Freeman et al v. Sullivan et al
Filing
52
ORDER granting Defendants' Motions to Dismiss; adopting Report and Recommendations [45-47]. Signed by Judge Samuel H. Mays, Jr on 06/17/2013.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
RICKY FREEMAN and BRENDA FAYE
HUNTER,
Plaintiffs,
v.
LAQUITA SULLIVAN, et al.,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
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No. 11-2424
ORDER ADOPTING THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court are the October 1, 2012 Motion to Dismiss
filed by Defendants Regina Fisher (“Fisher”), Robert Lipscomb
(“Lipscomb”), and LaQuita Sullivan (“Sullivan”) (collectively,
the “MHA Defendants”); the November 29, 2012 Motion to Dismiss
filed by Defendants Lynn Grosso (“Grosso”), Gregory Bernard King
(“King”),
and
Carlos
Osegueda
(“Osegueda”)
(collectively,
the
“Federal Defendants”); and the April 10, 2013 Motion to Dismiss
filed by Defendant Memphis Housing Authority (“MHA”).
(October
1 Motion, ECF No. 23); (November 29 Motion, ECF No. 33); (April
10 Motion, ECF No. 43-1.)
Plaintiffs responded to the October 1
Motion on October 12, 2012; the November 29 Motion on December
10, 2012; and the April 10 Motion on April 19, 2013.
(Resp. to
Oct. 1 Motion, ECF No. 28); (Resp. to Nov. 29 Motion, ECF No.
34); (Resp. to April 10 Motion, ECF No. 44.)
On April 24, 2013,
the Magistrate Judge filed her Report and Recommendation on the
October 1 Motion (Report 1, ECF No. 45), the November 29 Motion
(Report 2, ECF No. 46), and the April 10 Motion (Report 3, ECF
No. 47.)
Plaintiffs Ricky Freeman (“Freeman”) and Brenda Faye
Hunter (“Hunter”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) objected on May
7, 2013.
(Objections, ECF No. 48.)
In the Report on the October 1 Motion, the Magistrate Judge
recommends
dismissing
Defendants.
In
Magistrate
the
Judge
Plaintiffs’
Report
on
recommends
claims
the
November
dismissing
against the Federal Defendants.
against
29
the
Motion,
Plaintiffs’
MHA
the
claims
In the Report on the April 10
Motion, the Magistrate Judge recommends dismissing Plaintiffs’
claims against MHA.
For the following reasons, the Court ADOPTS
the Magistrate Judge’s Reports on the October 1, November 29,
and April 10 Motions and OVERRULES Plaintiffs’ objections.
The
October 1, November 29, and April 10 Motions are GRANTED.
I.
Facts and Procedural Background
A. Plaintiffs’ Allegations
On
May
27,
2011,
Plaintiffs
filed
a
pro
se
Complaint
alleging housing discrimination in violation of the Fair Housing
Act
(“FHA”),
42
U.S.C.
§§
3601,
et
seq.,
§
504
of
the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701, et seq., and §
1437f of the United States Housing Act of 1937 (the “Housing
Act”), as amended by the Housing and Community Development Act
2
of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f.
(Compl., ECF No. 8.)
On February
10, 2012, Plaintiffs filed a pro se Amended Complaint.
(Am.
Compl., ECF No. 14.)
Plaintiffs are an unmarried couple who lived in Section 8
housing
in
St.
Tennessee.
Paul,
Minnesota,
before
moving
to
Memphis,
When Plaintiffs moved to Memphis on August 22, 2006,
they immediately scheduled a meeting with representatives of MHA
to review Freeman’s Section 8 portability voucher, a document
that facilitates the relocation of current Section 8 renters.
Before
the
meeting,
Plaintiffs
rented
at
the
New
Horizon
Apartments in Memphis and paid their own expenses.
Freeman and Hunter make individual and joint allegations.
Plaintiffs’ joint allegations address their September 7, 2006
meeting with Sullivan and Fisher, who are employees of MHA.
the
September
request
to
meeting,
and
a
apartment.
the
discussion
included
the
cohabitate,
subsidization,
Freeman’s
7
required
paperwork
request
to
Freeman
accommodate his scoliosis.
install
requested
At
Plaintiffs’
for
rent
a
“grab
bar”
in
a
“grab
bar”
to
Lipscomb, the Executive Director of
MHA, was not at the meeting.
Portions of Freeman’s application for a Section 8 voucher
were allegedly denied, delayed, or ignored.
Plaintiffs’ request
to cohabitate was denied because Freeman and Hunter were not
married.
Plaintiffs’
paperwork
3
for
rent
subsidization
was
allegedly
delayed
five
months,
temporarily inflated rent.
which
required
them
to
pay
Sullivan and Fisher allegedly took
no action on Plaintiffs’ request for a “grab bar.”
Plaintiffs
also
they
allege
subjected
that,
to
during
demeaning
the
September
remarks
and
7
meeting,
actions
by
Sullivan
were
and
Fisher, including remarks about Plaintiffs’ relationship status.
Individually, Freeman alleges that Sullivan: (1) failed to
allow Freeman
to
apply
for
housing
with
Hunter;
(2)
delayed
processing Freeman’s paperwork for five months; and (3) failed
to
approve
the
installation
apartment bathroom.
delayed
the
reasonable
Hunter
a
“grab
bar”
in
Freeman’s
Freeman alleges that Fisher and Lipscomb
paperwork
for
accommodations
alleges
of
that
five
to
Sullivan
months
and
failed
his
apartment.
made
demeaning
to
install
Individually,
and
disparaging
remarks during the September 7 meeting.
B. The October 1 Motion
The MHA Defendants seek to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims as
insufficiently pled and Hunter’s claim for lack of standing.
According to the MHA Defendants, Plaintiffs’ claims are devoid
of
factual
Defendants
support
also
and
seek
fail
as
dismissal
a
matter
based
on
of
law.
qualified
The
MHA
immunity
because Plaintiffs sued them in their official capacities.
The
MHA
she
Defendants
argue
that
Hunter
lacks
standing
because
seeks to assert Freeman’s rights under the Section 8 portability
4
documents, and the Constitution requires litigants to suffer an
injury-in-fact.
On
October
12,
2012,
Plaintiffs
filed
a
response, in which they reiterate the allegations in the Amended
Complaint.
In
(Pls.’ Resp. to Oct. 1 Mot., ECF No. 28.)
recommending
Defendants
be
that
dismissed,
Plaintiffs’
the
claims
Magistrate
against
Judge
the
concluded
MHA
that
Hunter lacked standing because she failed to allege an injuryin-fact given that the Section 8 voucher was Freeman’s.
1
10-11.)
Considering
the
denial
of
Freeman’s
(Report
request
to
cohabitate, the Magistrate Judge concluded that Freeman failed
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because a
public
housing
authority
may
“prohibit
two
adults
children from sharing one applicant’s public housing.”
13) (emphasis in original).
without
(Id. 12-
The Magistrate Judge also concluded
that Freeman’s claims based on delayed paperwork and failure to
install a “grab bar” were insufficiently pled.
(Id. 13-14.)
Freeman’s allegations failed to establish that delayed paperwork
violated his legal rights or that the MHA Defendants had the
authority to install a “grab bar.”
(Id.)
C. The November 29 Motion
The Federal Defendants, who are employees of the Department
of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”), seek dismissal based
on sovereign immunity.
official capacities.
The Federal Defendants are sued in their
They argue that, because the United States
5
is immune to suit absent consent, and because Plaintiffs fail to
allege
that
the
United
States
consented,
their
claims
are
foreclosed as a matter of law.
In recommending that Plaintiffs’ claims be dismissed, the
Magistrate Judge concluded that sovereign immunity applied.
The
Magistrate Judge reasoned that, because the Amended Complaint
“does not specify the legal basis for their claims against the
Federal
Defendants,”
Plaintiffs
“cannot
bear
the
burden
of
identifying any Congressional waiver in the statute of sovereign
immunity.”
(Report 2 9.)
Absent allegations of Congressional
waiver, Plaintiffs’ claims failed as a matter of law.
D. The April 10 Motion
MHA seeks to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint because
Freeman’s
claims
lacks standing.
are
insufficiently
pled
and
because
Hunter
MHA argues that Freeman’s claims are devoid of
factual support and fail as a matter of law.
Hunter
lacks
standing
rights
under
the
because
Section
8
she
seeks
portability
to
MHA argues that
assert
documents,
Freeman’s
and
the
Constitution requires litigants to suffer an injury-in-fact.
In recommending that Plaintiffs’ claims be dismissed, the
Magistrate Judge concluded that Hunter lacked standing.
She
“has not pled any injury-in-fact that she has suffered . . .
[because] the Amended Complaint has not alleged that she has
been denied any of her rights to government-subsidized housing.”
6
(Report 3 10.)
The Magistrate Judge also concluded that the
alleged humiliation suffered by Hunter was not an injury-in-fact
sufficient to establish standing.
The
claims
Magistrate
because,
Minnesota
Judge
although
allowed
(Id. 11.)
recommended
the
public
Plaintiffs
to
dismissing
housing
cohabitate,
Freeman’s
authority
in
there
no
is
“authority that a public housing authority may not prohibit two
adults
without
housing.”
children
(Id.
from
12.)
sharing
The
one
Magistrate
applicant’s
Judge
public
recommended
dismissing Freeman’s claim based on delays in processing his
paperwork and the failure to install a “grab bar” to accommodate
his disability because they were insufficiently pled.
(Id. 13.)
Freeman’s allegations failed to establish that delayed paperwork
violated his legal rights or that the Federal Defendants had the
authority to install a “grab bar.”
II.
(Id.)
Jurisdiction
The Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1331 because Plaintiffs raise a federal question under the FHA,
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601, et seq., § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701, et seq., and § 1437f of the Housing Act,
as amended by the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974,
42 U.S.C. § 1437f.
III. Standard of Review
A. Motion to Dismiss
7
In addressing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court
construes
the
complaint
in
the
light
most
favorable
to
the
plaintiff and accepts all well-pled factual allegations as true.
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523,
527
(6th
Cir.
2007).
A
plaintiff
can
support
a
claim
“by
showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the
complaint.”
(2007).
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563
This standard requires more than bare assertions of
legal conclusions.
Bovee v. Coopers & Lybrand C.P.A., 272 F.3d
356, 361 (6th Cir. 2001).
“[A] formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.”
at 555.
Twombly, 550 U.S.
Any claim for relief must contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.”
curiam).
Erickson
v.
Pardus,
551
U.S.
89,
93
(2007)
(per
“Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need
only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is
and the grounds upon which it rests.’”
Id. (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555).
Nonetheless, a complaint must contain sufficient facts “to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face’” to
survive a motion to dismiss.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.
1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
plausibility
standard
is
not
8
akin
to
a
“The
‘probability
requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that
a defendant has acted unlawfully.”
U.S. at 556).
of
action,
Id. (citing Twombly, 550
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause
supported
by
mere
conclusory
statements,
do
not
suffice.”
Id. at 1949 (citation omitted).
A plaintiff with no
facts
“armed
conclusions”
and
with
nothing
more
than
cannot
Id. at 1950.
“unlock the doors of discovery.”
B. Review of the Magistrate Judge’s Reports
Congress intended 28 U.S.C. § 636 to relieve the burden on
the federal judiciary by permitting the assignment of district
court duties to magistrate judges.
237
F.3d
States,
598,
490
602
U.S.
(6th
858,
Cir.
See United States v. Curtis,
2001)
869-70
(citing
(1989));
Gomez
see
v.
also
Peterson, 67 F. App’x 308, 310 (6th Cir. 2003).
United
Baker
v.
“A district
judge must determine de novo any part of a magistrate judge’s
disposition that has been properly objected to.”
P.
72(b);
28
U.S.C.
§
636(b)(1)(C).
“‘Only
Fed. R. Civ.
those
specific
objections to the magistrate’s report . . . will be preserved
for [] review.’”
Carson v. Hudson, 421 F. App’x 560, 563 (6th
Cir. 2011) (quoting Souter v. Jones, 395 F.3d 577, 585 (6th Cir.
2005)); see also Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of Teachers, Local 231,
829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987).
After reviewing the evidence, the court is free to accept,
reject, or modify the proposed findings or recommendations of
9
the magistrate judge.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
The district
court is not required to review—under a de novo or any other
standard—those aspects of the report and recommendation to which
no objection is made.
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985).
The district court should adopt the findings and rulings of the
magistrate judge to which no specific objection is filed.
Id.
at 151.
IV.
Analysis
A. October 1 Motion
Plaintiffs
objected
to
the
Magistrate
Judge’s
recommendations in a letter dated May 1, 2013, which was filed
on May 7, 2013.
Plaintiffs’ letter addresses the disposition of
the October 1, November 29, and April 10 Motions.
Plaintiffs
object to portions of the Reports that are based on evidence
“stating [the] rules and regulations by the U.S. Department of
Housing
and
Urban
Development,
and
the
incorrect
regulations by the Memphis Housing Authority.”
rules
and
(Objections 2.)
The Court understands Plaintiffs’ objection to be an argument
based
on
the
regulations.
objection
incongruence
between
MHA
and
HUD
For purposes of the October 1 Motion, Plaintiffs’
addresses
differences
Freeman’s
alleged
between
rights
the
MHA
because
Magistrate
and
MHA
HUD
conclusion
regulations
acted
10
Judge’s
within
do
its
not
that
violate
authority
in
denying
a
housing
voucher
to
an
unmarried
couple
without
children.
Plaintiffs have not objected on additional grounds.
The
Court ADOPTS those portions of the Magistrate Judge’s Report on
the
October
1
Motion
to
which
Plaintiffs
have
not
objected.
“[M]aking some objections but failing to raise others will not
Smith, 828 F.2d
preserve all the objections a party may have.”
at 1373.
The Court’s de novo review is limited to whether
federal law requires that unmarried adults without children be
provided housing accommodations.
Section 8 of the Housing Act, as amended by the Housing and
Community
rental
Development
subsidy
Act
plan
of
under
1974,
which
42
U.S.C.
owners
of
§
private
receive payments on behalf of low-income tenants.
Cincinnati
Metropolitan
Housing
(6th
1982).
funds,
Cir.
disbursed
PHAs
by
Public
receive
contracts
with
administrative
The
Housing
funds
HUD,
plan
after
for
that
Authority,
although
Agencies
which
specifies
675
(“PHAs”).
the
the
annual
PHA
is
a
housing
See Baker v.
F.2d
released
executing
1437f,
by
836,
837
HUD,
are
at
838.
Id.
contributions
must
criteria
file
by
eligibility and assistance priority will be determined.
an
which
See 42
U.S.C. § 1437f(b)(1) (“The Secretary is authorized to enter into
annual
contributions
contracts
with
public
housing
agencies
pursuant to which such agencies may enter into contracts to make
11
assistance
payments
to
owners
of
existing
dwelling
units
in
(1)
to
accordance with this section.”).
Section
1437
promotes
three
overarching
goals:
assist “States and political subdivisions of States to remedy
the unsafe housing conditions” and the shortage of “decent and
safe dwellings” for low-income families; (2) “to assist states
and political subdivisions of States to address the shortage of
housing affordable to low-income families”; and (3) “to vest in
public housing agencies that perform well, the maximum amount of
responsibility and flexibility in program administration, with
appropriate
accountability
to
public
localities, and the general public.”
housing
residents,
42 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(1)(A)-
(C); see also Bakos v. Flint Housing Com’n, 746 F.2d 1179, 1180
(6th
Cir.
1984)
(“Section
8
is
designed
to
provide
safe,
sanitary and decent housing to low-income families.”).
A prospective applicant for Section 8 benefits must apply
for
a
Certificate
applicant
must
requirements.
of
Family
establish
Participation,
family
status
and
See Bakos, 746 F.2d at 1180.
in
meet
which
the
low-income
“In addition, the
application must satisfy any criteria promulgated by the local
PHA,
provided
related
to
that
the
approved by HUD.”
these
objectives
additional
of
the
criteria
Section
Id. (citations omitted).
12
8
are
reasonably
program
and
are
MHA is a local PHA.
Plaintiffs’ “family status” is the relevant issue in this
appeal.
Plaintiffs argue that MHA’s definition of “family” is
not reasonably related to the objectives of the Housing Act.
Stated differently, Plaintiffs argue that MHA’s definition of
family differs so fundamentally from the definition applied by
HUD that it deprives them of their rights under the Housing Act.
In
deciding
family
status,
MHA’s
criteria
permit
an
applicant to add persons to a household in the event of: (1)
birth, (2) marriage, (3) adoption, (4) the need for a live-in
aide limited to a person providing care, and (5) emergencies.
(ECF No. 44-1.) 1
HUD’s definition of a family, which adopts the
definition used in the Housing Choice Voucher Program, 24 C.F.R.
§ 982.201, states that a family “may be a single person or a
group of persons” or “a group of persons consisting of two or
more elderly persons living together.”
See also 24 C.F.R. §
5.403 (family “may include two or more persons with disabilities
1
Plaintiffs do not attach the MHA and HUD regulations to the Amended
Complaint, although they reference differences between them.
(Am. Compl. ¶
2.)
Plaintiffs attach MHA and HUD regulations to their Responses to the
October 1 and April 10 Motions. (See ECF Nos. 32, 44.) The Court “retains
the discretion to consider or exclude [] extrinsic evidence presented with a
Rule 12(b) motion.” Notredan, LLC v. Old Republic Exch. Facilitator Co., No.
11-2987-STA-tmp, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48976, at *13 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 6,
2012).
When a complaint explicitly cites documents that are not attached,
courts may consider those extrinsic materials if they are central to
plaintiff’s claims. See id.; see also Duferco Steel v. M/V Kalisti, 121 F.3d
321, 324 n.3 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Documents referred to in, but not attached to,
a plaintiff’s complaint that are central to its claim may be considered in
ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.”).
The documents are considered part of
the pleadings “for all purposes.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c). In the context of
a 12(b)(6) motion, “all purposes” means treating the facts contained in the
exhibit as true.
Jones v. City of Cincinnati, 521 F.3d 555, 561 (6th Cir.
2008).
Because the MHA and HUD regulations are central to Plaintiffs’
claims, the Court will consider them in deciding Defendants’ Motions.
13
living together, or one or more persons with disabilities living
with one or more live-in aides.”).
Differences between PHA and HUD regulations are not enough,
absent a showing of an unreasonable relationship between local
and federal regulations, to state a claim under the Housing Act.
The
statutory
framework
contemplates
the
possibility
of
differences between local and federal regulations, going so far
as to state that “the policy of the United States . . . [is] to
vest
in
local
public
housing
agencies
the
maximum
amount
of
responsibility in the administration of their housing programs.”
See 42 U.S.C. § 1437.
A “maximum amount of responsibility”
entails, not only day-to-day operations, but also the strategic
formulation
of
policies
and
regulations
designed
programmatic aims while conserving public resources.
to
meet
Requiring
a plaintiff to show an unreasonable relationship between PHA
regulations
and
the
underlying
goals
maximizes the deference given to PHAs.
of
the
Housing
Act
The desire for deference
arises from Congress’ intent to facilitate the provision of lowincome
housing
through
local
authorities,
which
are
more
responsive to community needs.
Conditioning the expansion of an applicant’s household on
marital status is reasonably related to the goals of the Housing
Act.
Congress
required
PHAs
to
exercise
their
authority
“consistent with the objects” of the Housing Act, which means
14
implementing objectives that advance the provision of low-income
housing.
Requiring a marital relationship in circumstances not
involving
children
establishes
a
clear
criterion
that
serves
multiple interests consistent with the Housing Act, including
the avoidance of fraudulent applications and the limitation of
scarce
public
resources
to
legally
established
family
relationships.
HUD is required by law to approve regulations established
by
PHAs,
and
Plaintiffs
do
not
allege
that
HUD
failed
approve, or otherwise disagreed with, MHA’s regulations.
approval
of
regulations
afforded
deference.
agency’s
interpretation
entitled
to
that
Baker,
of
deference.”).
differ
675
its
from
F.2d
at
its
own
840
own
governing
Because
MHA’s
to
HUD’s
should
(“[A]
be
federal
regulations
regulations
is
are
reasonably related to HUD’s, and HUD has not disapproved them,
Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.
Plaintiffs rely on Hann v. Housing Authority of City of
Easton, 709 F. Supp. 605 (E.D. Pa. 1989), in which a district
court invalidated a PHA’s decision to deny an application to
cohabitate brought by the unmarried parents of three children.
The
PHA
had
denied
the
plaintiff’s
application
to
advance
a
“traditional family requirement,” a rationale the district court
found unpersuasive.
The court concluded that unmarried couples
15
with children were entitled to family status because “couples
with children can often create a positive family situation when
unmarried.”
Id. at 610.
because
parents
the
Denying the plaintiffs’ application
refused
to
get
a
marriage
certificate
produced an unjust result that undermined the purpose of the
Housing Act, “which is to shelter the poor.”
Hann is distinguishable.
Id.
The plaintiffs were denied family
status because they were unmarried, despite being in a stable
relationship that had produced three children.
Id.
The court
reasoned that denying family status under those circumstances
undermined
the
Housing
Act,
not
because
of
the
plaintiffs’
marital status, but because it “would be a bizarre world where
the
refusal
condemns
of
the
Plaintiffs
do
the
parents
children
to
not
children.
have
to
a
get
life
a
of
The
marriage
certificate
homelessness.”
policy
Id.
underlying
the
decision in Hann does not apply.
Hann also disapproved of the PHA’s criteria insofar as they
limited
parents.”
eligibility
to
Id. at 608.
“traditional
families
with
married
Nothing in the record suggests that
MHA’s criteria advance a moral agenda.
A fair reading of MHA’s
policy would permit cohabitation for unmarried caregivers and in
cases of emergency.
Absent the need for a caregiver or an
emergency, restricting cohabitation by unmarried adults without
children deters fraudulent applications, a policy cited by Hann
16
as reasonable.
See id. (citing James v. New York City Housing
Authority, 622 F. Supp. 1356 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (“[A] good reason
for their eligibility requirement [was] avoidance of fraud.”)).
MHA’s decision not to approve Plaintiffs’ request must be given
deference.
For
the
OVERRULED.
foregoing
reasons,
Plaintiffs’
objection
is
The Court ADOPTS the Report on the October 1 Motion.
B. The November 29 Motion
The Magistrate Judge’s Report on the November 29 Motion
recommends
dismissing
Plaintiffs’
claim
against
Defendants on the basis of sovereign immunity.
not object to that recommendation.
difference
between
MHA
and
HUD
the
Federal
Plaintiffs do
Their objection rests on the
regulations.
The
Magistrate
Judge’s Report on the November 29 Motion does not rely on MHA or
HUD regulations.
Because Plaintiffs have not objected to the
Magistrate Judge’s recommendation based on sovereign immunity,
the Court ADOPTS the Report on the November 29 Motion.
C. The April 10 Motion
Plaintiffs object to the Magistrate Judge’s Report on the
April 10 Motion on the ground that differences between MHA and
HUD regulations violate their rights.
on additional grounds.
differences
between
Plaintiffs do not object
Plaintiffs’ rights are not violated by
MHA
and
HUD
17
regulations.
The
Court
OVERRULES
Plaintiffs’
objection
and
ADOPTS
the
Magistrate
Judge’s Report on the April 10 Motion.
V.
Conclusion
Because
Plaintiffs
have
failed
to
state
a
claim,
their
objections are OVERRULED and the Court ADOPTS the Magistrate
Judge’s Reports on the October 1, November 29, and April 10
Motions.
Defendants’
Motions
to
Dismiss
are
GRANTED.
Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint is DISMISSED.
So ordered this 17th day of June, 2013.
s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr._______
SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
18
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