 S.W.3d 749, 757 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2002).
On February 13, 2023, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Davidson
County Circuit Court, seeking judicial review of the disciplinary proceedings held at the HCCF.
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(ECF No. 30-1 at PageID 302-13.) Respondent moved to dismiss the petition because it was not
verified under oath as required by Tennessee law and because it was untimely. (Id. at PageID
363-65.) Following a hearing, Petitioner voluntarily decided to withdraw his petition for writ of
certiorari and dismiss the matter. (Id. at PageID 377.) The order dismissing the petition was
signed on March 4, 2024. (Id. at PageID 379.)
Respondent argues that Petitioner’s § 2254 claims concerning his disciplinary proceedings
should be dismissed because, although Petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari, he withdrew
the petition and has not exhausted his state court remedies. (ECF No. 31-1 at PageID 386.)
Because Petitioner no longer has any available state court remedies, his claims are procedurally
defaulted. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732.
Petitioner alleges that the corrections officer falsely accused him of the assault that resulted
in the recission of his parole. (ECF No. 18 at PageID 87.) To the extent that Petitioner’s
allegation could be construed as a claim of actual innocence, Petitioner has failed to satisfy his
burden of showing that the exception to the procedural bar for such claims should apply.
Petitioner has not supported his claim of actual innocence with “new reliable evidence” as required
by Schlup. See 513 U.S. at 324. Petitioner attaches only a self-serving affidavit to his amended
§ 2254 petition, and he failed to file a response to Respondent’s motion to dismiss and
supplemental motion to dismiss. (See ECF No. 18-1 at PageID 98-102.) Accordingly, he has
not shown that the exception to the procedural bar for claims of actual innocence should apply.
Petitioner no longer has an available state court remedy to properly exhaust his claims
related to his disciplinary proceedings, and he has not shown a credible claim of actual innocence.

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Therefore, his claims concerning his disciplinary proceedings are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE as procedurally defaulted.
With respect to Petitioner’s claim that he did not receive notice of the hearing where his
parole was rescinded, Respondent argues that Petitioner has never presented this claim in state
court or in any internal administrative proceeding. (ECF No. 26-1 at PageID 263-64; ECF No.
31-1 at PageID 387.)
The common law writ of certiorari is “the proper procedural vehicle through which
prisoners may seek review of decisions by . . . parole eligibility boards.” Willis v. Tenn. Dep’t of
Corr., 113 S.W.3d 706, 712 (Tenn. 2003). The decision of whether to grant or deny parole to a
prisoner is vested with the Board of Parole, not the courts. Hopkins v. Tenn. Bd. of Paroles &
Prob., 60 S.W.3d 79, 82 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). Because actions of the Board are deemed
“judicial” in nature and “not reviewable if done according to law,” prisoners have only the limited
right of review afforded by the common law writ of certiorari. Stewart v. Schofield, 368 S.W.3d
457, 465 (Tenn. 2012).
Before a prisoner may seek judicial review of an adverse decision by the Board, he must
exhaust the internal appellate remedies provided by the Board. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28105(d)(11) (allowing a prisoner “whose parole has been revoked or rescinded, or who ha[s] been
denied parole, or whose grant of parole has been rescinded” to request appellate review by the
Board). An inmate, like Petitioner, who has had his grant of parole rescinded, must submit a
written request for appellate review to the Board “within forty-five (45) days from the date the
inmate signed the decision notification.” See Rules and Regulations of the Tennessee Board of
Parole, Rule 1100-01-01-.08(4)(a) (last accessed Aug. 5, 2024).
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Petitioner was notified of his right to appeal the Board’s final parole decision and of the
45-day deadline in the letter informing him of the Board’s decision to rescind his parole.
(ECF No. 25-1 at PageID 184.) Respondent asserts that the “[r]ecords collected from the State of
Tennessee Board of Parole are void of any appeal request made on behalf of Petitioner.”
(ECF No. 31-1 at PageID 387.) Thus, Petitioner has failed to exhaust his internal administrative
remedies with the Board.
Petitioner also failed to exhaust his state court remedies. His petition for writ of certiorari
did not raise any claim concerning lack of notice of the hearing where his parole was rescinded.
(See ECF 30-1 at PageID 302-13.) Petitioner’s allegations all related to the prison disciplinary
proceedings. (See id. at PageID 311-12.) Even if Petitioner had raised his claim that he did not
receive notice of the hearing where his parole was rescinded, the Court would still dismiss the
claim because Petitioner voluntarily withdrew his petition for writ of certiorari, and therefore, he
did not exhaust his state court remedies. (See ECF No. 30-1 at PageID 377.)
Petitioner no longer has an available state court remedy to properly exhaust his claim that
he did not receive notice of the hearing where his parole was rescinded.

The claim is

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as procedurally defaulted.
IV.

Appellate Issues

There is no absolute entitlement to appeal a district court’s denial of a § 2254 petition.
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). The Court must issue or deny a certificate of
appealability (“COA”) when it enters a final order adverse to a § 2254 petitioner. Rule 11, Rules
Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. A petitioner may not take an

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appeal unless a circuit or district judge issues a COA. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1); Fed. R. App. P.
22(b)(1).
A COA may issue only if the petitioner has made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right, and the COA must indicate the specific issue or issues that satisfy the required
showing. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)-(3). A “substantial showing” is made when the petitioner
demonstrates that “reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the
petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate
to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). If the petition was denied on procedural grounds, the petitioner must
show, “at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid
claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable
whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,
478 (2000).
In this case, reasonable jurists would not debate the correctness of the Court’s decision to
dismiss Petitioner’s amended § 2254 petition as procedurally barred. Because any appeal by
Petitioner does not deserve attention, the Court DENIES a certificate of appealability.
Additionally, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(1) provides that a party seeking
pauper status on appeal must first file a motion in the district court, along with a supporting
affidavit. However, if the district court certifies that an appeal would not be taken in good faith,
or otherwise denies leave to appeal in forma pauperis, the prisoner must file his motion to proceed
in forma pauperis in the appellate court. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(4)-(5). In this case, for the
same reasons the Court denies a COA, the Court determines that any appeal would not be taken in
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good faith. It is therefore CERTIFIED, pursuant to Rule 24(a) that any appeal in this matter
would not be taken in good faith and leave to appeal in forma pauperis is DENIED.1
IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ S. Thomas Anderson
S. THOMAS ANDERSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Date: August 30, 2024.

1

If Petitioner files a notice of appeal, he must pay the full $605 appellate filing fee or file
a motion to proceed in forma pauperis and supporting affidavit in the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals within 30 days of the date of entry of this Order. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(5).
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