Freeman et al v. Sullivan et al

Filing 52

ORDER granting Defendants' Motions to Dismiss; adopting Report and Recommendations [45-47]. Signed by Judge Samuel H. Mays, Jr on 06/17/2013.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION

RICKY FREEMAN and BRENDA FAYE
HUNTER,
Plaintiffs,
v.
LAQUITA SULLIVAN, et al.,
Defendants.

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No. 11-2424

ORDER ADOPTING THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Before the Court are the October 1, 2012 Motion to Dismiss
filed by Defendants Regina Fisher (“Fisher”), Robert Lipscomb
(“Lipscomb”), and LaQuita Sullivan (“Sullivan”) (collectively,
the “MHA Defendants”); the November 29, 2012 Motion to Dismiss
filed by Defendants Lynn Grosso (“Grosso”), Gregory Bernard King
(“King”),

and

Carlos

Osegueda

(“Osegueda”)

(collectively,

the

“Federal Defendants”); and the April 10, 2013 Motion to Dismiss
filed by Defendant Memphis Housing Authority (“MHA”).

(October

1 Motion, ECF No. 23); (November 29 Motion, ECF No. 33); (April
10 Motion, ECF No. 43-1.)

Plaintiffs responded to the October 1

Motion on October 12, 2012; the November 29 Motion on December
10, 2012; and the April 10 Motion on April 19, 2013.

(Resp. to

Oct. 1 Motion, ECF No. 28); (Resp. to Nov. 29 Motion, ECF No.
34); (Resp. to April 10 Motion, ECF No. 44.)

On April 24, 2013,

the Magistrate Judge filed her Report and Recommendation on the
October 1 Motion (Report 1, ECF No. 45), the November 29 Motion
(Report 2, ECF No. 46), and the April 10 Motion (Report 3, ECF
No. 47.)

Plaintiffs Ricky Freeman (“Freeman”) and Brenda Faye

Hunter (“Hunter”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) objected on May
7, 2013.

(Objections, ECF No. 48.)

In the Report on the October 1 Motion, the Magistrate Judge
recommends

dismissing

Defendants.

In

Magistrate

the

Judge

Plaintiffs’
Report

on

recommends

claims

the

November

dismissing

against the Federal Defendants.

against
29

the

Motion,

Plaintiffs’

MHA
the

claims

In the Report on the April 10

Motion, the Magistrate Judge recommends dismissing Plaintiffs’
claims against MHA.

For the following reasons, the Court ADOPTS

the Magistrate Judge’s Reports on the October 1, November 29,
and April 10 Motions and OVERRULES Plaintiffs’ objections.

The

October 1, November 29, and April 10 Motions are GRANTED.
I.

Facts and Procedural Background
A. Plaintiffs’ Allegations

On

May

27,

2011,

Plaintiffs

filed

a

pro

se

Complaint

alleging housing discrimination in violation of the Fair Housing
Act

(“FHA”),

42

U.S.C.

§§

3601,

et

seq.,

§

504

of

the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701, et seq., and §
1437f of the United States Housing Act of 1937 (the “Housing
Act”), as amended by the Housing and Community Development Act
2

of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f.

(Compl., ECF No. 8.)

On February

10, 2012, Plaintiffs filed a pro se Amended Complaint.

(Am.

Compl., ECF No. 14.)
Plaintiffs are an unmarried couple who lived in Section 8
housing

in

St.

Tennessee.

Paul,

Minnesota,

before

moving

to

Memphis,

When Plaintiffs moved to Memphis on August 22, 2006,

they immediately scheduled a meeting with representatives of MHA
to review Freeman’s Section 8 portability voucher, a document
that facilitates the relocation of current Section 8 renters.
Before

the

meeting,

Plaintiffs

rented

at

the

New

Horizon

Apartments in Memphis and paid their own expenses.
Freeman and Hunter make individual and joint allegations.
Plaintiffs’ joint allegations address their September 7, 2006
meeting with Sullivan and Fisher, who are employees of MHA.
the

September

request

to

meeting,

and

a

apartment.

the

discussion

included

the

cohabitate,

subsidization,
Freeman’s

7

required

paperwork

request

to

Freeman

accommodate his scoliosis.

install

requested

At

Plaintiffs’
for

rent

a

“grab

bar”

in

a

“grab

bar”

to

Lipscomb, the Executive Director of

MHA, was not at the meeting.
Portions of Freeman’s application for a Section 8 voucher
were allegedly denied, delayed, or ignored.

Plaintiffs’ request

to cohabitate was denied because Freeman and Hunter were not
married.

Plaintiffs’

paperwork
3

for

rent

subsidization

was

allegedly

delayed

five

months,

temporarily inflated rent.

which

required

them

to

pay

Sullivan and Fisher allegedly took

no action on Plaintiffs’ request for a “grab bar.”

Plaintiffs

also

they

allege

subjected

that,

to

during

demeaning

the

September

remarks

and

7

meeting,

actions

by

Sullivan

were
and

Fisher, including remarks about Plaintiffs’ relationship status.
Individually, Freeman alleges that Sullivan: (1) failed to
allow Freeman

to

apply

for

housing

with

Hunter;

(2)

delayed

processing Freeman’s paperwork for five months; and (3) failed
to

approve

the

installation

apartment bathroom.
delayed

the

reasonable
Hunter

a

“grab

bar”

in

Freeman’s

Freeman alleges that Fisher and Lipscomb

paperwork

for

accommodations

alleges

of

that

five
to

Sullivan

months

and

failed

his

apartment.

made

demeaning

to

install

Individually,
and

disparaging

remarks during the September 7 meeting.
B. The October 1 Motion
The MHA Defendants seek to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims as
insufficiently pled and Hunter’s claim for lack of standing.
According to the MHA Defendants, Plaintiffs’ claims are devoid
of

factual

Defendants

support
also

and

seek

fail

as

dismissal

a

matter

based

on

of

law.

qualified

The

MHA

immunity

because Plaintiffs sued them in their official capacities.

The

MHA

she

Defendants

argue

that

Hunter

lacks

standing

because

seeks to assert Freeman’s rights under the Section 8 portability
4

documents, and the Constitution requires litigants to suffer an
injury-in-fact.

On

October

12,

2012,

Plaintiffs

filed

a

response, in which they reiterate the allegations in the Amended
Complaint.
In

(Pls.’ Resp. to Oct. 1 Mot., ECF No. 28.)

recommending

Defendants

be

that

dismissed,

Plaintiffs’
the

claims

Magistrate

against

Judge

the

concluded

MHA
that

Hunter lacked standing because she failed to allege an injuryin-fact given that the Section 8 voucher was Freeman’s.
1

10-11.)

Considering

the

denial

of

Freeman’s

(Report

request

to

cohabitate, the Magistrate Judge concluded that Freeman failed
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because a
public

housing

authority

may

“prohibit

two

adults

children from sharing one applicant’s public housing.”
13) (emphasis in original).

without
(Id. 12-

The Magistrate Judge also concluded

that Freeman’s claims based on delayed paperwork and failure to
install a “grab bar” were insufficiently pled.

(Id. 13-14.)

Freeman’s allegations failed to establish that delayed paperwork
violated his legal rights or that the MHA Defendants had the
authority to install a “grab bar.”

(Id.)

C. The November 29 Motion
The Federal Defendants, who are employees of the Department
of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”), seek dismissal based
on sovereign immunity.
official capacities.

The Federal Defendants are sued in their
They argue that, because the United States
5

is immune to suit absent consent, and because Plaintiffs fail to
allege

that

the

United

States

consented,

their

claims

are

foreclosed as a matter of law.
In recommending that Plaintiffs’ claims be dismissed, the
Magistrate Judge concluded that sovereign immunity applied.

The

Magistrate Judge reasoned that, because the Amended Complaint
“does not specify the legal basis for their claims against the
Federal

Defendants,”

Plaintiffs

“cannot

bear

the

burden

of

identifying any Congressional waiver in the statute of sovereign
immunity.”

(Report 2 9.)

Absent allegations of Congressional

waiver, Plaintiffs’ claims failed as a matter of law.
D. The April 10 Motion
MHA seeks to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint because
Freeman’s

claims

lacks standing.

are

insufficiently

pled

and

because

Hunter

MHA argues that Freeman’s claims are devoid of

factual support and fail as a matter of law.
Hunter

lacks

standing

rights

under

the

because

Section

8

she

seeks

portability

to

MHA argues that
assert

documents,

Freeman’s
and

the

Constitution requires litigants to suffer an injury-in-fact.
In recommending that Plaintiffs’ claims be dismissed, the
Magistrate Judge concluded that Hunter lacked standing.

She

“has not pled any injury-in-fact that she has suffered . . .
[because] the Amended Complaint has not alleged that she has
been denied any of her rights to government-subsidized housing.”
6

(Report 3 10.)

The Magistrate Judge also concluded that the

alleged humiliation suffered by Hunter was not an injury-in-fact
sufficient to establish standing.
The
claims

Magistrate
because,

Minnesota

Judge

although

allowed

(Id. 11.)

recommended
the

public

Plaintiffs

to

dismissing
housing

cohabitate,

Freeman’s

authority

in

there

no

is

“authority that a public housing authority may not prohibit two
adults

without

housing.”

children

(Id.

from

12.)

sharing

The

one

Magistrate

applicant’s
Judge

public

recommended

dismissing Freeman’s claim based on delays in processing his
paperwork and the failure to install a “grab bar” to accommodate
his disability because they were insufficiently pled.

(Id. 13.)

Freeman’s allegations failed to establish that delayed paperwork
violated his legal rights or that the Federal Defendants had the
authority to install a “grab bar.”
II.

(Id.)

Jurisdiction

The Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1331 because Plaintiffs raise a federal question under the FHA,
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601, et seq., § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701, et seq., and § 1437f of the Housing Act,
as amended by the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974,
42 U.S.C. § 1437f.
III. Standard of Review
A. Motion to Dismiss
7

In addressing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court
construes

the

complaint

in

the

light

most

favorable

to

the

plaintiff and accepts all well-pled factual allegations as true.
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523,
527

(6th

Cir.

2007).

A

plaintiff

can

support

a

claim

“by

showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the
complaint.”
(2007).

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563

This standard requires more than bare assertions of

legal conclusions.

Bovee v. Coopers & Lybrand C.P.A., 272 F.3d

356, 361 (6th Cir. 2001).

“[A] formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do.”
at 555.

Twombly, 550 U.S.

Any claim for relief must contain “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.”
curiam).

Erickson

v.

Pardus,

551

U.S.

89,

93

(2007)

(per

“Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need

only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is
and the grounds upon which it rests.’”

Id. (quoting Twombly,

550 U.S. at 555).
Nonetheless, a complaint must contain sufficient facts “to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face’” to
survive a motion to dismiss.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.

1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
plausibility

standard

is

not
8

akin

to

a

“The

‘probability

requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that
a defendant has acted unlawfully.”
U.S. at 556).
of

action,

Id. (citing Twombly, 550

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause

supported

by

mere

conclusory

statements,

do

not

suffice.”

Id. at 1949 (citation omitted).

A plaintiff with no

facts

“armed

conclusions”

and

with

nothing

more

than

cannot

Id. at 1950.

“unlock the doors of discovery.”

B. Review of the Magistrate Judge’s Reports
Congress intended 28 U.S.C. § 636 to relieve the burden on
the federal judiciary by permitting the assignment of district
court duties to magistrate judges.
237

F.3d

States,

598,
490

602

U.S.

(6th
858,

Cir.

See United States v. Curtis,

2001)

869-70

(citing

(1989));

Gomez

see

v.

also

Peterson, 67 F. App’x 308, 310 (6th Cir. 2003).

United

Baker

v.

“A district

judge must determine de novo any part of a magistrate judge’s
disposition that has been properly objected to.”
P.

72(b);

28

U.S.C.

§

636(b)(1)(C).

“‘Only

Fed. R. Civ.
those

specific

objections to the magistrate’s report . . . will be preserved
for [] review.’”

Carson v. Hudson, 421 F. App’x 560, 563 (6th

Cir. 2011) (quoting Souter v. Jones, 395 F.3d 577, 585 (6th Cir.
2005)); see also Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of Teachers, Local 231,
829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987).
After reviewing the evidence, the court is free to accept,
reject, or modify the proposed findings or recommendations of
9

the magistrate judge.

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).

The district

court is not required to review—under a de novo or any other
standard—those aspects of the report and recommendation to which
no objection is made.

Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985).

The district court should adopt the findings and rulings of the
magistrate judge to which no specific objection is filed.

Id.

at 151.
IV.

Analysis
A. October 1 Motion

Plaintiffs

objected

to

the

Magistrate

Judge’s

recommendations in a letter dated May 1, 2013, which was filed
on May 7, 2013.

Plaintiffs’ letter addresses the disposition of

the October 1, November 29, and April 10 Motions.

Plaintiffs

object to portions of the Reports that are based on evidence
“stating [the] rules and regulations by the U.S. Department of
Housing

and

Urban

Development,

and

the

incorrect

regulations by the Memphis Housing Authority.”

rules

and

(Objections 2.)

The Court understands Plaintiffs’ objection to be an argument
based

on

the

regulations.
objection

incongruence

between

MHA

and

HUD

For purposes of the October 1 Motion, Plaintiffs’

addresses

differences
Freeman’s

alleged

between

rights

the
MHA

because

Magistrate
and
MHA

HUD

conclusion

regulations

acted

10

Judge’s

within

do

its

not

that

violate

authority

in

denying

a

housing

voucher

to

an

unmarried

couple

without

children.
Plaintiffs have not objected on additional grounds.

The

Court ADOPTS those portions of the Magistrate Judge’s Report on
the

October

1

Motion

to

which

Plaintiffs

have

not

objected.

“[M]aking some objections but failing to raise others will not
Smith, 828 F.2d

preserve all the objections a party may have.”
at 1373.

The Court’s de novo review is limited to whether

federal law requires that unmarried adults without children be
provided housing accommodations.
Section 8 of the Housing Act, as amended by the Housing and
Community
rental

Development

subsidy

Act

plan

of

under

1974,

which

42

U.S.C.

owners

of

§

private

receive payments on behalf of low-income tenants.
Cincinnati

Metropolitan

Housing

(6th

1982).

funds,

Cir.

disbursed
PHAs

by

Public

receive

contracts

with

administrative

The

Housing

funds
HUD,
plan

after
for
that

Authority,
although

Agencies

which
specifies

675

(“PHAs”).

the
the

annual
PHA

is

a

housing

See Baker v.
F.2d

released

executing

1437f,

by

836,

837

HUD,

are

at

838.

Id.

contributions
must

criteria

file
by

eligibility and assistance priority will be determined.

an

which
See 42

U.S.C. § 1437f(b)(1) (“The Secretary is authorized to enter into
annual

contributions

contracts

with

public

housing

agencies

pursuant to which such agencies may enter into contracts to make
11

assistance

payments

to

owners

of

existing

dwelling

units

in

(1)

to

accordance with this section.”).
Section

1437

promotes

three

overarching

goals:

assist “States and political subdivisions of States to remedy
the unsafe housing conditions” and the shortage of “decent and
safe dwellings” for low-income families; (2) “to assist states
and political subdivisions of States to address the shortage of
housing affordable to low-income families”; and (3) “to vest in
public housing agencies that perform well, the maximum amount of
responsibility and flexibility in program administration, with
appropriate

accountability

to

public

localities, and the general public.”

housing

residents,

42 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(1)(A)-

(C); see also Bakos v. Flint Housing Com’n, 746 F.2d 1179, 1180
(6th

Cir.

1984)

(“Section

8

is

designed

to

provide

safe,

sanitary and decent housing to low-income families.”).
A prospective applicant for Section 8 benefits must apply
for

a

Certificate

applicant

must

requirements.

of

Family

establish

Participation,

family

status

and

See Bakos, 746 F.2d at 1180.

in
meet

which

the

low-income

“In addition, the

application must satisfy any criteria promulgated by the local
PHA,

provided

related

to

that

the

approved by HUD.”

these

objectives

additional
of

the

criteria

Section

Id. (citations omitted).

12

8

are

reasonably

program

and

are

MHA is a local PHA.

Plaintiffs’ “family status” is the relevant issue in this
appeal.

Plaintiffs argue that MHA’s definition of “family” is

not reasonably related to the objectives of the Housing Act.
Stated differently, Plaintiffs argue that MHA’s definition of
family differs so fundamentally from the definition applied by
HUD that it deprives them of their rights under the Housing Act.
In

deciding

family

status,

MHA’s

criteria

permit

an

applicant to add persons to a household in the event of: (1)
birth, (2) marriage, (3) adoption, (4) the need for a live-in
aide limited to a person providing care, and (5) emergencies.
(ECF No. 44-1.) 1

HUD’s definition of a family, which adopts the

definition used in the Housing Choice Voucher Program, 24 C.F.R.
§ 982.201, states that a family “may be a single person or a
group of persons” or “a group of persons consisting of two or
more elderly persons living together.”

See also 24 C.F.R. §

5.403 (family “may include two or more persons with disabilities
1

Plaintiffs do not attach the MHA and HUD regulations to the Amended
Complaint, although they reference differences between them.
(Am. Compl. ¶
2.)
Plaintiffs attach MHA and HUD regulations to their Responses to the
October 1 and April 10 Motions. (See ECF Nos. 32, 44.) The Court “retains
the discretion to consider or exclude [] extrinsic evidence presented with a
Rule 12(b) motion.” Notredan, LLC v. Old Republic Exch. Facilitator Co., No.
11-2987-STA-tmp, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48976, at *13 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 6,
2012).
When a complaint explicitly cites documents that are not attached,
courts may consider those extrinsic materials if they are central to
plaintiff’s claims. See id.; see also Duferco Steel v. M/V Kalisti, 121 F.3d
321, 324 n.3 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Documents referred to in, but not attached to,
a plaintiff’s complaint that are central to its claim may be considered in
ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.”).
The documents are considered part of
the pleadings “for all purposes.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c). In the context of
a 12(b)(6) motion, “all purposes” means treating the facts contained in the
exhibit as true.
Jones v. City of Cincinnati, 521 F.3d 555, 561 (6th Cir.
2008).
Because the MHA and HUD regulations are central to Plaintiffs’
claims, the Court will consider them in deciding Defendants’ Motions.

13

living together, or one or more persons with disabilities living
with one or more live-in aides.”).
Differences between PHA and HUD regulations are not enough,
absent a showing of an unreasonable relationship between local
and federal regulations, to state a claim under the Housing Act.
The

statutory

framework

contemplates

the

possibility

of

differences between local and federal regulations, going so far
as to state that “the policy of the United States . . . [is] to
vest

in

local

public

housing

agencies

the

maximum

amount

of

responsibility in the administration of their housing programs.”
See 42 U.S.C. § 1437.

A “maximum amount of responsibility”

entails, not only day-to-day operations, but also the strategic
formulation

of

policies

and

regulations

designed

programmatic aims while conserving public resources.

to

meet

Requiring

a plaintiff to show an unreasonable relationship between PHA
regulations

and

the

underlying

goals

maximizes the deference given to PHAs.

of

the

Housing

Act

The desire for deference

arises from Congress’ intent to facilitate the provision of lowincome

housing

through

local

authorities,

which

are

more

responsive to community needs.
Conditioning the expansion of an applicant’s household on
marital status is reasonably related to the goals of the Housing
Act.

Congress

required

PHAs

to

exercise

their

authority

“consistent with the objects” of the Housing Act, which means
14

implementing objectives that advance the provision of low-income
housing.

Requiring a marital relationship in circumstances not

involving

children

establishes

a

clear

criterion

that

serves

multiple interests consistent with the Housing Act, including
the avoidance of fraudulent applications and the limitation of
scarce

public

resources

to

legally

established

family

relationships.
HUD is required by law to approve regulations established
by

PHAs,

and

Plaintiffs

do

not

allege

that

HUD

failed

approve, or otherwise disagreed with, MHA’s regulations.
approval

of

regulations

afforded

deference.

agency’s

interpretation

entitled

to

that

Baker,
of

deference.”).

differ
675

its

from

F.2d

at

its

own

840

own

governing

Because

MHA’s

to

HUD’s

should

(“[A]

be

federal

regulations
regulations

is
are

reasonably related to HUD’s, and HUD has not disapproved them,
Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.
Plaintiffs rely on Hann v. Housing Authority of City of
Easton, 709 F. Supp. 605 (E.D. Pa. 1989), in which a district
court invalidated a PHA’s decision to deny an application to
cohabitate brought by the unmarried parents of three children.
The

PHA

had

denied

the

plaintiff’s

application

to

advance

a

“traditional family requirement,” a rationale the district court
found unpersuasive.

The court concluded that unmarried couples
15

with children were entitled to family status because “couples
with children can often create a positive family situation when
unmarried.”

Id. at 610.

because

parents

the

Denying the plaintiffs’ application

refused

to

get

a

marriage

certificate

produced an unjust result that undermined the purpose of the
Housing Act, “which is to shelter the poor.”
Hann is distinguishable.

Id.

The plaintiffs were denied family

status because they were unmarried, despite being in a stable
relationship that had produced three children.

Id.

The court

reasoned that denying family status under those circumstances
undermined

the

Housing

Act,

not

because

of

the

plaintiffs’

marital status, but because it “would be a bizarre world where
the

refusal

condemns

of

the

Plaintiffs

do

the

parents

children

to

not

children.

have

to

a

get

life

a
of

The

marriage

certificate

homelessness.”
policy

Id.

underlying

the

decision in Hann does not apply.
Hann also disapproved of the PHA’s criteria insofar as they
limited
parents.”

eligibility

to

Id. at 608.

“traditional

families

with

married

Nothing in the record suggests that

MHA’s criteria advance a moral agenda.

A fair reading of MHA’s

policy would permit cohabitation for unmarried caregivers and in
cases of emergency.

Absent the need for a caregiver or an

emergency, restricting cohabitation by unmarried adults without
children deters fraudulent applications, a policy cited by Hann
16

as reasonable.

See id. (citing James v. New York City Housing

Authority, 622 F. Supp. 1356 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (“[A] good reason
for their eligibility requirement [was] avoidance of fraud.”)).
MHA’s decision not to approve Plaintiffs’ request must be given
deference.
For

the

OVERRULED.

foregoing

reasons,

Plaintiffs’

objection

is

The Court ADOPTS the Report on the October 1 Motion.
B. The November 29 Motion

The Magistrate Judge’s Report on the November 29 Motion
recommends

dismissing

Plaintiffs’

claim

against

Defendants on the basis of sovereign immunity.
not object to that recommendation.
difference

between

MHA

and

HUD

the

Federal

Plaintiffs do

Their objection rests on the
regulations.

The

Magistrate

Judge’s Report on the November 29 Motion does not rely on MHA or
HUD regulations.

Because Plaintiffs have not objected to the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation based on sovereign immunity,
the Court ADOPTS the Report on the November 29 Motion.
C. The April 10 Motion
Plaintiffs object to the Magistrate Judge’s Report on the
April 10 Motion on the ground that differences between MHA and
HUD regulations violate their rights.
on additional grounds.
differences

between

Plaintiffs do not object

Plaintiffs’ rights are not violated by

MHA

and

HUD

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regulations.

The

Court

OVERRULES

Plaintiffs’

objection

and

ADOPTS

the

Magistrate

Judge’s Report on the April 10 Motion.
V.

Conclusion

Because

Plaintiffs

have

failed

to

state

a

claim,

their

objections are OVERRULED and the Court ADOPTS the Magistrate
Judge’s Reports on the October 1, November 29, and April 10
Motions.

Defendants’

Motions

to

Dismiss

are

GRANTED.

Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint is DISMISSED.
So ordered this 17th day of June, 2013.

s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr._______
SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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