Lovelace v. City of Memphis Police Department et al

Filing 29

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 17 . Signed by Judge Samuel H. Mays, Jr., on February 24, 2010. (Mays, Samuel)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE WESTERN DIVISION RICHARD LOVELACE, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF MEMPHIS POLICE DEPARTMENT and JOHN DOES 1-10, Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

Case No. 08-2776

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

Before

the

Court

is

Defendant

City

of

Memphis

Police See

Department's (the "MPD") July 22, 2009, Motion to Dismiss. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). responded.1 2) Plaintiff

Plaintiff Richard Lovelace has not

The MPD argues that 1) it is an improper Defendant; has failed to state a valid claim against the

proper defendant, the City of Memphis (the "City"); and 3) the Court should dismiss the John Doe Defendants because Plaintiff has failed to effect service and the statute of limitations has run, barring him from doing so in the future. Because the MPD's

arguments are persuasive, the Court GRANTS the MPD's Motion and DISMISSES Lovelace's suit.

This Court has once before issued a Show Cause Order warning Plaintiff that his suit could be dismissed for failure to prosecute. (See Dkt. Nos. 7 (order), 8 (response).)

1

I.

BACKGROUND

Lovelace alleges in his Complaint that he and John Raiter resided at a house at 3849 Orchi Road, Memphis, Tennessee.

Lovelace and Raiter rented the property from Joey Punsen on October 21, 2007. (Compl. ¶¶ 6-7.) Lovelace's two children, a

thirteen-year-old son and a six-year-old daughter, also resided in the Orchi Road house. officers "burst into the (Id. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff's On November 3, 2007, home without announcing

their presence."

(Id. ¶ 8.)

Officers drew their weapons and (Id.

ordered all of the home's occupants to lie on the ground. ¶ 9.)

One officer fatally shot Lovelace's "beloved dog, Tyson." The unknown Defendant officers searched the home,

(Id. ¶ 10.)

destroyed all of the mattresses and box springs, confiscated all of Lovelace's firearms, and slashed the tires on his car. ¶¶ 11-13.) (Id.

Officers then arrested Lovelace, who later learned (Id. ¶¶ 14-15.) Shelby County,

that he was charged with criminal trespass. The General Sessions Criminal Court for

Tennessee, "discharged" Lovelace on that charge.

(Id. ¶ 16.)

Lovelace filed suit on October 31, 2008, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the Defendants had deprived him of his right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment and his right to due process under the

Fourteenth Amendment. compensatory damages

(Id. ¶ 17.) and $75,000 2 in

Lovelace seeks $25,000 in punitive damages against

each Defendant.

(Id.)

The MPD filed its Motion to test the

validity of Plaintiff's Complaint. II. This JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW Court has original jurisdiction over Plaintiff's

federal claims under the general federal question jurisdiction conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In addressing a motion to dismiss, the Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all well-pled factual allegations as true. League of

United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007). of facts A plaintiff can support a claim "by showing any set with the allegations in the complaint." This legal

consistent

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007). standard requires more than bare assertions of

conclusions.

Bovee v. Coopers & Lybrand C.P.A., 272 F.3d 356, "[A] formulaic recitation of the elements Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

361 (6th Cir. 2001).

of a cause of action will not do."

Any claim for relief must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam).

"Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only `give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" 555.) 3 Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at

Nonetheless, a complaint must contain sufficient facts "to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face'" to survive a motion to dismiss. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. "This

1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). plausibility standard is not akin to a

`probability

requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." U.S. at 556). of action, Id. (citing Twombly, 550

"Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause by mere conclusory statements, do not

supported

suffice." facts and

Id. at 1949 (citation omitted). "armed with nothing more than

A plaintiff with no conclusions" cannot

"unlock the doors of discovery." III. ANALYSIS

Id. at 1950.

A. MPD is not a Proper Defendant and Plaintiff's Complaint Does Not State a Valid Cause of Action Against the City Defendant's Motion argues that the MPD is "an

unincorporated department of the City [that is] merely a vehicle through which the City fulfills its policy functions."

(Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 5.) ("Def's. Memo") the City. The MPD asserts that the proper Defendant is

However, the MPD also asks the Court to dismiss

Lovelace's Complaint because he has failed to state a § 1983 action against any municipality. (Id. 5-6.)

4

Defendant is correct that the MPD is an improper party to this suit. Numerous cases in the Sixth Circuit have found that

the party against which to assert claims of constitutional and statutory violations by police departments is the local

municipality.

See, e.g., Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049

(6th Cir. 1994) (proper party for suit against Jefferson County, Kentucky Police Department is Jefferson County); Alexander v. Beale Street Blues Co., 108 F. Supp. 2d 934, 947 (W.D. Tenn. 1999) (Memphis Police Department is not an independent entity capable of being sued); Lee v. Knox County Sheriff's Office, No. 3:05-CV-571, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79945, at *6-7 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 31, 2006) (same for Knox County, Tennessee Sheriff's

Department).

The proper party for those claims Plaintiff brings

against the Memphis Police Department is the City of Memphis. See Alexander, 108 F. Supp. 2d at 947. The Court, therefore,

GRANTS the Defendant's Motion and DISMISSES the Memphis Police Department as a Defendant in this action. "To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Local West v. are

governments

considered "persons" for purposes of § 1983. 220 F.3d 767, 772 (6th Cir. 2000). 5

Holloway v. Brush,

To state a claim under §

1983 against a municipality, a plaintiff must allege that the purported violation of a federal right occurred as the result of an illegal policy or custom. 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). § 1983 for Id. his Complaint, Lovelace fails to allege that any an injury Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.,

Municipalities "may not be sued under solely by its employees or

inflicted

agents." In

specific policy or custom was the moving force directly causing the alleged of constitutional Bryan a County v. "to violations. Brown, identify 520 a Cf. U.S. Bd. 397, of 403 County (1997) or

Comm'rs

(requiring `custom' appears

plaintiff caused in a

municipal The that

`policy' word

that only

plaintiff's conclusory

injury").

custom Doe

allegation

the

John

Defendants "acted toward Plaintiff under color of the statutes, ordinances, customs and usage of the State of Tennessee, City of Memphis, and Memphis Police Department." Complaint is silent as to what those (Compl. ¶ 4.) "statutes, The

ordinances,

customs, and usages" are.

The Court is under no duty to conjure See

a policy or custom that would support Plaintiff's suit. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563, 570.

Rather, Plaintiff bears the

burden of explaining with minimal, but sufficient, facts exactly what policy or custom U.S. it at caused 94 his injury. pro Id. se at 570; cf. met C

Erickson, standard

551 where

(prisoner's prison 6 staff

complaint

alleged

withheld

hepatitis

medication

as

discipline

for

prisoner's

alleged

theft

of

a

needle, leading to the threat of permanent damage to prisoner's health). Complaint Because Lovelace has failed to meet this burden, his fails to state any claim against any municipality

against which suit would lie.

The Court, therefore, DISMISSES

Lovelace's § 1983 municipal liability claim. B. Lovelace's Claims Against the Unknown Officers Must Be Dismissed Because He Cannot Now Timely Amend His Complaint to Reflect Their Identities The MPD next argues that the Court should dismiss all

claims against the John Doe officer Defendants because the oneyear statute of limitations on § 1983 actions has expired and any effort by Lovelace to amend the Complaint to reflect the actual names of the individual Defendants would not relate back to the suit's original filing date. (Def.'s Memo at 6-9.) The

MPD's argument rests on the interaction between the statute of limitations and two related provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Actions brought in Tennessee under § 1983 are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-

104(a)(3); Berndt v. Tennessee, 796 F.2d 879, 883 (6th Cir. 1986). Where an amendment to a complaint would add a new party,

the amendment must come within the statute of limitations period or relate back to the original filing date of the complaint. Cox v. Treadway, 75 F.3d 230, 240 (6th Cir. 1996). 7 Naming a

John Doe defendant cannot save a pleading from this requirement. Id.; Force v. City of Memphis, No. 95-6333, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 30233, at *11-12 (6th Cir. Nov. 14, 1996) (following Cox).

Lovelace has not sought to amend his Complaint to replace a John Doe Defendant with a named defendant. Lovelace would have

needed to file such an amendment by November 3, 2008, one year after the MPD entered his home, for the amendment to be timely. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(3). Therefore, Lovelace's

claim against the unknown officers may only survive dismissal if any future amendment can relate back to the original date he filed suit. Cox, 75 F.3d at 240.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) ("Rule 15") governs the relation back of amendments to the date of the original pleading. (1) It provides: When an Amendment Relates Back. An amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when: (A) the law that provides statute of limitations back; the applicable allows relation

(B)

the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out--or attempted to be set out--in the original pleading; or the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party against whom a claim is asserted, if Rule 15(c)(1)(B) is satisfied and if, within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for serving the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment: 8

(C)

(i)

received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in defending on the merits; and knew or should have known that the action would have been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party's identity. 15(c)(1). As noted above, the applicable

(ii)

Fed.

R.

Civ.

P.

statute of limitations will not allow an amendment to relate back. one-year See Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(3) (providing for a limitations Thus, period); for any see also to Fed. R. Civ. back, P. the

15(c)(1)(A).

amendment

relate

amendment must satisfy the provisions of both Rule 15(c)(1)(B) and (C)2. The Court will assume a future amendment would meet

Rule 15(c)(1)(B)'s requirement that the amendment relate to "a claim . . . that arose out of the conduct . . . set out . . . in the original pleading" because Lovelace would be seeking to add the names of the officers who entered his house on November 3, 2007. See Force, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 30233, at *6-7 (finding

Rule 15(c)(1)(B) satisfied when officers to be named are the same as those who allegedly violated plaintiff's rights during incident in question). Lovelace must then satisfy the two

requirements of subsection (c)(1)(C).

He can satisfy neither.

2

This is because Rule 15(c)(1)(C) also requires a requirements of subsection (B). See Fed. R. Civ. amendment is valid "if Rule 15(c)(1)(B) is satisfied").

party to meet P. 15(c)(1)(C)

the (an

9

Rule 15(c)(1)(C) first requires that the party to be added have received notice of the pending action. 15(c)(1)(C)(i). Fed. R. Civ. P.

The party must have had that notice within 120

days of the date Lovelace originally filed his Complaint, i.e., the time period Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) allows for serving the summons and complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

15(c)(1)(C) (making the time period allowed for service under Rule 4 the limitations period for notice). has suggested in dicta that this notice The Sixth Circuit can be actual or

constructive.

See Berndt, 796 F.2d at 884 ("We believe that

Rule 15(c) does not require that the new defendants received actual notice." (citation omitted)) (dicta). is factual and takes into account the The notice inquiry totality of the

circumstances surrounding the proposed new defendants and their relation to the already named defendants. Id.; Force, 1996 U.S.

App. LEXIS 30233, at *11 (describing the Berndt factors as a "non-exhaustive list"). Although this inquiry is made more difficult by Lovelace's failure to take steps to obtain the names of the officers, one factor suggests that constructive notice might be inferred. officers are alleged to have worked for the original The named

Defendant, MPD.

Cf. Berndt, 796 F.2d at 884 (suggesting that,

where a proposed individual defendant worked for an alreadynamed corporate defendant, suing the corporate defendant might 10

give constructive notice to the party).

However, there is no

indication in Plaintiff's Complaint that any of the officers who are alleged to have raided his home in 2007 were high-ranking supervisors or would have any other reason to be aware of the legal affairs of the MPD. Compare Compl. ¶ 4 (describing John

Doe Defendants as "duly appointed police officers of the City of Memphis"), with Force, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 30233, *8-9 (where officers are not "`high officials' of the city or of the police department and would not have been involved in the city's legal affairs," Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(i) not satisfied). Lovelace is

represented by counsel, unlike the Berndt plaintiff, who was pro se. rules. Thus, there is no reason to bend the normal procedural Berndt, 796 F.2d at 882-83 (explaining that, to avoid a

"miscarriage of justice," the pro se plaintiff should be allowed to amend his Complaint). result here. No such miscarriage of justice would

Lovelace cannot meet the notice requirement of

Rule 15(c)(1)(C). Lovelace requirement: also that, fails but to for satisfy the mistake Rule in 15's second the

identity,

proposed new defendant knew or should have known that an action would have been brought against him. Fed. R. Civ. P.

15(c)(1)(C)(ii). naming unknown

The Sixth Circuit held in Cox that, because officer defendants is not a "mistake or

misnomer," a late-filed amendment to add a party cannot meet 11

Rule

15's

mistaken

identity

requirement.

75

F.3d

at

240.

Because Lovelace would have to meet both requirements of Rule 15 to amend his Complaint, his failure on the second prong alone is sufficient to preclude his suit against the John Doe Defendants. See Force, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 30233, *11-14 (noting the

mistaken identity requirement as an additional reason to affirm the district court's refusal to allow the amendment). Rule 15

prevents Lovelace from adding any defendant who has yet to be named; therefore, his suit has no properly-named defendants and cannot continue. The Court, therefore, DISMISSES the claims

against the unnamed officer Defendants. IV. CONCLUSION

The MPD is an inappropriate defendant in a § 1983 action. Because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against any

municipal defendant and cannot amend his Complaint to add a properly-named individual defendant, the Court GRANTS MPD's

Motion and DISMISSES Lovelace's suit. So ordered this 24th day of February, 2010.

s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr. SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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