Conner v. The United States Postal Service et al

Filing 162

ORDER GRANTING DE 95 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; GRANTING DE 104 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; DENYING DE 124 Motion to Amend/Correct; GRANTING DE 125 Motion for Summary Judgment; ADOPTING in part and REJECTING in part DE 149 Report and Recommendations; ORDER DISMISSING CASE. Signed by Judge John T. Fowlkes, Jr on 4/4/14. (Fowlkes, J.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION

HARRY CONNER, sole heir and
designated beneficiary of Mary Conner
Nelson (deceased),
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,
et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 2:11-cv-02476-JTF-cgc

ORDER ADOPTING IN PART AND REJECTING IN PART MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE AND
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR OFFICE OF WORKERS’
COMPENSATION PROGRAMS MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED
COMPLAINT
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ METLIFE, INC. AND METROPOLITAN LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY MOTION TO DISMISS
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S RECORD/MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON
ADMINISTRATIVE PLEADINGS
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR EXCESS PAGES
ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Before the Court is Defendants’ United States Postal Service (“USPS”) and Office of
Workers’ Compensation Program (“OWCP”) Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint
(D.E. #95); Defendants MetLife, Inc. and Metropolitan Life Insurance Company’s (collectively
“MetLife Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss (D.E. #104); Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend
Administrative Record/Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Pleadings (D.E. #124);
United States Office of Personnel Management’s (“OPM”) Motion for Summary Judgment (D.E.
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#125); and Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages (D.E. #140). On June 6, 2013, this
Court entered an Order referring all Motions to the Magistrate Judge for Report and
Recommendation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§631-39. (D.E. #14). On September 16, 2013,
Magistrate Judge Charmaine G. Claxton entered her Report and Recommendation on the above
motions. (D.E. #149). On September 17, 2013, Plaintiff filed his Objections to the Magistrate’s
Report and Recommendation. (D.E. #150). Plaintiff also filed a Second Set of Objections to the
Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation on September 30, 2013. (D.E. #153).
MetLife Defendants filed their Response in Opposition to Plaintiff’s First Set of
Objections on October 21, 2013 (D.E. #154), and subsequently filed a Response in Opposition to
Plaintiff’s Second Set of Objections on October 31, 2013 (D.E. #158). Also on October 31,
2013, the Federal Defendants filed Exceptions to the Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation
with respect to their Motion to Dismiss. (D.E. #157). Plaintiff filed his Response to the Federal
Defendants’ Objections on November 4, 2013. On December 17, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Motion
for the Court to Consider Additional Evidence in Support of His Objections to the Magistrate’s
Report and Recommendation (D.E. #160), but this Court entered an Order Denying Plaintiff’s
Motion on January 28, 2014.

(D.E. #161).

After reviewing the Magistrate’s Report and

Recommendation, all Objections and Response, and the entire record, this Court finds that all of
Plaintiff’s Objections should be overruled, and the Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation
should be adopted in part and denied in part. Therefore, this case is dismissed in its entirety with
prejudice.
I.

BACKGROUND

This Court adopts and incorporates the thorough analysis of the Magistrate Judge’s summary
of the background and proposed findings of the facts of this case. See D.E. #149, at 2-21.
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II.

LEGAL STANDARD
A. Standard for District Court Judge’s Review of a Report and Recommendation
A district judge has the discretion to refer dispositive matters to a magistrate judge to

conduct a hearing and propose findings of fact and recommendations. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)
(“[A] judge may also designate a magistrate judge to conduct hearings, including evidentiary
hearings, and to submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and recommendations
for the disposition, by the judge of court, of any motion excepted in subparagraph (A) [for which
a motion for summary judgment, judgment on the pleadings, motion to dismiss, etc. are
included]”). The district court judge has the authority to review the magistrate judge’s proposed
findings of fact and recommendations under a de novo determination.

See 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(C); See e.g. Baker v. Peterson, 67 Fed.App’x. 308, 311, 2003 WL 21321184 (6th Cir.
2003) (“A district court normally applies a ‘clearly erroneous or contrary to law’ standard of
review for nondispositive preliminary measures.

A district court must review dispositive

motions under the de novo standard.”); U.S. v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667,676 (1980) (quoting
Matthews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 275 (1976) (“in providing for a ‘de novo determination’
Congress intended to permit whatever reliance a district judge, in the exercise of sound judicial
discretion, chose to place on a magistrate’s proposed findings and recommendations.”)
B. Standard for Motion to Dismiss
When assessing a plaintiff’s claim at the motion-to-dismiss stage, the Sixth Circuit has
stated that the court must “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and
accept all allegations as true.” Keys v. Humana, Inc., 684 F.3d 605, 608 (6th Cir. 2012). A
complaint need not have specific facts, it need only “give the defendant fair notice of what the

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. . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Id (quoting Erikson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
93 (2007)). However, the courts have also emphasized that the complaint must raise more than
labels, conclusions, or a “formulaic recitation of a cause of action’s elements.” Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). The threshold inquiry in determining if the
moving party is entitled to dismissal is whether the plaintiff has “provided the ‘grounds’ of his
entitle[ment] to relief.” Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. 555.
A complaint can survive a motion to dismiss if it contains “a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim has “facial
plausibility” if the plaintiff provides enough factual allegations for the court “to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. As the Iqbal
Court explains, “whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a contextspecific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense.” Id at 679. If the complaint merely pleads facts that are parallel to the defendant’s
liability, then the complaint “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
‘entitlement to relief.’” Id at 678 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp., at 557).
C. Standard for Motion for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party can establish there is “no genuine
dispute as to any material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The threshold inquiry in determining if
the party is entitled to summary judgment is whether a finder of fact could reasonably find in
favor of either party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 259 (1986). A party,
asserting that a fact cannot be or that a fact is genuinely disputed, must support his assertion by
citing to specific parts in the record, and the court must examine all factual evidence in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party. See Fed. R. Civ. P 56(c); See McLean v. 988011

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Ontario Ltd., 224 F.3d 797,800 (6th Cir. 2000)(citing Northland Ins. Co. v. Guardsman Prods.,
Inc., 141 F.3d 612, 613 (6th Cir. 1998)).
The non-moving party can survive a motion for summary judgment by establishing
“specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986). Although the non-moving party has the burden of producing rebuttal evidence,
the non-moving party can simply overcome summary judgment by producing evidence from the
pleadings, depositions, and any other documents in the record that establish a genuine issue. See
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Nevertheless, the non-moving party must prove more than a “mere
existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties” and must provide facts that are
material to the outcome of the suit in order to survive the summary judgment motion. Anderson,
477 U.S. at 247-248.
If the non-moving party fails to support the facts asserted, the court has discretion to:
(1) give an opportunity to properly support or address the fact;
(2) consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion;
(3) grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials—
including the facts considered undisputed—show that the movant
is entitled to it; or
(4) issue any other appropriate judgment.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
III.

ANALYSIS
The Magistrate Judge correctly and succinctly summarized Plaintiff’s allegations against

Defendants: (1) Count I alleges that Defendant USPS breached its duties under the Federal
Employees Group Life Insurance Act (FEGLIA); (2) Count II alleges that Defendant USPS
failed to properly maintain records in connection with Plaintiff’s Federal Employees Group Life
Insurance (FEGLI) policy; (3) Count III alleges that Defendant USPS was negligent and
breached its duties under FEGLIA and the Federal Tort Claim Act (FTCA), which, in turn,
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resulted in Defendant OWCP’s errors in processing the FEGLI policy; and (5) Count VI alleges
that Defendant USPS committed negligence by failing to perform duties in relation to Plaintiff’s
FEGLI policy. Based on the controlling case law and standards of the FEGLIA, the Magistrate
Judge recommended that: (1) Defendant USPS’s Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint
be granted in part and denied in part; (2) Defendant OWCP’s Motion to Dismiss Second
Amended Complaint be granted; (3) MetLife Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be granted; (4)
Plaintiff’s Record/Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Pleadings be denied; (5)
Defendant OPM’s Motion for Summary Judgment be granted; and (6) Plaintiff’s Motion for
Leave to File Excess Pages be granted.
Based upon the Magistrate’s analysis, Objections, Responses, and relevant case law, the
Court adopts recommendations (2)-(6) of the Magistrate’s findings and rejects recommendation
(1).
A. The Magistrate Judge properly analyzed Defendant OWCP’s Motion to Dismiss
Second Amended Complaint, MetLife Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff’s
Record/Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Pleadings, Defendant
OPM’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File
Excess Pages
Although there is no controlling law and little precedential authority in this Circuit
regarding FEGLIA and FEGLI policy claims, there is case law in this Circuit that is on point for
the issue before this Court. In Graber v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., the court ruled that
“[c]ase law holds, and the parties agree, that under this FEGLIA provision ‘the United States has
consented to be sued for any breach of legal duty owed by it under FEGLIA.’” 855 F.Supp.2d
673,677 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 9, 2012)(quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Atkins, 225 F.3d 510, 513 (5th
Cir. 2000). Specifically, the court found that the only duty the government owes under the
FEGLIA is the duty to safeguard the proper negotiation and issuance of the FEGLI policy. See
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id. at 678 (“the only legal duty imposed on the United States under FEGLIA is to ensure that the
correct FEGLI policy is negotiated and issued. . . . [it does not] include the duty to properly
maintain beneficiary forms.”) Under this analysis, the Magistrate Judge correctly found that
Defendant OWCP’s Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint (D.E. #95) should be
granted, the MetLife Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (D.E. #104) should be granted, Plaintiff’s
Record/Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Pleadings (D.E. # 124) should be denied,
Defendant OPM’s Motion for Summary Judgment (D.E. #125) should be granted, and Plaintiff’s
Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages (D.E. # 140) should be granted.
Plaintiff argues in his First Set of Objections that the Magistrate fails to: (1) liberally
construe his pleadings based on his pro se status; (2) consider specific material evidence from his
mother’s Retirement File from OPM, which shows Defendants’ falsification of documents
pivotal to his mother’s retirement benefits; and (3) apply the appropriate standard of law to the
facts.

Specifically, he asserts that the Magistrate’s determination of the applicable law is

contrary to controlling federal law.
In his Second Set of Objections, Plaintiff reiterates many of his same arguments but adds
that the Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation should not be adopted because it will: (1)
grant Defendant OPM excess discretionary authority over matters it has no legal discretion to
handle in the adjudicative process; (2) grant federal employees, who do not have designated or
appointed authority, the ability to improperly terminate a federal employee’s benefits and
employment; (3) allow Courts to improperly consider evidence in support of a motion to dismiss
without converting it to a motion for summary judgment; (4) allow for federal employers to
falsify employee documents; (5) advocate “clear fraud to be perpetrated upon the Court in order
to subvert the administration of justice and defile the integrity of the Courts through the
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deliberate use of perjured statements” (D.E. #153, at 2); and (6) allow for employing agencies to
use coerced statement by employees as material evidence in Court.

Plaintiff also requests that

the Court allow him to file a third amended Complaint to add additional claims and factual
background.
In the MetLife Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s First Set of Objections, the MetLife
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s mere reiteration of his claims do not rise to the standard
necessary to survive the Motion to Dismiss standard. Specifically, the MetLife Defendants
contend that “Plaintiff’s objections fail to address the substance of the Magistrate Judge’s legal
conclusions with respect to the lack of any legal duty owed by MetLife to the Plaintiff. . .” (D.E.
#154, at 3). Additionally, in the MetLife Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s Second Set of
Objections, the MetLife Defendants argue that: (1) Plaintiff’s additional Objections should be
denied; (2) Plaintiff’s request for leave to file a third amended complaint should be denied; and
(3) Plaintiff’s reiteration of his baseless conclusions should be dismissed against the MetLife
Defendants, and (4) the Magistrate’s recommendation for dismissal should be adopted.
Before addressing Plaintiff’s Objections, this Court finds it necessary to discuss whether
Plaintiff’s second set of Objections should be allowed. MetLife Defendants raise a credible
argument that Plaintiff’s second Objections are improper, and this Court is inclined to agree.
Rule 72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Fed. R. Civ. P.) states, in relevant part,
that,
Within 14 days after being served a copy of the recommended disposition,
a party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed
findings and recommendations. A party may respond to another party’s
objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. . .

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See also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C)(“Within fourteen days after being served with a copy, any
party may serve and file written objections to such proposed findings and recommendations as
provided by rules of court.”) and Local Rule 72.1(g)(2)(“Within fourteen (14) days after such
service, any party may file and serve written objections thereto.”) Based upon the Fed. R. Civ.
P. and all other governing rules, this Court believes Plaintiff’s Second Set of Objections was
improperly filed and should be struck from the record. Therefore, this Court hereby STRIKES
Plaintiff’s second set of Objections and all arguments contained within.
The Court now turns to Plaintiff’s First Set of objections and the MetLife Defendants’
Response. As explained above, Plaintiff asks the Court to overturn the agency’s decision,
consider evidence showing Defendants’ alleged malfeasance, and apply a less stringent standard
against his pleadings since he is a pro se plaintiff. However, Plaintiff does not provide any new
or additional evidence or case law that supports his allegations. Much of Plaintiff’s objections
are, as the MetLife Defendants have correctly asserted, simply reiterations of the claims in his
Complaint. Although he does object to the Magistrate’s application of legal standards, Plaintiff’s
objections fall short of surviving the Motion to Dismiss, Motion for Summary Judgment, and
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) standards for his respect claims. The Magistrate Judge
correctly analyzed Defendant OWCP’s and MetLife Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), Defendant OPM’s Motion for Summary Judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a), and Plaintiff’s Record/Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Pleadings under the
APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard.
Plaintiff is correct in arguing that pro se plaintiffs are not to be held to the same stringent
standards as a schooled attorney. However, it is important for this Court to note that “even a pro
se litigant, whether plaintiff or defendant, is required to follow the law.” Graham-Humphreys v.
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Memphis Brooks Museum of Art, Inc., 209 F.3d 552, 561 (6th Cir. 2000). Therefore, as a pro se
plaintiff, Plaintiff is not exempt for the requirements of the Fed. R. Civ. P., federal statutes, or
local rules of the district.
Therefore, this Court hereby OVERRULES Plaintiff’s Objections and ADOPTS the
Magistrate’s recommendation, regarding Defendant OWCP’s Motion to Dismiss Second
Amended Complaint, the MetLife Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff’s Record/Motion for
Judgment on the Administrative Pleadings (D.E. # 124), Defendant

OPM’s Motion for

Summary Judgment (D.E. #125), and Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages.
B. The Magistrate Judge properly analyzed Defendant USPS’s Motion to Dismiss,
but USPS’s Motion should be construed as a Motion for Summary Judgment
The Magistrate recommends that Defendant USPS’s Motion to Dismiss should be
granted in part and denied in part. Specifically, the Magistrate recommends that: (1) Plaintiff’s
claim that Defendant USPS breached its duty under FEGLIA (i.e. Count I) should be dismissed
for failure to state a claim; (2) Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant USPS failed to properly maintain
records in connection with Plaintiff’s mother’s FEGLI policy and her optional insurance
elections (i.e. Count II) should not be dismissed; (3) Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant USPS’s
negligence caused Defendant OWCP’s errors in properly negotiating and issuing his mother’s
policy (Count III) should not be dismissed; (4) Plaintiff’s claims that Defendant USPS was
negligent under the FTCA (Count III) should be dismissed; and (5) Plaintiff’s claim that
Defendant USPS committed negligence by failing to perform its duties with regard under the
policy (Count IV) should not be dismissed.
As stated above, Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate’s legal analysis of his claims, urges
this Court to consider additional information evidencing the validity of his claims, and asks the
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Court to reject the Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation. The Federal Defendants, without
directly addressing the Plaintiff’s Objections, filed their Exception to the Magistrate’s
recommendations. Instead of objecting the findings of the Magistrate, the Federal Defendants
argue that “the indisputable facts, the R&R’s recommendation that [OPM’s] Motion for
Summary Judgment . . . and the statutory requirements governing eligibility for coverage under
[FEGLIA] dispose of all the remaining claims asserted in Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint.” (D.E. #157, at 1). Specifically, the Federal Defendants argue that all of Plaintiff’s
surviving claims arise from the same negligence allegations that have been recommended by the
Magistrate to be dismissed. The Federal Defendants request that the Court construe their Motion
to Dismiss as a Motion for Summary Judgment and dismiss all claims in their entirety.
Plaintiff’s Response to the Federal Defendants’ Exception again reiterates Plaintiff’s
allegations of Defendants’ alleged malfeasance and the Court’s need to consider additional, nonhearsay evidence to make a proper determination of the facts of the case. However, based on the
relevant case law in Graber cited above, the Magistrate’s proper analysis of the Plaintiff’s
claims, the Federal Defendants’ Exception, and the Plaintiff’s Objections, this Court finds the
Federal Defendants’ Exception persuasive and appropriate. Counts II, III, and IV of Plaintiff’s
Complaint do arise from the same facts and analysis of the claims recommended for dismissal by
the Magistrate. The remaining counts do bring at issue the Federal Defendants’ duties to
negotiate and issue the policy, but the remaining counts fail to not only state a claim for which a
relief could be granted but also fail to assert a genuine dispute as to any material fact.
With all the relevant facts and analysis already decided upon in the Final Agency Decision and
the Magistrate Judge’s evaluation of the claims, this Court finds that the coverage that was issued
is in the proper amount, $14,000, and that all allegations of Defendants’ negligence are without
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merit. Therefore, this Court hereby OVERRULES Plaintiff’s Objections and ADOPTS in part
and REJECTS in part the Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation.
IV.

CONCLUSION
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation is

ADOPTED in part and REJECTED in part. Consequently, Defendants’ USPS and OWCP
Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint is GRANTED; the MetLife Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss is GRANTED; Plaintiff’s Record/Motion for Judgment on the Administrative
Pleadings is DENIED; Defendant OPM’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED; and
Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages is GRANTED.

This case is hereby

DISMISSED with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 4th day of April, 2014.
BY THIS COURT:
s/John T. Fowlkes, Jr.
JOHN T. FOWLKES, JR.
United States District Judge

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