Pease Construction, Inc. v. Crowder-Gulf Joint Venture, LLP

Filing 12

ORDER GRANTING 5 DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS. Signed by Judge Samuel H. Mays, Jr., on 05/27/2011. (Mays, Samuel)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION

)
)
) No. 10-2780
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

PEASE CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
CROWDER-GULF JOINT VENTURE,
LLP,
Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiff Pease Construction, Inc. (“Pease Construction”)
brings

claims

against
Gulf”).

for

Defendant

breach

of

Crowder-Gulf

contract
Joint

and

unjust

Venture,

(See Compl. ¶¶ 9-16, ECF No. 1.)

LLP

enrichment
(“Crowder-

Before the Court is

Crowder-Gulf’s December 3, 2010 Motion to Dismiss (“Motion”) for
want of personal jurisdiction.
5.)

(“Mot.”)

Pease Construction responded in opposition on

January 26, 2011.

(See Def.’s [sic] Resp. to Pl.’s [sic] Mot.

to Dismiss, ECF No. 9.)
on February 1, 2011.
Resp.

in

Reply”).
I.

Opp’n

(See Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No.

to

(“Pl.’s Resp.”)

Crowder-Gulf replied

(See Reply to Pease Construction, Inc.’s
Mot.

to

Dismiss,

ECF

No.

10.)

(“Def.’s

For the following reasons, the Motion is GRANTED.
Background

Pease Construction alleges that, on or about September 29,
2008, it entered into a contract to work as a subcontractor for
Crowder-Gulf on a debris hauling project in Montgomery County,
(Compl. ¶¶ 1, 5; see Ex. A, ECF No. 1-

Texas (the “Project”).
1.)

According to the complaint, Pease Construction furnished

the labor, services, and materials required under the contract
and, based on a verbal agreement, performed additional work for
Crowder-Gulf on or about November 7, 2008.

(Compl. ¶¶ 7, 10;

see Ex. B, ECF No. 1-2.)
Pease Construction alleges that Crowder-Gulf defaulted on
its

obligations

Specifically,

under

Pease

the

contract.

Construction

(See

alleges

Compl.

that

¶

8.)

Crowder-Gulf

failed and refused to pay it at least $114,368.96; failed and
refused to pay it in a timely manner, preventing it from paying
its subcontractors; interfered with its work and that of its
subcontractors; refused to allow it or its subcontractors to
perform work as scheduled; and failed and refused to pay it for
(Id. ¶ 11.)

additional work on the Project.

Pease Construction

asserts that those acts constitute breach of contract and unjust
enrichment.

(Id. ¶¶ 9-16.)

Crowder-Gulf has moved to dismiss

Pease Construction’s claims for want of personal jurisdiction.
(See Mot.)
According to affidavits in the record, the parties began
their business relationship in late September 2008.
2

(See Pease

Aff., ECF No. 9-1; Hall Aff., ECF No. 5-1.)

In his affidavit,

Eric Hall (“Hall”), Debris Reduction Manager for Crowder-Gulf,
states that, on September 27, 2008, while he was in Montgomery
County,

Texas,

Larry

Pease

(“Pease”),

Construction, contacted him by telephone.

owner

of

Pease

(Hall Aff. ¶¶ 4, 6.)

Hall states that Pease told him that Pease Construction had
numerous trucks that could assist Crowder-Gulf with the Project.
(Id. ¶ 4.)

According to Hall, because Pease told Hall that the

trucks would come from Austin, Texas, Hall assumed that Pease
(Id. ¶ 5.)

Construction was based in Texas.
In

Pease’s

affidavit,

he

states

that,

on

September

27,

2008, one of his business associates, Don Childers, told him
about an opportunity for Pease Construction to work for CrowderGulf on the Project in Texas.

(Pease Aff. ¶ 3.)

According to

Pease, he was “contacted by Hall by telephone at [his] office in
Collierville, Tennessee to discuss delivery of 26 trucks and
necessary loaders at [Crowder-Gulf’s] storage yard in Montgomery
County[,] Texas on Monday[,] September 29, 2008.”

(Id. ¶ 4.)

Pease does not state when that telephone call took place.

(See

id.)
According to Hall, Pease travelled to Texas to review a
potential contract between Pease Construction and Crowder-Gulf
for work on the Project.
when that visit occurred.

(Hall Aff. ¶ 7.)
(See id.)
3

Hall does not state

Hall states that, while in

Texas, Pease received a copy of a contract for “load-in work”
that Pease Construction might perform if it had the necessary
equipment.
received

(Id.
the

Construction

¶¶

7-8.)

contract,
had

the

(Id. ¶ 8.)

Project.

According

Pease

did

necessary

to

not

Hall,

know

equipment

when

Pease

whether

Pease

available

for

the

Hall states that, although Pease received

a copy of the contract in Texas and was instructed to return it
to Crowder-Gulf’s agents in Texas, Pease did not do so.

(Id. ¶

9.)
In

Pease’s

affidavit,

he

states

that

Crowder-Gulf

sent

contracts to his office in Collierville, Tennessee; that he was
instructed to return those contracts to Theodore, Alabama; and
that he signed the contract on which he bases his claims in his
office in Collierville, Tennnessee.

(Pease Aff. ¶¶ 8-9.)

contract appears to have been drafted by Crowder-Gulf.
A.)

However, no one from Crowder-Gulf executed it.

The

(See Ex.
(See Hall

Aff. ¶ 9; Ex. A.)
Pease
Construction

states

that,

delivered

the

on

September

trucks

and

29,

loaders

2008,
that

Pease

Hall

had

requested by telephone to the Project site, but that they sat
idle until October 1, 2008.

(See Pease Aff. ¶¶ 5-6.)

According

to Hall, on October 2 and October 3, 2008, Pease Construction
performed some “load-out work” on the Project, but that work was
not covered by the contract.

(See Hall Aff. ¶ 9.)
4

The “load-

out

work”

on

October

2

and

3

was

the

only

work

Pease

Construction Performed on the Project, and that work occurred in
Montgomery County, Texas.
Hall

states

that

(Id. ¶ 11.)

all

of

his

communications

with

Pease

Construction occurred in Texas and related exclusively to the
(See id. ¶¶ 10-11.)

Project.

According to Hall, he and Pease

did not discuss any other potential contracts or projects.
id. ¶ 11.)

(See

Pease states that “[a]ll of [his] conversations by

phone or email with Eric Hall occurred from [his] office in
Collierville, Tennessee” and that Pease Construction’s telephone
number has a Memphis, Tennessee area code.

(Id. ¶ 7.)

Although

Pease states that he “performed all of the negotiations and
billing from [his] office in Collierville, Tennessee,” he

does

not state whether he and Hall had any in-person conversations.
(Cf. id.)
II.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Pease Construction asserts that subject matter jurisdiction
is

proper

under

28

U.S.C.

§

1332(a).

(Id.

¶

3.)

Pease

Construction is a Tennessee corporation with its principal place
of business in Collierville, Tennessee.
Gulf

is

an

Alabama

corporation

business in Theodore, Alabama.
diversity exists.

with

(Id. ¶ 1.)
its

(Id. ¶ 2.)

principal

Crowderplace

of

Therefore, complete

See V & M Star, LP v. Centimark Corp., 596

F.3d 354, 355 (6th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).
5

Because Pease

Construction seeks compensatory damages of at least $144,368.96
and an unnamed amount of punitive damages, more than $75,000 is
in

controversy.

(See

Compl.

requirement is satisfied.

4.)

The

amount-in-controversy

See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).

This Court

has subject matter jurisdiction.
III. Personal Jurisdiction
A. Standard of Review
A

plaintiff

bears

the

burden

of

establishing

a

court’s

See Neogen Corp. v. Neo

personal jurisdiction over a defendant.

Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 887 (6th Cir. 2002) (citation
omitted).

Where

the

court

does

not

conduct

an

evidentiary

hearing, the plaintiff “need only make a prima facie showing of
jurisdiction”

to

jurisdiction.
omitted).

survive
Id.

A

court

a

motion

(internal
reviews

to

dismiss

for

want

marks

and

citation

quotation

pleadings

and

affidavits

in

of

the

record, but does “not consider facts proffered by the defendant
that

conflict

“construe[s]

with

the

nonmoving party.”
Inc.

v.

Paragon

those

facts

in

offered
the

by

light

the

most

plaintiff”

favorable

and

to

the

Id. (citations omitted); see Kerry Steel,
Indus.,

106

F.3d

147,

149

(6th

(reviewing the parties’ pleadings and affidavits).

Cir.

1997)

“Dismissal

in this procedural posture is proper only if all the specific
facts which the plaintiff . . . alleges collectively fail to
state a prima facie case for jurisdiction.”
6

Bridgeport Music,

Inc. v. Still N the Water Publ’g, 327 F.3d 472, 477 (6th Cir.
2003) (quoting Kerry Steel, 106 F.3d at 149).
B. Analysis
“In a diversity action, the law of the forum state dictates
whether personal jurisdiction exists, subject to constitutional
Intera Corp. v. Henderson, 428 F.3d 605, 615 (6th

limitations.”
Cir.

2005)

(citations

omitted).

“Where

the

state

long-arm

statute extends to the limits of the due process clause, the two
inquiries are merged and the court need only determine whether
exercising

personal

process.”

Bridgeport Music, Inc., 327 F.3d at 477 (citations

omitted).

Because

interpreted

as

jurisdiction

“the

violates

Tennessee

coterminous

constitutional

long-arm

with

the

statute

limits

on

has

due

been

personal

jurisdiction imposed by the due process clause,” federal courts
in Tennessee may exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-ofstate defendant if doing so comports with federal due process
requirements.

Id. (citation omitted).

“Personal

jurisdiction

over

an

out-of-state

defendant

arises from ‘certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.’”

Air Prods. & Controls,

Inc. v. Safetech Int’l, Inc., 503 F.3d 544, 550 (6th Cir. 2007)
(quoting
(1945)).

Int’l

Shoe

Personal

Co.

v.

Washington,

jurisdiction
7

may

be

326

U.S.

specific

or

310,

316

general,

depending on the type of minimum contacts maintained by the outof-state

defendant.

jurisdiction
continuous

“depends
and

Id.
on

a

systematic

(citation
showing

omitted).

that

contacts

the

with

General

defendant

the

forum

has
state

sufficient to justify the state’s exercise of judicial power
with

respect

to

any

and

against the defendant.”
omitted).

all

claims

the

plaintiff

may

have

Kerry Steel, 106 F.3d at 149 (citations

Specific jurisdiction “exposes the defendant to suit

in the forum state only on claims that arise out of or relate to
a defendant’s contacts with the forum.” (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).

Id.

Pease Construction contends that

this Court has specific personal jurisdiction over Crowder-Gulf.
(See Pl.’s Resp. 3-6.)
In Southern Machine Company v. Mohasco Industries, Inc.,
the Court of Appeals promulgated a three-part test to decide
whether specific personal jurisdiction exists and to protect a
defendant’s due process rights.
Indus.,

Inc.,

omitted).

401

F.2d

374,

381

See S. Mach. Co. v. Mohasco
(6th

Cir.

1968)

(citations

That test states:

First, the defendant must purposefully avail [it]self
of the privilege of acting in the forum state or
causing a consequence in the forum state. Second, the
cause of action must arise from the defendant’s
activities there. Finally, the acts of the defendant
or consequences caused by the defendant must have a
substantial enough connection with the forum state to
make the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant
reasonable.
8

Id.

The Mohasco test remains the starting point for analyzing
Kerry Steel, 106 F.3d at

questions of personal jurisdiction.

149; see Citizens Bank v. Parnes, 376 F. App’x 496, 502-03 (6th
Cir. 2010) (applying the Mohasco test) (citation omitted).
The essence of Crowder-Gulf’s argument is that it has not
purposefully
causing

a

availed

itself

consequence

Specifically,

in

Crowder-Gulf

of

the

privilege

Tennessee.
argues

of

acting

(See
through

that,

Mot.
its

or

¶

3.)

agents,

Pease Construction contacted Crowder-Gulf in Texas, discussed a
contract

with

and

received

a

contract

from

Crowder-Gulf

in

Texas, and performed the work due under that contract in Texas.
(See id.; see also Def.’s Reply 2-3.)

The essence of Pease

Construction’s argument is that, through its agents, CrowderGulf purposefully availed itself of the privilege of acting in
Tennessee because Crowder-Gulf contacted Pease Construction at
its

Tennessee

Construction

telephone

at

its

number,

Tennessee

sent

a

address,

contract

and

to

received

Pease

invoices

from Pease Construction with a Tennessee payment address.

(See

Pl.’s Resp. 1-2, 4.)
To

satisfy

jurisdiction,
[it]self

of

the
‘the

the

first

defendant
privilege

requirement
“must
of

of

have

acting

in

purposefully
the

causing a consequence in the forum state.’”

9

specific

forum

personal
availed
state

or

Air Prods., 503

F.3d at 551. Where a defendant’s contacts with the forum state
result

from

actions

the

defendant

itself

undertakes,

the

defendant has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of
acting

in

the

state.

Id.

(quoting

Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)).

Burger

King

Corp.

v.

Physical presence in the

forum state is not required, but a defendant’s connection to the
forum

state

must

be

“substantial,”

rather

than

a

result

“random,” “fortuitous,” or “attenuated” circumstances.
“The

Supreme

Court

has

emphasized,

with

of

Id.

respect

to

interstate contractual obligations, that parties who reach out
beyond

one

state

obligations

with

regulation

and

and

create

citizens

of

sanctions

continuing
another

in

the

consequences of their activities.”

relationships

state

other

are

subject

[s]tate

for

and
to
the

Lak, Inc. v. Deer Creek

Enters., 885 F.2d 1293, 1300 (6th Cir. 1989) (quoting Burger
King, 471 U.S. at 473) (internal quotation marks omitted).
out-of-state

defendant’s

entering

into

a

contract

with

An
a

plaintiff in the forum state does not automatically subject the
defendant to personal jurisdiction in the forum state.

See Air

Prods., 503 F.3d at 551 (citation omitted); Lak, Inc., 885 F.2d
at 1301 (citation omitted).

“Factors to consider are ‘prior

negotiations and contemplated future consequences, along with
the terms of the contract and the parties’ actual course of

10

Air Prods., 503 F.3d at 551 (quoting Burger King,

dealing.’”

471 U.S. at 479).
In Cole v. Mileti, the Court of Appeals suggested that the
formation of a contract by telephone and mail supports a finding
that a defendant has personally availed itself of the privilege
of acting in the state where its communications are directed.
See

133

F.3d

nonresident

433,

436

defendant

(6th

Cir.

transacts

1998)

business

(“If,
by

as

here,

negotiating

a

and

executing a contract via telephone calls and letters to an Ohio
resident, then the defendant has purposefully availed himself of
the

forum

(citations

by

creating

omitted)).

a

continuing

Other

obligation

authority

in

suggests

Ohio.”
that

a

defendant’s use of the telephone and mail to form a contractual
relationship or to conduct business with an out-of-state party
does not by itself constitute personal availment.

See Reynolds

v. Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 23 F.3d 1110, 1119 (6th Cir.
1994) (“Moreover, [t]he use of interstate facilities such as the
telephone and mail is a secondary or ancillary factor and cannot
alone provide the minimum contacts required by due process.”
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Lak, Inc., 885
F.2d at 1301 (“The telephone calls and letters on which the
plaintiff’s claim of jurisdiction primarily depends strike us as
precisely the sort of ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous’ and ‘attenuated’
contacts that the Burger King Court rejected as a basis for
11

haling

non-resident

(citation omitted)).
than

the

parties’

quantity

defendants

foreign

jurisdictions.”

Courts are to consider the “quality rather

of

the

relationship,

relationship.”

into

contacts”

rather

and

than

“the

the

quality

duration

of
of

the
the

Calphalon Corp. v. Rowlette, 228 F.3d 718, 722

(6th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
In Calphalon, the Court of Appeals considered a Minnesota
defendant that had served as an Ohio plaintiff’s exclusive sales
representative in certain states other than Ohio for seventeen
years.

See id. at 720-21.

Over the course of that contractual

relationship, the defendant had visited the plaintiff in Ohio
twice

and

telephone,

had

corresponded

mail,

and

fax.

regularly
See

id.

with
The

the

plaintiff

Court

of

by

Appeals

concluded that the defendant had not purposefully availed itself
of the privilege of acting or causing a consequence in Ohio
because its contacts there “occurred solely because Calphalon
chose to be headquartered in Ohio, not because Rowlette sought
to further its business and create ‘continuous and substantial’
consequences there.”

Id. at 723.

“Following Calphalon, courts

analyzing personal jurisdiction in the context of a contractual
relationship have often distinguished Cole, or cautioned that
its holding should not be read outside of the factual context in
which it was written.”

McMunigal v. Bloch, No. 1:09CV01674,

12

2010 WL 2106186, at *9 (N.D. Ohio May 25, 2010) (collecting
cases) (citations omitted).
Where a defendant responds to an out-of-state plaintiff’s
business proposition “without leaving home,” it does not “reach
out beyond one state and create continuing relationships and
obligations with citizens of” the plaintiff’s state.

See Kerry

Steel, 106 F.3d at 151 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).

In Kerry Steel, an Oklahoma defendant’s responding to

an unsolicited sales call from a Michigan plaintiff, negotiating
an order from the plaintiff by telephone and fax, and receiving
an

order

from

availment.

the
id.

See

plaintiff
at

did

152.

not

The

constitute

court

stated,

personal
“To

hold

otherwise would be to offend against the traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice of which the Supreme Court
spoke in International Shoe.”

Id. (citation omitted).

There is some ambiguity about the origin of the contractual
relationship between Pease Construction and Crowder-Gulf.

Hall

states in his affidavit that Pease contacted him on September
27,

2008,

offer

Pease

Construction’s

(See Hall Aff. ¶ 4.)

Project.
called

to

him

delivery”

of

at

his

the

he

with

the

Although Pease states that Hall

Tennessee

trucks,

assistance

telephone
does

not

number

state

to

when

“discuss
that

call

occurred or dispute that he initially called Hall to pitch Pease
Construction as a possible subcontractor for the project.
13

(See

Pease Aff. ¶ 4.)
that

point,

Because the two affidavits do not conflict on

Hall’s

statement

that

the

parties’

relationship

began when he received a call from Pease on September 27, 2008,
offering

Pease

Construction’s

uncontroverted.
Construction

services

on

the

Project

stands

Therefore, as in Kerry Steel, because Pease
originally

contacted

Crowder-Gulf

with

the

proposition of hauling debris for the Project, Crowder-Gulf did
not reach out to Tennessee.

See McMunigal, 2010 WL 2106186, at

*8; (Hall Aff. ¶ 4).
Even

if

Crowder-Gulf

had

initially

contacted

Pease

Construction to solicit assistance with the Project, that would
not necessarily mean that it personally availed itself of the
privilege
Nothing

of

acting

suggests

continuing

or

that

relationships

causing

a

Crowder-Gulf
and

consequence

in

Tennessee.

“intended

to

establish

obligations”

in

Tennessee.

Kerry Steel, 106 F.3d at 151 (citation omitted).

See

Courts in this

circuit have concluded that defendants do not purposefully avail
themselves of the privilege of acting or causing a consequence
in a forum state based on one-time, project-based contractual
relationships.

See, e.g., McMunigal, 2010 WL 2106186, at *7-10;

Shook, Inc. Heavy & Envtl. Div. v. City of Moundsville Water
Bd., No. 3:09CV00210, 2010 WL 761947, at *5-9 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 2,
2010); cf. Air Prods., 503 F.3d at 551 (noting that “the parties
did not engage in a one-time transaction, but in a continuing
14

business relationship that lasted a period of many years” in
concluding

that

satisfied).

the

In

purposeful
a

McMunigal,

availment
district

requirement

court

was

considered

a

Delaware defendant that had contracted with an Ohio plaintiff to
write a casebook for the corporation.
2106186,

at

*1.

Although

the

See McMunigal, 2010 WL

defendant

had

approached

the

plaintiff about writing the book and communicated with him by
telephone,

mail

and

email,

the

court

concluded

that

the

defendant had not purposefully availed itself of the privilege
of acting or causing a consequence in Ohio in part because the
defendant did not “intend to create an ‘ongoing relationship’
beyond the agreement to co-author the casebook.”
8

(adopting

a

magistrate

judge’s

report

and

See id. at *1,
recommendation)

(citation omitted).
In Shook, Inc., a district court considered a West Virginia
defendant that had contracted with an Ohio plaintiff to install
a water treatment facility in a West Virginia municipality.
2010 WL 761947, at *1-2.
judge’s

report

and

See

The court adopted in full a magistrate

recommendation,

which

concluded

that

the

defendant had not purposefully availed itself of the privilege
of acting or causing a consequence in Ohio, despite its using a
database
Virginia;

that

solicited

negotiating

bids

and

from

executing

states
a

other

contract

than
with

West
the

plaintiff by telephone, mail, and email; and sending payments to
15

the plaintiff in Ohio.

Id. at *6-9.

The court reached that

conclusion in part because “[t]he contract itself show[ed] that
at most Defendant Moundsville engaged in a single and isolated
transaction

with

Plaintiff

Shook,

.

.

.

nearly

all

the

performance of which occurred in West Virginia, not Ohio.”

Id.

at *7.
Just as the “main purpose and effect” of the contract in
Shook, Inc. “was the construction of [a] new water treatment
facility in West Virginia,” the main purpose and effect of Pease
Construction’s

contractual

relationship

the hauling of debris in Texas.
Ex. A).

with

Crowder-Gulf

was

See id. at *7; (Compl. ¶¶ 5-8;

Aside from billing and paperwork, Pease Construction

performed its work on the Project in Texas.

See Shook, Inc.,

2010 WL 761947, at *7; (Pease Aff. ¶¶ 5-6; Hall Aff. ¶ 10; Ex.
A; Compl. ¶¶ 5-8).
does

not

The contract is limited to the Project and

contemplate

any

Construction and Crowder-Gulf.
at *7; (Ex. A).

future

dealings

between

Pease

See Shook, Inc., 2010 WL 761947,

The parties did not discuss any other potential

contracts or projects, and nothing suggests that they intended
to create a business relationship lasting beyond the Project.
See Air Prods., 503 F.3d at 551; (Hall Aff. ¶ 11).

For those

reasons, Crowder-Gulf has not purposefully availed itself of the
privilege of acting or causing a consequence in Tennessee.

16

See

Air Prods., 503 F.3d at 551; McMunigal, 2010 WL 2106186, at *89; Shook, Inc., 2010 WL 761947, at *7-8.
Pease Construction argues that, because Pease “signed the
contract while at his office in Collierville, Tennessee” and
“performed all of his correspondence, billing, and negotiation
with

Defendant

Crowder-Gulf

from

his

office

purposefully

in

availed

Collierville,

itself

of

the

That

Pease

may

have

conducted

privilege

of

(See Pl.’s Resp.

acting or causing a consequence in Tennessee.
1-2.)

Tennessee,”

those

activities

in

Tennessee on behalf of Pease Construction does not mean CrowderGulf is subject to personal jurisdiction in Tennessee.

See

Shook, Inc., 2010 WL 761947, at *8 (considering similar contacts
and

noting

that,

although

the

utility

had

sent

payments

to

contractor “amounting to more than 14 million dollars, the vast
bulk of the effects the parties’ contract caused occurred in
West

Virginia”).

Construction

in

Crowder-Gulf’s
Tennessee

Construction

happened

to

Crowder-Gulf

“sought

to

be

limited

occurred

dealings

solely

headquartered

further

its

with

because

Pease
Pease

there,

not

because

business

and

create

continuous and substantial consequences there.”

See Calphalon,

228 F.3d at 723 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Crowder-Gulf’s

contacts

with

Tennessee

are

“the

sort

of

‘random,’ ‘fortuitous’ and ‘attenuated’ contacts” that do not

17

provide a basis for exercising personal jurisdiction.

See Lak,

Inc., 885 F.2d at 1301 (citation omitted).
Pease Construction has not made a prima facie showing that
Crowder-Gulf reached out to Tennessee to create a continuing
relationship there.

See Lak, Inc., 885 F.3d at 1300.

Crowder-

Gulf has not purposefully availed itself of the privilege of
See Mohasco, 401

acting or causing a consequence in Tennessee.
F.2d

at

381.

Therefore,

the

Court

does

personal jurisdiction over Crowder-Gulf.
IV.

not

have

specific

See id.

Conclusion

Crowder-Gulf
Tennessee,

and

is
this

not

subject

Court’s

to

personal

exercise

of

jurisdiction

specific

in

personal

jurisdiction over Crowder-Gulf would not comport with federal
due

process.

Therefore,

Crowder-Gulf’s

Motion

is

GRANTED.

Pease Construction’s claims are DISMISSED for want of personal
jurisdiction.
So ordered this 27th day of May, 2011.

s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr.
SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

18