Williams v. Pat Salmon & Sons

Filing 40

ORDER GRANTING 33 DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. Signed by Judge Samuel H. Mays, Jr., on 03/03/2011. (Mays, Samuel)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE WESTERN DIVISION

CLIMMIE R. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. PAT SALMON & SONS, INC., Defendant.

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

No. 07-2432

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff Climmie R. Williams ("Williams") brings claims for gender-based discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq. ("Title VII") against Defendant Pat Salmon & Sons, Inc. ("Salmon").

(See Compl., ECF No. 1.) for summary judgment. 33.)

Before the Court is Salmon's motion

(See Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. For the following reasons,

Williams has not responded.

the Court GRANTS Salmon's motion. I. Background1

All facts in this Part come from Salmon's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts. (See ECF No. 34-1.) Because Williams has not responded to those facts, they are deemed admitted. See W.D. Tenn. Civ. R. 7.2(d)(3) (requiring a party opposing summary judgment to respond to the moving party's statement of undisputed facts "by affixing to the response copies of the precise portions of the record relied upon to evidence ... that the ... designated material facts are at issue"); Akines v. Shelby Cnty. Gov't, 512 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1147-48 (W.D. Tenn. 2007) (explaining that, where the non-moving party fails to follow Local Rule 7.2(d)(3), courts in this judicial district

1

Salmon, Arkansas,

a

trucking

company

based to

in

North as

Little its

Rock,

initially

hired

Williams

work

Memphis,

Tennessee terminal temporarily.

(See Statement of Undisputed ("Facts") After several

Material Facts ¶¶ 1-2, ECF No. 34-1.)

months, Salmon hired Williams for a regular position as an overthe-road driver in October 2005. (Id. ¶ 2.) In that capacity,

she drove on "team runs" with Charles White ("White"), another over-the-road driver, based out of the Memphis terminal. 3.) (Id.¶

During team runs, the two drivers shared a single truck

that included a sleeper berth and, while one drove, the other rested in the berth to comply with Department of Transportation regulations. (Id. ¶ 4.)

When Salmon hired Williams, she received a copy of Salmon's Employee Handbook (the "Handbook"), which included a list of terminable offenses. ECF No. 34-2.) (Id. ¶ 5; see also Ex. 1, Attachment A,

According to the Handbook, "[v]erbal or physical

abuse of any co-worker" could result in termination, even for a first offense. sexual (Facts ¶ 7.) The Handbook and ¶ the 5.) also included for

Salmon's reporting

harassment

policy

procedure The

possible

harassment.

(Id.

Handbook

prohibited sexual harassment and permitted an employee to report possible harassment, in person or anonymously, to her direct

"consider the [moving party's] statement of undisputed material facts as having been admitted").

2

supervisor

or

to

a

corporate

general

manager.

(Id.

¶

6.)

Williams signed an acknowledgment that she had received, read, and understood the Handbook. On December 30, 2005, (Id. ¶¶ 8-9.) Salmon received a complaint from

White, alleging that Williams had threatened to kill him during a team run. (See id. ¶ 15.) Duane Wilbanks ("Wilbanks"),

manager of Salmon's Memphis terminal, met with Williams that day to discuss the complaint. 34-2.) (Id. ¶¶ 16, 42; Ex. 1 ¶ 1, ECF No.

During that meeting, Williams admitted that she had

threatened White but also claimed that White had been sexually harassing her. (Facts ¶¶ 17, 22, 42.) Although Wilbanks

otherwise would have immediately terminated Williams' employment based on her admitted threat to White, he suspended her to

investigate her complaint about sexual harassment. 23, 30.) After terminated, the meeting with a Wilbanks, written but

(Id. ¶¶ 22-

before

being her

Williams

submitted

statement

about

sexual harassment claims. 34-2.)

(See Ex. A, Attachments B, ECF No.

In that statement, she stated, "I was asked if I had

threatened to kill Mr. White if I had to stay in Mobile with him? them." I responded to them yes, but only to protect myself from (Id. ¶¶ 25, 44.) Williams also stated that she had told

her sister about White's alleged harassment, but that she had not mentioned his conduct to anyone at Salmon before the

3

December

30,

2005

meeting

with

Wilbanks.

(Id.

¶

26,

45.)

According to the statement, she had approached Robert Wilson ("Wilson"), moving to a assistant manager route. at the (Id.) Memphis She terminal, stated about in I

different

that,

response to her request, "he asked me to hold on.

I said OK.

did not tell [Wilson] the severity of my growing situation." (Id.) When requesting a transfer from Wilson, Williams did not (See id. ¶ 48.)

mention White or sexual harassment.

After his meeting with Williams, Wilbanks investigated her complaint. 67.) (Id. ¶ 27.) to White denied the allegations. all of the alleged (Id. ¶ sexual

According

Williams,

harassment occurred when she was alone in the truck with White and nothing occurred in the presence of others. (Id. ¶¶ 64-65.)

When Wilbanks was unable to corroborate Williams' allegations, he terminated her employment on January 12, 2006. 28; see Ex. 1, Attachment E, ECF No. 34-2.) Since her termination, Williams has discussed her (Id. ¶¶ 27-

employment at and termination from Salmon in several situations and provided different accounts. Williams told her counselor (Facts ¶ 57.) She also

that she had threatened to kill White.

told her counselor that White had harassed her "mostly verbally but some minimal touching was involved" and explained that she did not report White's conduct before December 30, 2005 because she wanted to "protect his wife." (Id. ¶¶ 19, 20-21.)

4

In

proceedings

before

the

Equal

Employment

Opportunity

Commission ("EEOC"), Williams admitted that she had threatened to kill White and that she had not complained to Salmon about his sexual advances toward her before December 30, 2005. ¶¶ 46-48, 50-51.) The on EEOC eventually 22, issued a "no (Id. cause that

determination"

letter

March

2007,

explaining

Williams had threatened White with bodily harm, had not informed Salmon about his sexual advances, and had identified no

witnesses in support of her claim.

(Id. ¶¶ 53-54.)

The EEOC

dismissed Williams' charges and notified her of her right to sue. (See Dismissal and Notice of Rights, ECF No. 34-7.) During a hearing for unemployment benefits before the

Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development Appeal Tribunal ("Tennessee Department of Labor") on March 6, 2009, Williams testified that she had not threatened to kill White. (Id. ¶¶ 35, 55.) of She admitted, however, that she had not the

informed

Salmon

White's

alleged

harassment (Id. ¶ 56.) has

before

December 30, 2005 meeting with Wilbanks. During accounts. this litigation, Williams

offered

different

In her Complaint, Williams admits threatening White

but also alleges, for the first time, that she did so only after he threatened to rape her. (Id. ¶ 58; see also Compl. ¶ 13.)

In contrast, during her August 10, 2010 deposition, Williams testified that she had only told White that she "would get him"

5

and denied threatening to kill him.

(See id. ¶¶ 41, 59.)

She

also claimed, for the first time, that Salmon had given White permission to sexually harass her while they were alone in the truck together. (See id. ¶ 64.)

During her deposition, Williams also claimed, for the first time, that she had provided Wilbanks with a letter about White's alleged harassment in November 2005. (Id. ¶ 60.) According to

Williams, when she gave the letter to Wilbanks on November 8, 2005, he made a copy for her, and she returned to the truck for her team run. (Id. ¶ 62.) She testified that Wilbanks then

called White, who was in the truck with Williams, and instructed him to take the letter and destroy it. those instructions, Williams (Id.) that After overhearing she ripped the

testified

letter from White's hands, put it in a stamped envelope that she had in the truck, and mailed it to a friend named Ellis Johnson, who had since died. (Id.) In the same deposition, however,

Williams also stated that she had not mentioned White's behavior to Wilbanks before December 30, 2005, stating that "a black woman my age does not just approach a man and say, okay, this man said that you told him to [sexually harass] me." 63.) During the deposition, Williams attempted to explain the differences between her testimony and her prior statements in other settings. In explaining why she had not mentioned the (Id. ¶

6

letter before, Williams testified that, before her August 10, 2010 deposition, she had not remembered the letter, that she had no copy of it, and that she did not want to get Wilbanks into trouble. (Id. ¶ 61.) Williams testified that her sister had

typed the written statement she submitted to Salmon and had "changed statement things," and her creating deposition inconsistencies testimony. (Id. between ¶ 41.) that In

explaining her prior statements to the EEOC, Williams initially denied that she had admitted to the EEOC that she had threatened White but later stated that she did not remember why she had told the EEOC that fact. (Id. ¶¶ 49, 52.) Finally, she

testified that the hearing officer at the Tennessee Department of Labor had turned off the tape recorder during the hearing and told her not to discuss certain facts. (Id.) At the

deposition, however, she refused to testify about what she had said at that hearing that had not been recorded. II. Jurisdiction (Id. ¶ 33.)

Because Williams' claims arise under Title VII, this Court has federal question jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,

1343(a)(4); Harper v. AutoAlliance Int'l, 392 F.3d 195, 201 (6th Cir. 2004) (stating that Title VII claims arise under federal law). III. Standard of Review

7

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, the party moving for summary judgment "bears the burden of clearly and

convincingly establishing the nonexistence of any genuine issue of material fact, and the evidence as well as all inferences drawn therefrom must be read in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Kochins v. Linden-Alimak, Inc., 799 The moving party can meet this

F.2d 1128, 1133 (6th Cir. 1986).

burden by pointing out to the court that the respondent, having had sufficient opportunity for discovery, has no evidence to support an essential element of her case. See Street v. J.C.

Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir. 1989). When confronted with a properly supported motion for

summary judgment, the respondent must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. A genuine

issue for trial exists if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See The

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

nonmoving party must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Elec. Indus. One Co. may v. Zenith Radio a Corp., properly 475 U.S. Matsushita 574, 586

(1986).

not

oppose

supported

summary

judgment motion by mere reliance on the pleadings. Corp. v. Catrett, must 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).

See Celotex Instead, the

nonmovant

present

"concrete

evidence

supporting

[her]

8

claims."

Cloverdale Equip. Co. v. Simon Aerials, Inc., 869 F.2d The district

934, 937 (6th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted).

court does not have the duty to search the record for such evidence. (6th Cir. See InterRoyal Corp. v. Sponseller, 889 F.2d 108, 111 1989). The nonmovant has the duty to point out

specific evidence in the record that would be sufficient to justify a jury decision in her favor. See id. "Summary

judgment is an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action[,] rather than a disfavored

procedural shortcut."

FDIC v. Jeff Miller Stables, 573 F.3d

289, 294 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). IV. Analysis alleges that Salmon violated Title VII by

Williams

subjecting her to sexual harassment that created a hostile work environment and by terminating her employment in retaliation for her complaints about that harassment. A. Hostile Work Environment To establish a prima facie case of hostile work environment based on sexual harassment, a plaintiff must show that 1) she was a member of a protected class, 2) she experienced unwelcome sexual harassment, 3) the harassment was "based on sex," 4) "the harassment unreasonably interfered with her work performance by (Compl. ¶ 17.)

9

creating

a

hostile,

offensive,

or

intimidating

work

environment," and 5) there is a basis for employer liability. See Thornton v. Federal Express Corp., 530 F.3d 451, 455 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Hafford v. Seidner, 183 F.3d 506, 512 (6th Cir. 1999)). held liable The fifth element ensures that employers are not for all sexual harassment perpetrated by their

employees.

See Gallagher v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 567

F.3d 263, 274 (6th Cir. 2009) ("The Supreme Court has ruled that employers are by not automatically employees." liable for sexual harassment v. Bell

perpetrated

their

(quoting

Petrosino

Atlantic, 385 F.3d 210, 225 (6th Cir. 2004))). "Where an employee is the victim of sexual harassment,

including harassment in the form of a hostile work environment, by non-supervisory co-workers, an employer's vicarious liability depends on the plaintiff showing that the employer knew (or reasonably should have known) about the harassment but failed to take appropriate remedial action." Id. The employer is

vicariously liable for co-worker harassment only if 1) it knew of the harassment or should have known of the harassment and 2) it failed to take appropriate remedial action. See id. at 276

(citing Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 517 F.3d 321, 338 (6th Cir. 2008); McCombs v. Meijer, Inc., 395 F.3d 346, 353 (6th Cir. 2005)). Where the employer responds to an employee's

allegations of sexual harassment, the employer is liable only if

10

the response "manifests unreasonableness in light of the facts the employer knew or should have known." Hawkins, 517 F.3d at

340 (citing Blankenship v. Parke Care Ctrs. Inc., 123 F.3d 868, 873 (6th Cir. 1997)). Because White allegedly sexually harassed Williams only

when the two were alone in the truck, Salmon had no reason to know of his conduct until Williams reported it. 64.) (See Facts ¶

The record before the Court demonstrates that, before confronted Williams about her threat to White on

Wilbanks

December 30, 2005, Williams had never reported White's alleged harassment to anyone at Salmon. proceedings Labor, before the EEOC and (See the id. ¶¶ 26, 46.) Department In of

Tennessee not

Williams

testified

that

she

had

complained

about

White's harassment to anyone at Salmon, much less her superiors. (See id. ¶¶ 47-48, 56.) She also told her counselor that she (See id.

had not reported White's conduct to anyone at Salmon. ¶ 21.) That given a Williams letter testified in her deposition to that

she

had in

describing

White's

harassment

Wilbanks

November 2005 does not create a genuine issue of material fact about whether Salmon had knowledge of her allegations before her meeting with Wilbanks on December 30, 2005. "[A] party cannot

create a genuine issue of fact sufficient to survive summary judgment simply by contradicting his or her own previous sworn

11

statement attempting

. to

.

.

without the

explaining disparity."

the

contradiction v. City

or of

resolve

Hanson

Fairview Park, 349 F. App'x 70, 74 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806 (1999)); see Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp., 556 F.3d 502, 517 (6th Cir.

2009) (citing Reid v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790 F.2d 453, 460 (6th Cir.1986)). The party's explanation for the contradiction Aerel, S.R.L. v. PCC Airfoils, L.L.C.,

must be "persuasive."

448 F.3d 899, 908 (6th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted); Carnette v. Exide Technologies, Inc., No. 2:07-CV-239, 2009 WL 1586783, at *6 (E.D. Tenn. June 4, 2009) ("To defeat summary judgment, that explanation must be sufficient to warrant a reasonable

juror's acceptance.") (citations omitted). In explaining why, in prior sworn testimony before the EEOC and the Tennessee Department of Labor, she had not mentioned the November 2005 letter to Wilbanks, Williams testified that she had not remembered the letter, that she had no copy of it, and that she did not want to cause trouble for Wilbanks. 61.) (Id. ¶

That explanation would not persuade a reasonable jury.

See Aerel, S.R.L., 448 F.3d at 908; Carnette, 2009 WL 1586783, at *6. A reasonable jury would not believe that, when

discussing whether she had previously reported allegations of sexual harassment to her superiors in two separate proceedings,

12

Williams simply forgot about a letter to Wilbanks in which she detailed that very harassment. Williams' explanation is (See Facts ¶ 61.) even less persuasive given the

dramatic scenario she recounted in her deposition.

Williams

testified that, after she had delivered the letter to Wilbanks, he ordered White destroy it but, before he could do so, Williams ripped it from White's hands and mailed it to a now-deceased friend. (See id. ¶¶ 61-63.) Those details are memorable. A

reasonable jury would not believe that Williams simply forgot them between November 2005 and November 10, 2010. Nor can Williams' request for a change in her route be construed as providing Salmon with knowledge of White's alleged harassment before December 30, 2005. An employee may establish

a factual question about whether an employer had constructive knowledge of co-worker harassment when an employee's transfer request is combined with additional facts. F.3d at 340. See Hawkins, 517

In Hawkins, there was a genuine issue of fact

about whether an employer had knowledge of co-worker harassment because an employee's co-worker had engaged in past acts of harassment and the employee requested a transfer because the coworker had been making her life "unbearable." 40. Nothing in the record before the See id. at 339suggests that

Court

Williams mentioned White or sexual harassment when requesting a transfer, and nothing suggests that White had engaged in prior

13

acts of harassment.

(See Facts ¶¶ 26, 48.)

The absence of any

reference to White or sexual harassment in Williams' request comports with her statement to her counselor that she wanted to protect White's wife from harm. (See id. ¶ 20.) Williams'

transfer request provided no reason for Salmon to believe that she was experiencing harassment. The Williams' reasonably. only issue is whether, once 30, Salmon 2005, had it notice of

allegations

on

December

responded

See Hawkins, 517 F.3d at 340.

Where the employer

responds to an employee's allegations of sexual harassment, the employer is liable only if the response "manifests

unreasonableness in light of the facts the employer knew or should have known." Inc., 123 F.3d an in Id. (citing Blankenship v. Parke Care Ctrs. 873 (6th Cir. 1997)). her To establish acted See

868,

liability, negligently

employee

must to

show the

that

employer

responding

alleged

harassment.

Mullins v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,

291 F. App'x 744, 747

(6th Cir. 2008) (citing Fenton v. HiSAN, Inc., 174 F.3d 827, 829 (6th Cir. 1999)). Id. at 758. An employer's response need not be perfect.

The question is whether "a reasonable jury could

find that [the employer's] response `exhibited such indifference as to indicate an attitude of permissiveness that amounts to discrimination.'" Id. (quoting McCombs, 395 F.3d at 353).

14

Salmon acted reasonably. he otherwise would have

Although Wilbanks testified that terminated Williams'

automatically

employment because she admitted that she had threatened White, because she alleged that White had been sexually harassing her before the threat, he suspended her pending an investigation. (Facts ¶¶ 22-23, 30.) (Id. ¶ 27.) Wilbanks investigated the allegations.

When he could not corroborate them, he terminated (Id. ¶ 28.) Nothing in the record suggests witness statements or

White's employment. that Wilbanks

ignored

corroborating

otherwise failed to conduct a proper investigation of William's allegations. Cf. Mullins, 291 F. App'x at 758 (concluding that

there was a factual question about the reasonableness of an employer's response where it had ignored corroborating witnesses and scrutinzed an employee's work record). After learning of

White's alleged sexual harassment on December 30, 2005, Salmon responded reasonably. Even assuming that White sexually harassed Williams, she has not met her burden of introducing evidence showing a basis to hold Salmon liable for that harassment. F.3d at 274; Thornton, 530 F.3d at 455. has failed to establish a prima facie See Gallagher, 567 For that reason, she case of hostile work

environment based on sexual harassment, and summary judgment on that claim is appropriate. See Balding-Margolis v. Cleveland

Arcade, 352 F. App'x 35, 44 (6th Cir. 2009).

15

B. Retaliation To establish a prima facie case of retaliation in violation of Title VII, a plaintiff must show that 1) she engaged in an activity protected by Title 3) VII, 2) the the defendant knew of

plaintiff's

activity,

after

plaintiff's

protected

activity, the defendant took an employment action adverse to plaintiff, and 4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Arendale

v. City of Memphis, 519 F.3d 587, 606 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559, 563 (6th Cir. 2000)). "To establish the causal connection required in the fourth

prong, a plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence from which an inference could be drawn that the adverse action would not have been taken had the plaintiff not [engaged in protected activity]." Nguyen, 229 F.3d at 563 (citations omitted). A

plaintiff must raise an inference that her "protected activity was the likely reason for the adverse employment action."

Simpson v. Vanderbilt Univ.,

359 F. App'x 562, 571 (6th Cir.

2009) (quoting Zanders v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 898 F.2d 1127, 1135 (6th Cir. 1990)). The complaint record about before the Court demonstrates harassment that a Williams' protected

White's

sexual

was

activity and that Salmon's termination of her employment was an adverse employment action, but it does not demonstrate a causal

16

connection between them.

Williams first complained about the

alleged harassment when Wilbanks met with her to discuss her threat to kill White on December 30, 2005. 26, 46-48, 56.) That Salmon terminated her employment on January 12, 2006, shortly after it received her complaint about White's alleged sexual harassment on December 30, 2005, does not show a causal connection. employer's closeness A causal of but connection the can be shown through coupled will an (See Facts ¶¶ 21,

knowledge in time,

protected

activity

with not

"temporal

proximity

alone

support an inference of retaliatory discrimination when there is no other compelling evidence." Imwalle v. Reliance Med. Prods.,

515 F.3d 531, 550 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Nguyen, 229 F.3d at 566)). possible There is no other evidence in the record that shows a causal connection between Salmon's learning of

Williams' complaint and Salmon's terminating her employment. Even if the Court were to conclude that Williams could establish a prima facie case of retaliation, her claim would fail because Salmon reason has for its proffered a legitimate, of her non-

discriminatory

termination

employment.

See Ladd v. Grand Trunk W. R.R., Inc., 552 F.3d 495, 502 (6th Cir. 2009). If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the

burden of production shifts to the defendant, which must offer a non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.

17

Ladd,

552

F.3d

495,

502

(6th

Cir.

2009)

(citing

Dixon

v.

Gonzales, 481 F.3d 324, 333 (6th Cir. 2007)).

If the defendant

meets that burden, the plaintiff must then demonstrate that the proferred reason was mere pretext. Id.

According to the Handbook, verbal abuse of any co-worker constitutes a terminable offense. demonstrates that, in (See Facts ¶ 5.) The record

statements to Wilbanks and her counselor

and in proceedings before the EEOC, Williams admitted that she had threatened to kill White. (See id. ¶¶ 25, 46-47, 57.) In

her Complaint, Williams also admitted that fact. also Compl. ¶ 13.) Although Williams denied

(Id. ¶ 58; see that she had

threatened to kill White in her deposition and asserted that she had instead threatened to "get him," cannot create Complaint. (6th Cir. (see id. ¶¶ 41, 59), she

question of fact by denying facts admitted in her

See Hughes v. Vanderbilt Univ., 215 F.3d 543, 549 2000) (explaining that a plaintiff was bound by

admissions in her pleadings and could not create a factual issue by filing a conflicting affidavit); Bluegrass Hosiery, Inc. v. Speizman Indus., Inc., 214 F.3d 770, 772 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000) (referring to a complaint as a pleading). The record before the Court demonstrates that, based on her threats alone, Wilbanks would have terminated Williams'

employment for violation of the Handbook's prohibition of verbal abuse of any co-worker. (See id. ¶ 23.) That constitutes a

18

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Williams' termination. Nothing in the record suggests that reason is pretextual. Williams' retaliation claim fails for two reasons. She has

failed to establish a causal connection between her complaints about sexual harassment and Salmon's termination of her

employment and therefore has failed to establish a prima facie case. has Even if she had established a prima facie case, Salmon proferred her a legitimate, non-discriminatory Williams has reason not shown for is

terminating pretextual.

employment,

which

For those reasons, summary judgment on Williams'

retaliation claim is appropriate. V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Salmon's motion for summary judgment claims and for DISMISSES hostile Williams' work gender-based and

discrimination retaliation.

environment

So ordered this 3d day of March, 2011.

s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr. SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

19