Willis et al v. Morgan Keegan & Company, Inc. et al
Filing
387
ORDER denying Defendant Morgan Keegan's 377 Motion to Enjoin Arbitration and 385 Emergency Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Signed by Judge Samuel H. Mays, Jr on 11/2/2018.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
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In re REGIONS MORGAN KEEGAN
SECURITIES, DERIVATIVE and
ERISA LITIGATION
This Document Relates to:
In re Regions Morgan Keegan
Closed-End Fund Litigation,
No. 2:07-cv-02830-SHM-dkv
No. 09-2009
ORDER
On January 4, 2013, the Court entered an Order preliminarily
approving settlement, providing for notice, and preliminarily
certifying a plaintiff class.
(Prelim. Order, ECF No. 276.)
That settlement was reached among Lion Fund, L.P., Dr. J. Samir
Sulieman, and Larry Lattimore, on behalf of the Class, and C.
Fred Daniels, in his capacity as Trustee ad Litem (“TAL”) 1, on
behalf of the TAL Subclass, (collectively the “Lead Plaintiffs”),
and J. Kenneth Alderman, Carter E. Anthony, James C. Kelsoe,
1 C. Fred Daniels is the court-appointed Trustee for the Leroy McAbee, Sr.
Family Foundation Trust, the Harold G. McAbee Family Trust, the KPS Group,
Inc. Profit Sharing Retirement Plan, the Boyd F. Horn IRA Rollover Trust, the
Alice C. Cade for the benefit of Carroll Corbin Bays Trust, and the Patricia
Penzone Irrevocable Trust for the benefit of Charles A. Penzone. (Combined
Amended Complaint ¶ 1, ECF No. 186.)
Jr.,
MK
Holding,
Management,
Inc.,
Inc.,
Allen
Morgan
B.
Keegan
Morgan,
&
Jr.,
Company,
Morgan
Inc.,
Asset
Regions
Financial Corporation, Brian B. Sullivan, Joseph C. Weller, and
the
Regions
Morgan
Keegan
Closed-End
(collectively the “Defendants”).
Funds
(the
“Funds” 2 ),
On August 5, 2013, the Court
entered an Order that approved the proposed settlement, approved
the Plaintiffs’ award of attorney’s fees and expenses, and
certified the Plaintiff class (“Final Approval Order”).
(ECF
No. 345.)
Before the Court are two motions.
The first is Defendant
Morgan Keegan & Company, Inc.’s (“Morgan Keegan”) May 3, 2018
Motion to Enjoin Arbitration Filed by George W. Porter, Jr. (the
“Motion”).
17,
2018
(ECF No. 377.)
Emergency
The second is Morgan Keegan’s October
Motion
for
Preliminary
“Emergency Motion”) seeking the same relief.
Injunction
(the
(ECF No. 385.)
Morgan Keegan asks the Court to enjoin Porter from proceeding
with
a
Financial
Industry
Regulatory
Association
(“FINRA”)
arbitration, Case No. 17-02221, filed on August 17, 2017 (the
“FINRA Arbitration”).
(Id.; FINRA Stat. Claim, ECF No. 377-2.)
Porter responded on May 17, 2018.
2
(Resp., ECF No. 378.)
Morgan
The “Funds” refers to the RMK High Income Fund, Inc. (“RMH”), RMK Strategic
Income Fund, Inc. (“RSF”), RMK Advantage Fund, Inc. (“RMA”), and RMK MultiSector High Income Fund, Inc. (“RHY”). (Id.) The names of the Funds in this
action were changed to Helios High Income Fund, Inc., RMK Strategic Income
Fund, Inc., Helios Advantage Fund, Inc., and Helios Multi-Sector High Income
Fund, Inc. after the Funds were acquired by Hyperion Brookfield Asset
Management, Inc. on July 29, 2008. (Id. at n.1.)
2
Keegan replied on May 30, 2018.
(Reply, ECF No. 382.)
filed a sur-reply on June 1, 2018.
Porter
(Sur-reply, ECF No. 384.)
Porter responded to the Emergency Motion on October 22, 2018.
(ECF No. 386.)
For
the
following
reasons,
Morgan
Keegan’s
Motion
and
Emergency Motion are DENIED.
I.
Background
In
this
Closed-End
Fund
Litigation,
Lead
Plaintiffs
asserted claims on behalf of a class of individuals and entities
that purchased or acquired the publicly traded securities of
four closed-end mutual Funds that were “issued, underwritten,
sold, and managed by two wholly owned and controlled subsidiaries
of Defendant Regions Financial Corporation (“RFC”).”
Amended Complaint, “CAC” ¶ 4, ECF No. 186.)
(Combined
Lead Plaintiffs
generally alleged that Defendants had misrepresented the types
of assets and the true value of assets in which the Funds had
invested.
(CAC ¶¶ 5-6.)
Lead Plaintiffs alleged that the Funds
had invested heavily in Asset-Backed Securities (“ABS”) and, in
particular, subprime mortgage-related ABS, in violation of a
“fundamental
investment
limitation”
diversification of assets.
also
alleged
that
the
meant
(CAC ¶¶ 6, 15-16.)
Funds
had
falsely
to
assure
Lead Plaintiffs
classified
their
portfolio securities as corporate bonds and preferred stocks in
SEC filings, overstated the values of their portfolio securities,
3
mischaracterized the Funds as “high yield,” and misrepresented
the professional management of the Funds’ portfolios.
(CAC ¶¶
6, 17-18, 21-22, 26-28, 25.)
Lead Plaintiffs filed suit on December 21, 2007. (ECF No.
1.)
This Court consolidated two separately pending suits and
appointed
Lead
Plaintiffs
December 15, 2010.
and
Lead
Counsel
by
Order
dated
(Order App. Lead Plaintiffs and Lead Counsel
and Consol. Cases, ECF No. 179.)
Lead Plaintiffs filed the
Combined Amended Complaint on February 22, 2011. The CAC alleged
five federal causes of action against Defendants: (1) violation
of section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933; (2) violation of
section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933; (3) violation of
section 15 of the Securities Act of 1933; (4) violation of
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and (5)
violation of section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.
(CAC ¶¶ 317-67.)
permanent
injunctive
Lead Plaintiffs sought preliminary and
relief,
restitution
in
the
form
of
compensatory damages for their losses, prejudgment interest,
rescission rights, costs, and attorney’s fees.
(Id. § XIII.)
On October 12, 2012, Lead Plaintiffs filed their Unopposed
Motion for Preliminary Approval of a Proposed Settlement and for
Preliminary Class Certification.
(ECF No. 261.)
On January 4,
2013, the Court granted Lead Plaintiffs’ Motion, approving the
preliminary settlement and preliminarily certifying the class.
4
(Prelim. Order, ECF No. 276.)
The Preliminary Approval Order
included in the Class “[a]ll Persons who purchased or otherwise
acquired the publicly traded shares” of the Funds during the
Class Period “and were damaged thereby . . . .”
The
Preliminary
Approval
Order
gave
(Id. ¶ 4.)
Class
opportunity to request exclusion from the Class.
Members
(Id. ¶ 6.)
the
To
be excluded, a Class Member had to mail a written request
containing certain information to the address designated in the
Notice.
(Id. ¶ 10.)
The Court appointed a Class Administrator
to process all Class Member claims and requests for exclusion.
(Id. ¶ 8.)
The Preliminary Approval Order prohibited Class Members
from pursuing any Released Claims against Defendants in any other
proceeding or forum.
(Id. ¶ 24.) The prohibition was “necessary
to protect and effectuate the Settlement and to enter judgment
when
appropriate,
and
[was]
ordered
in
jurisdiction and to protect its judgments.”
aid
of
the
Court’s
(Id.)
On March 8, 2013, Lead Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Final
Approval
of
Certification.
the
Proposed
Settlement
and
Final
Class
(Mot. for Final Approval, ECF No. 283.)
On
August 5, 2013, the Court granted Lead Plaintiffs’ Motion and
entered the Final Approval Order.
No. 345.)
(Final Approval Order, ECF
The Final Approval Order dismissed with prejudice all
claims asserted in the action against all Defendants.
5
(Final
Approval Order § III.)
The Final Approval Order also approved
the
as
Release
submitted
part
of
Exhibit
B
to
the
joint
Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement (the “Stipulation”).
(Id.; Stipulation, ECF No. 260-5.)
The Release prohibited Class
Members from pursuing any Released Claims 3 against Defendants in
any other proceeding or forum.
(Stipulation ¶¶ 10-17.)
The
Court retained jurisdiction to enforce the Release and the
Stipulation.
(Final Approval Order § IV.)
On August 17, 2017, George W. Porter, Jr. filed a statement
of claim for FINRA Arbitration on behalf of himself, the George
W. Porter, Jr. IRA, and the Porter Living Trust (collectively
“Claimants”).
(See ECF No. 377-2.)
On October 25, 2017,
Claimants filed an Amended Statement of Claim.
377-3.)
Claimants’
claims
against
Morgan
(See ECF No.
Keegan
are:
(1)
misrepresentations and omissions; (2) breach of fiduciary duty;
(3) unsuitable investments; (4) violation of section 11 of the
1933 Securities Act; (5) violation of section 12 of the 1933
Securities Act; (6) liability under section 15 of the 1933
Securities Act; (7) breach of the Securities Act of 1934; (8)
violations of the Tennessee Securities Act; (9) fraud; (10)
3
“‘Released Claims’ means any and all claims, rights, causes of action,
demands, actions, debts, sums of money, obligations, judgments, suits, and
liabilities of every nature and description . . . that arise out of, relate
to, or are in connection with the claims, allegations, transactions, facts,
events, acts, disclosures, statements, representations or omissions or
failures to act involved, set forth, or referred to in the Complaint filed
in the [Class] Action[.]” (ECF No. 260 at 14.)
6
negligence; (11) failure of supervision; (12) breach of contract;
(13) vicarious liability; and (14) violations of FINRA rules.
(Stat. Claim at ¶¶ 72-118.)
Morgan Keegan argues that Claimants’ arbitration action
violates the Final Approval Order.
Claimants contend that they
are not bound by that Order because they opted out of the Class.
II.
Standard of Review
The All Writs Act “‘authorizes a federal court to issue
such commands as may be necessary or appropriate to effectuate
and prevent the frustration of . . . orders it has previously
issued
in
exercise
of
jurisdiction
otherwise
obtained.’”
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Chester, Willcox & Saxbe, 589 F.3d 835,
844 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. City of Detroit,
329 F.3d 515, 522 (6th Cir. 2003)).
Federal courts have broad
injunctive powers to protect the finality of their judgments,
including the power to enjoin arbitration to prevent relitigation
of claims and issues the Court has already decided.
See Kelly
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 985 F.2d 1067, 1069
(11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1011, 114 S. Ct. 600
(1993).
Where a district court has retained jurisdiction to enforce
a final settlement agreement, “‘it necessarily makes compliance
with the terms of the settlement agreement a part of its order
so that a breach of the agreement would be a violation of the
7
order.’”
In re Lehman Bros. Sec. and ERISA Litig., 2012 WL
2478483, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2012) (quoting In re Am.
Express Fin. Advisors Sec. Litig., 672 F.3d 113, 127 (2d Cir.
2011)).
Where
the
alleged
relitigation
at
issue
is
an
arbitration, a court has “authority to order the cessation of an
arbitration
by
parties
within
its
jurisdiction
where
such
authority appears necessary in order for a court to enforce the
terms of the parties’ own agreement, as reflected in a settlement
agreement.”
III.
Am. Express, 672 F.3d at 141.
Analysis
Morgan Keegan argues that Claimants are Class Members who
submitted invalid opt-out notices to the Class Administrator.
(See ECF No. 377-1 at 14716.)
Morgan Keegan contends that
Claimants did not adequately opt out of the Class, and that the
Final Approval Order permanently enjoins them from pursing an
arbitration action against it for any Released Claims.
(Id.)
Claimants argue that they opted out of the Class when they
submitted two valid opt-out notices to the Class Administrator.
(ECF No. 378 at 14789.)
Claimants contend that those opt-out
notices excluded them from the Class, and that, as a result, the
Final Approval Order does not enjoin their arbitration action
against Morgan Keegan.
(Id.)
Claimants are Class Members because they bought shares of
the Closed-End Funds during the Class Period.
8
(See ECF No. 377-
4.)
The Final Approval Order applies to them unless they opted
out of the Class.
(See Prelim. Order, ECF No. 276 (“All Class
Members (other than those persons or entities who shall timely
and validly request exclusion from the Class) shall be bound by
all determinations and judgments in the Action . . .”).)
The Preliminary Approval Order established the requirements
for a valid opt-out request.
(ECF No. 276 ¶ 6.)
Each Request
for Exclusion was required to: (1) include the name, address,
and telephone number of the person seeking exclusion; (2) state
that the person requests exclusion from the Class in “In re
Regions Morgan Keegan Closed-End Fund Litigation, Case No. 2:07cv-02830-SHM-dkv”; (3) be signed and dated by each person seeking
exclusion; and (4) list the date of each purchase or acquisition
of Closed-End Fund shares during the Class Period and the number
of shares purchased or acquired in each transaction.
deadline to request exclusion was March 22, 2013.
(Id.)
(Id.)
The
The
Preliminary Approval Order provided that no request would be
effective “unless it provides all of the required information
and is made within the time stated above, or the exclusion is
otherwise accepted by the Court or allowed by Lead Counsel and
counsel
for
the
Morgan
Keegan
Counsel
did
not
object
to
Defendants
Claimants’
and
opt-out
RFC.”
(Id.)
notices,
Claimants did not receive any proceeds from the settlement.
9
and
Morgan Keegan argues that “Porter is in violation of the
permanent injunction entered by the Court in the [Final Approval
Order] because he indisputably failed to follow the process to
exclude himself from the Closed-End Fund Class.”
1 at 14721 (footnote omitted).)
(ECF No. 377-
Morgan Keegan contends that
Porter failed to submit a notice excluding himself from the
Class, and that Claimants submitted requests to exclude only
certain transactions listed by the Porter Trust and the Porter
IRA.
(Id. at 14722.)
Morgan Keegan argues that Porter is
enjoined from bringing any arbitration action in his individual
capacity, and that the Porter IRA and the Porter Trust are
enjoined from bringing an arbitration action that is not limited
to the transactions identified in their opt-out notices.
(Id.)
Claimants argue that they are not enjoined from bringing an
arbitration action against Morgan Keegan because they opted out
of the Class.
(ECF No. 378 at 14788.)
their
notices
opt-out
met
Preliminary Approval Order.
the
Claimants contend that
requirements
(Id.)
of
the
Court’s
They argue that Porter, as
an individual, effectively opted-out of the Class because he
“was the only individual involved and [he] was in privity with
his IRA and the Porter Living Trust.”
(Id.)
Claimants do not
dispute that they failed to list all of the Closed-End Fund
shares they bought.
notices
are
valid
They contend, however, that the opt-out
as
to
all
10
their
shares
because
they
“express[ed] a reasonable indication of a desire to opt-out” and
“substantially complied with the opt-out procedure.” 4
378 at 14794.)
(ECF No.
Any failure to list certain transactions was a
mere “technical deficiency.” 5
(ECF No. 384 at 14912, 14916.)
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), a notice
must inform class members “that the court will exclude from the
class any member who requests exclusion . . . .”
P. 23(c)(2)(B).
Fed. R. Civ.
If there is a dispute about whether a class
member has followed the appropriate procedure, the burden is on
the class member to establish that it made a sufficient effort
to communicate an intent to withdraw from the class through the
appropriate channels.
See In re Travel Agent Comm'n Antitrust
Litig., No. 1:03-cv-30000, 2006 WL 8439540, at *3 (N.D. Ohio
Sept. 14, 2006) (citing In re Four Seasons Sec. Laws Litig., 493
F.2d 1288, 1291 (10th Cir. 1974)).
The Sixth Circuit has not addressed the standard to be
applied when determining whether a class member’s technically
deficient opt-out notice is valid.
Courts that have considered
the issue have held that an opt-out notice need not perfectly
conform to the format chosen by the district court to effectively
4 Because no party has stated how many shares were omitted from Claimants’
opt-out notices, the Court cannot determine the magnitude of the deficiency.
5 Because the Court concludes that Claimants’ opt-out notices validly excluded
Claimants from the Class, the Court need not address Claimants’ arguments
that the relief Morgan Keegan seeks would violate Claimants’ due process
rights.
11
express a desire to opt out of a class action settlement.
For
example, in In re Four Seasons Securities Laws Litigation, the
Tenth Circuit held that “the important question [is] whether
notice [to opt out] was communicated,” and that a “reasonable
indication” of an intent to opt out is sufficient.
493 F.2d at
1291; see also Plummer v. Chem. Bank, 668 F.2d 654, 657 n.2 (2d
Cir. 1982) (“Any reasonable indication of a desire to get out
should suffice.”); In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 223 F.R.D.
357, 365 (E.D. Pa. 2004) amended 223 F.R.D. 370 (E.D. Pa. 2004)
(“The Court agrees with the Tenth Circuit that a ‘reasonable
indication’ of intent to opt out is sufficient.”). “Considerable
flexibility is desirable in determining what constitutes an
effective expression of a class member's desire to be excluded
and any written evidence of that desire should suffice.”
7AA
WRIGHT & MILLER, FED. PRAC. & PROC., § 2785 (3d ed. 2005).
Claimants
sent
two
opt-out
notices
to
the
Class
Administrator. (See ECF No. 377-4.) They are labeled “Exclusion
[R]equest 109” and “Exclusion [R]equest 110”.
letter attached to Exclusion Request 109 states:
12
(Id.)
A cover
In connection with the settlement [in In re Regions
Morgan Keegan Closed-End Fund Litigation, No. 07-cv02380-SHM-dkv], please find enclosed the opt-out forms
for the following:
George W. Porter
George W. Porter, Jr. — IRA
George and Kay Porter, Trustees
Porter Living Trust
for
the
(ECF No. 377-4 at 14784.)
A cover letter attached to Exclusion Request 110 states:
In connection with the settlement [in In re Regions
Morgan Keegan Closed-End Fund Litigation, No. 07-cv02380-SHM-dkv], please find enclosed the opt-out forms
for the following:
George
George
Laurie
George
Porter
W. Porter
W. Porter, Jr. — IRA
Ann Porter
and Kay Porter, Trustees
Living Trust
for
the
(Id. at 14784.) 6
Two other cover letters attached to the Exclusion Requests
begin: “I hereby request exclusion from the class in In re
Regions Morgan Keegan Closed-End Fund Litigation, No. 07-cv02380 SHM dkv.”
(Id. at 14774.)
Schedules showing the date
Fund shares were purchased, the name of the fund, the number of
shares purchased, the total cost of the purchase, and other
6 The quoted passages of the opt-out notices refer to “George W. Porter,” and
the individual named in this lawsuit is “George W. Porter, Jr.” The Court
will assume that references to George W. Porter and George W. Porter, Jr. in
this action refer to the same person. Claimants ground their arguments on
that assumption (see ECF No. 386 at 14935), and Morgan Keegan has not argued
otherwise.
13
information are attached to both Requests.
(See id. at 14777,
14780—83.)
The quoted passages demonstrate that Claimants expressly
requested exclusion from the Class.
They provided the basic
information required by the Preliminary Approval Order and listed
transactions for 81,000 Closed-End Fund shares.
377-4.)
(See ECF No.
Claimants gave a “reasonable indication” that they
intended to opt out of the Class.
Four Seasons, 493 F.2d at
1291.
The record does not support Morgan Keegan’s contention that
“[n]o opt-out was filed by Porter individually.”
1 at 14718l, 14784.)
(ECF No. 377-
Both opt-out notices state that they are
“the opt-out forms . . . for George W. Porter[.]”
(ECF No. 377-
4 at 14775, 14784.)
There is no evidence that Claimants intended to opt out
only as to those transactions listed in the schedules attached
to
the
Requests.
The
Preliminary
Approval
Order
did
not
authorize partial opt-outs, and there is no reason to believe a
partial
opt-out
was
possible.
A
partial
opt-out
would
be
“inconsistent with the fundamental premise that a class member
who opts-out cannot participate in the benefits of the case and
is not bound by the judgment in the case.”
Muldrow v. H.K.
Porter Co., 20 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1069 (N.D. Ala. 1975).
Assuming
a partial opt-out were possible, Claimants demonstrated their
14
intent to fully opt out of the Class.
qualify or limit their withdrawal.
They made no attempt to
Claimants should not be
barred from continuing their arbitration action merely because
they omitted certain transactions from their opt-out notices.
Morgan Keegan argues that even minor errors would render an optout notice invalid.
(See ECF No. 382 at 14902.)
That standard
imposes a significantly higher burden than the law requires.
Citing the Court’s May 17, 2013 Order in this action, Morgan
Keegan represents that the Court “has already found” that optout notices that do not comply with the Preliminary Approval
Order are ineffective.
(ECF No. 382 at 14902.)
Morgan Keegan
cites the Court’s determination that the opt-out forms submitted
by (1) Marion M. Stowers and (2) Steven E. Haddock were invalid.
(Id. at 13074–76.)
Unlike the notices Claimants submitted,
Stowers and Haddock did not substantially comply with the Court’s
Preliminary Approval Order. Stowers said only that he “purchased
several thousand shares of RMK funds[,]” and Haddock “decline[d]
to give . . . the dates of each purchase or acquisition of
Closed-End Fund shares . . . [because] [w]what [he] bought or
acquired is none of your business.”
contrast,
required
Claimants
by
the
supplied
Preliminary
all
(Id. at 13074, 13075.)
of
Approval
the
basic
Order
and
information
listed
necessary information for 81,000 Closed-End Fund shares.
15
By
the
Morgan Keegan argues that a stringent standard should be
applied when considering the validity of non-compliant opt-out
notices because of the inclusion of a “blow-out provision” in
its settlement with Lead Plaintiffs.
(ECF No. 382 at 14904.)
The blow-out provision allowed Defendants to withdraw from the
settlement agreement if the number of excluded shares exceeded
a certain number.
(Id. at 14904 n.1.)
Morgan Keegan argues
that it needed to know the exact number of excluded shares to
exercise its rights under the settlement, and that its right to
terminate “would be eroded if [Claimants] were able to bring
claims on non-excluded shares at this juncture, after Defendants
are no longer able to exercise their rights under the blow out
provision.”
(Id.)
Morgan
Keegan
contends
that
allowing
Claimants’ arbitration action to continue would deprive it “of
the benefit of [its] bargain by exposing [it] to liability [it]
believed had been foreclosed as of March 22, 2013.”
(Id. at
14904.)
Courts have recognized the importance of invalidating noncompliant opt-out forms so that parties can meaningfully exercise
their
right
to
withdraw
from
a
settlement.
See
Hughes
v. Microsoft Corp., Nos. C98-1646C, C93-0178C, 2001 WL 34089697,
at *2 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 26, 2001) (noting the importance of a
defendant’s termination rights when considering the validity of
certain opt-out notices lacking basic information); In re Kitec
16
Plumbing
Sys.
Prod.
Liab.
Litig.,
No.
09-MD-2098,
2011
WL
13289881, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 27, 2011) (same).
Here, Claimants submitted valid opt-out notices, containing
basic information.
Defendants could have considered Claimants’
shares when deciding whether to withdraw from the settlement
agreement.
so
their
Claimants made no claim to the settlement proceeds,
intention
to
opt
out
should
have
been
apparent.
Assuming Morgan Keegan was entitled to ignore Claimants’ opt-out
notices, Morgan Kegan does not contend that Claimants’ shares
influenced its decision not to withdraw from the settlement.
Although the number of excluded shares permitted Defendants to
terminate the settlement, Defendants did not do so.
No. 382 at 14904 n.1.)
(See ECF
Morgan Keegan does not contend that the
number of Claimants’ shares in excess of the 81,000 shares they
disclosed in their opt-out notices would have caused Morgan
Keegan
to
exercise
its
right
to
terminate
the
settlement
agreement.
Claimants’ opt-out notices were sufficient to exclude them
from the Class.
Because they opted out, Claimants are not
subject to the Court’s Final Approval Order prohibiting Class
Members from pursuing Released Claims against Morgan Keegan in
other forums.
Morgan Keegan’s Motion and Emergency Motion are
DENIED.
17
IV.
Conclusion
For
the
foregoing
reasons,
Morgan
Keegan’s
Motion
Emergency Motion are DENIED.
So ordered this 2nd day of November, 2018.
/s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr.
SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
18
and
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